Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2013

Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

Résumé

An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.

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hal-00661903 , version 1 (20-01-2012)

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Guillaume Carlier, Rose-Anne Dana. Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known. Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (4), pp.1606-1623. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014⟩. ⟨hal-00661903⟩
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