

Cooperation: the power of a single word? Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken

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The real payment procedure – 3rd session

After the session (namely after all the subjects have completed the following questionnaire), you will have the opportunity to win until **190 Euro**.

The payment procedure is described below. It was designed so as to encourage you to make your decisions as thoughtfully and sincerely as possible.

THE SELECTION OF THE WINNERS

A first draw will be done to determine two winners among the whole set of participants to the session. Questionnaires are numbered; the random draw (by a third person) of two numbers comprised between 1 and n (the number of participants) will allow us to select the winning questionnaires/subjects.

Those two subjects will be invited separately to join the experimenters for a second random draw in order to determine his/her gains.

DETERMINATION OF THE WINNERS' GAINS

If you are selected to be a winner, you will be asked to draw at random one of the choice situations you faced during the experiment and to play it out for real. Your final gain will then depend on both the choice you made on this occasion and the choice your partner made.

So, your interest is to make all your decisions as carefully and sincerely as possible. Suppose that, during the experiment, you did not always choose the option you really prefer. In that case, your final gain (which will depend on your actual previous choice in a given choice situation) may not be as good as it could have been if you had answered more carefully or sincerely.

Note that all the choice situations have the same probability to be selected at random. So your interest is to **pay equal attention to each of them**.

DETERMINATION OF YOUR PARTNER'S CHOICE IN THE SELECTED CHOICE SITUATION

As said before, your final gain will depend on both your own previous choice and the previous choice of your partner in the selected choice situation. Your partner's choice is determined as follows:

- Before determining his/her choice, it is first necessary to determine his/her type [(a) or (b)]. This will be achieved through a random draw using the theoretical composition of the population assumed in the selected choice situation.
- The choice of your partner will then be determined given his/her type and, if need be, from the choices made by some real participant of this type in the session. To be more specific:
 - ◆ If the random draw selects your partner to be of type (a), it means that he/she <u>cooperated</u> in the selected choice situation (since type (a) individuals always cooperate by definition).
 - ◆ If the random draw selects your partner to be of type (b), it means that he/she either <u>cooperated</u> or <u>did not cooperate</u> depending on his/her opportunities of gains and on what he/she thought you were going to play.

In this latter case, the choice of your partner will be determined as **the choice actually made** in **the selected choice situation by one of the <u>type (b)</u> participants to the session.** For that purpose, you will be asked to select a questionnaire at random <u>and anonymously</u> among the set of questionnaires the content of which is compatible with the type (b)-profile.

<u>Your final gain</u>: It will be determined confronting your own actual choice (**to cooperate** or **not to cooperate**) in the selected choice situation and the choice made by this (selected at random) type (b) participant. An example is given below.

A TYPICAL EXAMPLE:

Suppose that, in the randomly selected choice situation, 25% of partners are supposed to be of type (a) while 75% are supposed to be of type (b). You will be invited to draw at random a token among 100 tokens, 25 of which are yellow and 75 of which are green:

◆ If you draw a yellow token, your partner will be supposed to be of type (a), which means that he/she cooperated in the selected choice situation.

<u>Your final gain</u>: It will be determined confronting your own actual choice (**to cooperate** or **not to cooperate**) in the selected choice situation and the cooperative choice of your partner.

◆ If you draw a green token, your partner will be supposed to be of type (b), thus to have either cooperated or not cooperated depending on his/her opportunities of gain and on what he/she thought you were going to play. To determine his/her actual choice in the selected choice situation, you will be invited to draw a questionnaire at random among all the questionnaires completed by type (b) subjects.

<u>Your final gain</u>: It will be determined confronting your own actual choice (**to cooperate** or **not to cooperate**) in the selected choice situation and the choice of this (selected at random) other participant.

You see here the interest of thoughtful and sincere answers. For instance, if you choose to cooperate while you actually prefer not to cooperate (resp. to cooperate) and this choice situation is selected to be played out for real, you will get the gain corresponding to the cooperative (resp. non cooperative) choice while you would have preferred to get the gain corresponding to the non cooperative (resp. cooperative) choice.