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► **To cite this version:**

Maria Koinova. Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts: Mobilization of the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen Diasporas. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2010, PP (PP), pp.1. 10.1080/01419870.2010.489646 . hal-00606288


HAL Id: hal-00606288

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Submitted on 6 Jul 2011

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**Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts:
Mobilization of the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen
Diasporas**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2008-0051.R2
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	Diaspora, Secessionism, Mobilization, Radicalization, Balkans, Caucasus



Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts: The Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian, and Chechen Diasporas

Revised Submission, April 23, 2010

Abstract

This article examines the impact of diasporas on secessionist conflicts, focusing on the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen diasporas and the conflicts in Kosovo, Karabakh and Chechnya during the 1990s. How do diasporas radicalize these conflicts? I argue that despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the types of the secessionist conflicts, a common pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism emerges only after independence is proclaimed by the local elites. From that point onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the organizational strength of the local strategic center and the diasporic institutions, these coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radicalization influences on the conflict spiral on two specific junctures – when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal.

Keywords: diaspora, secessionism, mobilization, radicalization, Balkans, Caucasus

Introduction

Scholars on civil wars and secessionism are increasingly interested in the relationship between diaspora mobilization and secessionist conflicts. Domestic level explanations do not sufficiently explain the onset, duration, and termination of civil wars. Starting in the 1990s studies asserted that international actors – such as kin-states, refugees, distant and regional powers, and international organizations – influence the course and outcomes of secessionism. Mounting empirical evidence demonstrated that conflict-generated diasporas – such as the Albanian, Armenian, Irish, Tamil, and Palestinian – helped to perpetuate conflicts. The growing pace of globalization created more opportunities for diasporas to establish viable linkages to their homelands via the Internet, global media, and inexpensive transportation. Understanding diaspora mobilization with regard to secessionist conflicts became a theoretical necessity.

This article assesses the impact of conflict-generated diasporas on secessionist conflicts by offering theoretical innovation in three ways. First, while a number of studies analyzed either diaspora politics or secessionism, this study combines both and focuses on diaspora mobilization vis-à-vis local elites. Secondly, case studies on diasporas and secessionist conflicts exist, but lack systematic comparison. This article derives common patterns for diaspora mobilization by comparing three different cases of conflict-generated diasporas – the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen – and their linkages to secessionist conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Finally, this study is the first to explore the timing and sequencing of transformative events during diaspora mobilization.

The overarching question addressed is: *how* do diasporas exert a radicalizing impact on the secessionist conflicts of their homelands? The study also examines

1
2
3 whether diasporas start secessionist conflicts and whether diasporas become
4
5 radicalized themselves.
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8 I review the emerging literature on diasporas and conflicts and established
9
10 accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. Then I explain the value of the
11
12 transnational social movements literature for the study of diaspora mobilization, lay
13
14 out the research design and introduce the cases. I argue that despite differences in
15
16 diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist conflict types, a common
17
18 pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism
19
20 emerges only after independence is proclaimed by local elites. From that point
21
22 onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions
23
24 are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the
25
26 organizational strength of the local strategic center and the diasporic institutions, these
27
28 coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland
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30 politics at two junctures – when grave violations of human rights occur in the
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32 homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve
33
34 the secessionist goal.
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43 **Major theoretical accounts**

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46 The emerging scholarship on diasporas and conflicts goes back to
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48
49
50 Collier and Hoeffler's influential statistical study demonstrating that civil wars
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52
53 resist resolution if they are linked to large diasporas (2000). Stateless
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55
56 diasporas are more likely to remain involved with homeland politics as long as
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58
59
60 the nationalist struggle continues (Sheffer 2003). Diasporas generated by

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4 conflicts rather than by voluntary migration are especially likely to maintain a
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6
7
8 trauma of displacement and a myth of return that durably link them to a
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10
11 homeland territory (Scheffer 2003, Lyons 2006). Diasporas – such as the
12
13
14 Jewish and Armenian – may develop interests differing from those of the local
15
16
17 elites in order to preserve their own diasporic identity (Shain 2002).
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21
22 Some authors of particular case studies (Albanian, Croatian, Ethiopian,
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24
25 Irish, Tamil) captured practices of diaspora engagement with internal conflicts.
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Diasporas send labor remittances and humanitarian aid, recruit fighters, lobby
homeland governments and international organizations, disseminate
propaganda, stage demonstrations, and tap into resources of criminal
networks (Byman 2001, Hockenos 2003).

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The deficiencies of this literature, focused specifically on case studies,
lead us to draw theoretical insights from more established accounts on
external actors and internal conflicts. External actors intervene due to
instrumentalist motives that include geopolitical interests, political and
economic gains, military concerns, and gaining negotiating leverage
(Heraclides 1990, Taras and Ganguly 2006). Affective motivations relate to

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4 self-esteem established through national, religious, or racial identification,
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8 historic or recently inflicted injustice, and humanitarian considerations
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11 (Heraclides 1990, Carment and James 2000). Locked into domestic
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13
14 competition, leaders in states external to the conflict use their constituencies'
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18 ethnic ties to advance their domestic agendas and induce their states to
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20
21 intervene in the conflict (Saideman 2001). With their identity-based ties, kin-
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23
24 states are often bound in an interactive 'triadic nexus' with nationalizing states and
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26
27 minorities, where signals from one influence the behavior of others (Brubaker 1996,
28
29
30 Jenne 2007). Moreover, in separatist and irredentist crises where the institutional
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32
33 constraints in the homeland are low, transnational ethnic ties become
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36
37 important for local actors to exploit (Carment et al. 2006).
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40
41 Diasporas are identity-based actors like kin-states, but do they
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43
44 intervene in similar ways? Generational differences within diasporas matter,
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48 and both powerful individuals and institutions exert major influence. Thus,
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52 some scholars turn for theoretical leverage to scholarship on transnational
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55 social movements, allowing to unpack the term 'diaspora' and to delineate
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58 patterns and mechanisms linking the local and the global: 'Boomerang effects'
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4 and 'spirals' are used to pressure authoritarian regimes to adopt human rights
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6
7
8 change (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse 1999). Local issues are reframed to
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10
11 appeal to global actors and vice versa (Bob 2005, Tarrow 2005). Coalitions
12
13
14 and networks develop across borders (Della Porta et al. 2005). The opening
15
16
17 of local and global political opportunity structures affects various types of
18
19
20 mobilization (Sikkink 2005). Mechanisms—such as attribution of opportunity
21
22
23 and threat, frame alignment and brokerage—concatenate in the transnational
24
25
26 realm (McAdam et al. 2001, Tarrow 2005). A combination of injustice and
27
28
29 hope becomes an important emotional referent for the launching of social
30
31
32 movements (Aminzade and McAdam 2001). Fear and anger associated with
33
34
35 war and repression often trigger the use of violence.
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43 Few scholars of diaspora politics emphasize the particularistic identity-
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45
46 based character of diaspora mobilization in contrast to the universalistic
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48
49 solidarities binding other transnational social movements. They apply some
50
51
52 building blocks of social movement theory to the identity-based character of
53
54
55 diaspora politics (Wayland 2004, Smith and Stares 2007). Adamson
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57
58 discusses causal mechanisms operating during diaspora mobilization.
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4 'Transnational brokerage' builds on McAdam et al (2001) understanding that
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7
8 'brokerage' is the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites
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10
11 by a unit that mediates their relations with one another or with other sites.

12
13
14 'Ethnic outbidding' takes place 'when parties or elites attempt to outdo each other,
15
16
17 leading to a cycle of polarization that fuels extremism' (Adamson 2009).
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24 **Research Design and Introduction of Cases**

25
26
27 The term *diaspora* is used with Brubaker's (2005) understanding that
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29
30 diaspora is 'a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a
31
32
33 bounded group.' A diaspora is not simply constituted of the number of
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36 immigrants of various generations, but only of those who pro-actively make
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39 claims about their descent. The term is also limited to include only ethno-
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42 national groups residing outside territories adjacent to the homeland, which
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49 Anderson (1998) calls 'long-distance nationalists'.
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51

52
53 I adopt two more definitions. *Secessionism* is 'an attempt by an ethnic
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55
56 group claiming homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a
57
58
59 larger state of which it is a part' (Horowitz 1991). Secessionism often occurs
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4 alongside *irredentism*, understood either as the demand of a kin-state to
5
6
7 incorporate into its territory co-nationals living in another state, or as the
8
9
10 desire of an ethnic group inhabiting territories outside the kin-state to seek
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12
13 reunion (Chazan 1991). I introduce the two terms in order to consider the Armenian
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16 case where secessionism occurs first and is followed by *de facto* if not *de jure*
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irredentism.

This study's scope is limited to cases of conflict-generated diasporas linked to secessionist conflicts in the post-communist world. These cases are characterized by a common point of departure of secessionism in 1989-1991, communist institutional legacies, and the lack of durable linkages between diaspora populations in the West and their ethnic brethren in the East during the Cold War. These characteristics distinguish these diasporas from others linked to secessionism in Africa and Asia, where conflicts stem from decolonization. The Tamil diaspora has been mobilized for the secessionist movement in Sri Lanka since the 1970s. The Sikh diaspora supported Khalistan's secession from India in the 1980s. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been mobilized in support of territorial demands in southern Turkey since the 1980s. The Israeli and Palestinian diasporas have supported their ethnic brethren in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the late 1940s. While my findings could be further tested on the larger population of cases, this study makes a theoretical contribution by unpacking undiscovered processes of diaspora mobilization vis-a-vis secessionism in comparative perspective.

I select the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen diasporas on a control variable. The conflicts stem from *autonomist regions in ethno-national federations* (former

1
2
3 Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia), where an ethno-national system of government
4 was institutionalized. Kosovo was a constituent unit of Serbia, Karabakh of
5 Azerbaijan, and Chechnya of Russia. Institutional organization on an ethno-national
6 basis is considered a prerequisite for minority secessionist demands when totalitarian
7 regimes open to competitive politics (Bunce 1999). Unlike titular republics whose
8 nationalities were entitled to a right to self-determination, autonomous regions
9 enjoyed self-government on an ethno-national basis, but no self-
10 determination. Thus, they became especially susceptible to violent secession.
11
12 Serbia, Azerbaijan and Russia employed repressive practices respectively in
13 Kosovo (1991-1999), Karabakh (1991-1994), and Chechnya (1991-2003).
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34 The secessionist conflicts and diaspora characteristics differ significantly. The
35 Kosovo and Chechen conflicts are characterized by 'secessionism only', while
36 the Karabakh conflict is mixed with irredentism.¹ The Kosovo and Karabakh
37 cases involve a kin-state (Albania, Armenia), while there is none in the
38 Chechen case. A kin-state can act in favor of secessionism. In its absence,
39 secessionists may solicit more support from the diaspora. The dynamic of
40 large-scale violence also differs. In Karabakh violence ensued almost
41 immediately following the declaration of independence. In Kosovo it occurred
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4 after a non-violent secessionist movement had lost domestic support.
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7 Violence erupted in Chechnya after a local movement declared independence
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10 and after Chechnya's status was not resolved despite a *de facto* Chechen
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13 victory in the first war.
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16
17 The three diasporas also differ. The Armenian is the oldest and most
18 institutionalized. It originated in the 11th century, but its identity was defined by
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22 the 1915 genocide when around 1, 5 million Armenians were massacred in
23
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25

26 the collapsing Ottoman Empire (Tölölyan 2000). Dispersed populations settled
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30 in the Middle East, and later in Western Europe and the US (Panossian 1998).
31
32

33 Few emigrants came from Armenia proper and Karabakh. They started
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37 migrating *en masse* only in the 1990s due to the war in Karabakh and
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40

41 Armenia's drastic economic decline. At present the Armenian diaspora is
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45 global, with large communities residing in Russia, the US, France, Georgia
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49 and Lebanon.² Nevertheless, its diasporic identity and institutions are defined
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53 by an older generation linked to the 1915 genocide. The most influential
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57 diaspora group is the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), widely
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known as 'Dashnaks', facing a few weak opponents (Panossian 1998).

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4 The Albanian diaspora is more recent and less institutionalized.
5
6
7
8 Albanians started migrating only in the late 19th century. They settled mostly in
9
10
11 the US, while during communism 'guest-worker' programs for Yugoslav
12
13
14 citizens allowed Kosovo Albanians to work in Western Europe. Economic
15
16
17
18 crisis in Albania and Macedonia and repression in Kosovo in the 1990s
19
20
21 created the largest Albanian emigration wave. Albania alone sent around
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24
25 900,000 people abroad (Kosta 2004). The estimated more than 1 million
26
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28
29 Albanian emigrants are concentrated in the US, Switzerland, Germany,
30
31
32 Greece, Italy and Turkey.³ Unlike the globally defined Armenian diaspora
33
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35
36 institutions, the Albanian ones are more specific to nation-states. Before 1990
37
38
39 their strongest presence was in the US, most notably the Pan-Albanian
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42
43 organization, Vatra (Hockenos 2003).
44
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46
47 The Chechen diaspora is the most recent and least institutionalized. Hostilities
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50
51 between Ottomans and Russians in the 19th century prompted Chechens to
52
53
54 relocate to adjacent regions and territories of present-day Turkey, Jordan,
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58 Syria and Iraq (Kailani 2002, Shishani and Moore 2005). Large-scale
59
60
emigration did not take place until Josef Stalin inaugurated forced

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4 deportations within the Soviet Union in 1944, which left a large Chechen
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8 community in present-day Kazakhstan and a collective trauma associated with
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11 exile. During communism Chechens also moved to Russia.⁴ Due to the wars
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13
14 of the 1990s, Chechens moved to the US and Western Europe, establishing
15
16
17 some presence in Denmark and Germany. The Chechen diaspora in Moscow
18
19
20 remained the most influential. Diasporic institutions were weak if at all formally
21
22
23 organized.
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28
29 If the secessionist conflicts and diasporic characteristics are different,
30
31
32 but patterns of diaspora mobilization are similar, then it is theoretically
33
34
35 interesting to unpack the processes leading to this common mobilization. I do
36
37
38 not aim to explain the radicalization of domestic politics by weighing the
39
40
41 causal impact of diasporas' influences against other potential domestic or
42
43
44 external factors, but to understand the process of diaspora mobilization and
45
46
47 how it exerts radicalization influences on local politics. Hence, the dependent
48
49
50 variable is '*diasporic radicalization impact*'. I define it in line with McAdam et
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52
53 al.'s (2001) understanding of radicalization as the capacity to aid local actors
54
55
56 to 'adopt more extreme political agendas and transgressive forms of
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4 contention.' The Albanian diaspora exerted a radicalizing impact on the
5
6
7 Kosovo conflict by aiding the violence-oriented Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
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9
10 in 1998-1999. The Armenian diaspora aided radical elements that ousted the
11
12 more democratically oriented Armenian President Ter Petrossian from power
13
14 in 1998. External Islamic elements aided the growth of radical Islamism in
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18 Chechnya in 1996-1999.
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30 ----- TABLE 1 HERE -----
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36 The independent variable is a '*response to transformative events in the*
37
38 *homeland*'. Under 'transformative events' social movement theory
39
40 understands turning points in a social movement that follow a period of
41
42 organizational work, but precede a 'take-off' of mobilization (Hess and Martin
43
44 2006). Considering social movements theory from the vantage point of
45
46
47 identity-based politics, I argue that these transformative events relate to
48
49
50 significant threats to diasporic identity – such as grave violations of human
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60 rights – or to threats to deeply entrenched diaspora interests – such as threats

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4 to the success of a secessionist project.
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7 The study design is based upon a ‘structured focused comparison’ and the
8
9 ‘process tracing method’ (George and Bennett 2004). Overarching questions are asked
10
11 from the literature across cases, but the analysis is launched in line with a ‘within-
12
13 case’ rather than ‘across-case’ comparison. Such methodology offers an alternative to
14
15 research designs where the requirements for a ‘perfectly controlled comparison’ are
16
17 not met, and is appropriate in designs where sequential logic—such as diaspora
18
19 mobilization—is the subject of research. Hence, the process-tracing method is used to
20
21 rule out alternative explanations and validate theoretical propositions at different steps
22
23 of the mobilization process rather than only at its outset, as a comparative study
24
25 utilizing Mill’s methods would do. This work is based on evidence gathered from
26
27 newspapers, archives, secondary accounts, and personally conducted semi-structured
28
29 interviews selected through snowball sampling.
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38 **Process 1: Diasporas Become Part of a Conflict Spiral**

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40 I assert that despite their different make-up, all three diasporas *reacted* to
41
42 secessionism, but did not cause it. Some individual diaspora members forged
43
44 connections with local secessionists prior to the 1991 declarations of independence,
45
46 but large-scale diaspora mobilization took place only in their aftermath. Weak
47
48 linkages between the East and the West during the Cold War, and immigrant circles’
49
50 lack of capacity to engage with secessionism prevented diasporas from pro-active
51
52 involvement. Declaration of independence served as a focal point for mobilization and
53
54 triggered two mechanisms: identity-based response to local frames of injustice and
55
56 hope, and attribution of opportunity to secessionism.
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----- FIGURE 1 HERE -----

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Diasporas had some social, but little political interaction with their ethnic brethren prior to the end of communism. The US and UK-based Armenian diaspora offered humanitarian aid to victims of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Kosovo Albanian guest workers traveled freely between Yugoslavia and Western Europe. A product of the diaspora, future Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev spent most of his life in Estonia and Kazakhstan, and returned to Chechnya shortly before the declaration of independence.

Nevertheless, linkages remained weak because the existing diaspora organizations were focused on issues other than secessionism. In the Armenian case, internal elite competition between Dashnaks and their opponents led each bloc to have its own Apostolic Churches, cultural and charity institutions (Panossian 1998). Their only point of unity – to resolve the Armenian national question within the confines of Soviet politics – was a strong common opposition to secessionism. Operating out of a traumatic diasporic identity, they claimed that secessionism could trigger hostilities with Russia, an age-old protector of Armenia, causing Turkey to intervene and initiate another Armenian genocide. Though linked with the homeland on the civil society level when supporting victims of the 1988 earthquake victims, the diaspora organizations were caught ‘completely off-guard’ by the 1988 explosion of the political movement in Karabakh (Libaridian 1999).

Atomization of diaspora circles in the Albanian case and loss of identity in the Chechen further discouraged diaspora members from a pro-active approach. Although Albanian hard-liners founded the Movement for Kosovo in

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4 1982 to advocate armed revolt, many of its members died or were imprisoned
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6
7 (Judah 2000). Unlike the Albanians or the Armenians, the Chechens had lost
8
9
10 the salience of their identity. In the Soviet Union they underwent strong
11
12
13 Russification with rapid assimilation of values, language and lifestyles, and
14
15
16 pressures to integrate into the Soviet economy (Payin and Popov 1996). In
17
18
19 Kazakhstan, the Chechens spoke their language primarily at home (Brauer
20
21
22 2002). In Turkey, they assimilated under the nationalist pressures of President
23
24
25 Kemal Attatürk in the late 1920s. Their identity was surprisingly preserved in
26
27
28
29 Jordan where nationalism was weak. But the Cold War divided Jordan from
30
31
32 the Soviet Union and linkages between their Chechen populations were
33
34
35
36 almost non-existent.
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41
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43 One can argue that these findings may not represent the universe of cases,
44
45 since the Cold War divide applied to other diasporas linked to the post-communist
46
47 world, but their mobilization was more advanced. Ukrainians lobbied the US
48
49 Congress and institutions to endorse Ukrainian independence despite fierce US
50
51 opposition. Croatian diaspora funds sponsored the nationalist opposition in the 1990
52
53 republican elections (Skrbic 2007). Nevertheless, even in these cases diasporic
54
55 support *reacted* to processes in the homeland. The diaspora did not mobilize for
56
57 secessionism, local strategists reached out to the diaspora first.
58
59
60

Locally proclaimed independence in 1991 became a focal point for diaspora

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2
3 mobilization. In an international environment still defined by information deficiencies
4 across borders, diaspora entrepreneurs saw in the declaration of independence a
5 solution that seemed natural, special and relevant to them, a realization of
6 expectation.⁵ In all three cases, they quickly claimed support for secessionism.⁶
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11
12 In the words of a Vienna-based Albanian activist, 'the [nationalist Democratic
13 League of Kosovo] LDK was finally saying what everybody wanted to hear
14 and the Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora flocked to it' (Hockenos 2003).
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Despite their initial opposition to secessionism, the two Armenian blocs
quickly backed Armenia's and Karabakh's 1991 independence (Panossian
1998). Chechens in the former Soviet Union participated in the 1991 elections,
thus creating irregularities since they did not permanently reside in Chechnya
(Payin and Popov 1995).

One can argue that declaration of independence could have been an external
event without inducing diasporas to support secessionism. Yet, it became a
transformative event because it triggered two mechanisms enabling the diasporas to
enter a conflict spiral. First was the identity-based emotional response to messages of
'injustice', framed by local secessionists as measures to redress the political future of
nations captivated by communist regimes. These messages were not necessarily
targeted at long-distance diasporas, but were part of the overall mobilization
strategies. Local elites promoted the right to national self-determination as a political
alternative to communism. These messages resonated well with the conflict-generated

1
2
3 aspects of a diasporic identity locked into experiences of injustice. Armenians were
4 anchored in the 1915 genocide, Chechens in their 1944 deportation by Stalin, and
5 Kosovo Albanians in their exile from communism. However, as Gamson points out,
6 'injustice frames' cannot motivate for collective action alone unless they trigger
7 powerful emotions (1992). In these cases, the emotional referent was *hope for change*
8 that peaked across the former East-West divide in 1989-1991. As Aminzade and
9 McAdam argue, when reaction to injustice comes together with hope, social
10 movements are likely to take place (2001).
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22 In these cases, an identity-based emotional identification triggered a second,
23 instrumentally-based mechanism, *attribution of opportunity* to secessionism. As
24 McAdam et al. (2001) claim, no opportunity would invite mobilization unless it is
25 visible and perceived as such by potential challengers. Secessionism was seen in
26 diaspora circles as the viable option to redress past injustices. In contrast to other East
27 European countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria or Romania, where minority autonomy or
28 integration were considered political alternatives, these options were ignored in these
29 three cases. Even the two Armenian blocs, initially opposed to secessionism,
30 supported it after 1991. Diaspora Albanians, who earlier associated with the
31 Movement for Kosovo, saw an opportunity to pursue a long-cherished independence
32 goal. Ruslan Khasbulatov, a power-broker of Chechen descent responsible for
33 Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Chechen policy, saw in the new Chechen President
34 Dudajev an ally against pro-Gorbachev elements in the central government.
35 Allegedly, he and Yeltsin ordered that demonstrations in support of Chechen
36 independence be spared a brutal encounter with the authorities (Lieven 1999). Hence,
37 identity-based emotional identification with injustice frames, followed by an
38 attribution of opportunity to secessionism made diasporas engage in a conflict spiral.
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Process 2: Building Transnational Coalitions

Tarrow (2005) demonstrated that coalitions across borders can be short-lived or durable, depending on the actors' intensity of involvement and the common identity developed through collective action. Transnational coalitions were formed in all three cases of this study, but had different durations. They lasted from 1991-1997 in the Kosovo case, from 1991-1992 in the Armenia/Karabakh case, and from 1991-1996 in the Chechen case. Coalitions operating in the context of secessionism differ significantly from those built around universalist claims, because a common identity between diasporas and secessionist elites *precedes* the collective action, rather than is developed by it. Moreover, the mechanism of *brokerage* (McAdam et al 2001, Adamson 2009) was instrumental in making local secessionists secure tangible support beyond rhetoric. Depending on the strength of the strategic center in the homeland vis-à-vis major diaspora organizations, these transnational coalitions became more or less viable.

The mediating unit in the brokerage mechanism is the *strategic center* linking networks in the homeland to the diaspora. I develop the term 'strategic

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4 center' to designate not only secessionist elites, but power brokers who
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8 pursue secessionist or irredentist strategies out of different territories. In the
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11 Kosovo case, the strategic center was the shadow government, but it
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14 operated out of two countries. President Ibrahim Rugova was based in
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16
17 Kosovo, and Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi was in Germany. Focusing their
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20 efforts on receiving financial support for the shadow institutions and their non-
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23 violent strategy, Bukoshi and other activists paid numerous visits to cultural
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26 societies, guest worker clubs, and provincial beer halls, where they formed
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29 LDK branches (Hockenos 2003). As a result, in 1992-1995 new LDK offices
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32 sprang up in the US, Canada, Australia, Turkey and European countries. In
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36 the Armenian case, the strategic center was based in Armenia, but maintained
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39 close links with Karabakh. Although Armenia refused to recognize Karabakh's
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41
42 independence, it established a better relationship with its leaders in 1992,
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46 intervened militarily on its behalf in the war with Azerbaijan, and reached out
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48
49 to the diaspora (De Waal 1996). The Armenian National Movement (ANM)
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51
52 government of President Ter Petrossian made a number of high profile
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56 appointments of Armenian-Americans, such as Foreign Minister Raffi
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4 Hovannissian and Secretary of the Security Council Gerard Libaridian
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6
7 (Panossian 1998). It also formed the Armenian Fund to channel diaspora
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11 contributions, including for infrastructural projects in Karabakh. The strategic
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14 center was based in the secessionist region itself only in the Chechen case.
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18 Dudayev forged relations primarily with Chechens in Russia.
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25 -----FIGURE 2 HERE -----
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32 Instrumental reasoning bound these transnational coalitions. In the
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34
35 Kosovo case, the strategic center put little effort into converting already
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38 existing diaspora institutions for its cause, but built its own branches abroad. It
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41 remained strong vis-à-vis relatively weak diaspora institutions and became the
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44 center of a coalition aligned with its goals. This approach confirms Fair's
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47 observations that diaspora institutions formed specifically to support internal
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54 conflict become more effective than those formed around a broader scope of
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57 issues (Fair 2005). Old Albanian organizations like the US-based Vatra shifted
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attitude in support of Kosovo over time, but the banner of secessionism was

1
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4 carried by the new Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), linked to the
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6
7 LDK. The interest of its leader, former Congressman Joe DioGuardi, was
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10 initially to maintain his own political career with a meaningful cause abroad
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14 (Hockenos 2003).
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18 In the Armenian case, a weak transnational coalition emerged, since
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20
21 the strategic center was relatively weak vis-à-vis diasporic institutions. The
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23
24 ANM government wanted to take Armenia out of its post-Soviet isolation, and
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26
27 sought international contacts including with the diaspora. Government and
28
29
30 diaspora interests started diverging early on in their collaboration. The first
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33 issue emerged with Armenia's refusal to officially recognize Karabakh in order
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36 to avoid being internationally implicated in irredentism. But the diaspora ARF
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39 considered Karabakh the place holding the true values of 'Armenianness',
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42 unlike Armenia proper, and accused the ANM of 'abandoning Karabakh'
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47 (Panossian 1998). Although the diaspora initially took a back seat in
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54 influencing policy, it established its own local parties in both Armenia and
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57 Karabakh. Dashnak-based organizations such as the Armenian General
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60 Benevolence Union, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Armenian-

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4 French singer Charles Aznavour became quickly involved in homeland affairs.
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6

7
8 In the Chechen case, both the strategic center and diaspora
9
10 organizations were weak and created loose transnational relationships. From
11
12 the outset of independence Dudayev's regime did not enjoy the same
13
14 domestic legitimacy as the other two secessionist movements due to electoral
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16 fraud, autocratic pressures, and inability to deliver internal security.
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25 Preoccupied with holding his grip on power, Dudayev invested little effort in
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27 the diaspora. For instrumental reasons he still forged links with influential
28
29 individuals, such as the Russian-based Yaragi Mamadayev, who owned the
30
31 biggest construction company in Chechnya and is believed to have mobilized
32
33 political support for Dudayev (Lieven 1999). Moreover, during the first two
34
35 years after independence the Chechen mafia enjoyed a silent blessing from
36
37 the authorities, and reached its peak of local influence in the first two years
38
39 after independence (Gall and De Waal 1998). The diaspora was weak as well.
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53 Chechens in Western Europe were few at the time. Chechens from Central
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55 Asia and Ukraine returned to Chechnya spontaneously rather than in an
56
57 organized way (Lieven 1999). Primarily through charities, Sufi networks
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4 connected diaspora Chechens to the homeland (Chauffor 2005).
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7 It is difficult to establish the exact links between the strategic centers
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9
10 and the clandestine networks. Observable implications suggest that such
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12
13 networks—enhanced by clan-based and extended family structures—played
14
15
16 an important role in establishing these connections. Mafia networks in both
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18
19 the Chechen and Armenian cases emerged from the rising corruption in the
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21
22 Soviet Union since the 1970s, when criminal elements became fused with
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24
25 *nomenklatura* circles (Suny 1993). Voluntary or imposed remittances from
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28
29 Kosovars abroad and underground economic activities accounted for 70 per
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31
32 cent of Kosovo's entire economy (Adamson 2005).
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39 During the initial formation of transnational coalitions, diaspora
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41
42 members engaged primarily with a 'contained contentious repertoire',
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44
45 characterized by financial contributions and lobbying.⁷ Financially, Kosovars
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47
48 contributed 3 per cent of their incomes to the parallel structures. The
49
50
51 Armenian Fund collected diaspora contributions for both Armenia and
52
53
54 Karabakh. While no major diaspora lobby efforts were visible in the Chechen
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56
57
58 case, religious charities became a venue for activism. In terms of lobbying, the
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3
4 AACL facilitated contacts between American senators and Albanian political
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6
7 figures from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (Hockenos 2003). It exerted
8
9
10 limited impact on the US administration to pass the 1992 'Christmas
11
12
13 Ultimatum'—a short telegram warning Serbia that the US would employ
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15
16 military force if a conflict erupted in Kosovo (Sullivan 2004). The Armenian
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18
19 diaspora influenced the 1992 passage of two acts by the US Congress—the
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Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and Section 907 from the Freedom Support Act—aimed at preventing the US from rendering financial assistance to Azerbaijan due to its blockade on Armenia and Karabakh. This was a remarkable achievement, given the strong US interests in Azerbaijani oil.

Process 3: Grave Violations of Human Rights Radicalize Diasporas

Massacres, pogroms, and ethnic cleansing in the homeland serve as transformative events prompting diasporas to shift from contained to transgressive contention. Diasporas expand their repertoire to include fundraising for weapons, drafting of fighters, and aiding radical factions in the homeland. Formerly inactive diaspora members become mobilized. In short, a

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4 communal threat prompts a communal response from diaspora circles.
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10 -----FIGURE 3 HERE -----
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14 How does this shift in contention take place? As Carment et al argue,
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18 conflict escalation could occur through diffusion by way of information flows
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21 and transnational media (2006). Global media cover extensively grave
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23
24 violations of human rights, and indirectly expose diasporas to images of
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26
27 mutilated bodies, burials, and vandalized religious places. While such reports
28
29
30 may trigger limited response from international organizations, they have a
31
32
33 magnifying effect on diaspora populations. With their real or 'imagined'
34
35
36 affective linkages to kin and identity locked in a collective trauma, diasporas
37
38
39 experience powerful emotions of fear, anger and threat to their collective
40
41
42 identity. Such emotions become instrumental in firming a population's resolve
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44
45 to use violence (Petersen 2002). As Goldstone and Tilly (2001) argue,
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48 *attribution of threat* becomes a powerful mechanism mobilizing against
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51 repression 'when the costs of not acting seem to be too great'.
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In Kosovo, grave human rights violations occurred in February 1998,

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4 when Serbian military units massacred an entire extended family of a KLA
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6
7 commander in the Drenica region. This became a transformative event. In late
8
9
10 March, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in front of Yugoslav
11
12
13 embassies in major European and US cities (Hockenos 2003). The Homeland
14
15
16 Calling Fund, established initially in Europe, shifted to the US where
17
18
19 Albanians were more affluent. In New York, the roofer Florin Krasniqi
20
21
22 fundraised for military equipment (Sullivan 2004). The US-based 'Atlantic
23
24
25 Battalion' was formed to deliver fighters to Kosovo. Also, at least two busses
26
27
28 of volunteers left from the UK, and others were drafted from Germany and
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31 Switzerland. The Drenica massacre gave additional credibility to the radicals,
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33
34 since in US public discourse they were not treated as 'terrorists,' but as
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37 fighters against a repressive regime (Sullivan 2004).
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47 In the Chechen case, the 1994 Russian invasion inflicted massive
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49
50 casualties and mobilized previously inactive diasporas in Jordan and Turkey.
51

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53 In Jordan, a newly formed Committee for the Support of the Chechen
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55
56 Republic organized solidarity rallies, sit-ins, charity bazaars, and humanitarian
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60 aid. It also appealed to leaders in the US, France, Middle East and Asia to

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2
3
4 stop the violence (Shishani and Moore 2005). In Turkey, around 80 North
5
6
7
8 Caucasian diaspora organizations – most notably the umbrella Confederation
9
10
11 of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus – provided financial support to
12
13
14 Chechen rebels (Trenin and Malashenko 2004). Family patriarchs told young
15
16
17 men of Caucasian origin to fight in honor of the ‘ancestral’ homeland (Williams
18
19
20 and Altindag 2005). *Jihadi* web-sites featured the death of ‘martyrs’ and
21
22
23 stressed their Chechen origin (ibid). Wounded warriors enjoyed medical
24
25
26 treatment in Turkey, most notably the Chechen propaganda Chief Movladi
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28
29 Ugudov (Trenin and Malashenko 2004).
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35
36 In the Armenia/Karabakh case grave violations of human rights took
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38
39 place in 1992 when the Azeri army still had an upper hand in the conflict (ICG
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41
42 2004). Paradoxically, the Armenian diaspora sent less than 200 Armenian
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44
45 fighters to Karabakh (Panossian 1998). The majority of external fighters came
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47
48 from Armenia, and some from Lebanon. Such behavior can largely be
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50
51 explained by Armenia’s military involvement in the war, rendering military
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54 support from other sources less relevant. Nevertheless, some diaspora
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60 members sponsored the war effort, especially in 1992 when the Azeri army

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4 advanced on Armenian territory (Anonymous 2007). Civilian efforts were more
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6
7 visible, expanding to include humanitarian aid, increased lobbying and major
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9
10 individual contributions (ICG 2004).
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14 One can rightly argue that grave violations of human rights do not
15
16 necessarily trigger massive radicalization in diaspora circles. Indeed, the 1988
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18 Azeri pogroms against Armenians in suburbs of Azerbaijan's capital Baku left
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21 between 19 and 26 people killed, hundreds injured, and 14,000 refugees (De
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Waal 2003). The pogroms did not trigger diaspora political action, although they shocked it profoundly (Libaridian 1999).

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The answer to this puzzle is that timing and sequencing of transformative events matter for diaspora radicalization. If grave violations of human rights take place prior to diasporas' engagement in a conflict spiral, they are less likely to have a radicalizing effect than if they occur in its aftermath. In the Armenian case, the diaspora did not understand the scope and direction of the nationalist movement in 1988, but was already collectively invested in Karabakh's independence in 1992.

Process 4: Diasporas Influence the Radicalization of Domestic Politics

Diasporas further influenced the radicalization of local politics when they reacted to another transformative event affecting the outcome of secessionism. In the Kosovo case, this transformative event was the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement which did not include a solution for Kosovo, and so delegitimized LDK's non-violent strategy. In the Armenian/Karabakh case, this event was the 1994 cease-fire that ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although Armenia de facto won that war, its victory did not translate into a new international status for Karabakh. In the Chechen case, this transformative event was the end of the first Chechen war in 1996. While the war ended with Russia's de facto defeat, Chechnya was not granted legal independence. In the aftermath of these events, local elites started losing credibility that they could achieve the secessionist goal.

--- FIGURE 4 HERE -----

These transformative events started eroding the already established transnational coalitions. Alternative identity entrepreneurs reached out for diaspora support. Although all diasporas eventually exerted radicalization influences on homeland politics, the mechanisms through which they arrived there were different. In the Kosovo case *ethnic outbidding* took place (Adamson 2009), centered on a clash of strategies. After Dayton, LDK's leadership weakened domestically. A rift opened between President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi, leading to internal competition for influence within diaspora circles and reduced contributions for the parallel structures (ICG 1998). KLA operatives used this rift to infuse their

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4 own vision for a change of strategy from non-violence to guerilla warfare.
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7 Bukoshi (2002) argued that he proposed the KLA to join efforts with the exiled
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10 government in order to receive funding and international legitimacy. The KLA
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13 rejected his proposition and started building its own networks, considering
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18 'Rugova and company as traitors' (Thaci 2002).
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21 The diaspora shifted its support from the shadow government to the
22
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24 KLA in 1998. Major voluntary contributions started flowing from the US,
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26

27 Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland. A single charitable event in
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29

30 New York, Michigan, California and Alaska raised USD 16,000-56,000 (Judah
31
32

33 2000). Diaspora funds were often used to purchase cheap AK-47s from the
34
35

36 black market. Procured arms helped guerillas within Kosovo to stage attacks
37
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39 on Serbian police stations. As Serbia deployed more military and paramilitary
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42 units, Albanian villagers fled and Serbian troops looted their houses. This
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45 tactic served as 'the most effective recruitment drive the KLA could have
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48 hoped for' (Sullivan, 2004).
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51 Ethnic outbidding was possible as a mechanism emanating from a
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54 strong strategic center extending local political processes into the
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4 transnational realm. In the two other cases the strategic center was not strong
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8 enough to have a powerful transnational effect. The transnational coalitions
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11 dissipated through different mechanisms. In the Armenian/Karabakh case
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15 dissipation stemmed from a *clash of interests* between a weak strategic center
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17
18 and a powerful diaspora. The first move of diaspora withdrawal was in 1992,
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20
21 when the diaspora-appointed Foreign Minister Hovannisian resigned in
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25 opposition to governmental policies concerning Turkey. Locked into its
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28 traumatic identity, the Armenian diaspora insisted that Turkey's recognition of
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31 the 1915 genocide precede any rapprochement with Armenia. Further
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35 diaspora resentment followed ARF's ban as a political party in 1995 on the
36
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38 grounds that it was foreign-based and funded. This move boosted ARF's
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41 domestic and international reputation, following a well known effect: weak
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44 repression used against well-mobilized groups often boosts the reputation of
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46
47 the repressed. As a result, the ARF mobilized its wide international networks
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51 in a sustained anti-government campaign (Panossian 1998). Although major
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55 domestic factors such as internal party opposition, economic scarcities, and a
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58 militarized economy led to the successful 1998 palace coup against
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4 Petrossian, diaspora entrepreneurs did contribute to the radicalization of local
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7 politics. With their support, former fighters in the Karabakh war – most notably
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11 former Armenian President Robert Kocharian – entered office.
12

13
14 In the Chechen case the already weak coalition dissipated through a
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18 *clash* of values between a secular Chechen diaspora and growing Islamism
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21 within the country. Shortly after the first war, Dudayev was assassinated and
22
23
24 an Islamist opposition under Shamil Basayev picked up the banner of
25
26
27 secessionism. Using a religious rather than ethno-national appeal, the
28
29
30 strategic center attracted a growing body of Wahhabi fighters from Saudi
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33 Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan (Murphy 2004). A shift of
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36 support from a nationality-based to a religious diaspora occurred for two
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38
39 reasons. Unlike Albanians or Armenians, Chechens lived primarily in Russia,
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41
42 and were vulnerable to repression. Targeted police interventions demolished
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45 offices of a Chechen cultural center, and backed other criminal groups, hence
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48 diminishing both civic and mafia influences (Lieven 1999, RFE/RL 2002).
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51 Moreover, the secular values of a Chechen diaspora were challenged by
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60 radical Islamic ideas emanating from within Chechnya, most notably the

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4 introduction of Sharia Law (Tishkov 2004).
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9 10 **Conclusion**

11 This article sought to deepen the understanding of how diasporas exert a
12 radicalizing impact on secessionist conflicts in their homelands. I argued that
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14 despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist
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16 conflicts themselves, a common pattern of diaspora mobilization emerges.
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Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland politics at two specific junctures
– when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local
moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal.
Diasporas become a radicalization force only after engaging in a conflict spiral and
influencing it by participating in four mobilization processes. First, they enter the
conflict spiral after local secessionists proclaim independence. Although individual
diaspora members may be connected to secessionists prior to the declaration of
independence, diasporas endorse secessionism *en masse* only in its aftermath.
Independence becomes a focal point for mobilization because it triggers mechanisms
connecting traumatic parts of the diasporic identity to messages of injustice developed
by the local elites. Secondly, local secessionists broker transnational coalitions with
major diaspora organizations and influential individuals. These coalitions endure to
varying degrees depending on the strength of the secessionist strategic center vis-à-vis
the diaspora institutions. A third process is triggered by grave violations of human
rights, which become a transformative event for diaspora mobilization. Exposed to
large-scale violence through the international media, diasporas attribute threat to their

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3 conflict-generated traumatic identities. Diaspora entrepreneurs expand contention to a
4 larger circle of participants and to transgressive practices. Finally, established
5 transnational coalitions start to dissipate when local secessionists begin losing
6 credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. Different mechanisms drive this
7 process: ethnic outbidding and clash over strategy (Kosovo), clash over interests
8 (Karabakh), and clash over values (Chechnya). As a result, diasporas switch their
9 allegiance to more radical competitors.
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20 How generalizable are these findings? As mentioned earlier, this study limited
21 the scope of inquiry to conflict-generated diasporas linked to secessionist cases in the
22 post-communist world, anchored in autonomous regions seeking self-determination
23 from ethno-national federations. In this sense, these findings make narrow claims
24 related to the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen cases.
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32 Nevertheless, I maintain that these findings have relevance to a broader
33 universe of cases. While grave human rights violations radicalize diaspora politics, if
34 they take place *before* a diaspora is mobilized in a conflict spiral, they are less likely
35 to have a strong radicalizing impact. By being part of the conflict spiral, diaspora
36 organizations and individuals become emotionally and financially invested in the
37 desired political outcome, as in the Armenian case. A slightly modified variant is
38 manifested in the case of the Sikh diaspora with regard to Khalistan. As Fair writes,
39 diaspora support for the conflict peaked in response to the Indian army invasion of a
40 major Sikh temple in 1984. But because the diaspora was not well mobilized to
41 support the insurgents, the momentum was quickly lost (2007).
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56 Furthermore, the strength of a strategic center and the strength of the diaspora
57 institutions matter in relationship to each other. A strong Armenian ARF and a weak
58 Armenian state resemble a strong Israeli lobby, AIPAC, and an Israeli state, stronger
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3 than the Armenian, but still relatively weak with regard to its diaspora. The existence
4 of two major poles could predict strong clashes of interests, as Shain observed in
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than the Armenian, but still relatively weak with regard to its diaspora. The existence of two major poles could predict strong clashes of interests, as Shain observed in 2002. However, in many other cases, including Kosovo and Chechnya, the strategic centers were stronger than the diaspora institutions. For example, during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian center was strong and the diaspora institutions were weaker. Thus, local political processes were transplanted into diaspora politics.

Grave violations of human rights and loss of credibility of local actors could be good predictors that diasporas will expand their transgressive contentious repertoire and that transnational coalitions may dissipate when facing more radical competitors. For example, the 2008 Israeli bombing of Gaza created a large-scale mobilization of the Palestinian diaspora. The moderate Palestinian Authority lost large-scale support in diaspora circles, while its radical Islamic competitor, Hamas, gained new support.

The last two points relate to my policy recommendations. When grave violations of human rights occur in violent conflicts, and when local actors start losing credibility, international policy-makers largely focus on how to provide humanitarian aid to refugees, broker cease-fires, and support moderates. They pay little attention to the radicalization of diaspora politics in their own liberal states that occurs simultaneously to peace-building initiatives. Creating policies to address the specific *timing* of clashing external influences on the conflict spiral could aid the overall peace-building effort.

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47
48 ¹ Armenia has not yet recognized Karabakh, but Karabakh citizens carry Armenian passports, use
49
50 Armenian currency, and war-time leaders occupy important political positions.

51
52 ² Estimated numbers of Armenians: Russia (2,000,000), US (800,000), Georgia (400,000), France
53
54 (250,000), Lebanon (105,000), Iran (100,000), Ukraine (70,000), Argentina (60,000), Turkey (60,000),
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56 Canada (40,000), Australia (30,000) (Tölölyan, 2000).

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58 ³ Estimated numbers of Albanians: US (250,000), Switzerland (150,000), Germany (350,000), Italy
59
60 (250,000), Turkey (250,000) (CDS, 2002).

⁴ Estimated numbers of Chechens: Turkey (100,000), Jordan (8,000), Egypt (5,000), Syria (4,000), Iraq
(2,500) (Kailani 2002); Russia and the Former Soviet Union (300,000) (Lieven 1999). Jordan:
Circassians (95,000), and Chechens (15,000) (Wesseling 1997).

⁵ I adapt Schelling's (1960) understanding of a focal point's importance for mobilization under
information deficiencies.

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⁶ According to Tilly and Tarrow, claim-making is the 'claim bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts and programs, in which governments are involved, initiators of claims or third parties' (2007).

⁷ 'Contained contention' entails 'well established means of claim making' in episodic, public, and collective interaction with other claim makers. Goals are achieved through peaceful means. Politics becomes 'transgressive' when collective claims expand to include more extreme agendas, verbal and physical violence (McAdam et al, 2001).

For Peer Review Only

Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts

Table 1

Major Diaspora Characteristics

Diaspora	Age	Spread	Size*	Institutionalization
Armenian	Classic: Prior to the modern period, large-scale after 1915	Global	ca 4 million*	High level: entrenched divisions between two major blocks.
Albanian	Modern: Early 20th century, mostly after 1989	Predominantly Western hemisphere	More than 1 million**	Middle level: Primarily as of the mid-1980s
Chechen	Incipient: during communism and after 1989	Predominantly Russia and former Soviet republics, Middle East	Ca 420,000***	Low level: little institutionalization apart from Russia

These numbers represent conservative estimates and incorporate multiple generations of migrants. Thus, they do not directly relate to the much narrower scope of this study's definition considering a 'diaspora' only those members of a community who make a diasporic claim.

* Tölölyan, p.107.; ** Kosta, 2004, Sheffer, p.106.; *** Lieven, p.100, Kailani, 2002; Brauer, pp.387-400.

Web-links to Chronologies on the Secessionist Conflicts

Kosovo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War


Karabakh: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_War

Chechnya: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War

Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts

Figure 1


Process 1: Diasporas Engagement in a Conflict Spiral



Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts

Figure 2


Process 2: Building Transnational Coalitions



Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts

Figure 3

Mobilization Step 3: Grave Violations of Human Rights Radicalize Diasporas



Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts

Figure 4

Process 4:

Diasporas Influence the Radicalization of Domestic Politics

