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**Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation in Europe:  
A comparative analysis across four capital cities**

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**Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation in Europe:****A comparative analysis across four capital cities***Abstract*

Drawing on recent cross-national surveys of the Turkish second generation, we test hypotheses of secularization and of religious vitality for Muslim minorities in Europe. Secularization predicts an inverse relationship between structural integration and religiosity, such that the Turkish second generation would be less religious with higher levels of educational attainment and intermarriage. The religious vitality hypothesis predicts the maintenance of religion in the second generation, highlighting the role of religious socialization within immigrant families and communities. Taking a comparative approach, these hypotheses are tested in the context of different national approaches to the institutionalization of Islam as a minority religion in four European capital cities: Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm. Across contexts, religious socialization strongly predicts second-generation religiosity, in line with religious vitality. The secularization hypothesis finds support only among the second generation in Berlin, however, where Islam is least accommodated.

Key words: integration; religion; Islam; second generation; institutions; comparative approach

**Introduction**

Large-scale immigration of Muslims to North-Western Europe's highly secularized societies has raised the question of how the local-born children of Muslim immigrants relate to, and practice their religion. Being socialized with Islam within their families and local co-ethnic communities (Güngör et al., forthcoming), the second generation grows up in societies where the majority is historically Christian, highly secularized and increasingly anti-Islamic. This study examines religiosity among the Turkish second generation and asks how it relates to their religious socialization in immigrant families and communities and to their structural integration into European societies. Moreover, we investigate contextual variation in the relationship between structural integration and religiosity across four European capital cities – Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm – which represent different national traditions of church-state relations and distinct patterns of institutional incorporation of Islam.

Due to limited data availability, we currently lack comparative empirical evidence on second-generation Muslims' religiosity in Europe. Previous studies were often restricted to the foreign-born first generation; they used narrow measures of religious affiliation and worship; and/or they were single-country studies (Diehl and Koenig, 2009, Phalet et al., 2008, Van Tubergen, 2007). Comparative studies of religiosity among Muslim minorities in Europe remain an exception (but see Connor, 2010). Recent cross-national surveys from the TIES-project (The Integration of the European Second generation, see e.g. Crul and Schneider, 2010) allow comparative investigations of multiple dimensions of religiosity among the Turkish second generation. Due to their different national histories of church-state relations, the four countries in our study – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – are characterized by different opportunity structures for the practice of Islam by Muslim minorities (Bader, 2007, Fetzer and Soper, 2005). Against this comparative background, we assess theoretical expectations of religious decline and vitality in the second generation.

In the following, we first present our theoretical framework and derive hypotheses about individual-level determinants of religious decline and religious vitality in the second generation. Next, we derive hypotheses about contextual differences in the relation between

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 second-generation integration and religiosity from an institutionalist approach to the  
4 incorporation of Islam in European societies. Before putting our hypotheses to a test, we  
5 briefly describe the groups and contexts under study and the data and methods applied.  
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*The hypothesis of religious decline: structural integration and secularization*

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12 The secularization paradigm posits the erosion of religion through modernization processes,  
13 as evident from the progressive separation of church and state and from declining religious  
14 attendance (Dobbelaere, 1981). Religious decline has been firmly established among  
15 European majority populations (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008) and secularization has become  
16 an ideology – in stark contrast with the US. As Casanova (2003, p.19) puts it: ‘Americans  
17 think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to  
18 be irreligious’. Contrary to the US, in European societies religion is commonly portrayed as  
19 hindering immigrant integration (Foner and Alba, 2008).  
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32 Consequently, the classic assimilation hypothesis, which predicts that immigrants’  
33 life chances and life styles will gradually converge with those of natives over time and  
34 generations (Gordon, 1978 [1964]), when applied to the religious domain, amounts to a  
35 secularization hypothesis in European societies. Accordingly, our first hypothesis expects that  
36 second-generation Muslims will be less religious the more they are integrated into the  
37 mainstream (*Hypothesis 1*) in terms of social mixing and socio-economic inclusion relative to  
38 a non-immigrant reference population (Esser, 2001). Specifically, we predict that higher  
39 education and labour market participation as well as intermarriage with a non-Turkish partner  
40 will go together with lower levels of religiosity. Similar predictions can also be derived from  
41 the sociology of religion. Here, the expected inverse relationship of religiosity with education  
42 and labour market attainment is explained through increased exposure to a secular worldview  
43 (Berger, 1967) or through decreased economic uncertainty (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).  
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58 Research among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands (Van Tubergen,  
59 2007, Phalet et al., 2008) and in Belgium (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000, Smits et al., 2010)  
60 largely confirms secularization in the sense of an inverse relationship between socio-

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 economic attainment and religiosity. A more recent analysis, however, indicates an emerging  
4 trend towards religious revival particularly among more highly educated second-generation  
5 Dutch Muslims (Maliapaard et al., 2010). Similarly in Germany, Diehl and Koenig (2009)  
6 found remarkable stability instead of religious decline between migration generations. To our  
7 knowledge, there is no comparable evidence from large-scale surveys on religion and  
8 integration in Sweden.  
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*The hypothesis of religious vitality: religious socialization and reactive religiosity*

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20 An alternative hypothesis expects religious vitality, defined as the continuity of a minority  
21 religion through the religious socialization of the next generation within the family and the  
22 co-ethnic community, in parallel with a notion of ethno-linguistic vitality in socio-linguistic  
23 studies of minority languages (Harwood et al., 1994). Turkish immigrants come from a  
24 majority Muslim society where levels of religiosity are much higher than in Germany,  
25 Belgium, the Netherlands or Sweden (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This raises the question to  
26 what extent Turkish immigrants pass on Islamic traditions and practices to the next generation  
27 who are growing up in historically Christian and highly secularized European societies.  
28 Religious studies document the importance of a religious upbringing so that the children of  
29 more religious parents will themselves be more religious as adults (Kelley and De Graaf,  
30 1997). Accordingly, we predict that the Turkish second generation will be more religious  
31 when their parents visited the mosque more often during their youth and/or when they  
32 attended Koran lessons as children (*Hypothesis 2*).  
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49 A complementary hypothesis of religious reactivity expects increased religiosity in  
50 the second generation in response to societal exclusion and experiences of discrimination.  
51 This hypothesis extends a notion of reactive ethnicity among most deprived second-  
52 generation groups in the US (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) to the religious domain. The reactive  
53 religiosity hypothesis mirrors the inverse relation between socio-economic attainment and  
54 religiosity that is also predicted by the secularization hypothesis. In addition, however,  
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3 reactivity implies a positive association between perceived discrimination and religiosity  
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6 (*Hypothesis 3*).

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10 *The institutionalization of Islam: contextual differences*

11 European nation-states differ substantially in their accommodation of Islam, because the  
12 institutionalization of this minority religion builds on pre-existing national patterns of church-  
13 state relations (Bader, 2007, Koenig, 2007). Distinct institutional pathways thus provide  
14 different opportunity structures for the institutionalization of Islam (Statham et al., 2005).

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21 Among our four comparison countries, the formal accommodation of Islam is most  
22 advanced in the Netherlands. Due to the history of ‘pillarization’ (Lijphart, 1968) and despite  
23 increasing secularization among the majority population, pluralist church-state relations  
24 created opportunities for Muslims to develop their own institutions (Rath et al., 1996). Thus,  
25 Dutch Muslims have established numerous local mosque associations, as well as state-funded  
26 Islamic broadcasting networks and Islamic schools (Doomernik, 1995). From an institutional  
27 perspective, Dutch Muslims were granted formal equality with Christian and other religious  
28 groups from the early 1980s onwards; and they made the most of the opportunities offered by  
29 the Dutch system.

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40 In Germany, the institutional position of Islam is the most underprivileged by  
41 comparison. Due to their formal status as corporations of public law, Christian churches in  
42 Germany profit from taxes collected by the state. In the absence of a centralized  
43 organizational structure of German Muslims similar to that of the Christian churches, German  
44 authorities have refrained from granting Islam the same legal status (Fetzer and Soper, 2005).  
45 Consequently, Islamic organisations in Germany, lacking legal recognition and financial  
46 support, remain disadvantaged relative to established churches.

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56 In Belgium, the status of Islam is formally equal to that of the historically dominant  
57 Catholic Church since 1974. Yet, in order to receive the state funding for religious services to  
58 which they are legally entitled, Muslim communities were required to set up a nationally  
59 representative Islamic council as a partner for the Belgian state (Foblets and Overbeeke,  
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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

2002). Such a council has been established only recently upon the initiative of the Belgian authorities (Manço, 2000, Kanmaz, 2002). Because of the delayed implementation of the recognition of Islam, Islamic organizational structures are less fully developed in Belgium than they are in the Netherlands.

Finally, in Sweden Islam enjoys the same legal status as other religions and Islamic organisations, which are entitled to state funding proportionally to the size of their membership. However, Sweden has historically known a state church, which still counts more than 80 per cent of the Swedish population as its members (Alwall, 2000). Although the privileged position of the Swedish Lutheran Church has been dismantled in the second half of the twentieth century, the legacy of the state church system implies that Islam occupies a relatively marginal position. In spite of recent reforms, the Swedish religious landscape continues to be marked by a quasi-monopoly of the Swedish Lutheran Church.

From an institutionalist perspective, the position of Islam as a minority religion is most equal in the Netherlands and most unequal in Germany, with Belgium and Sweden granting some degree of recognition. Regarding our main research question about the relation between integration and religiosity, we reason that institutional opportunity structures can make the difference between complementary expectations of second-generation religious vitality or decline. Thus, we expect that upward integration will go together with decreased religiosity mainly in national contexts which do not recognize Islam nor facilitate its practice. When Islamic religion is excluded by mainstream institutions, the continued religiosity of Muslims stands in the way of successful integration. Conversely, in national contexts where the state recognizes and accommodates Islam, there will be more room for religiosity also among more integrated Muslims. We therefore predict an inverse relationship between integration and religiosity in contexts where the institutional accommodation of Islam is most restricted; and zero or even positive relationships where Islam has been more fully institutionalized (*Hypothesis 4*).

Institutionalist approaches in migration studies have been criticized for their formalistic and overly static conception of social processes, which would by-pass alternate



*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

resources and forms of agency ‘from below’ as well as ongoing socio-political struggles about institutional inequalities (Bousetta, 2000). Moreover, institutional arrangements may be far removed from public opinion in European societies. For instance, while the institutional accommodation of Islam is most advanced in the Netherlands, the position of Islam and Muslims is highly contested in Dutch media and politics and, despite constitutionally enshrined religious pluralism, Muslims are increasingly and overtly rejected by the Dutch majority population (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Moreover, the capital cities each add their own local flavour to the distinct national approaches of church-state relations. Yet, they are strategic sites for comparative research as the localities where national and local policies intersect and where most minorities are concentrated. Due to the path-dependency of institutional arrangements, distinct national histories of church-state relations impose differential constraints on the development of religious organizations and institutions by immigrant communities. From a comparative perspective, therefore, we expect a long-term impact of institutional arrangements on patterns of integration and religiosity, over and above variation resulting from short-term changes in public opinion and policy. Moreover, we argue that our comparison of capital cities is well-suited to bring out such national differences.

*The Turkish second generation in North-Western Europe*

Turkish immigrants first arrived in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium as so-called ‘guest workers’ and later through family-based migration. (Lesthaeghe, 2000, Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000, Münz et al., 1997). In the Swedish context labour migration has been less important as the country received relatively more refugees (Corman, 2008). Therefore, the Turkish-Swedish population is comparatively small and includes substantial shares of Kurdish and Assyrian refugees. Assyrians, who are mainly Orthodox Christians (Sander, 1990), are excluded from our analysis for reasons of comparability. Turks are the largest non-European minority group in the Netherlands; including naturalized Turks and the second generation, they numbered 0.38 million, which is 2.3 per cent of the total population in 2009 (Statline, 2010). Similarly, in Germany, Turkish immigrants and their offspring are the largest

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

immigrant minority with an estimated 2.5 million members, which constitutes 3.1 per cent of the total German population in 2009 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). In Belgium, Turks are the third largest ethnic minority group, which numbered approximately 150,000 or 1.5 per cent of the total Belgian population in the 2001 Census (Phalet et al., 2007). Finally, in Sweden, the size of the Turkish minority amounted to approximately 60,000 persons in 2000, or about 0.7 per cent of the Swedish population, including the Swedish-born second generation (Westin, 2003).

**Data and Method***The TIES-surveys*

Our analysis draws on new comparative survey data among the Turkish second generation in Amsterdam (NIDI-IMES, 2007, TIES06-07-Netherlands), Berlin (IMIS, 2008, TIES08-Germany), Brussels (CESO-CSCP, 2008, TIES07-08-Belgium) and Stockholm (CEIFO, 2008, TIES08-Sweden). The Turkish second generation is narrowly defined as the local-born children of immigrants from Turkey. Only young adults between 18 and 35 years old were sampled. Different sampling frames and response rates challenge the representativeness and comparability of minority samples in comparative surveys. In Amsterdam and Stockholm, random samples of native-born children of Turkish-born parents could be drawn from population registers. In Brussels, screening had to be applied to addresses in street segments which were sampled proportionally to the numbers of Turkish inhabitants. In Berlin, a random sample was drawn from a list of names generated by onomastic analysis identifying persons of Turkish origin within the population of 18-35 year old German-born residents of Berlin. For further information regarding sampling and fieldwork, readers are referred to the technical reports (Renstrand and Lundström, 2008 for Sweden, Groenewold, 2008 for the Netherlands, Swyngedouw et al., 2008 for Belgium; no technical report is available so far for Germany). Reported response rates were 29 per cent in Stockholm, 30 per cent in Amsterdam, and 31 per cent in Brussels and Berlin. Low response rates are due in part to the quality of available address lists in cities and neighbourhoods with high mobility rates and in part to

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

generally low cooperation rates in inner cities, in young age groups, and in ethnic minority populations (Stoop et al., 2010). These data constraints should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from our comparative analyses.

To ensure that our comparative results are not driven by differential selectivity of Turkish immigrants across the cities, a detailed comparison was undertaken of the characteristics of the parents of TIES-participants, i.e., the Turkish first generation.<sup>1</sup> The comparison revealed very few differences in parental characteristics between the four cities. Most parents matched the typical profile of Turkish guest worker migration to North-Western Europe. Because the parents of Turkish Muslims in Brussels and Stockholm had somewhat higher levels of education, we include parental education as a control variable. Furthermore, we conducted logistic regression analyses to examine differential selectivity of self-categorized Muslims across cities (see Note 4).

*Measures*

*Religious identification* was measured by four items reflecting participants' attachment to a common Muslim identity, e.g., "Being a Muslim is an important part of my self" (see Table 1 for the other items). They rated their agreement on five-point Likert-scales ranging from one (*totally disagree*) to five (*totally agree*).

Four indicators of religious practices were used to form two composite indices, labelled *dietary practices* and *worship*. Dietary practices refer to fasting during the last *Ramadan* and eating *halal* food; worship refers to saying daily prayers and attending religious services (i.e., visiting a mosque).<sup>2</sup> While interrelated, it is useful to distinguish between worship and dietary practices as they form distinct clusters in K-means cluster analyses across the same Turkish Muslim populations (Phalet et al., in preparation).

An additional political dimension of religiosity, labelled *political religion*, is assessed by four statements expressing support for the role of Islam in politics and its representation in the public sphere, e.g., "Islam should be represented in politics and society" (see Table 1 for the remaining items).

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation**Explanatory variables*

To assess the structural integration of the Turkish second generation, measures of educational attainment and employment status were used, along with marital status and ethnicity of the partner as a measure of social mixing in primary ties.

Four categories of *educational attainment* were distinguished based on participants' highest level of education completed or currently attended: lower secondary or less, vocational and academic upper secondary, and tertiary qualifications.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding *employment status*, we distinguish between working (employed or self-employed), unemployed, full-time student, or otherwise inactive participants.

Furthermore, we looked at the *ethnicity of the partner*, with a non-Turkish partner as a proxy for intermarriage outside the ethnic community of co-religionists. We distinguish between participants who had no partner, those who had a partner of Turkish origin, or a non-Turkish partner. Partners were categorized as Turkish when they, or one of their parents, were born in Turkey, thus including the second generation.

Two indicators were used to assess religious childhood socialization. A dummy variable indicates whether participants have attended *Koran lessons* outside school hours as a child. In addition, participants reported the frequency of parents' mosque visits during their youth on a five-point scale ranging from one (*never*) to five (*once a week or more*).

To test the reactive religiosity hypothesis, we used two questions on perceived discrimination. Participants were asked to rate the frequency with which they had personally experienced unfair treatment or hostility due to their background (*perceived personal discrimination*); and how often they thought that Muslims as a group experienced unfair treatment or hostility (*perceived group discrimination*). Although personal and group level perceptions of discrimination are inter-related, moderate correlations ( $< .40$ ) confirm that they are distinct phenomena, with group discrimination being reported more frequently than personal discrimination.

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*Gender* (female dummy) and *age* (in years) were added as control variables, along with *parental education* (dummy which is one if one or both parents have maximally completed primary education). Table 1 displays descriptive information about all variables used in the analysis.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As Table 1 shows, Muslim participants in Stockholm are the least religious of the four comparison groups. Conversely, overall levels of religious identification and practices and political religion are highest among Muslim participants in Berlin. Keeping in mind previously described data constraints, however, mean differences across cities should be interpreted with caution due to the fact that mean levels are more susceptible to sampling bias than the associations between variables (Stoop et al., 2010, Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997).

#### *Method*

Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis was applied to establish measurement equivalence of latent dimensions of religiosity across the four cities for subsamples of self-categorized Muslims.<sup>4</sup> Measurement equivalence is confirmed when the difference in  $\chi^2$  between a four-group model with equality constraints on factor loadings and an unconstrained model is not significant (Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008). Throughout our analysis, we report the values of  $\chi^2$  in relation to the degrees of freedom (df), CFI and RMSEA as indicators of model fit, which is considered to be good if the  $\chi^2$ /df ratio is approaching 1, CFI is above .90, and RMSEA is below .05 (Kline, 2005). Subsequently, we estimated a second-order factor model of religiosity with religious identification, dietary practices, worship and political religion as first-order factors. Using multi-group structural equation models, we replicated the hypothesized relationships of religiosity with religious socialization, structural integration, and perceived discrimination in the four cities, while controlling for gender, age and parental education.

## Results

### *Dimensions of religiosity*

Confirmatory factor analyses largely support the equivalence of the four latent dimensions of religiosity across groups. Loadings of the four indicators on the latent variable religious identification could be set equal across the four cities, as evident from a non-significant  $\chi^2$ -difference between models with and without equality constraints ( $\Delta \chi^2 (9) = 14.806, p > .05$ ) and a good model fit of the factorially invariant model:  $\chi^2 (17, 615) = 27.272, CFI = 0.979, RMSEA = 0.031$ . Concerning religious practices, full factorial invariance of the four indicators of worship and dietary practices is rejected: due to a lower loading of the *halal* item in Amsterdam, the  $\chi^2$ -difference test is significant at  $p = 0.042 (\Delta \chi^2 (6) = 13.081)$ . Because all loadings are significant and positive in the four cities and because the factorially invariant model fits the data well ( $\chi^2 (22, 615) = 39.780, CFI = 0.971, RMSEA = 0.036$ ), loadings of religious practice items are set equal in comparative analyses across cities for the sake of parsimony.<sup>5</sup> Regarding political religion, full factorial invariance was again rejected. The  $\chi^2$ -difference test is significant at  $p = 0.038 (\Delta \chi^2 (9) = 18.041)$  because the loading of the private religion item is non-significant in Stockholm. Again, we set loadings on political religion equal in comparative analysis since loading patterns are similar across cities and because the factorially invariant model fits the data well ( $\chi^2 (17, 615) = 30.104, CFI = 0.959, RMSEA = 0.046$ ).

After establishing the measurement equivalence of religious identification, worship, dietary practices, and political religion across cities, a second-order factor model was estimated specifying one common factor, religiosity, which explains inter-factor correlations between the four dimensions of religiosity. This model fitted the data reasonably well:  $\chi^2 (271, 615) = 512.010, CFI = 0.880, RMSEA = 0.038$ . However, the loadings of the four religiosity dimensions on the second-order factor differ significantly between the four cities, as the model fit is significantly worse when loadings are set equal:  $\Delta \chi^2 (9) = 39.667, p < .001$ . In comparative analyses, the loadings on the second-order factor religiosity are estimated

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 separately in each city while the loadings on the four dimensions of religiosity are constrained  
4 to be equal across cities. Figures 1a, b, c and d show the standardized factor loadings of  
5 religious identification, religious practices, and political religion in each city, revealing  
6 different patterns of religiosity among second-generation Turkish Muslims in the four cities.  
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14 FIGURES 1A-1D ABOUT HERE  
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18 In Berlin and Stockholm, very high loadings (>.80) on all four dimensions of religiosity  
19 suggest rather undifferentiated patterns of religiosity. Turkish Muslims in these cities who are  
20 strongly committed to their Muslim identity also engage more frequently in religious practices  
21 and more strongly support political religion. In Amsterdam and Brussels, in contrast, patterns  
22 of religiosity are more selective; and political religion in particular is distinctive of only  
23 highly involved Muslims. To test our hypotheses, we predict religiosity from indicators of  
24 structural integration, religious socialization, and perceived discrimination while controlling  
25 for age, gender and parental education.  
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*Structural integration and secularization*

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38 With regard to degrees of religiosity, including religious identification, worship, dietary  
39 practices, and political religion, the secularization hypothesis, which predicts religious decline  
40 with the structural integration of the second generation, is not supported in Amsterdam,  
41 Brussels and Stockholm; yet educational attainment is associated with lower religiosity in  
42 Berlin. Logistic regression of self-categorization as a Muslim yields parallel results (see Note  
43 4), which shows that our findings apply not only to the degree of religiosity of the second  
44 generation, but also to religious self-identification. In support of differential associations,  
45 constraining the effects of educational and labour market attainment on religiosity to zero  
46 yields a significantly worse model fit only in Berlin, but not in the other three cities:  $\Delta \chi^2 (18)$   
47 = 21.859,  $p > .05$ . Similarly, having a Turkish partner is associated with higher religiosity  
48 only in Berlin (although a non-Turkish partner has no additional effect on religiosity). In the  
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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 other cities, religiosity is dissociated from the ethnicity of one's partner so that constraining  
4 the effects to zero does not significantly affect the model fit. This is found in all cities except  
5 Berlin:  $\Delta \chi^2 (6) = 7.762, p > .05$ . These findings are in line with hypothesized contextual  
6 differences as a function of the institutional accommodation of Islam. As expected, structural  
7 integration and religion are inversely related in the German capital, where Islam is least  
8 accommodated, yet they are decoupled in the other cities.  
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*Religious vitality and reactive religiosity*

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12 In line with religious vitality, religious socialization has a strong impact on second-generation  
13 religiosity in all cities: Turkish Muslims who attended Koran lessons as a child or whose  
14 parents visited a mosque regularly are more religious.<sup>6</sup> Finally, reactive religiosity is not  
15 supported, as associations with perceived discrimination disappear after taking into account  
16 religious socialization, structural integration, and controls. Accordingly, constraining the  
17 effects of personal and group-level discrimination to zero in all cities does not significantly  
18 affect model fit:  $\Delta \chi^2 (8) = 9.323, p > .05$ . Again, these effects are paralleled in logistic  
19 regressions predicting Muslim self-categorization. Table 2 shows within-group standardized  
20 parameter estimates for the final most restrictive structural equation models in the four cities.  
21 Only effects that are different from zero are included in this model. Squared multiple  
22 correlations indicate substantial explained variances in religiosity in all four cities, with most  
23 explained variance in Berlin and least in Stockholm.<sup>7</sup>  
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

**Discussion**

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57 Against the background of heated public debates, yet scant empirical evidence on the  
58 integration of Muslim minorities in Europe, this study analysed the relationship between  
59 structural integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation. The secularization  
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3 hypothesis, which expects religious decline with increasing levels of structural integration in  
4 mainstream societies, is tested together with a complementary hypothesis of religious vitality.  
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6 The latter expects continued religiosity due to the religious socialization of the second  
7 generation within immigrant families and communities. In parallel, second-generation  
8 religion has been conceived as 'reactive' in response to perceived discrimination. Recently  
9 gathered cross-national data from the TIES-surveys among the Turkish second generation in  
10 major European cities allowed us to examine multiple dimensions of religiosity and to  
11 compare patterns of second-generation integration and religiosity between four European  
12 capital cities: Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, and Stockholm. Across cities, a majority of the  
13 Turkish second generation self-categorizes as Muslim and reports high overall levels of  
14 religious identification and practices, in line with earlier findings of sustained religiosity  
15 across generations of Turkish Muslims (Maliapaard et al., 2010, Diehl and Koenig, 2009,  
16 Phalet et al., 2008).

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18 Comparative analyses revealed distinct components of religiosity, including religious  
19 identification, worship, dietary practices and political religion. Across cities, the same  
20 components constituted different patterns of religiosity, however, with less differentiated  
21 religious involvement among the second generation in Berlin and Stockholm and more  
22 selective patterns of religiosity in Amsterdam and Brussels. In the latter cities, political  
23 religion in particular was distinctive of only a subgroup of highly involved Muslims, while it  
24 was more closely associated with religious identity and practices in Berlin and Stockholm.

25  
26 Turning to theoretical expectations of religious decline versus vitality in the second  
27 generation, we find support for the religious vitality hypothesis across the four cities whereas  
28 support for the secularization hypothesis is restricted to Berlin. Only here, educational  
29 attainment was inversely related to religiosity; in all other cities, second-generation religiosity  
30 was decoupled from structural integration. Differential associations of religiosity with  
31 integration point to the hypothesized moderating role of institutional accommodation. As  
32 expected, integration and religiosity were inversely related in the German context, where the  
33 state does not accommodate Islam as a minority religion. In the other contexts, where there is

*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 some degree of accommodation, religiosity was compatible with the structural integration of  
4 the second generation, in the sense of socio-economic inclusion and social mixing in  
5 mainstream society.  
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10 In line with our religious vitality hypothesis, we find that religious childhood  
11 socialization within Turkish immigrant families and communities strongly predicts continued  
12 religiosity in young adulthood. Second-generation Muslims whose parents visited a mosque  
13 more regularly or who attended Koran lessons as children were more religious later on in  
14 terms of their religious identification, practices and political religion in all four cities. This  
15 finding implies that the regulatory impact of different institutional arrangements is mostly  
16 restricted to that part of the social life of the second generation which is situated outside the  
17 co-ethnic community. Finally, and after taking into account religious socialization, we found  
18 no evidence of reactive religiosity.  
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29 Our findings should be interpreted with caution in light of data constraints. Firstly,  
30 the cross-sectional nature of the data does not permit us to empirically establish the direction  
31 of causality. Thus, we cannot be sure whether in Berlin higher education decreases religiosity,  
32 or high levels of religiosity hinder educational attainment, or whether the negative association  
33 of religion and integration works both ways. The issue of causal direction was not the main  
34 focus of our study, however, and our conclusions stand regardless of whether the negative  
35 association between religiosity and integration in Berlin works in either or both ways. The  
36 strength of the study is the comparative design, which allows us to replicate associations  
37 between integration and religion across four European capital cities which represent different  
38 models of church-state relations. Our finding of differential associations, in particular the lack  
39 of support for an inverse relationship of integration and religion in Amsterdam, Brussels and  
40 Stockholm, strongly suggests that there is nothing inherent in Islamic faith which would stand  
41 in the way of the integration of second-generation Muslims in European societies. The  
42 orthogonality of religion and structural integration is not an artefact due to a lack of variation  
43 in the structural integration of the Turkish second generation outside Berlin, since the  
44 marginal distributions of the four samples in Table 1 show that participants were similarly or  
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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 more dispersed over different integration outcomes in Amsterdam, Brussels or Stockholm.  
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5 Moreover, our analyses take into account competing explanations of religiosity from the  
6  
7 differential selection of the first generation across the four cities; from childhood religious  
8  
9 socialization; and from experiences of discrimination against Muslims. Taking into  
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11 consideration these precautions, it seems plausible that different patterns of religiosity and  
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13 integration between Berlin and the other capitals can be attributed at least in part to the  
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15 cumulative impact of (the absence of) institutional recognition and accommodation in the  
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17 receiving societies.  
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21 Secondly, our findings may be affected by low response rates to the TIES-surveys. In  
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23 combination with different sampling frames, selective non-response implies that we cannot  
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25 assume that the TIES-data are representative of the Turkish second generation, nor that  
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27 participants are similarly selected in the four cities. Yet we found few differences in the  
28  
29 selectivity of the first generation of Turkish immigrants across the four samples. Furthermore,  
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31 we could establish measurement equivalence of latent dimensions of religiosity across cities.  
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33 Finally, our comparative analyses are concerned with differential patterns and associations of  
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35 religiosity rather than differences in absolute levels, which are most vulnerable to sampling  
36  
37 and measurement bias (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997, Stoop et al., 2010). For these reasons,  
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39 the present analysis is a first step towards more comprehensive comparative analyses of  
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41 religion among the European second generation, which should cross-validate our main finding  
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43 of the conditional decoupling of religiosity and integration with other data sources.  
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47 Finally, our comparison is restricted to capital cities. To the extent that the differential  
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49 institutionalization of Islam affects the relation between integration and religiosity, these  
50  
51 effects of national institutions should show up in our comparative analysis. In support of our  
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53 approach, previous research on public claims-making related to immigrant integration,  
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55 revealed more variation between countries than between cities within the same country  
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57 (Koopmans, 2004). Our findings should not be generalized to the national level, however,  
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59 because, with only one city and one immigrant group per country, it is not possible to  
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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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3 disentangle contextual variation at the level of cities or ethnic communities from country-  
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5 level differences.  
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8 Keeping these limitations in mind, our results cast serious doubt on common  
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10 assumptions of an inherent conflict between Islamic religiosity and the integration of the  
11  
12 Muslim second generation in Europe. The fact that Berlin was the exception to the general  
13  
14 rule of sustained religiosity combined with structural integration among the second generation  
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16 highlights the distinctiveness of the German receiving context. Particularly in the religious  
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18 domain, the lack of recognition and accommodation of the Muslim minority implies that  
19  
20 Islam is treated as a second-class religion, leaving little room for a positive attachment to and  
21  
22 active practice of this religion among most integrated Turkish Germans. The absence of a  
23  
24 consistent trend towards lower religiosity with social mobility and social mixing in  
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26 Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm implies that Islamic religiosity does not signify failed  
27  
28 integration. Neither can it be interpreted in any straightforward way as a reaction of the  
29  
30 second generation against perceived discrimination – despite widely shared perceptions that  
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32 Muslims as a group are treated unfairly in European societies. Most importantly, in the  
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34 presence of some degree of public recognition of Islam as a minority religion, structural  
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36 integration is not significantly associated with religiosity. We conclude that religiosity is  
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38 compatible with structural integration in more welcoming receiving contexts which  
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40 accommodate religious diversity – albeit to varying degrees.  
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**Notes**

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49 <sup>1</sup> Results not shown, available upon request. We compared rural or urban origin, year of migration, age  
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51 at migration, migration motives and educational qualifications, as well as parents' employment status  
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53 during participants' youth. Most parents originate from rural areas in Turkey and migrated to Western  
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55 Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with mean age at migration between 18 and 23 years. Most  
56  
57 fathers migrated for economic reasons, while mothers generally migrated for family reunification or  
58  
59 formation. Most parents had little or no formal education, with somewhat higher levels in Brussels and  
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Stockholm. Most fathers were working in unskilled or skilled manual jobs when participants were

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4 fifteen years old, while mothers were mostly homemakers; in Brussels and Stockholm, however,  
5 mothers' levels of labour market participation were higher.  
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8 <sup>2</sup> Because mosque visiting is gendered with higher attendance among men (cf. Diehl & Koenig, 2009),  
9 a direct effect of gender on mosque attendance is included in all models.  
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12 <sup>3</sup> The levels of education distinguished correspond to the International Standard Classification of  
13 Education (ISCED; UNESCO 1997), with low education representing ISCED-2 and below, vocational  
14 referring to ISCED-3B, upper secondary to ISCED-3A and tertiary to ISCED-5 and higher.  
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18 <sup>4</sup> Self-categorized Muslims are participants who indicated that they currently had a religion and that  
19 this religion was Islam. Religious affiliation was used as a routing question in computer-assisted  
20 personal interviews such that participants who indicated that they had no religion did not answer  
21 questions on religious identification and practice. The wording of the routing question deviated in  
22 Berlin where participants were asked "Are you currently religious?" This wording may have resulted in  
23 a greater selectivity of participants who completed the religiosity measures in Berlin. We analysed self-  
24 categorization as Muslims using all independent variables as predictors in logistic regression. These  
25 results (not shown, available upon request) replicate similar context-dependent associations of religious  
26 membership with structural integration, religious socialization and perceived discrimination.  
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35 <sup>5</sup> Moreover, model fit statistics suggest that the distinction between the two religious practice scales fits  
36 better to the data, compared to a model where all four indicators load on one common practice scale.  
37 Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is used to compare these competing models, with smaller values  
38 indicating better fit (Kline, 2005, Hu and Bentler, 1999). AIC is 186.316 for a model with only one  
39 religious practice scale, while a model with two correlated practice scales has an AIC of 155.780,  
40 ceteris paribus.  
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48 <sup>6</sup> The effects of Koran lessons and parental religiosity are not significant in Stockholm, yet constraining  
49 them to zero results in significantly worse model fit ( $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 8.144, p = 0.017$ ).  
50  
51

52 <sup>7</sup> Table 2 also shows the loadings of the religiosity dimensions on the second-order factor after  
53 including all explanatory and control variables. Despite some changes in magnitude, the loadings still  
54 differ significantly between the four cities; constraining them to be equal results in significantly worse  
55 model fit:  $\Delta \chi^2 (9) = 38.733, p < .001$ .  
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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation***Table 1.** *Descriptive statistics*

	N	Amsterdam	Berlin	Brussels	Stockholm
		237	253	250	185
	Range	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)
<i>Religion</i>					
Self-categorized Muslim	0/1	0.70	0.62	0.71	0.63
<i>Religious socialization</i>					
Attended Koran school	0/1	0.58	0.45	0.30	0.30
Frequency of parental mosque visit	1/5	2.38 (2.08)	3.25 (1.46)	2.29 (1.87)	1.69 (1.92)
<i>Religious identification</i>					
Being a Muslim is an important part of myself	1/5	4.31 (0.86)	4.28 (0.67)	4.20 (0.92)	4.55 (0.82)
The fact that I am a Muslim is something I often think about	1/5	3.66 (1.16)	3.73 (1.04)	4.05 (1.01)	3.77 (1.47)
I see myself as a true Muslim	1/5	3.78 (0.97)	4.15 (0.75)	3.87 (1.00)	3.77 (1.31)
When somebody says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt	1/5	3.80 (1.11)	4.20 (0.85)	4.00 (1.08)	3.17 (1.57)
<i>Dietary practices</i>					
Ramadan	1/5	4.07 (1.47)	3.90 (1.25)	3.84 (1.48)	2.75 (1.75)
Halal food	1/5	4.33 (0.97)	3.79 (1.19)	4.49 (1.03)	3.15 (1.50)
<i>Worship</i>					
Daily Prayer	1/5	2.48 (1.51)	3.52 (1.09)	2.37 (1.30)	2.26 (1.23)
Mosque visit	1/5	2.60 (1.38)	3.71 (0.95)	2.59 (1.14)	2.69 (1.39)
<i>Political Religion</i>					
Religion should be a private matter between the believer and God*	1/5	4.25 (0.83)	4.20 (0.86)	4.47 (0.86)	4.85 (0.54)
Islam should be represented in politics and society	1/5	2.68 (1.10)	2.95 (1.23)	2.64 (1.21)	1.84 (1.22)
Islam should be the only and ultimate authority in political matters	1/5	2.25 (1.08)	2.58 (1.33)	2.15 (1.03)	1.22 (0.70)
Muslim women should cover their head when outside the home	1/5	2.72 (1.22)	2.92 (1.44)	2.52 (1.16)	1.89 (1.18)
<i>Structural integration</i>					
Lower secondary education or less	0/1	0.27	0.32	0.25	0.07
Vocational education	0/1	0.38	0.53	0.26	0.24
Upper secondary education	0/1	0.04	0.08	0.26	0.28
Tertiary education	0/1	0.29	0.07	0.23	0.28
Working	0/1	0.57	0.58	0.50	0.72
Unemployed	0/1	0.10	0.21	0.22	0.08
Full-time student	0/1	0.18	0.08	0.22	0.15
Otherwise inactive	0/1	0.13	0.13	0.05	0.05
No partner	0/1	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.50
Turkish partner	0/1	0.41	0.34	0.31	0.40
Non-Turkish partner	0/1	0.04	0.11	0.09	0.10
<i>Perceived discrimination</i>					
Perceived personal discrimination	1/5	1.88 (1.10)	2.11 (0.89)	1.98 (0.98)	1.89 (1.06)
Perceived group discrimination: Muslims	1/5	3.92 (1.27)	3.33 (1.18)	3.35 (1.10)	3.71 (1.05)
<i>Control variables</i>					
Female	0/1	0.54	0.44	0.36	0.57
Age	18/36	24.5 (4.3)	26.2 (5.3)	25.7 (5.2)	25.6 (4.8)
Parental education: one or both primary or less	0/1	0.71	0.80	0.44	0.65


\* This indicator loads negatively on the political religion scale. No standard deviation shown for dichotomous variables.

**Table 2.** *Multi-group structural equation models of religiosity (standardized coefficients)*

	Amsterdam	Berlin	Brussels	Stockholm
N	166	156	177	116
<i>Predictors</i>				
Age	-0.184 *	-0.108	-0.023	-0.196
Female (0/1)	-0.017	0.103	-0.041	-0.206
Parental education	0.013	-0.019	-0.053	0.097
Koran school (0/1)	0.270 *	0.441 ***	0.174 *	0.159
Parental mosque visit	0.373 **	0.434 ***	0.364 ***	0.170
<i>Education</i>				
Vocational (0/1)	0	-0.233 ***	0	0
Upper secondary (0/1)	0	-0.120 *	0	0
Tertiary (0/1)	0	-0.151 *	0	0
Otherwise inactive (0/1)	0	0	0	0
Full-time student (0/1)	0	0	0	0
Unemployed (0/1)	0	0	0	0
Turkish partner (0/1)	0	0.182 **	0	0
Non-Turkish partner (0/1)	0	0.009	0	0
Personal discrimination	0	0	0	0
Group discrimination	0	0	0	0
<i>Loadings</i>				
Religious identification	0.676 <sup>a</sup>	0.876 <sup>a</sup>	0.932 <sup>a</sup>	0.680 <sup>a</sup>
Dietary practices	0.790 ***	0.991 ***	0.677 ***	0.723 ***
Worship	0.802 ***	0.734 ***	0.680 ***	0.743 ***
Political religion	0.446 ***	0.696 ***	0.579 ***	0.541 ***
Squared multiple correlation	0.398	0.635	0.207	0.199


\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

<sup>a</sup> The unstandardized loading of religious identification on the second-order factor religiosity was fixed to one.


*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation***Figure 1(a).** *Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardized loadings): Amsterdam*

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**Figure 1(b).** *Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardized loadings): Berlin*




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**Figure 1(c).** *Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardized loadings): Brussels*



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**Figure 1(d).** *Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardized loadings): Stockholm*



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*Integration and religiosity among the Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation*

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