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Gender Roles and Ethnic Income Inequality in Ürümchi

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gender roles on earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in Ürümchi, China, using survey data (N = 1,600) from Ürümchi in 2005. It finds sizable earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. However, the differences in income between Uyghur men and Han men fade away controlling for socioeconomic variables. No similar patterns are found among women. Earnings differentials between Uyghur women and Han women and between Uyghurs and Han Chinese disappear after the measures for family responsibilities are introduced into the earnings equation. The differences in socioeconomic status and family responsibilities between Uyghur women and Han women underlie the aggregate income inequality between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.

Key words: Inequality, Earnings Differentials, Gender, Uyghurs, China

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6 The 2009 ethnic unrest in Ürümqi and the large casualties it produced call for an urgent
7
8 study of ethnic inequality in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's
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10 Republic of China (PRC). Many scholars and commentators have cited ethnic disparities as a
11
12 main cause of intergroup tensions and conflicts in Xinjiang (Pan and Tan 1999, p. 153;
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14 Sautman 2000, p. 240, Smith 2000, p. 200; Van Wie Davis 2008, p. 15;). Existing studies
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16 have investigated the effect of labour market discrimination and intergroup differences in
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18 schooling on income inequality by ethnicity in Xinjiang. This research goes one step further
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20 than to make a distinction between Uyghurs and Han Chinese and offers an alternative
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22 account of ethnic income inequality. It argues that gender roles account for both small gaps in
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24 earnings between Uyghur men and Han men and large pay gaps between Uyghur women and
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26 Han women, which underlies overall ethnic income inequality in Ürümqi.
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32 This research draws data from a survey (N = 1,600) conducted in Ürümqi in 2005.
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34 Data analysis shows sizable earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs.
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36 However, the wage gap between Uyghur men and Han men fade away, controlling for
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38 socioeconomic variables. No similar patterns are found among women. Earnings differentials
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40 between Uyghur women and Han women and between Uyghurs and Han Chinese disappear
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42 after the measures for family responsibilities are introduced into the earnings equation. The
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44 differences in socioeconomic status and family responsibilities between Uyghur women and
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46 Han women partly underscore the aggregate income inequality between Uyghurs and Han
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48 Chinese. These findings have important policy implications for the reduction of ethnic
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50 income inequality in Xinjiang.
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55 **Historical Context**

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57 Ürümqi is the capital of Xinjiang, which is located in Northwest China and occupies
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59 one sixth of China's territory. Uyghurs are one of the fifty-six ethnic groups in China. Han
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3 Chinese are the ethnic majority and dominate the PRC politically and economically. Uyghurs
4 are a Turkic people. The vast majority of them are Sunni Muslims. The 2000 Census found
5 nearly 8.35 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Uyghurs had lived in north-western Mongolia
6 before they migrated en masse to Xinjiang after the demise of the Uyghur Empire in 840.
7 They reportedly practiced Manichaeism, Nestorian Christianity, and shamanism before 932.
8 Some Uyghurs became Buddhist afterwards; others were converted to Islam before the
9 Mongol conquest around 1200 of the region known as Xinjiang today. The massive Uyghur
10 conversion to Islam started after the Mongol conquest but was not completed until the mid-
11 1400s. Some scholars claim that the conversion was concluded in the 1600s. After 1759, part
12 of the region, i.e., the Zhungarian Basin, was called Xinjiang, and 'the name was later applied
13 to the whole region' (Bellér-Hann et al. 2007, p. 38; Rudelson 1997, p. 20). Xinjiang became
14 a province of the Qing Empire in 1884. It was ruled by Han warlords after the establishment
15 of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911. The ROC managed to place Xinjiang under its
16 direct control in 1944. With Soviet support, Uyghurs established the East Turkistan Republic
17 in Ili, Tarbagatay, and Altay in northern Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949. It came to an end
18 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its army entered Xinjiang in 1949.

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41 When the CCP came to power in 1949, it sought to build a socialist Xinjiang and fully
42 integrate it into the PRC. The CCP carried out land reforms in rural villages and raised a large
43 group of Uyghur intellectuals and professionals in urban areas (Smith 2000, pp. 201, 205;
44 Benson 2004, pp. 191,194-7, 209-12; Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, pp. 301, 307; also
45 Rudelson 1997). At the same time, the CCP made efforts to undermine the position of
46 mosques and imams in Xinjiang. It eliminated Islamic taxes and carried out land reforms to
47 eliminate institutional Islam's main source of revenues. 'The state then put clerics on its
48 payroll and incorporated them institutionally within the Beijing-based Chinese Islamic
49 Association' (Millward and Tursun 2004, pp. 88-9). Religious suppression accumulated
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3 during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. The government policies included the closing
4 of rural bazaars, attacks on imams and mosques, forcible acculturation and assimilation, etc.
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6 (Fuller and Lipman 2004, pp. 322, 326-8). Many Uyghur intellectuals and officials were also
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8 persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, p. 307; also
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10 Rudelson 1997).
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15 After 1978, the CCP allowed a relatively tolerant environment for ethnic and religious
16 expressions (Van Wie Davis 2008, p. 17). By 1989, the number of mosques in Xinjiang had
17 increased by 5.8 times compared with a decade earlier to some 20,000 (Finley 2007, p. 634;
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19 Smith 2002, pp. 202, 208; Van Wie Davis 2008, p. 2). After fifteen years, *hajj* (pilgrimage)
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21 missions to Mecca were allowed to resume in October 1979. In addition, the CCP has carried
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23 out equal opportunity programs in education and employment, enlarging and diversifying the
24
25 Uyghur middle class in Xinjiang (Mackerras 2000, p. 299). The CCP declared a national
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27 strategy to develop the Great Western Region in 2000 and has carried out key construction
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29 projects in Xinjiang, including petroleum exploration, the West-East Power Transmission
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31 Project, the West-East Natural Gas Transmission Project, etc. (Mackerras 2000, p. 299). The
32
33 CCP aimed to reduce regional inequalities as the means of reducing ethnic inequalities.
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41 However, this strategy has not worked well (Becquelin 2004) partly because of the
42 intergroup differences in the first language spoken (i.e., Mandarin), schooling, access to bank
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44 loans and markets in China proper, etc. (Schluessel 2007). Han Chinese are more likely than
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46 Uyghurs to take advantage of the government development policies. It is found that overall,
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48 'Uyghurs are poorer than the Han' (Toops 2004, p. 262). It is found that 'Most of the modern
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50 sector in a very advanced city such as Ürümchi appears to be dominated by Han, not
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52 minorities' (Mackerras 2000, p. 299). Thus, 'Urban dissatisfaction stems from the fact that
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54 Uyghurs now have something to compare themselves with. It is socio-economic inequalities,
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56 there, which lies at the root of a rapidly strengthening Uyghur national identity' (Smith 2000,
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3 p. 201)'. Ethnic disparities have become a thorny issue and have been seen as a main cause of
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5 Uyghur-Han tensions and conflicts in Xinjiang (Van Wie Davis 2008, p. 15; also Mackerras
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7 2000).

10 11 **Existing Theories of Ethnic Inequality in Xinjiang**

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13 Why is there serious income inequality by ethnicity in Xinjiang? Some scholars have
14
15 argued that labour market discrimination is responsible for ethnic disparity in the region
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17 (Becquelin 2000, p. 85; Mackerras 2000, p. 299; Bovingdon 2002, p. 45; Smith 2002, p. 157;
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19 Yee 2003, p. 449). Amnesty International (1999, p. 9) has asserted that 'Many Uighurs
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21 complain that racial abuse and discrimination against ethnic minorities is common'. It is
22
23 reported that attitudes of racial and cultural superiority had become commonplace as the Han
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25 population in Xinjiang grew (Smith 2000, p. 201; Fuller and Lipman 2004, p. 325). Equally
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27 important, some Uyghurs have 'complained that the government has forsaken the preferential
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29 policy for national minorities'. They have encountered prejudice when seeking access to bank
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31 loans and administrative authorizations from Han officials (Becquelin 2000, p. 85; Mackerras
32
33 2000, p. 299; Yee 2003, p. 449; Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, and Zhang 2007, p. 181). In addition,
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35 most managers were Han Chinese. If a state firm downsizes its workforce, Han managers
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37 choose to sack minority workers. In the labour market, Han managers prefer Han workers
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39 over Uyghur workers. Many Uyghur university graduates are unable to convert their human
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41 capital into earnings capacity (Sautman 2000, p. 247; Benson 2004, pp. 198, 214; Rudelson
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43 and Jankowiak 2004, p. 316). It is likely that Han workers obtain high-paying jobs at the
44
45 expense of Uyghur workers. Uyghur educational and occupational attainment would not
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47 reduce their disadvantage in the labour market due to discrimination. Hence:
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55 *Hypothesis 1: There are significant earnings differentials between Uyghurs and Han*
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57 *Chinese, holding socioeconomic variables constant.*
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4 An alternative account of the Uyghur-Han earnings gap focuses on the differences in
5 education between the two ethnic groups. Post-1978 market reforms have been a transition
6 from a centrally controlled economy to a market economy, which has raised the importance
7 of human capital due to the emphasis on performance and efficiency. If education is a key
8 determinant of labour market outcomes, it will benefit Han workers at the expense of
9 minority workers due to ethnic variation in schooling. A study has found that despite
10 educational improvements across the board in Xinjiang, 'Han-minority differences in
11 education grew during the 1980s. This point is summarized in the growing ethnic gap in
12 estimated mean years of education: Between 1982 and 1990, the difference grew from 1.6
13 years to 2.3 years among men and from 1.3 years to 2.4 years among women' (Hannum and
14 Xie 1998, pp. 328-9; Mackerras 2000, p. 299). Another study suggests the relationship
15 between poor education and lower income among Uyghurs (Schuster 2009, p. 440). Ethnic
16 differences in schooling may explain why Han Chinese earn more than Uyghurs. Hence:

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Hypothesis 2: There shall be intergroup parity in income if the effect of education is controlled for.

Gender Roles and Uyghur-Han Income Inequality

While acknowledging the importance of intergroup variation in schooling and labour market discrimination in the study of Uyghur-Han income disparity, in this research, I go one step further than to make a distinction between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. I offer a gendered account of ethnic income inequality because gender is a key organization principle of human behaviour and plays a major role in the Islamic family institution. Clark (1999, p. 226) noted the effect of gender roles on Uyghur behaviour during his fieldwork in Ürümchi in the 1980s.

I argue that the Uyghur-Han differences in gender roles are a main cause of ethnic income inequality in Ürümchi. I disagree that Uyghurs are more likely than Han Chinese to hold gender bias against women. However, I maintain that Han Chinese and Uyghurs have

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3 different expectations of men's and women's roles in society and at home. Uyghur perceptions
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5 about gender roles help reduce intergroup gaps in earnings between Uyghur men and Han
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7 men and help maintain intergroup gaps in income between Uyghur women and Han women,
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9 which partly accounts for income stratification by ethnicity in Ürümchi.
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13 Accordingly, in this section, I compare gender role expectations among Han Chinese
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15 with those among Uyghurs. I first examine gender attitudes among Han Chinese. Han women
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17 were suppressed in imperial China where a 'virtuous' woman was the one without any
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19 education or a job. The traditional division of household labour was based on the idea that
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21 men were providers and women were homemakers (although in reality women in poor
22
23 families also earned money to supplement family expenditures). The position of Han women
24
25 varied according to social class and status and whether they lived in cities or the countryside.
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27 There were also significant regional differences in gender inequality in China.
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32 There were movements toward greater gender parity in society and at home in China
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34 in the early 20th century. After 1949, the CCP promoted love and mutual companionship as
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36 major criteria in selecting a mate, creating the condition for gender egalitarianism and
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38 conjugal marriage to emerge in China. The CCP also promoted the idea that women 'hold up
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40 half the sky' (i.e. women share equal social importance with men). The CCP criticized
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42 patriarchal ideology, publicized gender equality values, and encouraged women's
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44 participation in work and education. Of course, it is important not to overstate the CCP's
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46 achievements (Hershatter 2007, pp. 5, 8, 60-4). Nevertheless, the vast majority of women
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48 joined the labour force. Zuo and Bian (2001, pp. 1124-5) argue that the 'same-work, same-
49
50 pay' policy raised women's socioeconomic status relative to men's.
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55 In 1979, the PRC government promulgated the one-child birth control policy, which
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57 has further undermined traditional gender roles since singleton daughters cannot afford to
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59 become fulltime housewives. One-child families have no incentive to discriminate against
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3 girls in education in urban China (Deutsch 2006). Singleton daughters and sons have received
4 similar amounts of attention and educational investments from parents. They have held
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girls in education in urban China (Deutsch 2006). Singleton daughters and sons have received similar amounts of attention and educational investments from parents. They have held equally high educational aspirations and career ambitions since their parents rely on them for old age security (Tsui 2005; Tsui and Rich 2002). Other social forces including globalization and access to the internet have also undermined traditional gender roles among Han Chinese. Shu (2004, pp. 315-6, 321, 328) found no systematic difference in gender attitudes between Han men and Han women in urban China. Pimentel (2000, pp. 38; 2006, 345, 352) showed that some Han men were involved in household chores and many Han women had the decision-making power at home.

Others however have argued that men's breadwinner role and women's housekeeper role have persisted into the post-1978 era. The recent resurrection of Confucian culture and the gender role expectations it has supported have released Han husbands from the obligation to share housework equally with their wives (Zuo and Bian 2001, p. 1.122). These expectations have been partially responsible for discrimination against women in the labour market (Pimentel 2000, pp. 345-7; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, pp. 1,530, 1,533). There are still large gender gaps in earnings among Han Chinese. A recent study found that in 1988, women earned 83.9 per cent of men's income, whereas they made 83.8 per cent of men's income in 1995 (Shu and Bian 2003, p. 1,117; also Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p. 1,541). Another study found that the gender wage ratio was 84.2 per cent in 1988, 85.0 per cent in 1991, 79.4 per cent in 1994, 81.6 per cent in 1998, 79.4 per cent in 2001, and 75.7 per cent in 2004 (Zhang et al. 2008, pp. 227-8; also Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p. 1,533). It is argued that gender inequality in the post-1978 era has been affected by the institutions and policies that give women less education and political standing, place them in different kinds of occupations, sectors, and industries, and grant them different wages for jobs demanding the same level of skills, etc (Shu and Bian 2003).

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3 Notwithstanding, the gender pay gap among Han Chinese shall not be as large as that
4 among Uyghurs, which may underscore the overall Uyghur-Han earnings differentials. Many
5 factors have led to income inequality between Uyghur men and women. One of them is the
6 attachment to traditional gender roles and the consequent division of household labour by sex
7 among Uyghurs. In Muslim culture, 'A man's duty is to generate family income. A woman's
8 duty is first to take care of family and children and second to participate in generating family
9 income' (Predelli 2004, p. 478). I found in my fieldwork that Uyghur culture defined women
10 as homemakers, who were assessed in terms of their contribution to household chores rather
11 than the pay checks they brought home. For some Uyghur women, family responsibilities
12 must not be compromised by attention to the workplace. In comparison, Uyghur culture
13 designated men to the role of the provider, whose worth was assessed to a large extent by his
14 ability to provide for his family. There was religious and cultural meaning in his earnings.
15 Unlike Uyghur women, Uyghur men were expected to compete with Han workers in the
16 labour market, and their successes in labour market competition was viewed as key to the
17 survival of the Uyghur nation. Uyghur women safeguarded Uyghur culture through
18 housewifery and motherhood. This division of household labour by sex have maintained and
19 justified the gender wage gap among Uyghurs.
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43 Of course, by no means does the above discussion suggest little change in gender
44 norms and behaviour among Uyghurs since 1949. Uyghur informants stressed that gender
45 inequality among Uyghurs had in fact decreased a lot, and they were much more egalitarian
46 than their parents. There were some highly educated, ambitious Uyghur career women in
47 Ürümqi. But Uyghur informants also agreed that the level of gender egalitarianism among
48 Han Chinese was higher than among Uyghurs. Uyghur women had lower wage expectations
49 than Han women since their main responsibility was defined in terms of housewifery and
50 motherhood. These intergroup contrasts are understandable since, because of its geographic
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3 location, Xinjiang has been more receptive to Islamic influence than China proper. In
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5 addition, Uyghurs are not as well educated as Han Chinese. Thus, Han Chinese are less likely
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7 than Uyghurs to support traditional gender roles.
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10 Furthermore, Uyghurs are not subject to the one-child birth control policy (Clark 1999,
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12 p. 131) that has weakened traditional perceptions of gender roles among Han Chinese. Finally,
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14 as mentioned above, the CCP has promoted gender equality among Han Chinese since 1949.
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16 Yet it has not carried out similar campaigns among Uyghurs since it has wanted to preserve
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18 'ethnic cultures' to avoid political chaos and maintain social stability in Xinjiang. The CCP
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20 has rarely raised gender inequality as a social issue that Uyghurs must deal with. Some
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22 government officials, who are Han Chinese, have regarded gender issues as part of Uyghur/or
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24 Muslim culture that are not subject to state intervention.
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29 Traditional gender roles have affected the division of labour in the Uyghur household,
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31 which in turn shall contribute to gender income gaps among Uyghurs. Economically, the
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33 division of household labour by sex among Uyghurs makes sense since it supports Uyghur
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35 competition with Han Chinese in the labour market. Han Chinese are the dominant ethnic
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37 group in Xinjiang and have higher levels of human capital than Uyghurs. Han Chinese can
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39 attain socioeconomic status as individual competitors. In comparison, to compensate their
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41 human capital deficit, Uyghur men are supported by their families to compete in the labour
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43 market: Uyghur men devote their time and energy to work, whereas their wives take care of
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45 household chores. The Uyghur division of household labour can partly offset Han men's
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47 advantage in human capital over Uyghur men since Han men are more likely than Uyghur
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49 men to shift some attention from work to family responsibilities. The ethnic differences in the
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51 division of household labour shall reduce the wage gap between Han men and Uyghur men.
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57 In addition, the ethnic differences in the division of household labour enlarge the
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59 wage gap between Uyghur women and Han women. This is partly because housewifery and
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3 motherhood reduce women's earnings capacity: 'Sources of the mother penalty include
4 women's career breaks after childbirth, segregation into low-status and part-time jobs, shorter
5 work hours and, importantly, a disproportionate share of family responsibilities in the context
6 of dual-earner couples' (Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p. 1,531). The greater burden from
7 housewifery and motherhood, the weaker a woman's earnings capacity. Existing studies have
8 found that for married women workers in the US, each additional hour of housework reduces
9 their wages by 0.1-0.4 per cent. Housework time is a key determinant of the male-female
10 wage gap in the US (Keith and Malone 2005, p. 224). There is also a motherhood wage
11 penalty of about 3-5 per cent for one child and 5-7 per cent for two or more children, after
12 controlling for human capital and socio-demographic variables (Waldfogel 1997, p. 209;
13 Budig and England 2001, pp. 206, 208; Avellar and Smock 2003, p. 597). Similarly, Zhang,
14 Hannum, and Wang (2008, pp. 1,529, 1,548) found that Han women in China proper were
15 disadvantaged by various measures of human and political capital, but these disadvantages
16 explain little of the observed gender gap in earnings. Instead, the gender wage gap was
17 strongly related to family status. It was only married women and mothers who faced
18 significant disadvantages in earnings.
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41 Like their sisters in the US and China proper, both Han women and Uyghur women in
42 Ürümchi should suffer from housework and motherhood penalty. But the negative effect on
43 Uyghur women should be greater than those on Han Chinese since the former are more likely
44 to attach to the traditional division of household labour by sex. This contrast has an important
45 implication for ethnic income inequality: both Uyghur men and Han men compete in the
46 labour market, whereas Uyghur women are less likely than Han women to contribute to
47 family finances due to their greater burden from housewifery and motherhood. As a result,
48 ethnic differences in earnings shall be smaller between Uyghur men and Han men than
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3 between Uyghur women and Han women because of the intergroup difference in the division
4 of household labour by sex. Hence,
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8 *Hypothesis 3: There shall be little income inequality between Uyghur women and Han*
9 *women, controlling for socioeconomic status and housework.*
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12 The above discussion suggests relative parity in earnings between Uyghur men and
13 Han men, controlling for measures for socioeconomic status. Following Hypothesis 3, it is
14 possible that the aggregate ethnic income inequality in Ürümchi is related to the earnings
15 differentials between Uyghur women and Han women. Hence,
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22 *Hypothesis 4: There shall be insignificant earnings differentials between Uyghurs and*
23 *Han Chinese, controlling for socioeconomic status and housework.*
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26 **Data**

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28 The above four hypotheses are examined with data from the survey conducted in
29 Ürümchi in 2005. Ürümchi is located in Northern Xinjiang. Although Uyghurs are the largest
30 ethnic group in Xinjiang, they are a minority group in Ürümchi. The official statistics show
31 that 76 per cent of the Ürümchi residents are Han Chinese and 13 per cent of them are
32 Uyghurs (Toops 2004, p. 257). In addition, Uyghur residents are not distributed in the city
33 evenly. The 2000 Census showed that Tuanjielu had the highest percentage of Uyghur
34 households (47.5 per cent) among the fifty-two urban neighbourhoods in Ürümchi. Next was
35 Yananlu with 38.1 per cent Uyghur households. Xinhuananlu was ranked eighth with 21.1
36 per cent of Uyghur households. A randomly selected sample would not do given the
37 population composition and the distribution of Uyghur residents in Ürümchi.
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52 Thus, a disproportionate sampling method was used for the 2005 survey. Local
53 Chinese collaborators first chose eight neighbourhoods that had the highest percentages of
54 Uyghur households in Ürümchi (i.e. the Uyghur clusters). They then randomly selected eight
55 neighbourhoods from the remaining forty-four neighbourhoods (i.e. the Han clusters). They
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3 used the PPS (probability proportional to size) method to select 2,437 households from the
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5 sixteen clusters. Households in the Uyghur clusters were given a disproportionately better
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7 chance of selection than those in the Han clusters to yield roughly similar numbers of the
8
9 Uyghur and Han respondents in the sample. In all, 1,600 interviews were conducted,
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11 representing a completion rate of nearly 66 per cent (69.6 per cent for the Uyghurs and 62.1
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13 per cent for the Han). Among them, 799 were Uyghur households and 801 were Han
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15 households. There was no access to the other 34 per cent of the sampled households due to
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17 refusals, absence, poor access to gated residential buildings, etc. Cases with missing values
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19 are removed from data analysis, resulting in the final sample of 1,492 cases (Uyghurs = 754,
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21 Han = 738) for this research. Since Uyghurs were oversampled, data were weighted to adjust
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23 for the sampling bias for data analyses in the next section.
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29 Before the 2005 survey, interviewers were trained by experienced survey researchers.
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31 Some Han interviewers spoke Uyghur and many Uyghur interviewers spoke Mandarin, the
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33 language of Han Chinese. In the survey, the Uyghur interviewers were assigned to interview
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35 Uyghur respondents only whereas the Han interviewers were assigned to interview Han
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37 respondents only. This arrangement was made to enhance the degree of cooperation from the
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39 interviewee and effective communication between the interviewer and the interviewee. In the
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41 survey, all respondents were asked to provide information on demographics, income,
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43 education, etc. The Ürümqi survey started in March 2005 and ended in August 2005.
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48 In addition, I conducted interviews with Uyghurs and made observations in mosques,
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50 markets, shopping malls in Ürümqi. I also commissioned my collaborators to conduct 230
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52 interviews with both Han and Uyghur informants between 2005 and 2008. During the course
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54 of my fieldwork, I asked Uyghur taxi drivers, pedestrians, hawkers, or shop owners some
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56 short questions from time to time. Occasionally, these brief social encounters slid into
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58 lengthy discussions of Uyghur behaviour and culture. Even more interestingly, some Uyghurs
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3 saw me as a lone traveller and came to strike up a conversation with me every now and then.
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5 My fieldwork has enhanced my understanding of intergroup inequality in Ürümchi.
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8 **Variables and Measures**

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10 Following the four hypotheses mentioned above, I first assess the effect of
11 socioeconomic variables on ethnic income inequality and then examine the effect of
12 housewifery and motherhood on the pay gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. I conduct
13 OLS regression analyses of the men subsample, the women subsample, and the Ürümchi
14 sample respectively. Multicollinearity is not a problem. I use a respondent's earnings as the
15 dependent variable, which is operationally defined as his or her total monthly *income* (wage,
16 bonuses, and all other income) in 2004, i.e., the year prior to the data collection in 2005
17 (Eichenlaub, Tolnay and Alexander 2010, p. 108; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p. 1,537).
18 This variable is log-transformed to establish normality and constant error variances to obtain
19 better linearity in the regression function. Earnings have been widely used in research on
20 intergroup inequality in income (Reid, Adelman, and Jaret 2007, p. 142; Elliott and Lindley
21 2008, p. 645).
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38 The independent variables include control variables (*age*, *age*², *gender*, *marital status*,
39 and *urban status*), socioeconomic variables (*education*, *state employment*, and *fulltime work*),
40 measures for family responsibilities (*housework* and *motherhood*), and *Uyghur*. Age is a key
41 determinant of income and is a continuous variable. Age² is often used in earnings equations
42 (Gustafsson and Sai 2009, p. 502; also Eichenlaub, Tolnay and Alexander 2010, p. 109).
43 Gender is a dummy variable with men coded as 1 and women as 0 (Zhang, Hannum, and
44 Wang 2008, p. 1,540). Marital status is a dummy variable with married respondents coded as
45 1 and others as 0 (Bishop, Luo, and Wang 2005, p. 243; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p.
46 1,539). Urban status is also a dummy variable with urban residents coded as 1 and rural
47 migrants coded as 0 (Eichenlaub, Tolnay and Alexander 2010, p. 109).
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3 For socioeconomic variables: schooling is measured by an ordinal variable with seven
4 levels: (1) illiterate/semi-illiterate, (2) primary school, (3) junior high school, (4) senior high
5 school, (5) vocational school, (6) community college, and (7) university (Pimentel 2000, p.
6 39). Occupational attainment is measured by fulltime work (Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008,
7 p. 1,537) and state employment (Bian 1994, p. 168). Fulltime work is a dummy variable with
8 those who work full time coded as 1 and others as 0. State employment is also a dummy
9 variable with state workers coded as 1 and others as 0.

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There are two housework variables based on the above discussion on housewifery and
motherhood. The first is the number of children a respondent has (Bishop, Luo, and Wang
2005, p. 243; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008, p. 1,540). It is a continuous variable that
measures the motherhood penalty on women's earnings. The second measure is housework
(Pimentel 2006, p. 350), which is an ordinal variable with three levels: (0) no, (1) some, (2)
frequent. The levels of housework are based on the frequency of the respondent's self
assessment in participation in household chores. Finally, Uyghur is a dummy variable with
Uyghurs coded as 1 and Han Chinese coded as 0.

Findings

Table 1 shows the key background characteristics of the Uyghur and Han respondents
in Ürümqi. The mean age is 49.57 for the Han men, 49.25 for the Han women, 48.65 for the
Uyghur men, and 47.93 for the Uyghur women respectively. Nearly 95 per cent of the Han
men are married, the corresponding figure is 87.9 per cent for the Han women, 97.2 per cent
for the Uyghur men, and 75.3 per cent for the Uyghur women. More than 85 per cent of the
Han men are urban residents, as compared with 71.1 per cent for Han women, 85.6 per cent
for the Uyghur men, and 79 per cent for the Uyghur women.

Table 1 also shows that the mean score for education among the Han men is 4.11, as
compared with 3.74 among the Han women, 3.69 among the Uyghur men, and 3.32 among

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3 the Uyghur women respectively. Clearly, the Han respondents are better educated than the
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5 Uyghur counterparts. In terms of occupational attainment, 92.6 per cent of the Han men have
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7 a fulltime job, the corresponding figure is 78.9 per cent for the Han women, 96 per cent for
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9 the Uyghur men, and 61.5 per cent for the Uyghur women. Also, 82.1 per cent of the Han
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11 men are employed by the state sector, as compared with 68.2 per cent of the Han women,
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13 64.7 per cent of the Uyghur men, and 54.3 per cent of the Uyghur women respectively.
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17 In terms of the measures of family responsibilities, the mean score for the number of
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19 children is 1.23 among the Han women, as compared with 3.83 among the Uyghur women.
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21 Accordingly, the Han women shall suffer a less costly motherhood penalty than Uyghur
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23 women. Also, the mean score for housework for the Han men is .86, whereas the
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25 corresponding figure is 1.00 for the Han women, .70 for the Uyghur men, and 1.03 for the
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27 Uyghur women respectively. Clearly, the Uyghur men do less housework than the Han men,
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29 whereas the Uyghur women do more housework than the Han women.
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34 Finally, Table 1 shows that the mean monthly income for Han Chinese is ¥1,266.92,
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36 as compared with ¥817.04 for the Han women, ¥1,050.31 for the Uyghur men, and ¥527.15
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38 for the Uyghur women respectively. The pay gap between the Han men and the Han women
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40 is statistically significant ($F = 78.437$, Sig. = .000). So is that between the Uyghur men and
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42 the Uyghur women ($F = 25.426$, Sig. = .000). However, consistent with the above discussion,
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44 the income difference between the Han men and the Uyghur men is not statistically
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46 significant ($F = 3.318$, Sig. = .069), whereas the income difference between the Han women
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48 and the Uyghur women is statistically significant ($F = 11.824$, Sig. = .001).
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53 Table 2 shows that the Han men benefit more from schooling than the Han women,
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55 the Uyghur men, and the Uyghur women. For example, the monthly income of the Han
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57 university graduates is ¥1,926.03, as compared with ¥1,626.91 for the Han women, ¥1,467.68
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59 for the Uyghur men, and ¥1,296.67 for the Uyghur women respectively. The returns to
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3 fulltime work and state employment of the Han men are also greater than those of the Han
4 women, the Uyghur men, and the Uyghur women respectively. For example, the monthly
5 income of the Han state worker is ¥1,265.43, whereas the corresponding figure is ¥886.89 for
6 the Han women, ¥1,192.85 for the Uyghur men, and ¥803.55 for the Uyghur women
7 respectively.
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15 Table 2 also shows that the Uyghur women suffer more from family responsibilities
16 than the Han women, the Uyghur men, and the Han men. For example, the monthly income
17 for the Han men with three or more children at home is ¥988.81, as compared with ¥438.27
18 for the Han women, ¥988.33 for the Uyghur men, and ¥365.06 for the Uyghur women
19 respectively. There is virtually no difference between the Han men and the Uyghur men,
20 whereas the motherhood penalty for the Han women is less than that for the Uyghur women.
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22 As another example, the monthly income for the Han men with frequent participation in
23 housework is ¥1,036.84, whereas the corresponding figure is ¥644.44 for the Han women,
24 ¥946.50 for the Uyghur men, and ¥458.85 for the Uyghur women respectively.
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37 In short, Table 2 shows that both the socioeconomic variables and the measures for
38 family responsibilities are related to earnings differentials by gender and ethnicity in Ürümqi
39 and shall be included in the multivariable analysis of ethnic income inequality, which is
40 needed because the above findings are derived from bivariate analyses. It is not clear if these
41 findings are the outcomes of spurious relationships. Thus, I conduct three OLS regression
42 analyses to verify the relationship between Uyghur ethnicity and income inequality, holding
43 schooling and occupational attainment constant. The 2005 data were weighted to correct the
44 sampling bias before empirical analyses.
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56 Model 1 of Table 3 shows that men earn a lot more than women. Education is
57 positively related to high income. This is so also for state employment and fulltime work. The
58 relationships between income and these independent variables are statistically significant
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3 at .001. These findings make good sense and are consistent with existing research on income
4 inequality in other parts of China (Bian 1994, pp. 168-9). Models 2 & 3 of Table 3 show
5 similar results regarding the relationship between income and the measures of socioeconomic
6 status, holding control variables constant.
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12 Model 1 of Table 3 also shows that the OLS regression coefficient for Uyghur is
13 related to the dependent variable and the relationship is negative and statistically significant
14 at .01 level. The exponent of the coefficient for Uyghur in Model 1 suggests that the Uyghur
15 respondents earn 30 per cent less than the Han respondents in Ürümchi. This finding supports
16 Hypothesis 1 that there are significant earnings differentials between Uyghurs and Han
17 Chinese, holding socioeconomic variables constant. It does not support Hypothesis 2 that
18 there shall be intergroup parity in income if the effect of education is controlled for.
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29 Model 2 of Table 3 shows that for the men subsample, the OLS regression coefficient
30 for Uyghur is not related to income once main background characteristics are controlled for.
31 In comparison, Model 3 of Table 3 shows that for the women subsample, the OLS regression
32 coefficient for Uyghur is related to earnings and the relationship is negative and statistically
33 significant at .01 level. Taking the exponent of the coefficient for Uyghur in Model 3, it can
34 be seen that the Uyghur women earn 40 per cent less than the Han women. These findings do
35 not support Hypotheses 2 & 3 and suggest that the Uyghur-Han earnings differentials shall be
36 understood partly in terms of gender income inequality in Ürümchi.
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48 Following the above discussion on income inequality and the division of household
49 labour by sex, I introduce two measures for family responsibilities into the earnings equation.
50 Again, the 2005 data were weighted to correct the sampling bias before empirical analyses.
51 Model 1 of Table 4 shows that the two measures for family responsibilities are negatively
52 related to income and the negative relationships are statistically significant at .05 level. More
53 importantly, the OLS regression coefficient for Uyghur is not statistically related to earnings
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3 after the socioeconomic variables and the measures for family responsibilities are controlled
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5 for. This finding supports Hypothesis 4 that there shall be insignificant earnings differentials
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7 between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, controlling for socioeconomic status and housework.
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10 Model 2 of Table 4 shows that housework and the number of children are not related
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12 to the dependent variable. Their introduction into the earnings equation does not affect men's
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14 earnings capacity. Like its counterpart in Model 2 of Table 3, Uyghur is not statistically
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16 related to income for the men subsample. In comparison, Model 3 of Table 4 shows that the
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18 OLS regression coefficient for Uyghur is statistically after the introduction of housework and
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20 the number of children into the equation. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 that there shall
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22 be insignificant earnings differentials between Uyghur women and Han women, holding the
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24 effects of measures for socioeconomic status and housework constant.
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29 Finally, it is necessary to point out that the pay gap between the Uyghur men and the
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31 Han men is based mainly on intergroup differences in the socioeconomic variables such as
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33 schooling and is not affected by housework, whereas the pay gap between Uyghur women
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35 and Han women is based on both the socioeconomic variables and the measures for family
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37 responsibilities. There would be significant income inequality between Uyghur women and
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39 Han women if the socioeconomic variables were removed from the earnings equation.
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43 **Summary and Discussions**

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46 Scholars have explained Uyghur-Han earnings differentials in terms of discrimination
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48 or ethnic differences in human capital. This research goes one step further than to make a
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50 distinction between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, focusing on how gender and family
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52 responsibilities affect the wage gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Data analysis shows
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54 sizable earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs controlling for demographic
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56 and socioeconomic variables. However, the differences between Uyghur men and Han men
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58 fade away, controlling for the socioeconomic variables. Yet no similar patterns are found
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3 among women in Ürümchi. These findings indicate that the pay gap between Uyghur women
4 and Han women are partly responsible for the aggregate ethnic income inequality, and the
5 pay gap between Uyghur women and Han women cannot be explained away with the control
6 variables and socioeconomic measures.
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12 Data analysis shows insignificant earnings differentials between Han Chinese and
13 Uyghurs after the measures for family responsibilities are introduced into the earnings
14 equation. In addition, family responsibilities negatively affect women's earnings capacity but
15 not men's. The wage gap between Uyghur women and Han women is removed after the
16 socioeconomic variables and measures for housework are controlled for. These findings
17 suggest that, in addition to socioeconomic variables, family responsibilities are a key cause of
18 income inequality between Uyghur women and Han women, which in turn partly underlies
19 aggregate ethnic income inequality in Ürümchi. Thus, the Uyghur-Han difference in the
20 divisions of labour by sex partly accounts for income inequality by ethnicity in Ürümchi.
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34 The above findings have important policy implications. The Chinese government has
35 tried to develop Xinxiang's economy to reduce ethnic inequalities. The government has also
36 improved the levels of educational attainment among Uyghurs. But so far these policies have
37 achieved mixed or limited successes in reducing the level of intergroup disparities. The above
38 findings suggest that the government's policies may not narrow ethnic pay gaps by raising the
39 levels of socioeconomic status among minority ethnic groups. Firstly, because of traditional
40 gender roles, Uyghur men would be more likely than their sisters to be the beneficiaries of
41 these policies, which would maintain or even enlarge gender inequality among Uyghurs. For
42 example, Uyghur parents may support their sons to take advantage of the improved school
43 system but do not encourage their daughters to pursue similar educational careers. Secondly,
44 Uyghur-Han inequalities are partly attributed to Uyghur women's status. It is essential for the
45 Chinese government to address gender inequality among Uyghurs to eliminate intergroup
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3 disparities. It should promote initiatives to help Uyghur women and enhance their status in
4 society. One possible policy is to promote gender parity in wages with government financial
5 subsidies to show the returns to women's employment in Xinjiang. Another possible policy is
6 for the government to provide public facilities to relieve Uyghur women of heavy family
7 responsibilities. These policies are worth pursuing since they will not only promote gender
8 parity among Uyghurs but also reduce intergroup inequalities between Han Chinese and
9 Uyghurs.
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Table 1: Key Background Characteristics by Gender and Ethnicity

Background Characteristics	Han Men	Han Women	Uyghur Men	Uyghur Women
Age (mean/s.d.)	49.57/10.90 (392)	49.25/10.94 (346)	48.65/9.94 (354)	47.93/9.67 (400)
Married (%)	94.9% (372)	87.9% (304)	97.2% (344)	75.3% (301)
Urban (%)	85.2% (334)	71.7% (248)	85.6% (303)	79.0% (316)
Education (mean/s.d.)	4.11/1.68 (392)	3.74/1.73 (346)	3.96/1.88 (354)	3.32/1.74 (400)
Fulltime work (%)	92.6% (363)	78.9% (273)	96.0% (340)	61.5% (246)
State worker (%)	82.1% (322)	68.2% (236)	64.7% (229)	54.3% (217)
No. of children (mean/s.d.)	.96/1.39 (392)	1.23/1.63 (346)	3.44/1.34 (354)	3.83/1.23 (400)
Housework (mean/s.d.)	.86/.56 (392)	1.00/.60 (346)	.70/.58 (354)	1.03/.63 (400)
Ürümchi	¥1,266.92/997.49	¥817.04/737.39	¥1,050.31/695.84	¥527.15/601.67

Figures in parentheses are the numbers of cases

Table 2: Earnings Differentials by Gender and Ethnicity

Selected groups	Han Men	Han Women	Uyghur Men	Uyghur Women
Education				
<i>Illiterate/semiilliterate</i>	¥565.36/372.70	¥260.17/287.30	¥715.79/286.36	¥239.42/368.09
<i>Primary school</i>	¥920.11/447.52	¥521.85/435.58	¥708.23/548.02	¥318.72/565.13
<i>Junior high</i>	¥1,080.61/1,034.74	¥520.06/447.16	¥942.84/468.64	¥401.14/373.34
<i>Senior school</i>	¥1,259.51/1,139.75	¥872.45/573.64	¥857.71/441.03	¥542.25/759.39
<i>Vocational school</i>	¥1,231.85/732.91	¥1,032.48/468.80	¥1,077.95/834.95	¥880.39/491.40
<i>Community college</i>	¥1,650.52/740.38	¥1,404.63/849.07	¥1546.25/942.74	¥885.90/346.17
<i>University</i>	¥1,926.03/1,365.59	¥1,626.91/1,262.67	¥1,467.48/533.25	¥1,396.67/496.69
Fulltime work				
Other	¥1,323.29/1,009.22	¥980.74/733.53	¥1,072.04/694.39	¥809.85/603.87
Other	¥561.21/411.44	¥204.88/301.98	¥522.64/511.66	¥75.56/162.36
State worker				
Other	¥1,265.43/864.13	¥886.89/650.20	¥1,192.85/722.29	¥803.55/530.82
Other	¥1,273.76/1,481.16	¥667.19/881.09	¥789.18/559.35	¥199.39
No. of children				
<2	¥1,331.63/1,059.19	¥942.33/771.79	¥1,069.90/704.02	¥593.35/629.42
3>	¥988.81/600.78	¥438.27/445.82	¥988.33/669.58	¥365.06/493.71
Housework				
0	¥1,136.32/806.31	¥872.78/782.79	¥970.99/557.09	¥425.59/539.44
1	¥1,346.95/1,056.62	¥850.51/745.31	¥1,110.60/782.80	¥583.45/659.28
2	¥1,036.84/954.09	¥644.44/642.94	¥946.50/489.41	¥458.85/455.28

Table 3: Effects on Earnings Differentials, without Controlling for Family Variables

Covariates	Model 1 (Ürümchi)	Model 2 (Men)	Model 3 (Women)
Age	.097 (2.471)*	.049 (1.201)	.101 (1.514)
Age ²	-.001 (-3.027)**	-.001 (-1.412)	-.001 (-1.947)
Sex	.601 (7.510)***	---	---
Married	-.032 (-.234)	.339 (1.799)	-.205 (-1.063)
Urban	.017 (.163)	-.219 (-1.817)	.054 (.322)
Education	.158 (5.928)***	.120 (4.597)***	.216 (4.438)***
Fulltime work	2.920 (25.114)***	1.377 (8.536)***	3.374 (20.525)***
State worker	.820 (8.478)***	.441 (3.942)***	.976 (6.581)***
Uyghur	-.359 (-2.970)**	-.103 (-.776)	-.507 (-2.623)**
R ²	.514	.177	.589
F-Statistics	160.243***	19.210***	115.942***
N	1,376	721	655

* $P < .05$ ** $P < .01$ *** $P < .001$. Figures in parentheses are t -ratios.

Table 4: Effects on Earnings Differentials, Controlling for Family Variables

Covariates	Model 1 (Ürümchi)	Model 2 (Men)	Model 3 (Women)
Age	.084 (2.110)*	.049 (1.156)	.090 (1.350)
Age ²	-.001 (-2.236)*	-.001 (-1.305)	-.001 (-1.424)
Sex	.541 (6.734)***	---	---
Married	-.027 (-.197)	.321 (1.634)	-.120 (-.610)
Urban	-.075 (-.701)	-.225 (-1.809)	-.050 (-.299)
Education	.143 (5.350)***	.120 (4.536)***	.188 (3.861)***
Fulltime work	2.918 (25.194)***	1.380 (8.497)***	3.366 (20.603)***
State worker	.792 (8.238)***	.441 (3.937)***	.929 (6.304)***
No. of children	-.169 (-4.102)***	-.015 (-.311)	-.217 (-3.381)***
Housework	-.193 (-2.876)**	-.037 (-.478)	-.207 (1.985)*
Uyghur	-.241 (-1.930)	-.098 (-.709)	-.320 (-1.599)
R ²	.522	.178	.598
F-Statistics	135.380***	15.362***	95.961***
N	1,376	721	655

* $P < .05$ ** $P < .01$ *** $P < .001$. Figures in parentheses are t -ratios.

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