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## Abstract

The effects of power on implicit and explicit attitudes towards racial groups were examined. In Study 1, participants who had power showed a stronger facilitation of positive words after exposure to White faces, and negative words after exposure to Black faces, compared to participants who did not have power. In Study 2, powerful participants, compared to controls and powerless participants, showed more positive affective responses to Chinese pictographs that followed White compared to Black faces. Power did, however, not affect explicit racial attitudes. In Study 3, powerful participants showed greater racial prejudice toward Arabs in an Implicit Association Test than did powerless participants. This effect was driven by the power of the perceiver rather than the power of the target. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: Power, Explicit Attitudes, Implicit Attitudes, Prejudice, Racism

Understanding the ways power affects social perception has been the center of attention in socio-cognitive research on power. With Kipnis (1976) seminal work showing that powerful individuals neglect subordinates' contributions, a great deal of research has subsequently focused on understanding how power affects social perception. This research has primarily examined reliance on stereotypes (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote, 2007d; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006; Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003; Weick & Guinote, 2008), whereas *evaluations* of others (i.e., social attitudes) remains largely unexamined. The present article addresses this issue. Specifically, it examines whether power increases racial prejudice.

Various studies converge to indirectly support the notion that power biases individuals negatively towards others. Studies examining attention found that powerful individuals seek more stereotypic information, relative to individuating information, of their subordinates (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2000). Furthermore, suppressing stereotypes has more detrimental effects for powerful than powerless individuals: after attempting to avoid stereotypes the magnitude of stereotyping increases more for powerful compared to powerless individuals (Guinote, 2007d). Consistent with these findings, power also decreases perspective taking (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006) and increases the objectification of others (i.e., viewing others in ways that facilitate using them for personal gain, see Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008).

These studies did not address the question of whether power affects the ways individuals evaluate others, that is, whether power affects social attitudes. This question is important because attitudes affect behavior, and the judgments and behavior of powerful individuals have by definition important implications for others (see Fiske, 1993).

Initial evidence regarding the effects of power on attitudes stems from three studies. Using the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), Chen, Lee-Chai and Bargh (2001) did not find an overall effect of power on prejudice. Instead, powerful individuals' level of prejudice depended on

whether they were communal or relationship oriented. Similarly, a study examining attitudes towards immigrants found no differences in the explicit attitudes of powerful and powerless individuals (Guinote, 2007c; Study 4). Noteworthy is the fact that these studies focused on self-report measures. One problem that arises with these explicit measures of prejudice is that individuals may generally be unaware of their true sentiments (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994) or may be reluctant to reveal negativity towards stigmatized groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sigall, & Page, 1971).

The third study used an implicit measure of attitudes (Richeson & Ambady, 2003). White participants anticipated interacting with a White or a Black person in the role of subordinate or superior. They were provided with information about the target and performed an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). White individuals assigned to a powerful role displayed stronger automatic racial biases towards a Black subordinate, compared to White individuals assigned to a powerless role towards a Black superior. No differences emerged when the target was White.

This study is important as it reveals an association between power and racial preferences that emerged without the person's awareness (see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, 1993; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). However, it does not completely answer the question as to whether power increases implicit racial biases. Firstly, the study utilizes a specific interaction context. The interaction goals and the information provided about the targets may have affected implicit associations. More importantly, the power of the perceiver was confounded with the social position of the target. For powerless participants Blacks were high status (*superiors*), whereas for powerful participants Blacks were low status (*subordinates*). Barden, Maddux, Petty, and Brewer (2004) found that the relative status of a member of a racial group affects implicit attitudes: High status targets (e.g., a Black lawyer) elicited less negative implicit biases than low status targets (e.g., a Black prisoner). It is therefore important to know whether the results obtained by Richeson and Ambady (2003) were triggered by the power of the perceiver or the power of the target. Finally,

although the effects were interpreted as deriving from situational power, the study only included a powerful and a powerless condition. Therefore, it is not possible to identify whether the effects obtained were driven by power or by powerlessness.

This article examines how having power (vs. not having power) affects automatic and controlled evaluations of racial groups (Blacks and Arabs), addressing the issues outlined above. Firstly, it separates effects driven by the power of the perceiver and the power of the target by manipulating the power of the perceiver, and either holding constant the power of the target or manipulating also the power of the target. Secondly, in two studies participants did not expect to interact with stigmatized group members, and received minimal information. Under such minimal conditions, we felt in a better position to assess participants' most accessible associations between the racial groups and positive or negative attributes. Finally, we inspected the relative impact of power of the perceiver on racial attitudes by including a control condition in one study. We expected that perceiver power increases implicit racial prejudice, and we explored the relative impact of target power.

#### *Why does perceiver power increase implicit prejudice?*

Several factors converge to indirectly support the hypothesis that the power of the perceiver increases implicit prejudice. Firstly, having power may entail the desire to obtain advantages for the self, and maintain the status quo. This hypothesis stems from research on the power motive (Winter, 1973), the power-as-control model (Fiske, 1993), and the approach-inhibition perspective (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Accordingly, chronic motives may affect implicit judgments (see Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009; Pratto & Shih, 2000).

Furthermore, power may increase automatic social cognition, and powerlessness may trigger controlled cognition (Keltner et al., 2003; see also Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a). Controlled cognition is capable of overriding automatic processes (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000). If negative evaluations of low status racial groups can be automatically activated (see Devine, 1989),

and powerful individuals rely more on automatic processes, they should show more implicit prejudice compared to their powerless counterparts.

Finally, as proposed by the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a), power induces a more narrow, selective focus on the primary constructs activated in the situation (e.g., negative evaluations of low status groups). In contrast, lack of power gives rise to an extensive and broader focus of attention that considers multiple cues (e.g., not only stereotypes but also social norms and values). Accordingly, accessible negative evaluations of racial group members may guide more the judgments of powerful than powerless individuals.

These effects should be stronger for spontaneous (implicit) responses, which do not involve more complex, propositional processes (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; McConnell, Rydell, Strain, & Mackie, 2008, Rydell & McConnell, 2006; see also Devine, 1989). Conversely, explicit attitude judgments are made consciously and are more affected by social norms, by the desire not to appear prejudiced, and by genuine egalitarian values that some powerful individuals may have (see Vescio et al., 2005; see also Devine, 1989; Monteith & Mark, 2005).

The two above mentioned perspectives converge in suggesting that the power of the perceiver increases implicit prejudice towards low status racial groups. In addition to examining effects of perceiver power, we examined also the possibility that the power of a stigmatized interaction partner affects implicit attitudes towards the target's group.

Three studies addressed these issues. Study 1 used an evaluative priming procedure developed by Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) to examine the effects of perceiver power on implicit attitudes towards Blacks. Study 2 used an affective misattribution procedure developed by Payne and his colleagues (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), to expand the previous findings to the affective domain. It also includes the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and the Symbolic Racism Scale (Sears, 1988) to examine how the power position of the perceiver affects implicit and explicit attitudes towards Blacks. Study 3 used the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) to assess implicit prejudice, and manipulated



both perceiver and target power. In these studies, perceiver power was manipulated by having participants make decisions that affected (vs. did not affect) other individuals (Studies 1 and 3) or by priming power (vs. powerlessness or control; Study 2). Target power was manipulated by ascribing the target to a powerful or a powerless role.

### Study 1

Participants were assigned to a high-power or low-power role, and subsequently performed a computerized task in which they categorized words according to valence (Fazio et al., 1995). Words were positive or negative adjectives, and were preceded by a White, a Black or a neutral prime. Primes were pictures of White faces, Black faces or faces of a member of another ethnic group. Faster reaction times (RTs) for negative words after a Black prime compared to a White prime indicate a facilitation of negative constructs after a Black prime, and hence a negative implicit attitude towards Blacks. Conversely, faster RTs on positive words after a White compared to a Black prime indicate a facilitation for positive constructs related to the ingroup, and thus ingroup favouritism.

### Method

#### *Participants and Design*

Forty-nine pupils of the I.T.C. “Leonardo da Vinci”, Potenza (Italy) participated in the study (30 females and 19 males, with an average age of 17). All participants were White. Participants were randomly assigned to the between subjects factor power (high-power vs. low-power). Target race (White vs. Black and adjective valence (positive vs. negative) were manipulated within participants.

#### *Procedure*

Participants took part individually. They were led to believe that the experiment consisted of two separate studies. The first study was a survey organized by the school. Allegedly, the School’s Executive Committee was about to make decisions regarding school matters that would affect future students, for example, about new courses. The School’s Executive Committee wanted to hear

the pupils' opinions about these matters. Following a procedure adapted from Fiske and Dépret (1996) participants in the low-power condition were told that their opinion would not affect the Committee's final decision. Conversely, participants in the high-power condition were led to believe that their opinion would be entered in a statistical equation and have an impact of 50 % on the final decision. Participants were presented with a short questionnaire enquiring about their opinions on school matters.

As manipulation checks, participants also indicated, on rating scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much), how much their opinion would affect the Committee's decision, how much their opinion would be taken into account, and how seriously they thought their opinion would be taken into account.

After completion, participants were introduced to what was presented as an adjective association test, which allegedly examined whether the meaning of words is recognized automatically, even when, at the same time, attention is focused on a different task. It consisted of four phases, conducted on the computer.

The purpose of the first phase was to obtain mean RTs, which then served as baseline scores for each adjective. Participants engaged in a 'word-meaning task' and were presented with a series of words on the computer screen. Their task was to indicate whether each word was *good* or *bad*. In total they were exposed to 12 positive words (*attractive, likable, wonderful, appealing, delightful, outstanding, beautiful, excellent, magnificent, marvellous, extraordinary, and lovely*) and 12 negative words (*annoying, disgusting, offensive, repulsive, awful, horrible, miserable, hideous, dreadful, painful, aggressive, and harmful*), presented twice each. Participants responded by pressing a key labelled *good* or a key labelled *bad* on a response box. They were invited to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Word sequence and key position were randomized across participants.

The second phase was presented as a face learning task. Participants' task was to attend to and memorize faces, allegedly to recognize them later. They were presented with 16 pictures (young

female and male head shots against a white background) of a different Black, White or other face (Hispanic and Asian). Each picture was presented twice.

The third phase was a detection task, involving a recognition of the faces presented in the second phase. The same pictures used in the second phase were presented together with 16 new pictures. Students indicated whether each picture was old or new. This phase served to bolster the cover story.

Phase four was the critical phase, involving responses to positive and negative words following a White or a Black prime. Participants were told that this phase of the experiment involved both learning the faces and judging the connotation of the adjectives. The instructions were the same as in phase one, but here participants were told that they also had to attend to the faces in order to recall them later. Participants were informed that if the judgment of words is truly an automatic skill they should have been able to perform just as well as in the very first phase of the experiment when they only had to judge the meaning of words.

Four blocks of trials were presented. Each block consisted of 48 trials in which each of the primes appeared once, followed by one of the 24 adjectives presented in the first phase. Over the course of the four blocks, each prime was followed by 2 positive and 2 negative adjectives. Each Black face was randomly paired with a same-sex White face. The paired faces were followed by an identical set of 4 adjectives. The trials involving the “other” faces served as fillers. Each trial started with a row of asterisks presented for 500 ms. The prime was then presented for 315 ms followed by a 135 ms interval before onset of the target adjective. The adjective stayed on the screen until participants responded or a maximum of 1.75 ms. A 2.5 s interval separated each trial. After completion participants were debriefed, thanked and dismissed.

## Results

### *Manipulation Check*

Answers were collapsed into a single score of perceived influence ( $\alpha = .89$ ). An independent *t*-test on this score confirmed that participants in the powerful condition believed to have stronger

influence on the Committee's decision than participants in the powerless condition ( $M_s = 6.62$  vs. 2.31),  $t(47) = -13.109$ ,  $p < .001$ , indicating that the manipulation of perceiver power was successful.

#### *Data Reduction*

RTs were log transformed to reduce the skewness of the data distribution. Incorrect responses were excluded from the data analyses (6.6%). Additionally, responses that occurred outside of a 300 ms to 1.000 ms time window were excluded, following Ratcliff (1993) (9.8 %).

Following Fazio et al. (1995), baseline scores for each adjective were calculated averaging the two response latencies for each adjective obtained in the first phase. Latencies for each adjective presented in phase 4 (priming task) were also computed. Facilitation scores were computed subtracting the latencies obtained in the priming task from the baseline of each adjective. Next, average facilitation scores were calculated on positive and on negative adjectives for each race. Higher scores indicate greater facilitation.

#### *Implicit Attitudes*

RTs were submitted to a 2 (perceiver power: high vs. low) x 2 (race: Black vs. White target) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative adjectives) analysis of variance, with race and valence as within-subjects factors<sup>1</sup>. This analysis yielded main effects of race,  $F(1, 47) = 5.43$ ,  $p = .024$ , and valence,  $F(1, 47) = 5.62$ ,  $p = .021$ . These effects were qualified by a significant race x valence interaction,  $F(1, 47) = 6.51$ ,  $p = .014$ . More importantly, there was a significant race x valence x power interaction,  $F(1, 47) = 8.54$ ,  $p = .005$ . Simple effects showed that for low-power individuals the interaction between race and valence was not significant,  $F < 1$  (Figure 1a). In contrast, for high-power individuals the interaction between race and valence was significant,  $F(1, 19) = 11.71$ ,  $p = .003$ . As can be seen in Figure 1b, for these participants there was a facilitation of responses when a White face was followed by a positive adjective compared to when a Black face was followed by a positive adjective ( $M_s = -0.029$  vs.  $-0.065$ ). Similarly, these participants showed a response facilitation when a Black face, compared to a White face, was followed by a negative adjective ( $M_s = -0.005$  vs.  $-0.028$ ). This pattern of results is consistent with the claim that powerful participants

show negative implicit attitudes towards Blacks and positive attitudes towards Whites, whereas powerless participants do not show biased attitudes.

## Study 2

Study 2 expanded the understanding of the links between power and prejudice in several ways. Firstly, whereas Study 1 focused on automatic associations between a racial group and a positive vs. negative evaluation, Study 2 examined a different component of implicit attitudes. Specifically, it examined automatic *affective* responses elicited by the target group. Furthermore, Study 2 included a control condition to assess whether increased implicit prejudice in powerful individuals derives from having power or from being in a powerless position. Finally, having established in Study 1 that perceiver power affects implicit attitudes, it was important to examine whether it also affects explicit judgments made about racial groups.

Automatic affective responses were examined using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005). The AMP relies on the individual's tendency to misattribute the affective reactions elicited by a target group to a neutral stimulus temporally associated with the target group. During this task, participants are primed with White or Black faces, followed by a Chinese pictograph. Participants' task is to evaluate each pictograph as "more pleasant than average" or "less pleasant than average". Prejudice is indicated by judgements of the pictographs as more pleasant after a White face compared to a Black face.

One main difference between the evaluative priming task used in Study 1 (Fazio et al., 1995) and the AMP (Payne et al., 2005) is that the former task implies response interference, whereas the latter doesn't. In the evaluative prime task, interference occurs when the prime stimulus and the target word are perceived differently in terms of valence, and therefore activate antagonistic response tendencies (see Gawronski, Deutsch, Lebel, & Peters, 2008). In contrast, in the AMP the affective response elicited by the prime is misattributed to the target stimulus (i.e., the Chinese pictograph).

Perceiver power was manipulated by asking participants to remember an incident in which they had power over someone (powerful condition), an incident in which someone else had power over them (powerless condition), or an incident that happened on the previous day (control condition; see Galinsky et al., 2003). Participants then completed the AMP, and filled out the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and the Symbolic Racism Scale (Sears, 1988) to assess their explicit racial attitudes.

## Method

### *Participants and Design*

Seventy-one first year students from the University of Granada (56 women, 15 men) took part in the study in exchange for course credit. Their mean age was 18.55 years. All participants were White.

Six participants were dropped from the analyses because they did not follow instructions. The experiment used a 3 (perceiver power: high-power, low-power, control) x 3 (prime: White face, Black face, and neutral prime) design, with repeated measures in the last factor. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three levels of power.

### *Procedure*

Participants took part individually, and were invited to participate in two separate studies. The first study allegedly focused on the perception of past events. Accordingly, an instructions booklet asked participants in the powerful condition to write a narrative essay about an incident in the past in which they had power over another individual or individuals. Participants in the powerless condition were asked to write an essay about an incident in the past in which somebody else had power over them. Participants in the control condition were asked to write a narrative essay about what they did the day before. After completion, participants assigned to the powerful and the powerless conditions rated, on a 9 point scale, the extent to which they were in charge of the situation.

Subsequently, the experimenter introduced the ostensibly second experiment as an “aesthetic judgment study”, and asked participants to perform the AMP. They saw pairs of pictures flashed one after the other on the computer screen, the first picture was a real-life image and the second picture was a Chinese pictograph. Participants’ task was to judge the visual pleasantness of each Chinese pictograph. The real-life images were allegedly used as a warning signal for the Chinese pictograph, and should therefore be ignored. Participants were instructed to press the “E” key on the keyboard if the image was less pleasant than average, and the “I” key if the image was more pleasant than average. Participants were invited to respond as quickly as possible.

Each trial started with a prime image presented in the center of the screen for 75 ms, followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, and a Chinese pictogram for 100 ms. Finally, a mask, consisting of black and white pictorial noise, appeared in the center of the screen until participants responded. Once a response was given, the next trial started. Primes were 12 pictures of White young men faces and 12 pictures of Black young men faces, each appearing twice throughout the experiment. The neutral stimuli consisted of a grey square. White and Black young men pictures were previously matched for attractiveness. Seventy-two different Chinese pictographs, randomly paired with one of the primes, were used as targets. In total participants were presented with 72 trials (24 containing White faces, 24 Black faces and 24 neutral primes). Upon completion, participants filled out two explicit measures, the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and the Symbolic Racism Scale (Sears, 1988)<sup>ii</sup>. Answers were given using 5-point scales. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

## Results

### *Manipulation Check*

As expected, participants assigned to the powerful condition ( $M = 6.90$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ), compared with those assigned to the powerless condition ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD = 2.23$ ), indicated that they were more in charge of the situation described,  $t(38) = 5.84$ ,  $p < .001$ .

### *Implicit Attitudes*

Firstly, the proportion of pleasant responses after each prime was computed. Because we were interested in the difference between pleasant responses after White and Black primes, neutral primes were not considered in the analysis. A 3 (perceiver power: high, low, control) x 2 (prime: White vs. Black) analysis of variance was computed on the proportion of pleasant responses, with prime as a within subject factor<sup>iii</sup>. This analyses yielded a marginal main effect of prime,  $F(1, 62) = 3.00, p = .088$ , indicating a tendency to give more pleasant responses after White faces ( $M = .58, SD = .14$ ) than after Black faces ( $M = .54, SD = .16$ ). This result indicates that participants were positively biased towards Whites. Furthermore, there was a marginal interaction between power and prime,  $F(2, 62) = 2.86, p = .064$ . More importantly for our hypothesis, contrast analyses considering only powerful and powerless participants yielded the expected power x prime interaction,  $F(1, 62) = 4.54, p = .037$ . As can be seen in Figure 2, compared to powerless participants, powerful participants significantly gave more pleasant responses after a White prime than after a Black prime. A contrast between the powerful and the control condition also showed a significant power x prime interaction,  $F(1, 62) = 4.10, p = .047$ . Powerful participants gave more pleasant responses after a White prime (vs. Black) compared to control participants. Finally, a last contrast showed no difference between the powerless and the control groups,  $F < 1$ . These results indicate that perceiver power, compared to perceiver powerlessness and controls, increased implicit prejudice.

#### *Explicit Prejudice*

To test whether participants differed in their explicit measures, a MANOVA was run on the average scores obtained in the Symbolic Racism Scale and the Modern Racism Scale. No main effects of power emerged ( $F_s > 1, ns$ ). Simple contrasts comparing the powerful and powerless conditions, and the powerful and control conditions, were also not significant,  $F_s > 1$ . The powerful ( $M_{symbolic} = 2.20, M_{modern} = 2.09$ ), the powerless ( $M_{symbolic} = 2.13, M_{modern} = 1.94$ ), and the control conditions ( $M_{symbolic} = 2.21, M_{modern} = 2.10$ ), showed a similar level of explicit prejudice.



Consistent with the results of Study 1, in Study 2 perceiver power increased implicit prejudice. Specifically, seeing pictures of members of a stigmatized outgroup elicited more negative affect in powerful participants compared to control participants and powerless participants. Consistent with past research (Chen et al., 2001; Guinote, 2007c, Study 4) no differences were found in explicit racial attitudes.

### Study 3

Holding the power of the target constant, in Studies 1-2 we found that the power of the perceiver affected implicit racial biases. However, it is possible that when encountering members of a stigmatized target group, the hierarchical position of the individual members affects attitude judgments. In particular, society at large may be less prejudiced against powerful members of disadvantaged groups (see Barden et al., 2004; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). For example, White perceivers may be less prejudiced against Blacks after encountering president Obama vs. a Black garbage collector. In the current context, powerholders may show increased automatic racial prejudice only when the target is perceived in the default low power position that is typical for stigmatized groups. Alternatively, the effects of perceiver power may be more prevalent and occur regardless of the power position of the target.

Study 3 was designed to examine this issue by disentangling perceiver and target effects of power. Participants were assigned to a powerful or a powerless role, and expected to interact with a member of a stigmatized group, who was in a powerful or a powerless role. Implicit prejudice was then measured using an Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). To examine the generalizability of the previous findings, Study 3 utilized a different target group: Arabs. This group is stigmatized in the European context (Díez-Nicolás, 2005).

### Method

#### *Participants and Design*

Seventy-nine participants from the University of Granada participated in this study in exchange of course credits. All participants were White females, and their mean age was 18.64

years. Three participants were dropped from the analysis because they were aware of the power manipulation prior to the experiment. This leaved a final sample of 76 participants. The experiment was a 2 (perceiver power: high vs. low) x 2 (target power: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions.

### *Procedure*

Participants took part individually, in front of a computer. Upon arrival, they were received by a male experimenter who welcomed them and introduced the study as focusing on creativity. Perceiver power was manipulated by assigning participants to a role in which they controlled the outcomes of another participant or their outcomes were controlled by the other participant, following a procedure adapted from Guinote et al. (2002). Participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire allegedly to identify their organizational skills. Upon completion, the computer ostensibly computed participants' scores, and gave them feedback. Participants in the high perceiver power condition were called *judges*. They were told that they were good at judging solutions for problems. Therefore, their task was to evaluate the solutions of workers, and determine how many extra course credits they would earn. Participants in the low power perceiver condition were called *workers*. They were told that they were good at finding solutions for problems and therefore would be performing tasks that call for solutions during this creativity study. They were also told that they would be evaluated by a judge, who would determine how many extra credits they could earn depending on the evaluation. Participants were informed that they would work or evaluate tasks in a subsequent session. However, prior to enacting their judge or worker roles they would meet and interact with another participant allegedly to become familiarized with the type of tasks used in this study. This person could be a judge or a worker depending on who was available. After the interaction with that person they would enact their judge and worker roles by either evaluating a task or doing the task by their own.

They were told that the pairing of participants for the training phase had been made. Following Richeson & Ambady (2003), participants were told that "it is sometimes helpful to have

some information about someone before having to work with them". They were then presented with a profile sheet of the judge or worker that they were supposed to interact with. It included other participant's name, sex, age and classes that she was attending. The profile described a 18 years old female, who was Arabic and had a North-African name and surname.

After the presentation of the profile participants rated, on a 9-point scale, how much they thought they would be in charge of the situation during the actual creativity task. This question served as the manipulation check. Subsequently, participants were asked to take part in what was allegedly a separate study for a cognitive psychology colleague. This separate study was the IAT, and included the critical dependent measure.

#### *Implicit Association Test*

The Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) examines the strength of the mental associations between pairs of concepts, and is able of measuring differences in associations between target concepts (in this study, Spaniard and Arab) and evaluative attributes (i.e., good and bad). The IAT operates on the principle that it is easier to make the same behavioral response to concepts that are associated than to concepts that are not associated.

The study utilized the seven blocks procedure IAT proposed by Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji (2007, see Table 1). In this task, participants categorized a series of items that belonged to two categories (Spaniard vs. Arab) and two attributes (pleasant vs. unpleasant valenced words). During the crucial trials of the task, one of the two categories and one of the two attributes are assigned to the same keyboard key, (e.g., Spaniard and pleasant), whereas another key is used for the other pair (e.g., Arab and unpleasant). Participants then perform a second block of trials in which the key assignments for one of the pairs are switched (e.g., Spaniard and unpleasant, and Arab and pleasant).

In the current study, the compatible block of trials was the one in which the Spaniard category and the pleasant attribute were assigned to the same key, and the Arab category and unpleasant attribute were assigned to the other key. Conversely, in the incompatible block of trials

the Spaniard category and the unpleasant attribute were assigned to the same key, and the Arab category and the pleasant attribute were assigned to the other key. The IAT produces measures derived from latencies of responses to these two blocks of trials (in Table 1, sequences B3 & B4 vs. sequences B6 & B7). To the extent that it is more difficult for participants to classify items during the incompatible block of trials compared to the compatible block of trials, the stronger is the assumed implicit negative evaluation of Arabs on the one side, and the positive evaluation of Spaniards on the other.

The items that comprised the two categories and the two attributes were taken from Rodríguez-Bailón, Ruiz and Moya (2009) study. Six names (three masculine and three feminine) were used for the Arab (e.g., Mohamed, Latifa, Rachid) and the Spaniard (e.g., Juan, Carmen, Manuel) categories. Six pleasant (e.g., Peace, Cheer, Happy) and six unpleasant words (e.g., Evil, Pain, Ugly) were used from Rodríguez-Bailón et al. (2009). When participants finished the IAT they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

## Results

### *Manipulation Checks*

Participants indicated how much they thought they were going to be in charge during the creativity task. A 2 (perceiver power: high vs. low) x 2 (target power: high vs. low) analysis of variance was conducted on this measure, with perceiver and target power as between-subjects variables. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of perceiver power, with participants in the high perceiver power condition perceiving themselves more in charge ( $M = 4.66$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ) than participants in the low perceiver power condition ( $M = 3.94$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ),  $F(1, 67) = 5.86$ ,  $p = .018$ . This result indicates that the perceiver power manipulation was successful. There was no main effect of target power,  $F(1, 67) = 2.54$ , *ns*, nor an interaction between perceiver and target power,  $F(1, 67) = .001$ , *ns*.

### *Data Analyses*

As suggested by Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) trials with RTs higher than 10,000 ms, and subjects with 10% or more trials with RTs lower than 300 ms were eliminated. Furthermore, the mean RTs for correct responses for each of the four crucial blocks (B3, B4, B6 & B7, see Table 1) was computed, and errors were replaced by the mean of the respective block plus a penalty of 600 ms.

Responses were then analyzed using the improved scoring algorithm (algorithm D6 proposed by Greenwald et al., 2003). Thus, the IAT score was calculated as the mean of: a) the difference between the compatible condition (Spaniard/pleasant and Arab/unpleasant) and the incompatible condition (Arab/pleasant and Spaniard/unpleasant) of the practice trials (B3 & B6) divided by their pooled standard deviation, and b) the difference between the compatible responses and the incompatible responses of the test trials (B4 & B7) divided by their pooled standard deviation.

### *Implicit Attitudes*

To examine implicit prejudice towards Arabs a 2 (perceiver power: high vs. low) x 2 (target power: high vs. low) analysis of variance was conducted on the IAT D effect. As expected, this analysis yielded a main effect of perceiver power,  $F(1, 72) = 4.10, p = .046$ . As can be seen in Table 2, participants assigned to the high perceiver power role showed a greater IAT effect ( $M = .38, SD = .26$ ) compared to those in the low perceiver power role ( $M = .26, SD = .22$ ). The main effect of target power and the interaction between perceiver and target power were not significant,  $F_s < 1, ns$ .

Consistent with the results of Studies 1-2 high perceiver power increased implicit prejudice. These results were obtained with a different measure (the IAT) and in relation to a different stigmatized target group (Arabs), which speaks for the generalizability of the effects of perceiver power. In contrast, target power did not affect implicit prejudice.

### General Discussion

Three studies examined whether having power affects racial attitudes. In Study 1 participants had power (vs. did not have power) over fellow students and completed an implicit measure of racial attitudes based on evaluative priming. This measure assessed automatic associations between the racial group and a positive vs. negative evaluation. As expected, perceiver power facilitated positive words after a White prime, and negative words after a Black prime. In Study 2 participants were primed with power, powerlessness or were subjected to a neutral prime. They then performed an affective priming task assessing affective responses after White and Black primes. As expected, participants primed with power, compared to participants primed with powerlessness or subjected to a neutral prime, showed more positive affective responses after a White prime compared to a Black prime. These effects derived from having power, rather than from being in a powerless position. In Study 3 the effects of perceiver and target power on implicit attitudes towards Arabs were assessed using an Implicit Association Test. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, perceiver power increased implicit prejudice. In contrast, target power did not affect implicit prejudice.

Together, the three studies indicate, for the first time, that perceiver power enhances implicit prejudice, and this occurs on two complementary dimensions: Having power increases automatic negative evaluations of stigmatized groups, and increases the experience of negative affect when encountering stigmatized group members. Furthermore, these detrimental effects of power were found across different target groups (Blacks and Arabs), and across different countries (Italy and Spain), contributing to the generalizability of the findings.

Consistent with prior research on power and explicit attitudes (Chen et al., 2001; Guinote, 2007c; Study 4) perceiver power did not affect explicit racial attitudes (Study 2). This suggests that the negative effects of having power on racial attitudes are restricted to automatic associative and affective responses, and do not occur when propositional processes underlie attitude judgments (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & Decoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Even though the spontaneous tendency of powerful individuals is to respond in a prejudiced way, the engagement of higher order cognition seems to correct the pre-existing biases.

The present findings expand, therefore, past research in several ways. Firstly, they unconfound effects associated with the power of the perceiver and the power of the target, indicating that the greater implicit prejudice of powerful individuals previously found in an intergroup encounter (Richeson & Ambady, 2003) derives from the power of the perceiver rather than the power position of the target (i.e., the fact that high status Blacks elicit less evaluative biases, see Barden et al., 2004). Secondly, by including a control condition, the present findings indicate that the previous effects derive from having power rather than from being in a powerless position. Thirdly, the studies demonstrate that perceiver power affects not only automatic associations between a target group and a positive or negative evaluation, but also *affective* responses towards stigmatized group members. In addition, present findings establish the generalizability of the links between power and implicit prejudice. They show that the effects occur beyond interaction contexts, when information about the target group is minimal (e.g., the mere exposure to Black faces elicits negative affect), and occur for different stigmatized target groups. Finally, the present results consolidate the finding that power does not necessarily affect explicit attitude judgments.

One question that arises is why are powerful individuals more prone to implicit prejudice. It has been argued that powerful individuals are more prone to engage in self-serving behavior (Kipnis, 1976; Winter, 1973), use power for own ends (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Keltner et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2000; Winter, 1973) and attempt to maintain the status quo (Fiske, 1993; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). These motivations could contribute to the present findings. Alternatively, power can elicit self-enhancing tendencies, thereby affecting evaluations of self-referential objects, for example, it can lead to more positive evaluations of ingroups compared to outgroups. According to these perspectives power increases implicit prejudice through motivation, a perspective that is consistent with past research showing that motivation is capable of affecting implicit attitudes (e.g., Ferguson, 2008) and pre-conscious stereotype activation (e.g., Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999).

It is, however, also possible that the present results have a cognitive basis. For example, according to the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a) powerful individuals focus attention more narrowly on accessible constructs in their current situation. Because intergroup biases can be automatically accessible (e.g., Devine, 1989), power may promote a selective reliance on these response tendencies. In contrast, individuals who lack power may have a broader array of constructs active at the time of judgment, which would decrease implicit bias. Importantly, motivational and cognitive factors may converge to originate more biases in powerful individuals compared to other individuals. To examine the contributions of these factors is a task for future research.

Power increases variability in judgment and behavior (see Guinote et al., 2002; Guinote, 2008). According to the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a) this occurs because powerful individuals more narrowly process information in line with the primary constructs activated in the situation. We would hypothesize that when subjective experiences (Weick & Guinote, 2008) or an active goal (Overbeck & Park, 2006; Vescio et al., 2003) render individuating information about disadvantaged group members meaningful, the selective focus of powerful individuals would turn away from chronically accessible negative constructs towards individuating information of the targets (see also Vescio et al., 2006). Under these circumstances, it is possible that powerful individuals would not show implicit biases. Powerless individuals, in contrast, tend to respond to multiple cues in any situation, and so should vary less their racial responses across situations.

The present findings are informative for research on attitudes. They consistently show that implicit attitudes are malleable, and that the social position of the perceiver is a key determinant of such malleability. This result expands past research. Past research has demonstrated that contextual factors affect implicit attitudes, focusing mainly on contextual cues provided by the environment (e.g., Barden et al., 2004; Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). For example, implicit bias is stronger when participants see pictures of Blacks in a negative (e.g., in



prison) compared to a positive context (e.g., in church; Wittenbrink et al., 2001). The present work demonstrates that temporary states of the perceiver (e.g., sense of power) also affect implicit attitudes. That is, similarly as environmental cues and physical cues associated with the target can affect the evaluations that are brought to mind, states of the perceiver, such as situational power, can also affect implicit evaluations. The impact of individual states on implicit attitudes has been neglected in past research.

Although perceiver power has detrimental effects for social attitudes, the gravity of this tendency is attenuated by the fact that power does not seem to affect explicit judgments about social targets. Nevertheless, the consequences of implicit prejudice should not be underestimated. Implicit attitudes affect judgment and behavior, in particular, spontaneous judgment and behavior, such as seating position (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). This type of behavior can be equally harmful for the victims (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). It may also be more subtle and difficult to detect, therefore, more difficult to reduce than overt prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). To examine the impact of the present findings concerning the behavior of powerholders towards stigmatized group members remains to be examined in future research.

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**Footnotes**

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<sup>i</sup> There were no effects of gender, so this variable was not considered in the other analyses.

<sup>ii</sup> Spanish validated versions of the Symbolic Racism Scale (Martínez & Vera, 1994) and of the Modern Racism Scale (Navas, 1998) were used.

<sup>iii</sup> There were no effects of gender, so this variable was not considered in any further analysis.

**Table and Figure Captions**


*Table 1.* IAT sequences of blocks (Study 3).


*Table 2.* IAT D effect as a function of Perceiver and Target Power (Study 3).


*Figure 1a.* Mean facilitation scores for positive and negative adjectives preceded by photos of White and Black faces for individuals in the low-power condition. Higher values reflect higher facilitation (Study 1).

*Figure 1b.* Mean facilitation scores for positive and negative adjectives preceded by photos of White and Black faces for individuals in the high-power condition. Higher values reflect higher facilitation (Study 1).

*Figure 2.* Proportion of “pleasant” responses as a function of prime race and participants’ condition (Study 2).







Block	No. of Trials	Items assigned to left-key response	Items assigned to right-key response
B1	24	North African Names	Spanish Names
B2	24	Unpleasant words	Pleasant words
B3	24	North African Names + Unpleasant words	Spanish Names + Pleasant words
B4	48	North African Names + Unpleasant words	Spanish Names + Pleasant words
B5	48	Spanish Names	North African Names
B6	24	Spanish Names + Unpleasant words	North African Names + Pleasant words
B7	48	Spanish Names + Unpleasant words	North African Names + Pleasant words

Note: B1, B3 & B4 and Blocks B5, B6 & B7 were counterbalanced across all the experimental conditions.

	High Target Power	Low Target Power	Total
High Perceiver Power			
<i>M</i>	.39	.37	.38
<i>SD</i>	.28	.25	.26
Low Perceiver Power			
<i>M</i>	.30	.23	.26
<i>SD</i>	.23	.21	.22