Inefficiencies in the sale of ideas: theory and empirics - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2011

Inefficiencies in the sale of ideas: theory and empirics

Résumé

The sale of ideas (e.g. through licensing) facilitates vertical specialization and the division of labor between research and development. This specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an idea should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. We show that in an environment with asymmetric information about the value of the idea and where this asymmetry decreases as the product is developed, the seller of the idea may delay the sale to the more efficient firm, thus incurring higher development costs. We obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of the sale and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential buyers influence it. Empirical analysis of licensing contracts signed between firms in the pharmaceutical industry supports our theoretical predictions.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
cahier_de_recherche_2011-27.pdf (375.79 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-00639128 , version 1 (08-11-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00639128 , version 1

Citer

Marie-Laure Allain, Emeric Henry, Margaret Kyle. Inefficiencies in the sale of ideas: theory and empirics. 2011. ⟨hal-00639128⟩
228 Consultations
226 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More