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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2012

Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure

Résumé

This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in senders-receiver games, games with strategic complementarities, and voting with deliberation.
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Dates et versions

hal-00753473 , version 1 (19-11-2012)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00753473 , version 1

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Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler, Eduardo Perez-Richet. Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure. 2012. ⟨hal-00753473⟩
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