



HAL
open science

Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature

Stephane Straub

► **To cite this version:**

Stephane Straub. Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature. The Journal of Development Studies, 2011, 47 (05), pp.683-708. 10.1080/00220388.2010.509785 . hal-00709551

HAL Id: hal-00709551

<https://hal.science/hal-00709551>

Submitted on 19 Jun 2012

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



**Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the
Macro-level Literature**

Journal:	<i>Journal of Development Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	FJDS-2009-Nov-0010.R2
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscripts
Keywords:	Economic development < Economics, Economic growth < Economics, Investment < Economics



SURVEY PAPER

Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature¹

Stéphane Straub

Toulouse School of Economics, Arqade

Manufacture des Tabacs

Allées de Brienne

31200 Toulouse, France

April 2010

Abstract: *This survey reviews the existing macro-level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development in a critical light. After providing a general framework that casts the problem in the context of an aggregate production function, it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed. This guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity. Finally, building on related research, in particular in contract theory and political economy, the paper spells out several promising research avenues.*

¹ I thank Michael Warlters for initiating this research and sharing stimulating conversations, as well as Marianne Fay, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, John Moore, Jonathan Thomas, the editor Oliver Morrissey, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the World Bank and the University of Edinburgh for insightful comments. Financial support from the World Bank is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Introduction

Infrastructure capital, understood as including transport related facilities (roads, railroads, ports and airports), water and waste water treatment facilities, telecommunications, and energy generation, transmission and distribution, is often mentioned as a prerequisite for the success of development policies and has therefore been for some time an important topic on the agenda of politicians and development practitioners that endow it with many virtues. Since the late 1980s, economists have produced hundreds of empirical papers on the subject, mostly making use of macro-level cross country or cross state data. Despite all this accumulated evidence, the link between infrastructure availability and economic productivity or growth is still subject to considerable uncertainty and debate.

This survey takes stock of the existing macro-level literature in order to see how 15 years of sustained research have enhanced our understanding of this major development issue. To assess these contributions, it provides a general framework that spells out the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function. It then signals in the context of this framework what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed. This guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies, which seeks to identify to what extent answers have been provided to these key questions and discusses the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity. Finally, building on related existing research, in particular in contract theory and political economy, it spells out several promising research avenues.

Infrastructure: A Review of Issues.

Infrastructure matters first because it provides key final consumption items to households, particularly water and to a lesser extent energy and telecommunications. Overall, a rule of thumb is that between one third and one half of infrastructure services

1
2
3 are used as final consumption by households (Prud'Homme, 2004; Fay and Morrison,
4 2007).
5
6

7
8
9 Moreover, basic services such as water and electricity often occupy a significant fraction
10 of poor households' budget; Foster and Yepes (2005) show that households in developing
11 countries spend a significant fraction of their income on water and electricity. For
12 example, in a sample of Latin American countries, households in the poorest quintile
13 often spend more than 5% of their income on water and more than 7% on electricity. In
14 East Asia, figures from ADB, World Bank, JICA (2005) for 2003 show that the average
15 share of total household expenditure spent on water services varies between 0.8% (China)
16 and 3.2% (Cambodia), but can reach up to 16-33% for some of the poorest households in
17 Indonesia for example. As for energy, average spending was 2.9% for Vietnam, 7.6% for
18 China, 9% for Indonesia and 24% for Cambodia. From another angle, looking at the
19 impact of privatization on welfare, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) show that service
20 extension to previously unconnected customers resulted in large welfare gains for the
21 poorest households, while Boccanfuso et al (2009) show that reform of electricity pricing
22 has important distribution effects.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35 The other half of infrastructure services corresponds to intermediate consumption, mostly
36 by firms. For small producers and firms of developing countries, access to distant
37 markets and contacts with potential clients rely on the existence of a suitable and
38 relatively cheap transport and telecommunication network. Specific channels through
39 which productivity costs may emerge span an array of phenomena that go from the
40 complete inability to access certain markets in some rural areas, to the impact of
41 deficiency in infrastructure sectors on logistic costs and inventory levels (Guasch and
42 Kogan, 2001).¹ Recently, the development of mobile telephony has been shown to have
43 an important effect on the ability to conduct business, for example in remote parts of
44 Africa (Vodafone, 2005) and Asia (Jensen, 2007). Similarly, electricity is a vital input for
45 many industrial and service activities. Deficient electricity networks, plagued by frequent
46 power outages and unstable voltage, induce high costs and even deter some type of
47 investments (Alby, Dethier and Straub, 2009).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 Indeed, people living in developing countries are well aware of how infrastructure
6 shortcomings affect many aspects of their daily life and work.² Tap water that is available
7 only a few hours a day, frequent power outages causing the breakdown of home
8 appliances and machinery, communities that find themselves isolated each time it rains,
9 frequently collapsed bridges, newly constructed roads already full of potholes, expensive
10 mobile phone services as the only option when the hope of getting a fixed line installed is
11 a distant and costly dream, are all common stories in these countries. At the
12 entrepreneurial level, in surveys assessing the investment climate, businesses usually rank
13 deficient infrastructure as an important barrier to their operation and growth. For
14 example, the World Bank investment climate assessment (ICAs) indicate that a large
15 proportion of respondents (between 20% in East Asia and the Pacific, and 55% in the
16 Middle East and North Africa, as well as Latin America) view any of electricity,
17 telecommunications or transport as a major or severe obstacle to doing business.³
18 Similarly, 33% of Japanese firms operating in Vietnam consider poor infrastructure as the
19 major obstacle to their business (ADB, World Bank, JICA, 2005).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 In this context, there is an intuitive presumption that infrastructure levels and quality
34 matter for firms' productivity and growth, and that a large part of the output and
35 productivity differences that we observe across countries could be due to different
36 endowments of such capital.⁴ This would be true if key infrastructure services, such as
37 transport, energy or communications, matter in a strongly complementary way to other
38 productive input, and as such may constitute major bottlenecks if not or insufficiently
39 available.⁵
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 However straightforward the presumption might appear, it is subject to considerable
49 dispute based on both theoretical and empirical arguments. Prominent scholars have
50 contested the notion that shortage of capital could credibly account for the large
51 productivity differences between developed and developing countries.⁶ Prescott (1998)
52 points to differences in the incentive structure prevailing in these countries as a leading
53 alternative candidate explanation. Although he does not specifically discuss infrastructure
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 capital, considering instead general physical as well as additional forms of intangible
4 capital such as human capital, firm-specific learning-by-doing and organization capital,
5 his approach might prove quite useful when applied to infrastructure, as it signals
6 incentive arguments, applied specifically to infrastructure delivery and maintenance, as a
7 potentially important topic that has largely been ignored in the literature. Formal models
8 can be found in Kocheerlakota (2001), who focuses on the interaction between limited
9 enforcement and inequality to explain the failure to adopt high-TFP technologies, and
10 Bental and Demougin (2006), who explain productivity differences by endogenous
11 differences in incentive schemes along the development path.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21 Taking an alternative perspective, Banerjee and Duflo (2005) stress the huge differences
22 in rate of returns within countries, so that many firms in developing countries are in fact
23 not taking advantage of available technologies and investment opportunities. They point
24 to “non-aggregative” reasons why this might be the case: government failures
25 (inadequate regulations, excessive interventions), credit constraints and failing insurance
26 markets, intergenerational constraints, among others.⁷ Then, adding to the infrastructure
27 capital stock may fail to significantly boost productivity as long as other types of
28 bottlenecks remain.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37 Polar views are also found in the large empirical literature that developed in the last 15 or
38 20 years to try to assess the real impact of infrastructure on output, growth and
39 productivity. Authors have come up with everything from hugely positive output
40 elasticities, as in the seminal work of Aschauer (1989) that launched a flurry of
41 subsequent research, to zero and even negative elasticities. Of course, results are not
42 always strictly comparable due to differences in the samples and time periods under study
43 (covering alternatively time-series data for a single country, worldwide cross country
44 samples or single country state-level panels) and econometric techniques used. We will
45 discuss below to what extent these disparities may account for the variations in results
46 found in the literature.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 On top of an ever growing literature, several surveys have by now extensively reviewed
4 the literature on the effects of infrastructure on output and growth, comparing and
5 contrasting the different methodologies available and the different results obtained. From
6 Gramlich (1994), who focused mostly on the US aspect of the debate to Sturm, Kuper
7 and de Haan (1998) and Romp and de Haan (2005) among others, these reviews have
8 compared different methodologies and results, trying to evaluate to what extent the
9 available results allowed the identification of potential shortages in infrastructure and
10 focused on policy-oriented questions such as the best way to finance infrastructure or its
11 contribution to development (Prud'homme, 2005). Gramlich (1994) had 51 references,
12 Sturm, Kuper and de Haan (1998) 97, of which 33 were from 1994 onwards, and Romp
13 and de Haan (2005), building on the previous survey, had 93 references, of which 59
14 were from 1998 onwards.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26 The structure of this paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
27 framework that will be used to structure the discussion of the empirical evidence. Section
28 3 then reviews a sample of macro-level empirical studies in the light of this framework,
29 and discusses the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of
30 infrastructure on output and productivity. Finally, section 4 considers potentially fruitful
31 developments integrating incentive arguments and shows how these relate to the key
32 policy questions that are still on the agenda, and section 5 concludes.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 **2. A Theoretical Framework**

42
43
44
45
46 To structure the analysis, it is useful to put the discussion of the different effects of
47 infrastructure on growth in a common framework. This debate can be framed by starting
48 with a general form of the aggregate production function used in most of the literature:
49
50
51

$$52 \quad Q = A.F(K, L, I(K_I)), \quad (1)$$

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Where Q is real aggregate output, K is (non-infrastructure) aggregate capital stock, K_I the infrastructure capital stock, L aggregate hours worked by the labour force, and $I(K_I)$ is an intermediate inputs variable.⁸ A is here a standard productivity term, which allows for shifts in the production function. In this framework, changes in K_I lower the cost of related intermediate inputs, resulting in what Hulten, Bennathan and Srinivasan (2003) call a *market-mediated effect* of infrastructure. In this framework, at the end of each period, agents get the return from their investments in physical and human capital and consume the realized output, maximizing some utility function.⁹

There are several reasons to make infrastructure K_I enter the production function through the services $I(K_I)$ provided by this type of capital, rather than simply as an additional factor of production as is often done in the literature (Romp and de Haan, 2005). First, introducing K_I directly assumes that infrastructure has pure public good attributes and produces services proportional to the stock of infrastructure in a non-rival and non-excludable way. However, this is only partially true as infrastructure is increasingly mediated through markets and has characteristics of standard private goods. In this case, its effect should indeed go, as in (1), through the production of specific services, like transport, communications, and so forth, that enter firms' production functions.¹⁰ Second, despite the increasing market mediation of infrastructure, there is also strong evidence that its costs and prices are largely not reflecting "fundamentals" of these activities, so it is implausible that this type of capital is remunerated according to its marginal productivity, even in a world of constant returns to scale.¹¹ When the unit cost of infrastructure is not market determined, it is therefore questionable to include it as a factor in the production function, as firms would not be able to make informed decisions on the cost of the amount of infrastructure capital they use (Duggal, Saltzman and Klein, 1999). This has prompted several authors to instead consider that infrastructure is part of the total factor productivity term A , for example because it influences productivity by lowering costs or through economies of scale resulting from market expansion. A generic formulation would be:

$$Q = A(\theta, K_I).F(K, L, I(K_I)), \quad (2)$$

1
2
3
4
5 where it is made explicit that outward shifts in the efficiency term A may come from two
6 sources: efficiency-enhancing externalities specifically linked to the accumulation of
7 infrastructure capital, and any other type of efficiency-enhancing externalities θ . To sum
8 up, in what follows we will refer to the market-mediated effect, through the intermediate
9 inputs, as the “*direct*” effects of infrastructure, while the efficiency-enhancing
10 infrastructure externalities will be characterized as “*indirect*” effects.
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18 Note that at this stage we make no specific assumption on the nature of returns to scale,
19 leaving open the possibility of diminishing, constant or increasing returns. In other
20 words, this framework is compatible with both a neoclassical exogenous growth model
21 and an endogenous growth model. In particular, it can accommodate externalities
22 generating some type of endogenous growth process in the logic of the AK model for
23 example, a point to which we come back below.¹²
24
25
26
27
28

29
30 This framework allows us to highlight three sets of issues that merit consideration. The
31 first of these deals with the magnitude and nature of the effects of infrastructure on
32 output. This again may be divided in three sub-questions, starting with the obvious one,
33 addressed in most of the empirical literature, namely the simple comparison of the
34 elasticities of output with respect to the two types of capital K and K_I .
35
36
37
38
39

40
41 The second important question is whether there are some sizable indirect infrastructure
42 effects, which raises the problem of disentangling direct vs. indirect effects of
43 infrastructure capital and deriving their relative signs and magnitude. Thirdly, a related
44 issue concerns the relative importance of θ and K_I in explaining the observed shifts in
45 $A(\cdot)$. Advocates of the “infrastructure matters a lot” view would argue that most of the
46 gains in productivity over time ultimately stem from improved infrastructure services
47 (K_I), while at the other extreme, it would be argued that other types of externalities (θ),
48 which we discuss in more detail below, are responsible for the gains. Between these two
49 extremes, some complementarities may exist between both dimensions, so that the
50 potential external benefits from infrastructure services only materialize in the presence of
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 the right set of incentives, for example at the level of the regulatory framework, of the
4 political game, and so forth. Before discussing the theoretical motivations for these
5 questions, we summarize them formally:
6
7
8
9

10 Question set 1: Magnitude and nature of the effects of infrastructure on output.

- 11
12 A. Comparison of the output elasticities of K and K_I .
13
14 B. Can we disentangle direct and indirect effects?
15
16 C. If indirect effects can be estimated, what are the respective contributions of
17 generic (θ) versus infrastructure (K_I) externalities to shifts in productivity (A)?
18
19 Are there interactions between both?
20
21
22

23 The theoretical underpinning of growth externalities can be found in several literatures,
24 including the endogenous growth theory¹³ and the new economic geography.¹⁴ As for
25 specific infrastructure related externalities, a few examples include higher quality
26 electricity supply making possible the use of more sophisticated machines, and better
27 transport infrastructure that, by lowering transport costs, leads to economies of scale, a
28 different pattern of agglomeration and better inventory management (Hulten et al., 2003;
29 Baldwin et al., 2004). Other potential channels involve the pattern of specialization of
30 agents, as well as incentives to innovate as the transport and communication
31 infrastructure, and therefore access to market, change. Economies of scale due to network
32 externalities are still another important explanation in the case of network industries.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 As for more general types of externalities, the main candidate category is a broad one
43 labelled “incentives”. Prescott (1998) argues that the large observed industry-level
44 differences in productivity among developed countries such as the US, Japan, Germany,
45 the UK and France, can hardly be attributed to differences in skills or the stock of useable
46 knowledge, and must instead be related to constraints such as laws, regulations or union
47 power. For example, drawing on Wolcott (1994), he argues that productivity differences
48 between Indian and Japanese cotton mills, in the period 1920 to 1938, can be traced back
49 to the ability of workers to resist organizational changes, itself due to differences in the
50 composition of the population of workers, rather than to differences in technology.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Similar reasons appear to explain the century-long pattern of productivity changes in
4 strongly unionized coal mining in the US, with surges in productivity only occurring
5 when changes in the environment (competition from low-price oil and from non-
6 unionized mines) presented workers with an alternative between changing work practice
7 to allow the use of more efficient technology or seeing the mines closed.
8
9

10
11
12
13
14 Recent contributions that blend endogenous growth theory with contract theory are
15 promising avenues to understand how the incentive structure prevailing in key areas such
16 as R&D or government services affect the growth path of an economy (for example
17 Martimort and Verdier, 2004; Sarte, 2002; Erlich and Lui, 1999). As for geographical
18 linkages, Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) provide microeconomic evidence of changes
19 in individual and geographical specialization patterns following the green revolution in
20 India, with industrial investment clustering in low agricultural productivity regions where
21 wages were lower. An intuitive question here is to determine to what extent the changes
22 in regional specialization and the agglomeration of industrial and agricultural activities
23 have been mediated or constrained by the availability of key infrastructure like roads and
24 telecommunications, suggesting the relevance of potential correlations or
25 complementarities between the different types of externalities.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37 This points to another key question implicit in the theoretical framework presented
38 above, namely whether an increase in the infrastructure capital stock will have a
39 permanent or only a transitory effect on growth of per capita income in the specific
40 geographical and temporal setting under study.
41
42
43
44

45
46 Question Set 2: Is the effect of additional infrastructure investment a permanent or a
47 transitory one?
48
49

50
51 Ultimately, the question boils down to whether we believe that infrastructure (or its
52 combination with other policies) generates enough externalities to induce constant returns
53 on aggregate and leads to endogenous growth, in which case it will have a permanent
54 effect on the growth rate, or that we are in a standard neoclassical case with decreasing
55
56
57
58
59
60

returns where any investment in infrastructure will only have transitory effects, increasing the level of output but not the long-run growth rate. Formally, consider a simplified version of our theoretical framework taking a Cobb-Douglas specification “à la Barro (1990)” of the form:

$$Q = (A \cdot K_I^\eta) \cdot K^\alpha \cdot L^\beta \cdot L^\gamma, \quad (3)$$

Where the first term in parenthesis is the productivity term, with η its elasticity with respect to infrastructure capital and, to focus on the question at hand, we have assumed away other sources of productivity growth, and introduced infrastructure capital directly as an additional factor of production. The point is that even if we assume decreasing returns to scale to the direct reproducible factors of production, that is, $\alpha + \beta < 1$, it could be the case that infrastructure externalities, captured by the parameter η , lead to constant returns to scale (CRS) on aggregate, i.e., $\alpha + \beta + \eta = 1$. Then, the overall growth rate of output is equal to the sum of the growth rates of general and infrastructure capital: $\hat{q} = \hat{A} + \alpha \hat{k} + \beta \hat{k}_I$ (where \hat{y} denotes the rate of growth of a given variable y in per capita terms). Anything that increases this growth rate (understood as maintenance and additions to the existing stock), will raise permanently the growth rate of the economy. Alternatively, if $\alpha + \beta + \eta < 1$, the growth rate will ultimately converge back to its initial level.

Note that this is not to say that a transitory positive shock, like the huge infrastructure investment in Vietnam since 1995 (near 10% of GDP on average) or in Thailand since 2001 (above 15% of GDP), would not be desirable. If it has the effect of shifting the economy to a higher level of output, even with the growth rate then going back to its previous level, this may still be a desirable policy, subject to cost-benefit considerations.

Potential reasons for aggregate CRS are rife in the literature.¹⁵ These include the effect of infrastructure capital availability and quality (through its maintenance), on private capital durability. This is clear for example in the case of roads for vehicles (See Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2009b), and electricity for machines connected to unstable voltage lines.

1
2
3 A closely related aspect has to do with adjustment costs to infrastructure deficiencies,
4 which can take the form of investments in palliative private investments, such as
5 electricity generators (see Alby, Dethier and Straub, 2009). Another dimension has to do
6 with labour productivity, which infrastructure may indirectly affect through several
7 channels, including some proximate ones such as reduced commuting time and better
8 communication technology, and also improvements in health (especially for water and
9 waste water treatment) and education. Finally, a number of infrastructure investments
10 have been shown to induce large economies of scale and scope. For example, a better
11 transport infrastructure may lead to more efficient inventory management, different
12 patterns of agglomeration and changes in the pattern of specialization of agents, as
13 stressed in the economic geography literature (see Baldwin et al., 2004). Yet another
14 channel could arise if network externalities imply returns that are higher at higher level of
15 coverage (at least for some type of services/sectors), providing one possible mechanism
16 through which a one time investment in infrastructure, leading to cross a threshold in
17 terms of service coverage, may have permanent effects on the growth rate.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32 Finally, another way to look at this debate is to think in terms of rate of returns to
33 infrastructure. If such rates of return are higher in situations of under provision,
34 characteristic of many developing countries, but decline as the stock of infrastructure
35 increases, infrastructure is likely to provide a one time boost to growth but not to have a
36 permanent effect. This then raises the question of the optimality of infrastructure stocks.
37
38
39
40
41

42 Question Set 3: Can we identify a country's optimal infrastructure stock?
43
44
45

46 Given the (at least partial) public good nature of infrastructure, determining the optimal
47 level of the infrastructure stock would require equating the social marginal benefits to
48 marginal costs (Romp and de Haan, 2005). Turning back to an even simpler specification
49 of our production function, of the type:
50
51
52
53

$$54 \quad Q = A \cdot K^\alpha \cdot K_f^\beta \cdot L^{1-\alpha-\beta}, \quad (4)$$

55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 and assuming as in Barro (1990) that infrastructure investment is a fixed fraction τ of
4 total savings, it can be shown that there is a growth- and welfare-maximizing level of
5 investment in infrastructure, given by $\tau^* = \beta/\alpha + \beta$. Canning and Pedroni (2004) show
6 that with added stochastic disturbances over time to productivity and infrastructure
7 investment (of the type $\tau_t = \underline{\tau} + \mu_t$), a positive shock to infrastructure investment will
8 increase income per capita as long as $\underline{\tau} < \tau^*$, and decrease it when $\underline{\tau} > \tau^*$. In this model,
9 the marginal cost of increasing infrastructure investment is the diversion of resources
10 from other productive use, while the marginal benefit is the gain in long run income.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20 However, as discussed in Pritchett (1996 and 2000), in practice there is no reason to
21 believe that infrastructure investment is determined as a result of equalizing the cost and
22 the benefit of infrastructure, as government are generally not profit maximisers.
23 Moreover, the determination of the exact mapping between investment and the actual
24 value of infrastructure created is a major challenge, because of lack of efficiency in
25 public investment, corruption and pork-barrel, and specific redistributive concerns,
26 among others. Public financing of infrastructure investment is even more complicated in
27 federal or decentralised systems (e.g. Josie et al, 2008). Therefore, even if one were able
28 to assess that a country's stock of infrastructure is below its optimal level, implementing
29 the obvious policy recommendations runs into the specific difficulty of uncovering the
30 value of the stock of infrastructure created by an additional dollar of investment. Indeed,
31 in countries where the efficacy of infrastructure capital is very low, Pritchett (1996)
32 indicates that a more desirable course of action may be to raise efficiency (for example
33 through maintenance) before generating new investments.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

46 Finally, there are additional issues with this macroeconomic approach. Indeed, one could
47 imagine situations characterized both by an adequate aggregate stock of infrastructure
48 and specific local bottlenecks. This would arise for example if roads development
49 concentrates in specific regions for political reasons,¹⁶ or if the conditions that determine
50 the optimal level of stock of infrastructure for private business development, for example
51 labour regulation, vary from regions to regions as shown for Indian states in Besley and
52 Burgess (2004).
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 The next section attempts to systematically organize what can be learned from the
6 existing empirical literature according to this framework.
7
8
9

10 11 **3. The Empirical Evidence** 12

13
14
15
16 This section reviews the evidence from the literature on the questions set out above. The
17 discussion draws in part on analysis of 30 macro-level studies of the link between
18 infrastructure and economic performance (for details see online Appendix and Straub,
19 2008).
20
21
22

23 24 25 **3.1. The output elasticity of infrastructure (question 1.A)** 26

27
28
29
30 Most of the available empirical evidence focuses on estimating the output elasticity of
31 infrastructure capital, by adding some measure of infrastructure in a specification
32 containing general capital as an explanatory variable (see Table A.1 in Appendix 2). The
33 first generation of studies on US state-level data, such as Aschauer (1989), Munnell
34 (1990) and Ford and Poret (1991), found output elasticities of public capital varying
35 between 0.31 and 0.54. Estimates of the marginal product of a unit of public capital from
36 these elasticities are bound to be approximate, as the results are very sensitive to
37 measurement errors in the ratio of output to public capital, but the rough implication is a
38 marginal product around 100%, meaning that infrastructure would pay for itself in one
39 year or less (Gramlich, 1994). For this reason, these numbers have often been dismissed
40 as unrealistic. In particular, as Gramlich (1994) pointed out, they raise the question of
41 why capital does not flow to infrastructure investment if rates of return there largely
42 outperform those of other types of investments.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53
54
55 A first line of response to this critique relies on industry-level studies. For example,
56 Fernald (1999) similarly estimates huge rates of return on investment in roads for US
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 industries that use roads more intensively: he finds an output elasticity of road investment
4 around 0.35. After noting that this is consistent with the initial results from Aschauer
5 (1989), he argues that the massive interstate highway network built in the 50s and 60s
6 generated a one-time boost in productivity (of approximately 1%) rather than a
7 permanent one, also explaining the post-1973 slowdown in productivity.¹⁷ In short, initial
8 large investments in infrastructure may produce very high rates of return, but this is no
9 guarantee that additional investments would also be characterized by the same returns. In
10 this view, Aschauer's results adequately captured the pre-1973 period. In this view, once
11 basic infrastructure is in place, adequate investment in maintenance might actually have a
12 higher rate of return than new investment, as argued in Hulten (1996), who uses a cross-
13 country sample and finds that the impact of an effectiveness index of infrastructure is
14 more than seven time larger than that of public capital itself (see also Rioja, 2003).

25
26 *Addressing endogeneity sources of infrastructure*
27

28
29 Holtz-Eakin (1994) argues that results are substantially modified when econometrically
30 taking into account state- or region-level unobserved effects.¹⁸ Indeed, when introducing
31 fixed state-level effects in US state panel data, Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Garcia-Milà,
32 McGuire and Porter (1996) find the effect of public capital to be insignificant.¹⁹
33 Accordingly, in the second generation of studies incorporating these concerns, the
34 positive estimates found were significantly smaller than those of Aschauer (1989), with
35 elasticities around 0.1 to 0.2 (Romp and de Haan, 2005). Note, however, that these
36 numbers are still quite high, as for the US case for example they imply rates of return of
37 between 25% and 50%. Consistently, more recent studies find similar elasticities:
38 Calderón et al. (2009) estimate the elasticity of a synthetic infrastructure index to be
39 between 0.07 and 0.10, while Bom and Ligthart (2008), in a meta-analysis of 67 studies
40 using public capital measures, come up with an unconditional output elasticity of public
41 capital of around 0.15, corresponding for example for the US to a marginal productivity
42 of around 30%. To the extent that estimations omit some relevant aspects for which
43 suitable proxies are typically difficult to find, the risk is that estimates of the total effect
44 of infrastructure are artificially inflated because of this potential correlation between
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 infrastructure capital and the error term. Fixed-effects or first differencing may help
4 address this problem under the assumption that the unobserved effects are time invariant,
5 but would fail if these effects vary across time.²⁰ In this case, an instrumental approach
6 such as the one described in the following paragraphs would be appropriate.
7
8
9

10
11
12 Beyond endogeneity induced by unobserved effects, an additional problem pointed out in
13 early studies was the potential reverse causality between output and infrastructure
14 investment, with the potential upward bias in results it could generate. Endogeneity
15 caused by reverse causality may not be entirely solved by the use of fixed effects,
16 implying the necessity of some sort of instrumental variable approach.²¹ Several types of
17 instruments have been used here, including the use of lagged values of the explanatory or
18 other related variables. While standard tests, such as Sargan tests, in general seem to
19 support this strategy, there are several reasons why lagged variables are only weak
20 instruments. In particular, the effects of infrastructure may take time to materialize, for
21 example if the construction of new transport links or electricity connections only leads to
22 new business development with a significant lag; growth rates themselves have a
23 distributed lag structure; and we are often dealing with relatively small samples, which
24 casts doubt on the asymptotic properties of the IV-estimators (Holtz-Eakin, 1994).
25 Alternatively, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) use as instruments continent dummies, as well
26 as country level structural characteristics such as population size and share of agriculture
27 in GDP. It is unclear, however, whether these last two are plausibly excluded from the
28 growth regression.²²
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44 An alternative strategy to define instrumental variables is to make use of geographical or
45 industry-level correlations. Examples are found in Holtz-Eakin (1994), who instruments
46 US state level public capital by using other neighbouring states' average levels of public
47 capital. In a different context, Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2007) instrument the choice of
48 projects' contractual clauses such as the type of regulation, using other countries'
49 contemporary average adoption rates of these clauses, and in the empirical industrial
50 organization literature, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), instrument product
51 characteristics and prices using characteristics and prices of other substitute products. The
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 common idea is that the correlation across regions or industries reflects some common
4 global trends and is orthogonal to specific regional or industry level unobserved effects.
5
6 However, while such instruments are well suited when the source of endogeneity is the
7 presence of unobserved effects, because say more prosperous states/countries also have
8 characteristics that make them more likely to spend more on infrastructure, their use must
9 be subject to more caution in the case of reverse causation. Indeed, in this last case, such
10 instruments would only be valid if the neighbouring state/country variable used as an
11 instrument (for example infrastructure capital stock, or some infrastructure sector level
12 indicator) is correlated with infrastructure in the state/country but not with the output
13 residual. If the instrument is linked to the infrastructure capital stock this would only be
14 true if output has no spatial correlation conditional on observed inputs. In most cases, this
15 will hardly be verified as common business cycles are usually observed both at the state
16 and the country level.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 Finally, measurement errors may also create an endogeneity bias. Although Garcia-Mila,
29 McGuire and Porter (1996) test for measurement errors using the Griliches and Hausman
30 test on US annual state-level public capital data and conclude there are no significant
31 measurement problems, data based on some form of public investment indicators do need
32 to be treated with caution, especially in developing countries where their quality is often
33 mediocre.
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 *Choice of indicators*

41
42
43

44 Two main types of infrastructure proxies have been used in the empirical literature:
45 Public capital (based on some monetary measure of public infrastructure capital
46 investment) and physical indicators of service production or coverage. Note first that,
47 given the increasing part of infrastructure investments corresponding to the private sector
48 in the last decades, public capital is unlikely to overlap completely with infrastructure
49 investment. To take only a few examples, in the period 1996-2001, the shares of total
50 spending in infrastructure corresponding to the public and the private sector respectively
51 amounted to 1.37 and 1.02% of GDP in Brazil, 0.27 and 0.98% of GDP in Mexico and to
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 2.93 and 4.35% of GDP in Bolivia (Calderón and Servén, 2004). To the extent that we
4 are interested in the effect of infrastructure capital, however it is financed, on growth,
5 rather than in the effect of fiscal policy, this is obviously problematic. If variations of the
6 private share of infrastructure investment across sectors or countries are not random, an
7 assumption that seems likely to be warranted, relying on public capital as a proxy for
8 total infrastructure investment therefore introduces a systematic measurement error.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16 The second problem is that whatever the measure of capital stock used, the numbers
17 available overlook the fact that cumulated investment flows are not reasonable proxies
18 for the true effective capital stocks, because the costs of these investments are likely to
19 differ from their values (Pritchett, 1996). Justifications for this include simple
20 government inefficiency or departure from efficiency for redistributive motives among
21 others and potential corruption, which can be quite high in infrastructure projects as
22 shown by Kenny (2009) among others.
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30 Partly to circumvent measurement problems, and the fact that about half of the
31 estimations using aggregate public capital fail to find any effect (appendix Table A.1),
32 cross-country physical indicators, like kilometres of road, number of phone lines, or
33 electricity generating capacity, have become a standard alternative.²³ However, their
34 widespread use also raises questions, both with respect to the accuracy and the quality of
35 these measures. Consider for example an indicator supposed to capture the availability of
36 transport infrastructure, “total road length”. Anyone having travelled in a low or middle-
37 income developing country is aware of how widely the quality of “paved road” can vary,
38 and it is well known that political considerations often lead to roads being paved where it
39 serves the ruler or its friends rather than where it is more efficient, as already spelled out
40 by Adam Smith in the 18th century, so similar extensions of road can have a very
41 different impact depending on their spatial distribution.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52
53 Another widely used indicator is electricity generation capacity. Consider the case of
54 Paraguay, a small landlocked country in South America, which happens to be host to
55 Itaipú (the once largest dam in the world, on the Paraná river along the border with
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Brazil) and Yacyretá (another large dam, lower down the Paraná river along the border
4 with Argentina). Itaipú, owned together with Brazil, has 18 turbines, one of which alone
5 provides 90% of all the electricity consumed in Paraguay (the rest is given to Brazil
6 under an agreement that stipulates the payment of yearly royalties). Thus, Paraguay
7 enjoys an electricity generating capacity that widely exceeds its need. However, a closer
8 look reveals that the state of the energy infrastructure network in Paraguay is less than
9 satisfactory. In Alto Paraná, the Paraguayan department where Itaipú is located, only
10 82% of rural households have electric connections and in a recent stay there, this author
11 experienced six major domestic power outages in twenty days, not to mention the
12 constant voltage jumps that plague the network because of the poor state of transmission
13 lines. Again, the question arises of what other potential measures to use (an alternative
14 might be the number of connected households or firms), and of suitable quality measures,
15 which are notably absent from standard databases.²⁴ Note indeed that electricity
16 generating capacity measured in this way is the indicator that more often fails to produce
17 significant results.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 *Level of Development*

33
34
35 Finally, concerning the relevance of the level of development, dissenting views are found
36 in the literature. Devarajan et al. (1996), using a sample of 43 developing countries, find
37 the effect of public capital expenditures to be negative. Their interpretation is that
38 developing country governments have been misallocating expenditures resulting in
39 excessive capital spending. This, however, runs in the face of some anecdotal evidence,
40 in particular from Latin America, showing that the capital part of public budgets has
41 repeatedly been sacrificed to current expenditures (Easterly and Servén, 2003; Fay and
42 Morrison, 2007).²⁵
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 Overall, the sample of specifications reviewed in the Appendix displays more
52 systematically positive returns to infrastructure in developed countries. This is consistent
53 with a network externalities type of story, but may also indicate that the productivity-
54 boosting effect would only materialize in the presence of a set of conditions enabling the
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 development of productive activities, including the right set of incentives and a minimum
4 critical mass of suitable human capital. An interesting potential question appears
5 therefore to concern interactions between infrastructure and proxies for these effects. We
6 discuss the issue of indirect effects in what follows.
7
8
9

10 11 12 13 **3.2. Indirect Effects (Questions 1.B and 1.C)** 14 15

16
17 Few papers have addressed this question. Examples are Hulten et al. (2000, 2005), La
18 Ferrara and Marcelino (2000) and Duggal et al. (1999). Except the last one, these
19 contributions use a growth accounting framework. Indeed, when discussing estimates of
20 the effect of infrastructure, a first issue is simply to recognize that empirical analysis
21 based on some version of a Cobb-Douglas production function approach has in general
22 little to say on the indirect effects, as this specification does not allow to distinguish it
23 from the direct effect. Growth accounting techniques suffer from a similar problem, as
24 they are unable to discriminate the direct effect of infrastructure for reasons discussed
25 above, namely the difficulty to attribute a price to infrastructure capital. Indeed, as
26 infrastructure is partially a public good, not remunerated at its marginal productivity, its
27 share of the output can only be guessed, which makes the estimates subject to caution.²⁶
28 Note that in most cases, growth-accounting studies find lower levels of infrastructure
29 externalities for more developed countries or regions than for developing ones. For
30 example, applying a similar framework to both cases, Hulten and Schwab (2000) show
31 that US state level data displayed no significant infrastructure externalities on growth,
32 while Hulten et al. (2005) found infrastructure (highways and electricity) to account for
33 about half of TFP growth across Indian states in the period 1972-1992.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49 Some recent evidence shows that more reliable infrastructure represents “grease in the
50 wheels” of economic agents activities: improved transport facilities lead to better
51 inventory management (see Li and Li, 2009, in the case of China); the economic
52 geography literature shows that better transport and communication infrastructure also
53 result in different patterns of agglomeration and of specialization of agents, as well as
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 different incentives to invest in innovation; more efficient market clearing and enhanced
4 competition is often the result of improved information flows, as Jensen (2007) shows in
5 the context of Indian fishermen. Some evidence also suggests the existence of network
6 externalities. Röller and Waverman (2001) find that in the case of telecom investment,
7 significant network externalities kick in at near universal service level, while Torero et al.
8 (2005) find that the effect is stronger among middle income countries. Using an
9 endogenous threshold panel model à la Hansen, in which infrastructure itself is the
10 threshold variable, Hurlin (2005) argues that such effects are relevant especially at
11 intermediate levels of infrastructure development, where the productivity of infrastructure
12 investments is significantly higher than that of other types of investment, while it is not
13 more productive at either low level of coverage or when the network is completed.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 Although this short review confirms that a definitive methodology to disentangle indirect
25 effects is not yet available, a number of useful research strategies can be deduced from
26 the theoretical discussion in Section 2 above, focusing on intermediate outcomes. For
27 example, it would be useful to estimate more widely the costs of road (lack of) quality in
28 terms of vehicles durability. Similarly, as mentioned above, good infrastructure is likely
29 to reduce adjustment costs for private capital, in particular because it lowers the need to
30 invest in palliative devices. This is well documented in the case of electricity generators
31 investments and their link with overall investment constraints,²⁷ but it would be
32 interesting to extend a similar approach to highlight how deficiencies in other
33 infrastructure dimensions affect firms' behaviour.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 **3.3. Permanent versus transitory effects (Question 2)**

46
47
48

49 There is again little convincing evidence on this crucial issue. We note in Table A.1 in
50 the Appendix that specifications using output level as dependent variable are generally
51 more supportive of a positive effect of infrastructure than those using either output
52 growth or productivity. This could be interpreted as a preliminary indication that
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

transitory effects (shifting the aggregate level of output through a temporary investment shock rather than the long term growth rate) are more often observed.

This point can be further developed by considering a recent example from the empirical literature. Calderón and Servén (2004) have argued that raising Latin American quantities and qualities of infrastructure stocks to East Asian Tigers' level would generate long-term per capita growth gains of around 3%. Note however that if the claimed causation running from the level of infrastructure stocks to growth rates were literally true, all growth in the US and Europe, which have high quantities and good quality of infrastructure and long-term growth rates of 2-3%, would be attributable to their levels of infrastructure stocks.²⁸

Perhaps another way to interpret these estimates is to say that, because of distinct incentive structures between Latin America countries and East Asian ones, their economies are settled at different equilibria that display marked gaps in both infrastructure stocks and output growth. Again, the right objective would be to disentangle the part of these incentive differences that has to do with potential infrastructure externalities from the part that boils down to different types of issues (question 1.C above). The global estimate of Calderón and Servén (2004) might then be biased upwards because it includes part of the effect of what we have called generic incentives (θ). Several contributions have shown for example that differences in the nature and efficiency of the regulatory framework, the quality of contracts, the political economy of the process, the quality of the local bureaucracy, the level of corruption, and so forth, have an impact on the business environment for infrastructure operators and the efficiency of their investments.²⁹ Moreover, as far as private sector involvement was concerned, Latin America went mostly for concessioning of retail and distribution facilities, while East Asia focused on build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes for wholesale facilities (for example power plants), which raised fewer direct political concerns, and was more successful in managing the financing through its higher savings. So despite Latin America having more mature regulatory frameworks than East Asia, the

1
2
3 characteristics of the process were such that Latin America may have experienced more
4 severe incentive and information problems.
5
6

7
8
9 Alternatively, we could read the Calderón and Servén's result as saying that with a huge
10 investment in infrastructure, Latin America would generate additional per capita growth
11 for a fairly long time. Obviously this is different from claiming that a higher stock of
12 infrastructure capital implies a higher steady state growth rate, although transitory effects
13 may look permanent when the transition period lasts long enough. Again, this issue is
14 clearly in need of more research. Finally, Canning (1999) and Canning and Pedroni
15 (2004) have proposed an alternative methodology to address this issue, that partly
16 overlaps with the issue of the determination of optimal infrastructure stocks. We discuss
17 these studies in the next subsection
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 25 26 27 **3.4. Optimal stocks of infrastructure (Question 3)** 28

29
30
31 Despite the crucial relevance of this topic, it has attracted very little attention in the
32 empirical literature, probably because of the technical challenges it raises. As pointed out
33 in Gramlich (1994), there have been several ways of estimating the optimal stock of
34 infrastructure, including engineering assessments of needs, political measures based on
35 voting behaviour, measures of rate of return and econometric estimates, and none have
36 provided definitive answers or methodology. Canning and Pedroni (2004) consider this
37 question in the context of a panel of countries, while Aschauer (2000) looks at a panel of
38 US States.³⁰ Finally, Cadot et al. (2005) provide indirect evidence on the non-optimality
39 of infrastructure investment decisions by showing that these are mainly politically driven.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49 Canning and Pedroni (2004) start from a Barro-type of growth model and use panel-
50 based unit root and cointegration tests to determine the sign of infrastructure long run
51 effects.³¹ They first estimate the cointegrating relationship between infrastructure and
52 income, and then estimate an error correction model that allows for the testing of the long
53 run causal effect of infrastructure on output. A positive (negative) sign is then taken to
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 mean that the infrastructure stock is below (above) its optimal level. The results provide
4 strong evidence of significant heterogeneity across countries: While average effects
5 across countries are close to zero, both telephones and roads appear to have long run
6 effects on income in about one third of the countries, with a larger number of negative
7 effects (meaning above optimal stocks) in the case of roads (21%).³²
8
9

10
11
12
13
14 Although Canning and Pedroni (2004) is the potential best practice given the quality of
15 macroeconomic and aggregate infrastructure data, two main shortcomings can be pointed
16 out here. First, the concept of optimal aggregate stock of infrastructure may in fact be of
17 limited policy relevance, when instead a large part of the effects of specific types of
18 infrastructure services on economic activities are typically of a local nature. Ultimately,
19 what is optimal for economic agents will depend on the national environment but also on
20 a string of physical, geographical and institutional variables, part of which display
21 significant within-country variations. Because it fails to inform the crucial question of the
22 spatial distribution of services across regions, districts, and so forth, any macroeconomic
23 answer is therefore bound to be of limited policy usefulness. Moving to a lower level of
24 aggregation (the state level in US or Indian data for example) should go some way
25 toward solving this problem, but at the same time, because a large part of infrastructure is
26 of both local and national use (for example roads that cross and connect different
27 regions), and because there might be inter-regional spillover benefits from the
28 infrastructure stock, it obviously raises other difficult questions with respect to allocation
29 of costs and benefits of infrastructure to one local area rather than another, which can
30 only be solved by taking into account detailed country specificities.³³ Indeed, Canning
31 and Pedroni (2004) themselves call for country-level studies as the appropriate tool to
32 determine the rate of return of specific types of infrastructure.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49 A careful discussion of rates of returns to infrastructure requires us to think much more
50 carefully about specific sector and project characteristics. Important differences may arise
51 depending on whether the policy focus is on the rate of return of a marginal investment or
52 on the average rate of return over a string of investments, for example over a period of
53 time. While marginal rates are likely to depend on the state of completion of a network
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 and be very case specific (the final investment allowing the termination of a transport
4 corridor would be large, while intermediate ones might be very low), average rates would
5 display much less such variations and may correlate better with the prevailing level of
6 coverage, although no simple linear relationship is likely to hold. This clearly calls for a
7 more microeconomic, or at least project-based, approach to the return of infrastructure
8 investment in order to complete the macroeconomic results.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16 Second, the results in Cadot et al. (2006) show that in a world of limited resources and
17 non-perfectly benevolent governments, assessing the optimality of past and present
18 infrastructure investment decisions (including the choice between new investments and
19 maintenance of existing ones) should be based on a positive theory of these decisions.
20
21
22
23

24
25 In the next section, we discuss some insights from related literatures, signalling what in
26 our view are some promising areas for future research on the effects of infrastructure on
27 growth and productivity.
28
29
30
31

32 33 **4. Incentives** 34 35 36

37 The effect of the generic type of incentives externalities is relevant to macro-level
38 estimations to the extent that some degree of complementarity exists between these and
39 infrastructure externalities, or in other words, if potential infrastructure externalities may
40 only materialize when other conditions are fulfilled. While in this case attributing the
41 returns to one or the other source is bound to be arbitrary, the identification of such
42 interactions would be extremely relevant from a policy point of view. In this section, we
43 review three broad areas where complementarities with infrastructure might be found,
44 namely regulatory frameworks and market structure, institutional quality and political
45 economy.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Regulatory frameworks and market structure

Because they often have characteristics of natural monopolies, infrastructure sectors are generally subject to a regulatory framework. The theoretical literature has long stressed the role of imperfect information, adverse selection and moral hazard, in determining the second best nature of public regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993 and 2000). In this context, the first relevant aspect to our discussion stems from possible regional or sector-level variations in the extent of information asymmetries and in the commitment power of infrastructure investors, operators and host governments. The water sector for example is often organised at the local level, with important variations both in the characteristics of resources, service requirements and the nature of regulation, with the consequence that large variations in the observed returns of operators are observed (see Straub, 2009).

Moreover, departing from the assumption that regulators are benevolent introduces additional concerns (Laffont, 2005). In particular, when governments have weak commitment power and large asymmetries of information exist, there are several ways in which the potential returns from infrastructure investment might be partly or entirely suppressed or appropriated, leading to a shortfall in such investment. When evaluating the returns to infrastructure investments, it becomes important to consider that problems of contract enforcement, expropriations, and opportunistic renegotiations have in many cases plagued infrastructure projects and are likely be obstacles to the maximization of such returns, especially when investment stems from private operators (Guasch, 2004). Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2007 and 2008) have shown that the choice of the incentive structure (price cap vs. rate of return for example), and the fact that a regulator is or not in place at the signing of the contract, have a major impact on the likelihood of transport and water concession contracts renegotiation in Latin America.

The channels through which weak regulatory frameworks may affect the returns to infrastructure investments are various. By making opportunistic political interference more likely (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2007) they increase the likelihood of ex post expropriation of sunk investments, which often results in a degradation in maintenance, a

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

lack of follow-up in planned investments, and so forth, and may jeopardize the realization of medium term returns. Another channel stressed by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2009a) is the fact that poor accounting standards allow governments to put future infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPP) liabilities off-budget, thus possibly leading to excessive and unjustified spending (therefore with likely low returns) for example in advance of elections. Even in the absence of renegotiations or expropriations, Cubbin and Stern (2005) and Estache and Rossi (2005) have shown that the electricity sector is more efficient in countries that enjoy a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance.

Moreover, market structure also appears to matter in conjunction with effective regulation. In those sectors and places where the introduction of competition has been successful, Wallsten (2001), among others, show that telecommunications are significantly more efficient and reach higher level of coverage. Similar conclusions arise from a review of the UK's privatization experience, as discussed in Parker (2004) and Newbery (2004). More generally, there is a presumption that the market structure that results from the ownership and regulatory choices imposed on a given sector will crucially affect potential access, prices, and so forth, all variables that are likely to be relevant to the social return of infrastructure, as shown for example in Estache, Laffont and Zhang (2005). Andres, Guasch and Lopez Azumendi (2007) is an example of empirical study addressing, in the Latin American case, the link between sector organization, regulatory characteristics and sector performance.

Institutional quality

Some of the aspects mentioned above have to do more generally with the quality of the institutional framework of the host economy (quality of contracts, enforcement, corruption, and so forth). Here again, there is a widely held presumption, supported by some sparse empirical evidence, that better functioning institutions should in general contribute to the realization of infrastructure returns. Formally, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), using a structural model of infrastructure and output growth, display estimates

1
2
3 that support the key role of generic institutional capabilities, such as contract enforcement
4 and bureaucratic efficiency, in enabling high infrastructure returns. The important role of
5 such aspects in mediating disruptive events such as renegotiations is highlighted in
6 Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2007 and 2008). Dal Bo and Rossi (2007) stress the fact that
7 greater corruption, as measured by subjective perception indices in a cross-country of
8 Latin American countries, is significantly associated with lower efficiency in electricity
9 distribution.
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17 Moreover, this last study points to an additional interesting aspect, which is the
18 importance of the ownership structure, as a channel through which institutional
19 weaknesses may affect the operation of infrastructure sectors. Indeed, Dal Bo and Rossi
20 show that the effect of corruption is stronger for publicly owned firm. Martimort and
21 Straub (2009) develop a model of privatization that highlights sector- and economy-wide
22 conditions under which corruption may be higher under private ownership, and relate this
23 to popular dissatisfaction with privatizations in Latin America. By threatening the
24 political viability of specific infrastructure projects, popular reactions and the associated
25 potential policy swings (see Bonnet et al., 2009) may also drive a wedge between optimal
26 and actual investment decisions.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 36 37 *Political economy* 38

39
40 As mentioned previously, some authors have interpreted differences in the estimates of
41 infrastructure returns across geographical units as proof that some areas may have
42 exceeded their optimal level of infrastructure stock, while others may be below it
43 (Canning and Pedroni, 2004; Devarajan et al. 1996; see discussion in de Romp and Haan,
44 2005). Different conclusions have emerged depending on the econometric techniques
45 used, from simple panel estimations to sophisticated unit root testing.
46
47
48
49
50

51
52
53 There is a presumption that decisions to invest in infrastructure, be it directly through
54 public budgets or by calling on the private sector through some form of PPP, respond to
55 political motives rather than simple economic efficiency considerations. Pork-barrel,
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 electoral pandering, and so forth, provide theoretical channels through which investment
4 may be suboptimal and returns may be affected. Examples of such analysis are in
5 Robinson and Torvik (2005), Maskin and Tirole (2004; 2006) and Dewatripont and
6 Seabright (2006) among others.
7
8
9

10
11
12 These theoretical insights are confirmed by a few empirical papers. Cadot et al. (2006),
13 specify a simultaneous-equation model, which explicitly considers the political-economy
14 process that drives infrastructure investments. Their results, based on a panel of French
15 regions over the period 1985-92, support the idea that such investments are mostly
16 determined by electoral concerns and interest-groups activities, to the detriment of the
17 maximization of economic returns. Solé-Ollé (2009) provides similar evidence across
18 Spanish regions. André and Mesplé-Somps (2009) is to our knowledge the only study to
19 date to shed some light on the political economy determinants of infrastructure
20 investment in the context of a developing country, namely Ghana. Fedderke and Luiz
21 (2008) address a related issue for South Africa, considering the effect of institutions and
22 political stability on total investment.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33
34 Rauch (1995) shows, using data from US cities in the first two decades of the twentieth
35 century that an educated bureaucracy and adequate formal rules in terms of recruitment,
36 tenure, and so forth, are instrumental in allowing the choice and successful realization of
37 long-matured infrastructure projects. In this sense, a professionalization of the
38 bureaucracy that to some extent constrains politicians and limits opportunism, makes
39 better choices more likely or at least reduces the risk that long-gestation-period projects
40 be replaced by short term ones for electoral considerations. Finally, Henisz and Zelner
41 (2006) argue, on the basis of cross-country evidence from the electricity sector, that the
42 investment incentives of private firms are affected by a combination of the level of
43 political constraints on politicians and the degree of interest-group intervention in the
44 organization and regulation of the industry.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 This potential policy endogeneity presents a challenge for econometric studies. Indeed, if
56 infrastructure investment decisions are the result of an endogenous policy process, the
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 expected signs may not be the obvious ones, a point forcefully made in Rodrik (2005) in
4 the context of the cross-country growth literature. For example, if countries deciding to
5 increase their infrastructure investment are precisely the ones where the existing stock is
6 deficient, and the resulting improvement to the infrastructure stock is only partial
7 (leaving this group of countries with lower average stocks), the expected sign would then
8 be negative despite the fact that the effect of this investment might be positive for this
9 specific group of countries. This therefore requires the right specification of the
10 underlying model and may be addressed by one of the IV strategies discussed above
11 (reverse causality or unobserved effects) and by the use of simultaneous-equation models,
12 as in Cadot et al. (2006).³⁴
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 Finally, a related issue is how political conditions affect the distribution of returns from
24 large scale infrastructure investments among the population. In their evaluation of the
25 economic impact of dams in India, Duflo and Pande (2007) conclude that the
26 microeconomic impact depends on the local institutional framework and that the lack of
27 redistribution from “winners” to “losers” is especially felt in areas where institutions, for
28 historical reasons, favour the politically and economically well-connected agents. More
29 research on this question is clearly needed.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 5. Conclusion

40
41
42 This survey has reviewed the existing macroeconomic level literature on the link between
43 infrastructure and development in a critical light. It has shown that this literature suffers
44 from several related problems. First, it often fails to lay down clearly the relevant
45 theoretical questions to be addressed. Second, it also tends to ignore the fact that most
46 relevant answers, from a policy point of view, cannot be meaningfully addressed with the
47 type of data available. Within these limitations, the last section has highlighted some of
48 the potential areas for further work, bridging the gap with related literatures such as the
49 ones on regulation and political economy.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 To our knowledge, the effects of regulatory frameworks, market structure and detailed
4 institutional mechanisms, have never formally been considered in the context of studies
5 looking at the effect of infrastructure investment on output or productivity, and may
6 constitute a promising area for research. One important challenge here will be the
7 potential endogeneity of such aspects. A combination of fixed effects estimations and/or
8 the use of instrumental variables of the type developed in Holtz-Eakin (1994) and
9 Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2007) (see section 3) should be appropriate to address this
10 problem. Similarly, a positive theory of the decision to invest in infrastructure that could
11 guide empirical exercises, in particular integrating political economy aspects, has been
12 missing.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 It is clear, however, that major advances along these lines will require both more theory
24 and better data sets, that go beyond the macroeconomic level, to combine the existing
25 insights with those from sector- and project-level microeconomic studies, integrate the
26 spatial dimension, and allow policy makers to better assess the potential linkages between
27 specific infrastructure investments and growth.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

¹ For example, Japanese vehicle manufacturers in Thailand consider that Bangkok traffic congestion increases their costs by raising the amount of parts stock they need to hold (ADB, World Bank, JICA, 2005).

² See for example the World Bank World Development Indicators and Briceño-Garmendia, Estache and Shafik (2004) for statistics on access around the world.

³ See <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>, last visited on November 4, 2009.

⁴ Such a presumption underlies the inclusion of infrastructure indices in much publicized competitiveness indices such as the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report and the IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook. However, to the extent that infrastructure indices are used as an input into multivariate competitiveness indices, problems of circular reasoning and potential simultaneity are obviously not absent from these indices, making their use in applied economic research problematic.

⁵ An O-ring type of production function (Kremer, 1993) in which capital is made part of the multiplicative formulation in which quantity of any input cannot be substituted for quality of other key inputs like infrastructure, could be used to formalize such an argument.

⁶ The point that output-per-worker in developing countries is lower than implied by the amount of capital available is discussed in Prescott (1998) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005). This mirrors Lucas (1990)'s point that the marginal product of capital implied by differences in output-per-worker between developed and developing countries is higher than the average rate we observe. Note that all these discussions are framed within a Cobb-Douglas type of specification.

⁷ Note that the first point of the list overlaps with Prescott's argument above.

⁸ Adding subscripts i and t would yield an inter-temporal production function at a lower level of aggregation, for example the regional or state level, but we abstract from this as it is not useful to our current discussion. A discussion of the assumptions behind the aggregation process that leads to (1) can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (2005).

⁹ To reconcile this with the fact that part of infrastructure services are directly consumed by households, consider that the composite capital stock of this economy (physical and infrastructure capital) is made of the unique final good, as is usual in such models. Thus in a sense, infrastructure capital is both consumed and used as intermediate input.

¹⁰ Fernald (1999) adapts this "service" approach to study the impact of the road infrastructure in the US on specific industrial sectors according to their vehicle-intensity.

¹¹ See Pritchett (1996, 2000) on the issue of costs and prices.

¹² The AK model is a simple endogenous growth model, in which on aggregate there are constant returns to reproducible inputs like capital despite the fact that each firm faces decreasing returns to private capital, so the long-run growth rate depends on the investment rate. Such dynamics can arise through different mechanisms, for example learning-by-doing externalities when firms' investments add to the general non-rival stock of knowledge (Romer, 1986) or through government investment in public goods (Barro, 1990).

¹³ Standard general endogenous growth theory references are Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) discuss several channels through which infrastructure may affect growth in these models.

¹⁴ Krugman (1998) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) are seminal references in the new economic geography literature. Baldwin et al. (2004) offer extensions and discuss infrastructure policy implications. Straub (2007) summarizes the contribution of this literature to the debate on infrastructure.

¹⁵ See Straub (2008) for a more detailed discussion of these aspects.

¹⁶ We discuss the evidence for political biases in infrastructure investment in the next section.

¹⁷ The total post-1973 US productivity slowdown was about 1.3%. Yeaple and Golub (2004) using an industry level panel across countries similarly find significant positive effects of infrastructure on TFP growth and on industrial specialization.

¹⁸ While growth accounting using single-country time-series data implicitly controls for these unobserved region-specific effects, production function-based estimates do not, so they need to explicitly incorporate fixed effects.

¹⁹ This conclusion is supported by the lessons from our sample of studies (see Table A.2 in the Appendix) as the inclusion of fixed effects strongly reduces the share of significant results.

²⁰ Note also that first differencing destroys the long term relationships in the data (for example for labour and private capital) so it is unclear whether it still allows their identification (Duggal et al, 1999; Sturm et al., 1998).

²¹ In a nutshell, this involves the use of some outside variables that are correlated with the potentially endogenous explanatory variable (infrastructure) but not with the dependent variable to be explained (output or productivity growth for example) See Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion.

²² Table A.3 in the Appendix shows that the use of an IV strategy makes more of a difference in the context of cross-country regressions, where endogeneity problems are likely to be more acute, than with panel data studies.

²³ These indicators, for which Canning (1998) put together a comprehensive cross-country database, have been used extensively. Examples include Canning (1999), Canning and Bennathan (2002), Canning and Pedroni (2004), Calderón and Servén (2003, 2004), Sanchez-Robles (1998), Estache, Speciale and Veredas (2005).

²⁴ See Briceño-Garmendia, Estache and Shafik (2004) for a discussion of the issue of quality indicators and an overview of existing data.

²⁵ For East Asia and the Middle East, the presumption is that capital expenditure has been largely adequate, but maintenance has been inadequate (see Straub, Vellutini and Warlters, 2008, and Nounba, Straub and Vellutini, 2009).

²⁶ Hulten et al. (2000, 2005) attempt to disentangle these indirect effects for regional US manufacturing data and Indian manufacturing data respectively. They estimate the share of output of intermediate input by assuming it is constant over time.

²⁷ See among others, Lee, Anas and Oh (1996) for Indonesia and Nigeria, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) for Uganda, Foster and Steinbuck (2009) for 25 African countries, and Alby, Dethier and Straub (2009) for a sample of 87 countries from the World Bank enterprise survey database

²⁸ We thank Michael Warlters for pointing this out.

²⁹ See for example Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 2008) who show that regulatory quality had a key impact on the wave of concession renegotiations in the Latin America in the 1990s, an occurrence that has notably discouraged private investment in infrastructure there. Other contributions include Wallsten (2001) Dal Bo and Rossi (2007) and Cubbin and Stern (2005).

³⁰ Aschauer (2000) assumes a steady-state output elasticity of infrastructure of 0.30, in line with his initial paper, in order to determine whether actual stocks are indeed optimal, but fails to address issues of simultaneity between output and infrastructure, casting doubt on the relevance of its results.

³¹ Canning and Pedroni (2004) argue that impulse responses from VAR based estimates are typically plagued by large and unreliable standard errors over the long run horizons such as the ones of interest here.

³² The panel includes 67 countries between 1960 and 1990 for electricity, and 42 countries between 1961 and 1990 for paved roads.

³³ See Josie, McDonald and Petchey (2008) for a methodology to incorporate regional concerns in a model of social capital grants allocation, and a discussion of the case of infrastructure.

³⁴ Fedderke and Luiz (2008) is an example of application to the issue of political stability and its link to investment in South Africa.

References

ADB, IBRD, WB, JICA (2005) *Connecting East Asia. A New Framework for Infrastructure* (Washington DC: The World Bank).

Agénor, P.-R. and Moreno-Dodson, B. (2006) *Public Infrastructure and Growth: New Channels and Policy Implications*. Policy Research Working Paper 4064, Washington DC: World Bank.

Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998) *Endogenous Growth Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Alby, P., Dethier, J.-J. and Straub, S. (2009) *Firms Operating under Infrastructure and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries. The Case of Power Generators*. Mimeo, World Bank and Toulouse School of Economics.

André, P. and Mesplé-Soms, S. (2009) *The Allocation of Public Goods and National Elections in Ghana*. Paris School of Economics, Mimeo.

Andres, L., Guasch, J.L. and Lopez Azumendi, S. (2007) *Regulatory Governance and Sector Performance: Methodology and Evaluation for Electricity Distribution in Latin America*. Mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank.

Aschauer, D.A. (1989) *Is Public Expenditure Productive?* *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 23, pp. 177-200.

Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2003) *Economic Geography and Public Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press)

Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2005) *Growth Theory Through the Lens of Development Economics*, in: Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (eds) *Handbook of Economic Growth* (North-Holland: Elsevier), pp. 473-554.

Barro, R. (1991) *Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries*. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106 (2), pp. 407-444.

Barro, R. and Lee, J.-W. (2000) *International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications*. Harvard University, CID Working Paper No. 42.

Barro R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2005) *Growth Theory, 2nd Ed.* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

1
2
3
4
5 Bental, B. and Demougin, D. (2006) Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity.
6 *International Economic Review*, 47(3) pp. 1021-1043.
7

8
9 Berry, S., Levinsohn, J. and Pakes, A. (1995) Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.
10 *Econometrica*, 63(4) pp. 841-890.
11

12 Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2004) Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance?
13 Evidence from India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(1) 91-134.
14

15 Bom, P. and Ligthart, J. (2008) How Productive is Public Capital? A Meta-Analysis.
16 CESifo Group Munich, Cesifo working paper no. 2206.
17

18
19 Bonnet, C., Dubois, P., Martimort, D. and Straub, S. (2009) Empirical Evidence on
20 Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs. Toulouse,
21 IDEI Working Paper, n°566.
22

23
24 Bramati, M.C. and Veredas, D. (2006) The Impact of Infrastructure on Growth in East
25 Asia: Technical Report. Mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank.
26

27
28 Briceño-Garmendia, C., Estache, A. and Shafik, N. (2004) Infrastructure Services in
29 Developing Countries: Access, Quality, Costs and Policy Reform. Policy Research
30 Working Paper 3468, Washington DC: World Bank.
31

32
33 Boccanfuso, D., Estache, A. and Savard, L. (2009) A Macro-Micro Analysis of the
34 Effects of Electricity Reform in Senegal on Poverty and Distribution, *Journal of*
35 *Development Studies*, 45 (3), 351-368.
36

37
38 Cadot, O., Röller L.H. and Stephan, A. (2006) Contribution to Productivity or Pork
39 Barrel? The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 90, 6-
40 7, 1133-1153.
41

42
43 Calderón, C. and Servén, L. (2004) The Effects of Infrastructure Development on
44 Growth and Income Distribution. Santiago, Central Bank of Chile, Working Papers N°
45 270.
46

47
48 Calderón, C., Moral E. and Servén, L. (2009) Is infrastructure capital productive? A
49 Dynamic Heterogeneous Approach. Mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank.
50

51
52 Canning, D. (1998) A Database of World Infrastructure Stocks, 1950-95. Policy Research
53 Working Paper 1929, Washington DC: World Bank.
54

55
56 Canning, D. (1999) Infrastructure's Contribution to Aggregate Output. Policy Research
57 Working Paper Series 2246, Washington DC: World Bank.,
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 Canning, D. and Bennathan, E. (2002) The Social Rate of Return on Infrastructure
6 Investments. Policy Research Working Paper Series 2390, Washington DC: World Bank.
7

8 Canning, D. and Pedroni, P. (2004) The Effect of Infrastructure on Long Run Economic
9 Growth. Williams College, Mimeo.
10

11 Cubbin, J. and Stern, J. (2005) Regulatory Effectiveness : The Impact of Regulation and
12 Regulatory Governance Arrangements on Electricity Industry Outcomes. Policy Research
13 Working Paper 3536, Washington DC: World Bank.
14

15 Dal Bo, E. and Rossi, M. (2007) Corruption and Inefficiency: Theory and Evidence from
16 Electric Utilities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(5-6) 939-962.
17

18 Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V., and Zou, H-f. (1996) The Composition of Public
19 Expenditure and Economic Growth. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 37 (2), 313-344.
20

21 Dewatripont, M. and Seabright, P. (2006) Wasteful Public Spending and Public Control.
22 *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 4(2-3) 513-522.
23

24 Duflo, E. and Pande, R. (2007) Dams. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2) 601-646.
25

26 Duggal, V., Saltzman, C. and Klein, L. (1999) Infrastructure and productivity: a
27 Nonlinear Approach. *Journal of Econometrics*, 92 (1), 47-74.
28

29 Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. (1993) Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical
30 Investigation. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 32 (3), 417-458.
31

32 Easterly, W. and Servén, L. (2003) *The limits of stabilization. Infrastructure, Public
33 Deficits and Growth in Latin America, 1980-2000* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
34 Press).
35

36 Ehrlich, I. and Lui, F.T. (1999) Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic
37 Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(6) 270-29.
38

39 Engel, E., Fischer, R., and Galetovic, A. (2009a) Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in
40 Public-Private Partnerships. Yale University, Mimeo.
41

42 Engel, E., Fischer, R., and Galetovic, A. (2009b) On the Efficient Provision of Roads.
43 New Delhi, GDN Working papers No. 12.
44

45 Esfahani, H.S. and Ramirez, M.T. (2003) Institutions, Infrastructure, and Economic
46 Growth. *Journal of Development Economics*, 70 (2), 443-477.
47
48
49
50
51

1
2
3
4
5 Estache, A., Laffont, J.J. and Zhang, X. (2006) Universal Service Obligations in LDCs:
6 The Effect of Uniform Pricing on Infrastructure Access. *Journal of Public Economics*,
7 90(6-7) 1155-1179.
8

9
10 Estache, A. and Pinglo, M.E. (2004) Are Returns to Private Infrastructure in Developing
11 Countries Consistent with Risks Since the Asian Crisis? Policy Research Working Paper
12 3373, World Bank, Washington D.C.
13

14 Estache, A. and Rossi, M. (2005) Do Regulation and Ownership Drive the Efficiency of
15 Electricity Distribution? Evidence from Latin America. *Economic Letters*, 86(2) 253-257.
16

17 Estache, A., Speciale, B. and Veredas, D. (2005) How much does Infrastructure Matter to
18 Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ecares Brussels, Mimeo.
19

20
21 Fay, M. and Morrison, M. (2007) *Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean.*
22 *Recent Development and Key Challenges* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank).
23

24
25 Fedderke, J.W. and Luiz, J.M. (2008) The Political Economy of Institutions, Stability and
26 Investment: A Simultaneous Equation Approach in an Emerging Economy. The Case of
27 South Africa. *Journal of Development Studies*, 44(7) pp. 1056-1079.
28

29
30 Fernald, J.G. (1999) Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link between Public Capital and
31 Productivity. *American Economic Review*, vol. 89(3) pages 619-638.
32

33
34 Ford, R. and Poret, P. (1991) Infrastructure and Private-Sector Productivity. *OECD*
35 *Economic Studies*, 17, 63-89.
36

37 Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M. (2003) Agricultural Productivity Growth, Rural
38 Economic Diversity, and Economic Reforms: India 1970-2000. Brown University,
39 Mimeo.
40

41
42 Foster, V. and Yepes, T. (2005) Latin America Regional Study on Infrastructure Is Cost
43 Recovery a Feasible Objective for Water and Electricity? World Bank, Washington D.C.,
44 Mimeo.
45

46
47 Foster, V. & Steinbuks, J. (2009) Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies : In-
48 house Generation of Electricity by Firms in Africa. Policy Research Working Paper
49 Series 4913, Washington DC: World Bank.
50

51 Fujita, M., Krugman, P., and Venables, A. J. (1999) *The Spatial Economy: Cities,*
52 *Regions, and International Trade* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
53

54
55 Galiani, S., Gertler, P. and Schargrodsky, E. (2005) Water for Life: The Impact of
56 Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113
57 (1): 83-120.
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6 Garcia-Milà, T., McGuire, T. and Porter, R. (1996) The Effect of Public Capital in State-
7 Level Production Functions Reconsidered. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 78 (1),
8 177-180.
9

10
11 Gramlich, E.M. (1994) Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay. *Journal of Economic*
12 *Literature*, 32 (3), 1176-1196.
13

14 Guasch, L. (2004) *Granting and Renegotiating Concessions. Doing it Right* (Washington
15 D.C.: World Bank Institute Development Studies)
16

17
18 Guasch, J.L, Laffont, J.J. and Straub, S. (2007) Infrastructure Concessions in Latin
19 America: Government-led Renegotiations. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 22(7) 1267-
20 1294.
21

22
23 Guasch, J.L, Laffont, J.J. and Straub, S. (2008) Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in
24 Latin America. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 26 (2), 421-442.
25

26 Guasch, J.L. and Kogan, J. (2001) Inventories in Developing Countries: Levels and
27 Determinants-A Red Flag for Competitiveness and Growth. Policy Research Working
28 Paper 2552, World Bank, Washington D.C.
29

30
31 Henisz, W. J. and Zelner, B.A. (2006) Interest Groups, Veto Points and Electricity
32 Infrastructure Deployment. *International Organization*, 60(1), 263 – 286.
33

34 Holtz-Eakin, D. (1994) Public-Sector Capital and the Productivity Puzzle. *Review of*
35 *Economics and Statistics*, 76 (1), 12-21.
36

37
38 Hulten, C.R. (1996) Infrastructure Capital and Economic Growth: How Well you Use it
39 May Be more Important than how much you Have. Cambridge, MA: *NBER Working*
40 *Paper 5847*.
41

42
43 Hulten, C.R., Bennathan, E. and Srinivasan, S. (2005) Infrastructure, Externalities, and
44 Economic Development: A Study of Indian Manufacturing Industry. Mimeo, Washington
45 DC: World Bank.
46

47
48 Hulten, C.R. and Schwab, R. (2000) Does Infrastructure Investment Increase the
49 Productivity of Manufacturing Industry in the US?, In: L.J. Lau (ed) *Econometrics and*
50 *the Cost of Capital* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
51

52
53 Hurlin, C. (2005) Network Effects of the Productivity of Infrastructure in Developing
54 Countries. Policy Research Working Paper 3808, World Bank, Washington D.C.
55
56
57
58
59
60

Jensen, R., (2007) The Digital Divide: Information (Technology) Market performance, and Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3) 879-924.

Josie, J., MacDonald G. and Petchey, J. (2008) A Dynamic Equalisation Model for Economic and Social Capital Grants with a South African Example. *Journal of Development Studies*, 44(8) pp. 1169-1189.

Kenny, C. (2009) Measuring Corruption in Infrastructure: Evidence from Transition and Developing Countries, *Journal of Development Studies*, 45(3) 314-332.

Kocherlakota, N. (2001) Building Blocks for Barriers to Riches. Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, research department staff report 288.

Kremer, M. (1995) The O-ring Theory of Economic Development. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3) 551-575.

Krugman, P. (1998) *Development, Geography and Economic Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

La Ferrara, E. and Marcelino, M. (2000) TFP, Costs and Public Infrastructure: An Equivocal Relationship. Mimeo, Bocconi University and IGER.

Laffont, J.J. (2005) *Regulation and Development* (Cambridge: Federico Caffé Lectures, Cambridge University Press).

Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J. (1993) *A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Third Printing* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J. (2000) *Competition in Telecommunications*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Lee, K. S., Anas, A. and Oh, G.-T. (1996) Cost of infrastructure deficiencies in Manufacturing in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Thailand. Policy Research Working Paper 1604, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992) A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions. *American Economic Review*, (82) 942-963.

Li, Z. and Li, H. (2009) Road investment and inventory reduction: Evidence from a large developing country. Hong-Kong University, Mimeo.

Lucas, R. (1990) Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? *American Economic Review*, 80(2) 92-96.

1
2
3
4
5 Martimort, D. and Straub, S. (2009) Infrastructure Privatization and Changes in
6 Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent. *Journal of Development*
7 *Economics*, 90(1), 69-84.
8

9
10 Martimort, D. and Verdier, T. (2004) The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and
11 Schumpeterian Growth. *Review of Economic Studies*, 71(4), 1119-1141.
12

13 Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (2004) The Politician and The Judge: Accountability in
14 Government. *American Economic Review*, 94(4), pp 1034-1054.
15

16 Maskin E. and Tirole, J. (2006) Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending
17 Limits. Toulouse School of Economics, IDEI Working Paper, n. 439.
18

19
20 McKenzie, D. and Mookherjee, D. (2003) The Distributive Impact of Privatization in
21 Latin America: Evidence from Four Countries. *Economía*, 3 (2): 161-233.
22

23
24 Munnell, A.H. (1990) How Does Public Infrastructure Affect Regional Economic
25 Performance? *New England Economic Review*, Sept-Oct., 2-22.
26

27
28 Newbery, D. (2004) Privatising Network Industries. CESifo Group Munich, CESifo
29 Working Paper 1132.
30

31 Numba, P., Straub, S. and Vellutini, C., (2009) Infrastructure and Economic Growth in
32 the Middle East and North Africa. Policy Research Working Paper 5105, World Bank,
33 Washington D.C.
34

35
36 Parente, S. and Prescott, E. (2000) *Barriers to Riches*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
37

38 Parker, D. (2004) The UK's Privatisation Experiment: The Passage of Time Permits a
39 Sober Assessment. CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper 1126.
40

41
42 Prescott, E.C. (1998) Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity. *International*
43 *Economic Review*, 39(3) 525-551.
44

45 Pritchett, L. (1996) Mind your P's and Q's. The Cost of Public Investment is Not the
46 Value of Public Capital. *Policy Research Working Paper 1660*, World Bank, Washington
47 D.C.
48

49
50 Pritchett, L. (2000) The Tyranny of Concepts: CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated,
51 Investment Effort) Is Not Capital. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5 (4) 361-84.
52

53
54 Prud'homme, R. (2005) Infrastructure and Development, in: Bourguignon, F. and B.
55 Pleskovic (eds). *Lessons of Experience, Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Bank conference*
56 *on Development Economics* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank and Oxford University
57 Press), pp. 153-181.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4
5
6 Rauch, J.E. (1995) Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from
7 U.S. Cities During the Progressive Era. *American Economic Review*, 85(4), 968-979.
8
9
10 Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2002) Coping with poor public capital. *Journal of*
11 *Development Economics*, 69 (1), 51-69.
12
13 Rioja, F. (2003) Filling Potholes: Macroeconomic Effects of Maintenance versus New
14 Investments in Public Infrastructure. *Journal of Public Economics*, 87 (9-10), 2281-2304.
15
16
17 Robinson, J.A. and Torvik, R. (2005) White Elephants. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89
18 (2-3), 197-210.
19
20
21 Rodrik, D. (2005) Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on
22 Policies. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Mimeo.
23
24 Röller, L.H. and Waverman, L. (2001) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic
25 Development: A Simultaneous Approach. *American Economic Review*, 91 (4), 909-923.
26
27
28 Romer, P. (1986) Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. *Journal of Political*
29 *Economy*, 94(5), 1002-1037.
30
31 Romp, W. and de Haan, J. (2005) Public capital and economic growth: a critical survey.
32 Luxembourg, European Investment Bank Papers Volume 10, n°1.
33
34
35 Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997) I just ran two millions regressions. *American Economic Review*.
36 87(2), 178-83.
37
38 Sanchez-Robles, B. (1998) Infrastructure Investment and Growth: Some Empirical
39 Evidence. *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 16 (1), 98-108.
40
41
42 Sarte, P.-D.G. (2000) Informality and Rent-Seeking Bureaucracies in a Model of Long-
43 run Growth. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 46(1) 173-197.
44
45 Solé-Ollé, A. (2009) Inter-Regional redistribution through infrastructure investment:
46 tactical or programmatic? Working Papers 2009/32, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona
47 (IEB).
48
49
50 Straub, S. (2009) Governance in Water Supply. Toulouse School of Economics, IDEI
51 Working Paper, n°544.
52
53
54 Straub, S., Vellutini, C. and Warlters, M. (2008) Infrastructure and Economic Growth in
55 East Asia. Policy Research Working Paper 4589, World Bank, Washington D.C.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 Sturm J.-E., Kuper, G.H. and de Haan, J. (1998) Modelling Government Investment and
6 Economic Growth on a Macro Level: A Review, in: Brakman S., van Ees H., and S.K.
7 Kuipers (eds) *Market Behaviour and Macroeconomic Modelling* (London, UK:
8 MacMillan Press Ltd).
9

10
11 Vodafone (2005) Africa: The Impact of Mobile Phones. Newbury, England, The
12 Vodafone Policy Paper Series, No 2.
13

14 Yeaple, S. and Golub, S. (2004). International Productivity Differences, Infrastructure,
15 and Comparative Advantage. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
16

17
18 Wallsten, S. (2001) An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and
19 Regulation in Africa and Latin America. *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 49(1), 1-
20 19.
21

22
23 Waverman, L., Meschi, M., and Fuss, M. (2005) The impact of telecoms on economic
24 growth in developing countries. Newbury, England, Vodafone Policy Paper Series:
25 Africa: The impact of mobile phones. Number 2,10-23.
26

27
28 Wolcott, S. (1994) The Perils of Lifetime Employment Systems: Productivity Advance in
29 the Indian and Japanese Textile Industries, 1920-1938. *Journal of Economic History*, 54
30 (2), 307-324.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Appendix1: Summary of empirical studies reviewed.

<u>Studies based on cross-country data</u>	<u>Number of specifications considered</u>
Production function	
"Infrastructure's Contribution to Aggregate Output", Canning, D., 1999	9
"Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach", Röllers L.H. and L. Waverman, 2001	1
"Network Effects of the Productivity of Infrastructure in Developing Countries", Hurlin Christophe, 2005	3
"How much does infrastructure matter to growth in Sub-Saharan Africa?", Antonio Estache, Biagio Speciale and David Veredas, 2005	5
"Institutions, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth", Hadi Salehi Esfahani and Maria Teresa Ramirez, 2003	2
"Infrastructure Capital and Economic Growth: How Well You Use it May Be more Important than how much You Have", Charles Hulten, 1996	2
"The Impact of Telecoms on Economic Growth in Developing Countries", Waverman L. Meschi M. and Fuss M., 2005	1
"The Social Rate of Return on Infrastructure Investment" David Canning and Esra Bennathan, 2002	8
"The Effect of Infrastructure on Long Run Economic Growth", David Canning and Peter Pedroni, 2004	3
Cross-country regressions	
"The Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic Growth", Devarajan S., Swaroop V., Zou H., 1996	2
"Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation", Easterly W. and S. Rebelo, 1993	6
"Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic growth: A Cross-Country Analysis", Torero M., S. Chowdhury and A. Bedi (in Torero M. and J.Von Braun, eds. 2006)	5
"Public Investment and Economic Growth", Milbourne R. Otto G. and G. Voss, 2003	4
"Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries", Barro R., 1991	1
"Infrastructure Investment and Growth, some Empirical Evidence", Blanca Sanchez-Robles, 1998	6
"Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth", Robert Barro, 1990	1
"The Effect of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribution", Calderon C. and L. Serven, 2004	2
"A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions", Ross Levine and David Renelt, 1992	1
"I just ran 2 million regressions", Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1997	1
<u>Studies based on cross-states or cross-regional data</u>	
Production function	
"Public-Sector Capital and the Productivity Puzzle", Holtz-Eakin D., 1994	2
"The Effect of Public Capital in State-Level Production Functions	2

1		
2		
3	Reconsidered", Garcià-Milla, McGuire T.J. and R. Porter., 1996	
4	"Infrastructure and Productivity: A Nonlinear Approach", Duggal V.,	
5	Saltzman C. and Klein L., 1999	1
6	"Do States Optimize? Public Capital and Economic growth", Aschauer, D.,	
7	2000	1
8	"Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel? The two Faces of	
9	Infrastructure Investment", Cadot, O., L.-H. Roller and A. Stephan, 2005	1
10	"Is Public Expenditure Productive?", David Aschauer, 1989	2
11	"Infrastructure and Private-Sector Productivity", Robert Ford and Pierre	
12	Poret, 1991	1
13	"Modelling Government Investment and Economic Growth on a Macro	
14	Level: A Review", Sturm J.-E., G.H. Kuper and J. de Haan, 1998	1
15		
16		
17		

Growth accounting

18		
19		
20	"TFP, Costs, and Public Infrastructure: An Equivocal Relationship", Eliana	
21	La Ferrara and Massimiliano Marcelino, 2000	3
22	"Infrastructure, Externalities, and Economic Development: A Study of	
23	Indian Manufacturing Industry", Charles Hulten, Esra Bennathan and Sylaja	
24	Srinivasan, 2005	2
25	"Does Infrastructure Investment Increase the Productivity of Manufacturing	
26	Industry in the US?" Charles Hulten and Robert Schwab, 2000	1
27		
28		
29		
30		

Appendix 2: General conclusions from empirical studies

This Appendix reviews a sample of 80 different specifications from 30 macro-level studies, realized between 1989 and 2006, that include some measure of infrastructure as an independent variable and some measure of economic performance (output level or growth, productivity level or growth) as dependent variable.¹ These studies were selected as being some of the most widely quoted ones in the literature. So although there is of course an element of subjectivity in this selection, it is likely to be fairly representative of what informed readers would be exposed to when skimming through the literature. 16 of the 30 studies have been published in peer-reviewed outlets like the American Economic Review, the Journal of Monetary Economics or the Journal of Development Economics, others as book chapters or working papers.

A majority of these papers uses cross country data, the rest being either cross-state, cross-region or time series based. Their data sets cover periods that go as far back as 1949, up to 2003, and sample sizes (when not single country time series) vary from 8 to 121 countries/states. In terms of level of development, we find a relatively balanced composition between studies looking either at developed, developing or mixed settings. In terms of

1
2
3 technical characteristics, there is also a lot of variation. Looking at the whole set of
4 specifications, we see that 66% use panel data, and fixed effects are included in 35% of them.
5
6 The underlying theoretical framework is either a production function (58%), cross country
7 regressions (37%), cost function (1%) or growth accounting (4%). As for the dependent
8 variable being explained, it is output (60%), output growth (30%), productivity (9%) or
9 inequality (1%). The independent variable used as a proxy for infrastructure is either some
10 measure of public capital (44%) or a physical indicator (56%).
11
12
13
14
15
16

17 What are the main questions addressed in the literature under review? The overwhelming
18 majority of specifications (77 out of 80) limit themselves to estimating the output or growth
19 elasticity of infrastructure capital without putting anymore theoretical structure on the
20 problem (our question 1.A). The disentangling of direct versus indirect effects is rarely
21 tackled (5 cases), and so is the question of the nature of indirect effects (4 cases).
22
23 Additionally, 36 specifications also attempt to distinguish permanent from transitory effects,
24 although 22 of these are simply cross-country specifications that by construction imply the
25 estimation of long term effects. Finally, only 5 specifications are concerned with the
26 estimation of countries' optimal stocks of infrastructure.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35 What can we infer from the 80 specifications under study? Overall, a little over half of them
36 (45, equivalent to 56%) conclude to a positive and significant effect of infrastructure, while
37 30 (38%) find no effect and 5 (6%) find a negative and significant effect.² In Table A.1, we
38 consider the results of these studies according to the taxonomy of questions outlined in
39 Section 2, and consider specifically how the variations in sample, techniques and type of
40 variables used affect the conclusions.
41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48 Most of the available empirical evidence (96%) simply reports some estimate of the output
49 elasticity of infrastructure capital. This is done by inserting some measure of infrastructure in
50 a specification already containing general capital as an explanatory variable. Table 1 gives an
51 overview of the distribution of results, classifying them as either negative and significant (-1),
52 non significant (0) or positive and significant (+1), according to a number of characteristics of
53 the studies, namely sample type, type of dependent and independent variables, and theoretical
54 framework used.
55
56
57
58
59
60

Table A.1

	Results		
	-1	0	+1
Sample type			
Developed (23)	8.70%	21.74%	69.57%
Developing (22)	9.09%	54.55%	36.36%
Mixed (32)	3.13%	37.50%	59.38%
Dependent variable			
Output (48)	0.00%	43.75%	56.25%
Output growth (24)	16.67%	29.17%	54.17%
Productivity (4)	25.00%	25.00%	50.00%
Other (1)	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Independent variable			
<u>Public Capital</u> (34)	14.71%	44.12%	41.18%
Aggregate (27)	18.52%	48.15%	33.33%
Transport (4)	0.00%	25.00%	75.00%
Telecom (2)	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Water (1)	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
<u>Physical Indicator</u> (43)	0.00%	32.56%	67.44%
Electricity (11)	0.00%	45.45%	54.55%
Roads (10)	0.00%	40.00%	60.00%
Telecom (14)	0.00%	21.43%	78.57%
Water (1)	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Sanitation (1)	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
Synthetic (6)	0.00%	16.67%	83.33%
Theoretical framework			
Prod function (46)	2.17%	36.96%	60.87%
Cross-country reg (29)	13.79%	37.93%	48.28%
Cost function (1)	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
Growth accounting (1)	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Total (77)	6.49%	37.66%	55.84%

Note: Number of specifications considered in parentheses.

A number of stylized facts emerge from this initial view of the data. Overall, positive effects of infrastructure are found more often in samples of developed countries, and when the dependent variable is output level rather than output growth or productivity. As for the independent variable, more conclusive results are obtained by studies using physical indicators rather than measures of public capital. Within these categories, looking at the specific sectors for which more than a few studies are included, positive effects are found mostly for telecom, roads and electricity in that order. Finally, studies based on a production function framework reach more positive conclusions than those relying on cross-country regressions. These results are discussed further in what follows when specific issues like permanent versus transitory effects, or the quality of different indicators of infrastructure are addressed.

In panel settings, while three quarter of the specifications yield positive and significant results when fixed effects are not included, and none yield negative outcomes, the use of fixed effects leads to less positive estimation outcomes, and some significantly negative ones (Table A.2).

Table A.2

	Results		
	-1	0	1
Fixed effects			
No (26)	0.00%	23.08%	76.92%
Yes (25)	8.00%	48.00%	44.00%

Note: Number of specifications considered in parentheses.

Table A.3 shows that the use of instruments makes a significant difference to the results derived in the context of cross-country regressions, where endogeneity problems are likely to be more acute, while very little difference is observed in the context of panel data studies.³

Table 3

		-1	0	1
Panel				
	IV			
Yes (51)	No (34)	2.94%	35.29%	61.76%
	Yes (17)	5.88%	35.29%	58.82%
No (26)	No (20)	15.00%	45.00%	40.00%
	Yes (6)	0.00%	33.33%	66.67%

Note: Number of specifications considered in parentheses.

Finally, overall, 9 specifications, from 3 papers, claim to explicitly test for the existence of network effects. The first 2 papers (Röller and Waverman, 2001; Torero et al., 2005) simply do so by running estimations on subsamples of richer and poorer countries respectively, which raises among others the problem of sample selection.

¹ In a given paper, specifications testing the effect of different types of infrastructure services (telecom, transport, electricity, and so forth) are considered separately, and so are estimations using different techniques (for example panel data, then collapsed cross-country) or those testing the effect on different dependent variables.

² This is in line with Bom and Ligthart (2008), where roughly 70% of the 67 studies reviewed display positive results.

³ Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) are indeed unable to reject exogeneity in a panel of US states.