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
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Stigmatization, Space and Boundaries in De-industrial Burnley

Abstract

For Loic Wacquant (2007; 2008), de-industrialization and the rise of post-Fordism, the weakening of the welfare state, and intensified economic polarization, mark the development of a new age of ‘advanced marginality’. He argues that we have witnessed the intensification of ‘territorial stigmatization’, as specific neighbourhoods within cities face both heightened material and symbolic degradation. Drawing on qualitative interviews with white residents in Burnley, particularly those that openly supported the far-right British National Party (BNP), Wacquant’s notion of ‘territorial stigmatization’ will be explored. The article examines the ways in which such forms of stigma manifested themselves within Burnley focusing upon the negative representations that were associated with areas identified as ‘Asian’ and ‘scruffy white’. The article concludes that these forms of stigmatization were a means through which specific areas were cast as ‘undeserving’ recipients of resources.

Keywords: *Space, stigma, racism, class, whiteness, BNP*

Introduction

For Loic Wacquant (2007; 2008), the urban processes of de-industrialization and the rise of post-Fordism, the weakening of the welfare state, and intensified economic polarization, mark the development of a new age of ‘advanced marginality’. Drawing on the case studies of Chicago’s Black Belt and the ‘Red Belt’ of Paris, Wacquant argues that this phenomenon is characterized by, ‘a dualization of the social and physical structure of the metropolis that has consigned large sections of

1
2
3 the unskilled labour force to economic redundancy and social marginality' (2008
4 p.24). For him, this new form of marginality has three distinguishing features: firstly,
5
6 rising unemployment and instability leads to 'deproletarianisation and the diffusion
7
8 of labour precariousness'; secondly, increasing numbers of people experience
9
10 'relegation to decaying neighbourhoods', as public and private resources 'diminish'
11
12 and competition for scarce resources increases; thirdly, residence in 'a degraded and
13
14 degrading neighbourhood' is accompanied by 'heightened stigmatization' (2008
15
16 p.25). It is the feature of 'territorial stigmatization' (Wacquant 2007; 2008) that this
17
18 article focuses on. Wacquant views this form of stigma as the 'blemish of place'
19
20 (2007 p.67) which becomes assigned to the 'neighbourhoods of exile' that house the
21
22 contemporary 'urban outcasts' (2008 p.169). Residents of such areas are faced not
23
24 only with the material but also the symbolic degradation that, 'is now everywhere
25
26 attached to living in locales widely labelled as 'no-go areas', fearsome redoubts rife
27
28 with crime, lawlessness and moral degeneracy where only the rejects of society
29
30 could bear to dwell' (2008 p.29). Drawing on qualitative interviews with white
31
32 residents in Burnley, particularly those that openly supported the far-right British
33
34 National Party (BNP), conducted as part of an ESRC-funded study, Wacquant's
35
36 notion of 'territorial stigmatization' will be explored. Three issues in particular are
37
38 focused upon; Wacquant recognises that while these forms of contemporary stigma
39
40 share commonalities and exist as a feature of all 'First World' metropolises, they
41
42 differ both within and between national contexts, influenced by patterns of
43
44 governance, racial formation, demography and urban geography. The article
45
46 considers how such stigmatization was expressed in Burnley and what that suggests
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48 about the form such processes assume in the British context. Secondly, Wacquant
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50 primarily conceives of 'territorial stigmatization' as impacting upon areas constituted
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3 by 'racially' or 'ethnoracially'-defined 'others'. It is argued that in Burnley, areas
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5 primarily populated by 'scruffy whites' were also subject to such forms of
6
7 denigration. Finally, the consequences and significance of forms of 'territorial
8
9 stigmatization' will be considered within the context of 'advanced marginality'
10
11 (Wacquant 2008). It will be claimed that this form of stigmatization informs notions
12
13 of entitlement with regards to the allocation of resources. It operates upon a
14
15 'culturalist' sensibility (Alexander 2004) which sees social inequality and
16
17 marginalisation as a manifestation of cultural difference and dysfunction rather than
18
19 an outcome of social, economic, and political processes.
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29 **Stigmatization and socio-spatial polarization**

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32 Wacquant (2008) suggests that since the 1980s, we have witnessed the
33
34 intensification of economic inequalities. This has largely resulted from changes in
35
36 the dominant system of production and the reluctance of the state to address the new
37
38 forms of socio-economic polarisation these shifts have produced. For Wacquant,
39
40 these new forms of inequality and polarisation are both reflected within and
41
42 reproduced through increasingly distinct spatial formations, that exist within an
43
44 emergent age of 'advanced marginality'. He defines 'advanced marginality as a,
45
46 'novel regime of sociospatial relegation and exclusionary closure' (2008, p.2),
47
48
49 Wacquant argues that these formations are subjected to forms of stigmatization-
50
51 perpetuated by journalists, residents, and politicians. Such forms of spatial
52
53 stigmatization have been recognised by a range of other academics (Skeggs, 2004;
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55 Bottero, 2005; Watt, 2006; Sampson, 2009). In Skeggs' own research, for instance,
56
57 she observed how, 'local areas were continually used as shorthand to name those
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3 whose presence was seen to be potentially threatening' (2004 p.112). For Wacquant,
4
5 this stigma acts to repel investment, works to justify increased 'structural violence'
6
7 from above such as institutional withdrawal, intensified surveillance and policing, as
8
9 well as demoralizing and disuniting residents, further limiting prospects for social
10
11 mobility. Wacquant states that this form of stigma falls most heavily upon areas that
12
13 exhibit a combination of racial or ethnic difference and class inequality, whose
14
15 residents have suffered most acutely from new forms of 'post-Fordist poverty'
16
17 (Wacquant, 2008 p.237). This emphasis on how distinctions are made and
18
19 boundaries drawn through space is important as it recognises space as both
20
21 constituted by and constitutive of social relations and patterns of differentiation and
22
23 group formation (Massey 1994; Bottero 2005; Clayton 2009) Such a perspective
24
25 enables us to see how, 'the spatial, itself a product of competing discourses, practices
26
27 and power relations, has the capacity to constitute, constrain and mediate social
28
29 distinctions including race' (Clayton, 2009 p.483).
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41 Wacquant (2007; 2008) focuses on two distinct spatial formations to
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43 illuminate his argument: the 'hyperghetto' within the historic 'Black Belt' of
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45 Chicago in the United States, and the 'banlieues' of the Parisian 'Red Belt'. He
46
47 defines the former as, 'a novel, decentered, territorial and organizational
48
49 configuration characterized by conjugated segregation of race and class' (2008 p.3).
50
51 For Wacquant, the 'hyperghetto' is characterized not just by its acute levels of
52
53 violence, insecurity, and institutional 'desertification', but also by the way it exists as
54
55 a 'specifically racial formation' (2008 p.182). In contrast, he argues that the
56
57 multiethnic make-up of the French 'banlieue' means that here stigma is not 'linked
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3 in a univocal manner to a phenotypical or cultural marker'. Instead, it is based
4
5 primarily on residence rather than being 'jointly spatial-cum-racial' as in the US
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7 (2008 p.181). Such differences illustrate for Wacquant the variations in territorial
8
9 stigmatization across different national contexts. These differences are rooted in
10
11 different demographics, regimes of governance and patterns of racial and class
12
13 formation. Wacquant's differentiation between the neighbourhoods of 'relegation' in
14
15 France and the US, informs then a central aim of this article; to elucidate more
16
17 clearly the forms of representation that the territorial stigmatization of marginalised
18
19 neighbourhoods exhibits within the UK context. Drawing on interviews with white
20
21 residents in Burnley, particularly British National Party (BNP) supporters who made
22
23 strong forms of stigmatization, this article examines how territorial stigmatization
24
25 manifests itself and the forms it assumes.
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36 The article also attempts to address Wacquant's failure to adequately
37
38 consider the stigmatization faced by residents of predominantly white areas of
39
40 'relegation'. For Wacquant, a key feature of stigmatized areas is the existence of
41
42 significant minority populations or 'phenotypically marked populations' (2008
43
44 p.168) While he recognizes the differing constitution of stigmatized areas, he still
45
46 conceives of such formations as being primarily populated by 'racial' or
47
48 'ethnoracial' others, as such areas come to be associated with 'poverty and ethnic
49
50 origin or postcolonial immigrant status' (2008 p.238). For Hartigan, this reflects the
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52 tendency, prevalent within the US, to associate blackness with poverty and whiteness
53
54 with affluence. However, Hartigan observes how the residence of poor whites in
55
56 stigmatized areas of Detroit, also led to acute forms of distinction and distancing. For
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3 him, such processes are evident in the epithet of 'white trash' which, 'designates
4 ruptures of conventions that maintain whiteness as an unmarked, normative identity'
5 (1997b p.46). Hartigan argues that to 'paint ghettos in uniquely colored terms'- as
6 Wacquant does- serves to, 'delimit our attention to the disconcerting complexity and
7 nuance of how race continues to matter, not only in the country's ghettos but in the
8 political debates and the research agendas of those charged with objectifying these
9 troubling sites' (1997a p.340). As contemporary research on both sides of the
10 Atlantic consistently shows, boundaries are drawn and negative attributes assigned
11 not just to minority ethnic groups or spaces, but also to white groups and spaces seen
12 to represent a threat- be it moral, cultural, physical, or social, evidenced in
13 representations of 'white trash' and 'chavs' (Hartigan 1997a; 1997b; 2005; Newitz
14 and Wray 1997; Haylett 2001; Nayak, 2006; Wray 2006; Webster 2008). In this
15 sense, 'geographies of difference...are not just imagined in terms of race, but they
16 also incorporate territorial and class dimensions' (Clayton 2009, p.490). This is
17 particularly significant in the UK context where, unlike the US, notions of an urban
18 'underclass' often focus more heavily upon white bodies and spaces (Haylett 2001).
19 It is argued here that areas deemed both 'white' and 'Asian' in their nature were
20 subjected to forms of 'territorial stigmatization' by interviewees.
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50 'Stigmatypes' (Wray 2006) such as 'chav' and 'white trash' alert us not just
51 to the varied racial or ethnic constitution of the areas of 'advanced marginality', they
52 also suggest that Wacquant may have taken his understanding of differentiation
53 further, considering more fully the various representations of 'urban outcasts' and
54 the sociospatial formations in which they reside. For instance, while Wacquant
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3 recognises that stigmatized areas are broadly associated with danger, degradation
4 and moral degeneracy, such notions coalesce around particular themes and focus
5
6 upon specific bodies. In this sense, not all residents of stigmatized spaces are equally
7
8 burdened by disparate forms of stigma. Wacquant himself notes how the residents of
9
10 'relegated' neighbourhoods, make internal distinctions which include, 'the diversion
11
12 of public opprobrium onto scapegoats, such as notorious "problem families" and
13
14 foreigners, or drug dealers and single mothers' (2008 p.183). However, such
15
16 distinctions- made both internally and externally- place particular weight on specific
17
18 'others', and the form this process of 'othering' will take differs in each context. In
19
20 France, for instance, Wacquant observes how the male 'youths' of the banlieues,
21
22 both 'native and foreign', carry special symbolic weight 'as the chief source of
23
24 disorder, delinquency and ambient insecurity in the city' (2008 p.188). These figures
25
26 remind us that stigmatization rests upon specific representations that operate within
27
28 'multiple registers of difference simultaneously' (Hartigan 2005, p.21). This is
29
30 something which Wacquant, at times appears to overlook, evident in his assertion
31
32 that in the case of the French 'Red Belt', class is more significant than 'race' in its
33
34 formation (2008 p.5). As Hartigan states, the task of the analyst is not to attempt to
35
36 assert which of 'race', class, and gender is more 'fundamental' or assumes primacy,
37
38 but instead to see these social divisions as, 'a series of interlocking codes by which
39
40 patterns of inequality are maintained and reproduced' (2005 p.9). Furthermore, as
41
42 Wacquant himself acknowledges, aspects of 'advanced marginality', including
43
44 'territorial stigmatization', manifest, 'differently in different countries and/or types
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46 of urban environment as a function of the social and political history of which the
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48 city and its divisions are the theatre and the product' (2008 pp.248-49). It is these
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3 different specifications and forms of representation that this article considers in more
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5 detail.
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12 Wacquant is keen to stress that while ‘territorial stigmatization’ principally
13
14 pertains to the labelling and denigration of specific areas, it does not simply have
15
16 symbolic effects. He argues informs particular institutional practices which serve to,
17
18 ‘destabilise and further marginalise their occupants’ (2008 p.240; see also Sampson
19
20 2009). For Wacquant, the development and designation of these areas is linked to the
21
22 sway that notions of the ‘underclass’ hold within the political imagination. This
23
24 construction- of which ‘territorial stigmatization’ is an integral part- serves to ‘sever’
25
26 such areas and those residing within them, ‘from the broader socio-political
27
28 structures of caste and class domination of which it is both an instrument and a
29
30 product’ (2008 p.89). Instead, the explanation for the existence of such areas is seen
31
32 to reside primarily in the cultural dispositions of the inhabitants. Such ideas lead to
33
34 increased disinvestment, depressed property values, and avoidance by outsiders.
35
36 Wray, observes how ‘symbolic boundaries’, if they become widely-believed and
37
38 established can lead to the solidification of ‘social boundaries’. The latter are,
39
40 ‘embodied and materialised in our collective practices, our shared activities and our
41
42 social institutions. Such practices, activities, and institutions give social boundaries
43
44 extraordinary administrative power, authority, and legitimacy’ (2006 p.14). The final
45
46 part of this article considers then the significance of these negative forms of stigma.
47
48 It is argued that the symbolic boundaries identified by interviewees had social effects
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50 as they were the basis upon which claims to entitlement were evaluated.
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52 Interviewees drew upon these stigmatizations as a means of asserting a cultural,
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3 moral and social distance that is highly spatialized through the invocation of
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5 'geographies of roughness' and 'respectability' (Watt 2006).
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10 11 12 **'Territorial Stigmatization' in Burnley** 13

14
15 Burnley is a former textile-town, located in East Lancashire in the United Kingdom,
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17 approximately 30 miles north of Manchester. During the 1880s, the town prospered
18
19 as one of the largest cotton producers in the world, however, by the 1930s the
20
21 industry was in decline. This is reflective of broader shifts in manufacturing in the
22
23 UK, and Burnley has suffered an additional downturn in local manufacturing in the
24
25 last decade. Between 1999 and 2008 alone, the town lost 5,700 jobs in this sector,
26
27 representing a decline of 48.3 per cent. In the same time period, 3,400 jobs were lost
28
29 in total; a 9.4 per cent decline in the number of jobs in Burnley (Burnley Borough
30
31 Council 2010, p.33). Annual Population Survey statistics estimate that in 2008, just
32
33 67 per cent of the working-age population in Burnley were in employment. This
34
35 compares to a rate of 70.7 per cent in 2004 (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.19).
36
37 The lack of employment opportunities has contributed to the population decline that
38
39 Burnley has consistently been experiencing since 1991. The town had an estimated
40
41 population of 88,200 in 2008 compared to 90,600 in 1994 (Burnley Borough Council
42
43 2010, p.3). Between 2001 and 2008, Burnley lost 2.46 per cent of its population,
44
45 compared to an increase of 2.42 per cent across Lancashire (Burnley Borough
46
47 Council 2010, p.12). A significant consequence of this population decline, as well as
48
49 the poor quality of much of the town's housing stock, has been a weakening demand
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51 for housing. In 2004, 23.1 per cent of the town's housing stock was deemed unfit for
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53 dwelling (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.16), while in 2008, 6.6 per cent of
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3 houses were vacant (Burnley Borough Council, 2010, p.56). In 2008 Burnley had the
4
5 lowest average house price in England and Wales (Burnley Borough Council 2010,
6
7 p.58).
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15 The outcome of these interrelated transformations is that levels of deprivation
16
17 within Burnley have increased in relation to the rest of the country. In 2007, Burnley
18
19 was ranked as the 21st most deprived of 354 local authority areas in England
20
21 compared to 46th in 2000. Additionally, 42 per cent of the town's Super Output
22
23 Areas (SOAs) were within England's most deprived 20 per cent, compared to 35 per
24
25 cent in 2004 (Burnley Borough Council, 2008, p.12)). This illustrates Wacquant's
26
27 (2008) assertion that 'advanced marginality' does not refer to a point in time that has
28
29 been arrived at, but rather an ongoing process that is intensifying. While Burnley as a
30
31 whole exhibits significant levels of socio-economic deprivation- such as lower than
32
33 average life expectancy and educational attainment, and higher than average rates of
34
35 crime, incapacity, and unemployment- within the town itself there is wide
36
37 differentiation. Indeed, Webster suggests that one of the most marked features of
38
39 Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley is the, 'juxtaposition and transparency of deprivation
40
41 and affluence between often-contiguous neighbourhoods within relatively small
42
43 bounded areas' (2003 p.104). This reflects the uneven and complex effects of de-
44
45 industrialization and economic restructuring, both between and within places. For
46
47 instance, in the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward, in 2007 all four of the Super
48
49 Output Areas (SOAs) ranked within the 10 per cent most deprived in the country
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51 (Burnley Borough Council 2008, p.12). Furthermore, within this ward the
52
53 unemployment rate in 2007 was 9.4 per cent compared to just 0.7 percent in the
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3 more affluent outer-ward of Cliviger with Worsthorne (Burnley Borough Council
4 2008 p.7) (see Figure 1). Similarly, in Trinity in 2008, 35.4 per cent of the
5
6 population were in receipt of some form of out of work benefits, compared to 10.3
7
8 per cent in Cliviger with Worsthorne (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.29). Indeed,
9
10 it was specific areas of the town, usually exhibiting the highest levels of socio-
11
12 economic deprivation that interviewees identified as particularly degraded and
13
14 degenerate. However, before discussing such views in more detail it is necessary to
15
16 provide a brief discussion of the methodological approach that generated the data for
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18 analysis.
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29 **(Insert Figure 1 here)**
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35 Between June 2004 and March 2005, in-depth interviews were conducted
36
37 with 34 white residents of Burnley aged between 18 and 76, as part of an Economic
38
39 and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded study examining the political
40
41 breakthrough of the British National Party (BNP) in the town. In 2002, the BNP
42
43 secured its first elected representatives in the UK since 1993 as the party received
44
45 9,984 votes. The following summer, with eight local councillors, the party briefly
46
47 became the main opposition grouping following the 2003 local elections. At the
48
49 beginning of 2011, the BNP still has two local councillors. Additionally, during the
50
51 summer of 2001, whites, 'Asians', and the police clashed as a series of disturbances
52
53 swept through the former textile-towns of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley. These
54
55 events have served to ensure that Burnley has been nationally identified as a key
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3 location for debates around segregation, racism, political extremism, and social
4 cohesion. In 2002, an article in the *Observer* labelled the town, 'the unofficial racist
5 capital of Britain' (Harris and Wazir 2002). Following the 2004 local elections,
6 2,000 questionnaires were sent to addresses in the wards that had consistently
7 registered the highest levels of BNP support over the previous two years. This
8 elicited a response rate of just over 12 per cent. Anyone interested in participating
9 was then asked to provide contact details, and these respondents, as well as those
10 subsequently reached through snowball sampling, were interviewed. The interviews
11 were recorded with the consent of the interviewees and fully transcribed by the
12 author, and then coded thematically using a word-processing programme. The
13 sample included sixteen BNP supporters, sixteen non-BNP supporters, and two ex-
14 BNP electoral candidates. The high number of BNP voters in the sample reflected a
15 purposive strategy to engage with as many party supporters as possible. Nineteen
16 men and fifteen women were interviewed. In keeping with the areas of BNP support
17 at the time, those interviewed were drawn more heavily from the relatively more
18 affluent, more homogeneously white wards of the town. However, the sample
19 included individuals from the majority of the areas in the town, and displayed a
20 degree of class heterogeneity while favouring those from the lower-middle and
21 upper-working classes located in the outer-wards of Burnley. The following
22 discussion focuses, primarily on the views of BNP voters, but also non-BNP
23 supporters, examining how negative assertions about specific areas were constructed
24 and articulated. BNP voters, in particular, offer an interesting insight into processes
25 of stigmatization. While BNP supporters more frequently engaged in stigmatizing
26 what were perceived to be 'Asian' and also 'scruffy white' areas (Rhodes, 2011),
27 such views were not exclusive to BNP voters. However, it is true that in comparison
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3 to the rest of the sample as a whole, they engaged in more overt and intense forms of
4 negative attribution towards areas that were seen to be the location for distinct sets of
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7
8 'troubling' behaviours. The material included therefore is not a representative
9
10 account of the views held by white residents across Burnley; rather, it focuses
11
12 especially upon those- primarily BNP supporters- that most clearly expressed
13
14 sentiments of 'territorial stigmatization', considering how such views manifested and
15
16 the nature that they assumed.
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24 **Difference, Degradation, and Danger: The 'Asian' area**

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26
27 One of the most visible aspects of the social landscape in Burnley is the high levels
28
29 of segregation that exist along lines of ethnicity. While the 'Asian'/'Asian British'¹
30
31 population of Burnley comprises just 8.2 per cent of the total population according to
32
33 estimates made in 2005 by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (Burnley
34
35 Borough Council, 2008 p.4), the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward has a majority-
36
37 'Asian' population, with 63.9 per cent of residents belonging to black and minority
38
39 ethnic groups according to the 2001 census. Just two of the town's other fifteen
40
41 wards- Bank Hall and Queensgate- have 'Asian' populations exceeding 5 per cent,
42
43 and both areas neighbour Daneshouse and Stoneyholme (see Figure 1). Through this
44
45 spatial concentration a situation has emerged in which areas have become codified
46
47 according to 'race' (Burnley Task Force Report 2001; Webster 2003; Simpson et al
48
49 2007; Phillips 2008; Clayton 2009). This tendency has been identified particularly
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56 ¹ The 'Asian'/'Asian British' population of Burnley is primarily of Pakistani (5.6 per cent),
57 Bangladeshi (1.6 per cent), and Indian (0.7 per cent) heritage. The term 'Asian' is hereafter used in
58 the way that it was by interviewees in Burnley, who regularly used the terms 'Asian', 'Pakistani', and
59 'Muslim' interchangeably.
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3 within the smaller, de-industrialized towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire. This has
4
5 resulted from historic patterns of settlement, experiences of racism, housing
6
7 discrimination, wage disparity, and socio-economic deprivation that have adversely
8
9 impacted upon minority ethnic communities, concentrating them in the poorest areas
10
11 (Webster 2003; Simpson et al 2007; Phillips 2008) Webster argues that as a
12
13 consequence, in these locations there exist, 'perceptions of ethnic difference that are
14
15 less amorphous, more visible, striking and contrasting than are found in larger more
16
17 multicultural cities' (2003 p.102). This 'racialisation of space' (Phillips 2008) was
18
19 present in the accounts of all of the white residents, not only BNP supporters. The
20
21 Stoneyholme and Daneshouse ward was seen as the 'Asian' part of Burnley. One
22
23 male BNP voter in his sixties stated that locally the area was referred to as the
24
25 'Khyber Pass', which is a mountain passage that links Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
26
27 notion of 'Asian areas' also led to the construction of an asserted racialized
28
29 'ownership' of space, particularly apparent in the accounts of BNP voters. As one
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31 BNP voter, a female living on a suburban estate in one of the most affluent wards of
32
33 town commented on the building of a recreation centre in Daneshouse and
34
35 Stoneyholme, 'There's a new gym opened...all fantastic *from the outside from what*
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37 *we can see*, well to me it's all very elegant, its cost a lot of money but *it's for Asians*'
38
39 (emphasis added).
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52 It was the distinctive 'ethnoracial' demography of the Daneshouse and
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54 Stoneyholme ward on which the 'territorial stigmatization' of this area was based. In
55
56 keeping with the key features of this form of stigma as identified by Wacquant, the
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58 area was seen as a site of social and cultural degeneracy, and the residents its agents.
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3 BNP voters, but also a number of the other white residents interviewed, saw the area
4 as the site of 'benefit-scroungers' and criminals, especially 'drug dealers'. As a
5 female BNP voter in her twenties, living in a privately-owned property in an almost
6 exclusively white, deprived ward stated,
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13 Have a look through the *Burnley Express* there's always somebody
14 been stabbed...there's Asian men raping young girls, addicts given one
15 last chance by the courts and it's a Paki, most of them are Asian or
16 they're drug addicts.
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24 Statistically, the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward does exhibit disproportionately
25 high rates of crime. However, as observed it also has the highest rates of
26 unemployment and socio-economic deprivation in the town, and similarly deprived,
27 predominantly white wards in Burnley, such as Trinity, are also characterized by
28 high levels of crime (Burnley Borough Council 2010, p.86). However, it is clear that
29 the association of the 'Asian' community with crime carried particular symbolic
30 weight. This reflects how, 'A *blemish of* place is thus superimposed on the already
31 existing stigmata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or
32 postcolonial immigrant status' (Wacquant, 2007 p.67). An outcome of this was that
33 Daneshouse and Stoneyholme came to be identified as a 'no-go area' for whites, a
34 view widely, but by no means exclusively held by the interviewees. This was despite
35 the fact that according to the 2001 census approximately one-third (34.3 per cent) of
36 residents in the ward were white. One female BNP voter in her fifties living in an
37 affluent suburb and working in a managerial position stated that Daneshouse and
38 Stoneyholme was becoming a 'no-go area', describing the area as 'intimidating' and
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‘unsafe’. The following Labour supporter, in his thirties illustrates this point through his assertion that,

I think its [Burnley] getting as well to no-go areas. I used to go out collecting money and I used to go into these areas and I would stick out an absolute mile, you go in and you would be the only one [white person] and it is intimidating...I wouldn't dream of walking around there at night now, you just wouldn't dream it.

This association between the residents of the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme ward and crime was not the only way in which the area came to be negatively stigmatized; its perceived physical degradation was viewed as being linked to the ‘cultural’ practices of the ‘Asian’ residents. For instance, one BNP voter, a self-employed male in his forties living in an affluent area of Burnley related an incident when he was working in Daneshouse and Stoneyholme,

I was working with one of the builders that was there, one of my friends got clouted with a nappy that came out of the back window. Now in Pakistan they might throw nappies out of the windows and clean up later on but in England you don't do that, it's disgusting.

Another BNP voter, a male in his fifties living in a detached property on an affluent suburban estate bemoaned what he saw as the material degradation of Daneshouse and Stoneyholme; ‘I will accuse Asians of not looking after their property...it's the old ghetto situation...more Asians come in and they get in that area and they don't look after the property, so very quickly it becomes slums’. Even where residents

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3 disavowed this association between ‘race’ and behaviour, negative stigmatizations
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5 were still often assigned due to the classed nature of the ward. The following quote
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8 from a Labour voter, a university-educated professional in her twenties living in one
9
10 of the more affluent areas of Burnley, demonstrates this; ‘I wouldn’t move to
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12 Stoneyholme or Duke Bar...just because they’re full of scrubbers and I don’t mean
13
14 black or white, I just mean they’re full of scruffy people with scruffy ideas, dole
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16 dossers’. The quotes outlined in this paragraph demonstrate the role that notions of
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18 the visceral and ‘disgust’ play in the assertion of moral boundaries (Sayer 2005)
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26 It was also the identification of Daneshouse and Stoneyholme as a ‘Muslim’
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28 area that informed the negative symbolism it carried. BNP voters in particular
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30 viewed traditional forms of Muslim dress, the persistence of ‘foreign’ languages, and
31
32 the presence of mosques as evidence of the ‘Asian’ community’s inherent difference
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34 and reluctance to integrate into mainstream society and accept the dominant cultural
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36 values of the nation. One BNP voter, a male, former semi-skilled worker in his early-
37
38 60s, stated that he felt that the ‘Asian’ community was ‘drip fed by the mosque’, and
39
40 that ‘They want their own culture. They don’t want to mix with us’. This sense of
41
42 difference- alternately presented as a sign of perceived immutable difference or as
43
44 indicative of an asserted refusal to integrate- was expressed most clearly in the
45
46 account of a female, public-sector worker, who voted for the Liberal Democrats and
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48 lived in a privately-owned semi-detached property in a more affluent area. In
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50 attempting to explain the good relations she enjoyed with an ‘Asian’ ‘Muslim’
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52 colleague at work, she stated how, ‘she’s not like an Asian, she’s like we are’. Here,
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54 individual ‘exceptions’ were often drawn upon by the interviewees; however, this
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3 did not necessarily serve to destabilise the broader assumptions about 'Asian'
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5 communities. This justifies Wacquant's insistence on the importance of considering
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7 national variation in the forms and targets of territorial stigmatization. The
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9 representations of a number of the white residents interviewed reflected more
10
11 widespread national anxiety about the 'problem' of Muslim communities and their
12
13 perceived 'lack' of integration in the wake of the 2001 riots, 9/11, and the London
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15 Bombings of 2005 (Webster 2003; Alexander 2004; McGhee 2008; Phillips 2008).
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17 The notion of the 'Asian' area was the spatial formation through which concerns
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19 over 'self-segregation', crime, degradation, cultural difference, and anxieties around
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21 terrorism and insecurity coalesced. As argued above, 'territorial stigmatization'
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23 involves the identification not just of specific areas, but also specific figures
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25 associated with such locales, that are deemed to be particularly problematic. Here,
26
27 the figure of the young 'Asian' 'Muslim' male held particular symbolic value, being
28
29 seen associated with crime and violence. A female BNP voter in her fifties, living in
30
31 an affluent area stated how, 'I've been stared at in a very intimidating way by
32
33 particularly young Asians who I think are very violent, they're always fighting and I
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35 think its [Daneshouse and Stoneyholme] just not safe'. Such views relate closely to
36
37 broader media and political discourses about the perceived increasing problem of
38
39 rising 'Asian' criminality, particularly amongst young males. These ideas gained
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41 increased currency in the wake of the 2001 riots and have become more frequent
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43 features of contemporary public discourse (Webster 2003; Alexander 2004).
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57 **Degradation and Dysfunction: 'Scruffy white' areas**

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4 It is not only areas primarily populated by 'ethnoracial' groups that are subjected to
5
6 forms of 'territorial stigmatization'. Deprived white areas are also identified as
7
8 spaces of degradation and dysfunction (Hartigan 1997a; 1997b; Haylett 2001;
9
10 Webster 2008; Clayton 2009). As well as Daneshouse and Stoneyholme, poor white
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12 areas such as the Stoops social housing estate, Burnley Wood, and Accrington Road
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14 were also deemed 'problem' areas, viewed as the residences of 'scruffy whites'. For
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16 example, in explaining the deterioration of his former neighbourhood, one BNP
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18 voter, a self-employed tradesman in his early-40s made the following observation;
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23 We had to get out because the area were going down...we just got out
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25 in time before the house prices really dropped...[it] used to be a nice
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27 area...but that's not the Asians because there's not a lot of them down
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29 there, a lot of it's the *scruffy whites* who've moved in (emphasis
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31 added).
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36 These 'scruffy whites' were often equated with minority ethnic groups, and were
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38 charged with criminality, drug and alcohol addiction, single-parenthood, benefit
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40 scrounging, and anti-social behaviour. Nayak observes how these traits coalesce in
41
42 the construction of the 'chav', which bears close resemblance to the 'scruffy whites'
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44 identified in Burnley, symbolizing, 'fear of crime, economic displacement and loss
45
46 of class respectability' (2006 p.824). One female BNP voter, living on a mixed
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48 tenure housing estate commented that, 'they did all Stoops up, but I mean that's
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50 white, it's not Asian, they just run it down. It didn't make any difference'. A retired
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52 financial sector worker in his seventies, who voted for the BNP and lived in one of
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54 the most affluent areas of Burnley made a similar comparison; 'its [Stoneyholme and
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56 Daneshouse] an enclave which is almost 100 per cent Asian, and then of course
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3 you've got Burnley Wood which is almost 100 per cent white, low quality because
4 of the drug addicts who live there'. Similarly, a male BNP voter employed in a
5 managerial position stated that while Stoneyholme had 'known' issues with drugs,
6 Burnley Wood was also identified as a 'problem' area as, 'you've got the worse end
7 of the white population living there'. Even those from more deprived areas- although
8 less frequently or forcefully- still distinguished themselves from other poor whites.
9 An unemployed male living on incapacity benefits in social housing who voted for
10 the BNP, distanced himself and his neighbours from the residents of Stoops, whom
11 he labelled, 'bagheads', 'thieves', and 'pillocks'.
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29 In the same way as the 'Asian ghettos', 'white estates' were also seen to be
30 sites of various dysfunctional behaviours; promiscuity, drug and alcohol abuse,
31 crime and anti-social behaviour were identified as the cultural practices through
32 which 'scruffy whites' areas were identified. Interestingly, while across the sample
33 of white residents issues relating to unemployment, absentee landlords, lack of
34 opportunity, low wages, were mentioned, notions of cultural dysfunction remained
35 preminent. As mentioned, in the constructions of the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme
36 area, the figure of the young, male 'Asian Muslim' carried particularly negative
37 symbolic value. Young, 'scruffy white' males were also identified as particularly
38 problematic prone to violence, benefit-scrounging, and identified with drug and
39 alcohol problems. 'Scruffy white' single-mothers were also often portrayed as a
40 problem, something which was not the case in relation to Daneshouse and
41 Stoneyholme. For one BNP voter, a self-employed, upwardly mobile male in his
42 40s, the 'single-parent lasses with prams' represented the problems of laziness and
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3 welfare dependency that he identified as a key problem in low-wage economies such
4 as Burnley. Similarly, for a male BNP voter in his early-thirties working in the low-
5 paid call-centre industry and struggling to maintain what he saw as a 'respectable'
6 law abiding, house-proud lifestyle in a privately-owned property in one of the most
7 deprived wards in Burnley, single-mothers were a particularly powerful symbol of
8 the moral and cultural degeneracy seen to exist in 'scruffy white' areas. While he
9 felt that areas such as Burnley Wood and Stoops had suffered from what he saw as a
10 lack of investment and the perceived favouritism exhibited by the council towards
11 'Asian' areas, he saw the residents of poor white areas as contributing to their own
12 marginalisation;
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28 Some people like young girls they've got a mindset where I feel that
29 they've seen their mum, they know they can go down to the dole
30 office and get benefits and if they become pregnant they jump the
31 housing queue on the council register they can have 2,3,4,5 kids and
32 get paid £350 a week off the state, and that's their mentality.
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44 Interestingly, similarly to the 'Asian' areas, the Stoops estate- the scene of
45 riots in the summer of 1992- was identified by a number of non-BNP voters as a 'no-
46 go area'. As one manual worker, a Labour supporter who resided in a deprived,
47 multi-ethnic area commented; 'Stoops...you don't walk down there, you don't go up
48 there unless you know somebody up there, you know the area and they've seen your
49 face around a bit, but no I wouldn't go up there, that's another place [like
50 Stoneyholme] that I wouldn't go'. In the same way that 'Asian' ghettos were
51 deemed to be problematic areas, so too were white 'estates'. A powerful way in
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3 which notions of 'white trash', 'white underclass', and 'chavs' have been
4 constructed within political, media, and popular discourses is through the association
5 between these groups, council housing ,and 'problem estates' (Haylett 2001; Skeggs
6 2004; Nayak 2006; Watt 2006; Webster 2008). This was reflected in the majority of
7 the accounts of the white residents interviewed. Watt argues that a consequence of
8 the large-scale privatization of council housing during the 1980s is that,
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Council housing has become a residual 'tenure of last resort' catering
for the economically deprived and socially marginalised...This kind of
stigmatising "underclass" discourse that conflates council housing
with moral decline and criminality, dominates mass media and policy
representations of council estates (Watt 2006, p.779).

Indeed, Watt (2006) points out that housing tenure and residence have become one
of the principle bases upon which social distinctions, particularly between the
'rough' and the 'respectable' are drawn. Skeggs too observes how notions of space
have become a way in which expressions of class difference are most commonly
articulated. She points out how within notions of social exclusion, particular
emphasis is placed on 'geographical and spatial discourses'. Skeggs argues that,
'The highlighting, identifying and naming of "sink estates" as the "worst housing
estates" provides evidence of an actual physical difference between the respectable
and the unrespectable, the deserving and undeserving' (2004 p.89). Despite this
however, it was clear that for many BNP voters in particular, symbolically 'white
estates' were less threatening than 'Asian' ghettos. This perhaps in part reflects the
way in which poor whites are often located somewhere 'between' black minority
ethnic groups and 'respectable' whites (Webster 2008), as well as how they were not

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3 viewed as a threat to nation and locality in the same way that 'Asian' communities
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5 were.
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12 The stigma associated with poorer white areas within Burnley appears then
13 to endorse Wacquant's argument that, as in the case of the French *banlieue*, 'class'
14 becomes more significant than 'race' as the basis for the stigmatization of these poor
15 white areas. However, in reality is the interaction between whiteness and deprivation
16 on which this form of representation rests and derives its potency. For Wray, the
17 'stigmatype' 'white trash', reflects this interaction as it, 'brings together into a single
18 ontological category that which must be kept apart in order to establish a meaningful
19 and stable symbolic order' (2006 p.3). For Haylett, the attention placed on 'abject'
20 whites does not simply relate to the existence of deprivation but rather to the way in
21 which they this category represents 'an ugly contradiction: abject and white' (2001
22 p.352). This is demonstrated through the following quote from a male BNP voter, in
23 his sixties who had spent most of his life working in semi-skilled manual
24 occupations. He retold a story of a local family exposed in the media for
25 fraudulently claiming benefits. What gave this incident its significance for the
26 interviewee, what most infuriated him was how such behaviour could have been
27 committed by white people; 'they were laundering money doing drugs, and drawing
28 all sorts of social and that you know. I mean I'm appalled, they're white people'.
29 The symbolic power of 'scruffy whites' then is the way that they, 'are seen to
30 embody an unsettling mix of whiteness, 'working classness', and poverty' (Haylett
31 2001, p.353).
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Stigmatization and its effects

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it has been argued then that for those white residents that engaged most strongly in forms of ‘territorial stigmatization’, both ‘Asian’ and ‘scruffy white’ areas were subjected to negative forms of representation. Although sharing similar ‘symbolic registers’ (Haylett 2001, p.361), they, were stigmatized in differing ways and within these constructions particular figures such as the young, ‘Asian’ male, and the young white single-mother were assigned especially negative attributions. Similarly, ethnic markers such as religion, dress, and language played a much more significant role in the representations of perceived ‘Asian’ difference. However, what both forms of ‘territorial stigmatization’ share is how marginalisation was seen by the interviewees as resulting from the cultural characteristics of the residents of these areas, rather than as a result of forms of inequality and stratified social relations. Wacquant (2007; 2008) views ‘territorial stigmatization’ as a central feature of discourses that seek to assert the existence of an identifiable, socially and culturally discrete, ‘underclass’. For him, this deflects attention away from social, economic and political processes driving ‘advanced marginality’ in favour of a simplistic discourse that locates inequalities as resulting from dis-embedded cultural choices. As a result, ‘the thematic of the “underclass” has hidden the political roots of the institutional implosion and material collapse of the ghetto, and it has contributed to accentuating the stigmatization and political isolation of its residents’ (2008 p.89). The explanatory power granted to such discourses was reflected in the accounts of the interviewees. For instance, a male BNP voter, a self-employed tradesman in his early-forties living in a privately-owned property in one of the most affluent areas of Burnley equated the degradation of the Stoops estate and Daneshouse and

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3 Stoneyholme. For him, targeting resources at such places was counterproductive as,
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6 'The problem is the way people are allowed to behave in those areas...and if you
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8 don't stop them behaving the way they always have, no matter how much money
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10 you throw at it, they will still end up in disrepair'. Symbolically, this became an
11
12 important way through which individuals distanced themselves from such cultural
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14 practices, as deprivation was explained through perceived cultural difference. It was
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16 noticeable that those white residents who engaged less strongly, or resisted such
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18 forms of stigmatization were less likely to cast deprived areas as 'undeserving'.
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27 As Wacquant argues, 'territorial stigmatization' does not only have symbolic
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29 effects, it also plays an active role in decisions over investment, resource allocation,
30
31 and service provision. Sampson (2009) too observes how negative perceptions of an
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33 area and its perceived 'disorder', serve to further marginalise and stigmatize such
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35 locations heightening deprivation. However, extending the arguments of both
36
37 Sampson and Wacquant, it has been argued that this process applies to areas that are
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39 racialized and classed as 'scruffy white' as well as those that are home to racial and
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41 ethnic 'others'. The tendency to see deprivation largely in terms of cultural
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43 difference and deficiency- prevalent amongst BNP voters in particular- lead many of
44
45 the interviewees to dismiss the idea that resources should be allocated on the basis of
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47 'need'; rather, they should be based on an earned, hierarchically-structured notion of
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49 'entitlement', derived primarily through paid employment, the maintenance of
50
51 property, and adherence to established social and cultural norms associated with
52
53 'respectability' (Rhodes 2011). One BNP voter, a self-employed tradesman living in
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55 an affluent area of Burnley bemoaned how, 'all these grants goes on these poor areas
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3 and it's the sort of folk who aren't working who are in them'. As Wacquant
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5 observes, at a time when rising unemployment and wage insecurity has increased
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7 through the process of de-industrialization, the retrenchment of state provision has
8
9 served to intensify competition for resources. Consequentially, the bases of
10
11 'entitlement', such as secure and well-paid employment, are becoming more and
12
13 more difficult to attain, especially for those residing in areas that have suffered most
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15 acutely through the uneven distribution of socio-economic deprivation. In places
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17 such as Burnley, with disproportionately low-levels of education, higher rates of
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19 unemployment, and depressed house prices, this contest for resources and
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21 'respectability'- as well as the forms of stigmatization that inform such ideas-
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23 become particularly pertinent. This contestation also has an inherently spatial
24
25 dynamic., as, 'declining housing markets... trap residents in area-based ethnic and
26
27 class immobility in ways that concentrate and heighten imagined geographies of fear,
28
29 ethnic conflict and resentment' (Webster 2003 p.96). Similarly, the levels and
30
31 variance of socio-economic polarisation within a limited local geography, serve to
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33 intensify processes of stigmatization and distancing in a context where depressed
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35 wages and house prices contribute to a strong sense of social insecurity.
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48 'Territorial stigmatization' serves not only to marginalise the claims of
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50 specific areas, it also provides a means through which those that don't reside in such
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52 locations assert their own social, cultural, moral distance, encoded in the contrast
53
54 between stigmatized areas and their own 'enclaves of respectability' (Watt 2006,
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56 p.794). In her study of Chicago's Beltway district, Kefalas observed how white
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58 residents, 'inscribe their class-based moral values into their physical surroundings as
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3 they fortify moral and symbolic boundaries against the social forces that threaten
4 their way of life' (2003 p.5). Similarly, for the interviewees, neighbourhood was a
5 means through which notions of 'respectability' and entitlement were articulated.
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Claims were made on the basis, not of clearly identifiable, large collectivities, but instead for 'people like us'- those inhabiting a similar symbolic, and also, social space (Bottero 2005). In contrast, deprivation was widely seen as resulting from the perceived possession of distinct sets of cultural values amongst poor communities. This was evident in the quote of a female Labour voter, a homeowner employed in a professional occupation. She stated how, 'the cultures in deprived areas aren't cultures and morals that I live by, I don't mean cultures as in 'Asian' versus something, I mean general living culture'. It is through this form of identification that symbolic and social boundaries elide, as forms of negative stigmatization not only represent inequality in a particular way but also play a part in its reproduction. This is especially significant in the current social, economic and political climate. Ongoing processes of de-industrialization, rising unemployment, as well as the increasing retrenchment of public resources and services that have resulted from the UK coalition government's Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010, are likely to accentuate these forms of stigmatization and distancing. Indeed, such decisions, as Wacquant suggests, both rely upon 'territorial stigmatization' as a means of public justification, while simultaneously serving to reproduce the social inequalities that lead to their entrenchment.

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