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
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The 'British jihad' and the curves of religious violence

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THE 'BRITISH JIHAD' AND THE CURVES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

ABSTRACT

In exploring anti-civilian violence and alleged plots undertaken in the UK by small groups often termed 'salafi-jihadi' and popularly called 'terrorists', the essay attempts to present alternative routes of analysis. The violent events or (alleged) plots seen recently in the UK present a political and sociological form that is different to state-centric or transnational migrant politics, including political Islam and communitarian Muslim identity politics. The discussion of events in the UK extends to an analysis of a systematic pattern of association between small groups in the UK and Pakistani militias operating in Kashmir. The origins and ideologies of the militias are explored and the dynamics of the militia movements in relation to UK events are considered.

KEYWORDS Al Qaeda, terrorism, Dhiren Barot, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Harakat-ul Mujahideen, Jaish-e Mohammed

THE 'BRITISH JIHAD' AND THE CURVES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

Dhiren Barot was born in India in 1971 and grew up in a *cul de sac* near the centre of Kingsbury, a dull north-west London suburb. Around 1992, he converted (reverted, he would say) to Islam, though whether he adopted a religion or embraced a political ideology is moot. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to planning a series of attacks targeting civilians in London using limousines filled with explosive fuels. Currently, he is an 'AA' high risk prisoner on a thirty year sentence without parole. Barot had argued that:

...any project that can be carried out in the UK [means] that it is extremely possible to transfer (the project) to other parts of the world (Inshalla). This is because security in the UK is probably the tightest in the world...the UK sets the benchmark (standard) for project feasibility / possibility (Allah s.w.t knows best).¹

Barot is often described as the most significant Al Qaeda figure captured in the UK. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the so-called 'mastermind of 9/11', in a statement to the US Department of Defense Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay in March 2007, said he was responsible for the 'surveying and financing for the destruction of the New York Stock Exchange and other financial targets after 9/11'. These same targets were ones that Barot had undertaken surveillance of (US Department of Defense 2007, pp.18-19). Barot is also claimed to be the person named 'Issa al-Brittani' who Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, presumably following CIA interrogation that involved

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2
3 waterboarding torture, said he sent to Malaysia and, under Bin Laden's direction, to the
4
5 US in early 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004, pp. 150, 514).
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10 Barot's treatise about his experiences as a fighter for a militia active in Kashmir is
11
12 an important document widely circulated in the UK (Al-Hindi 1999). The book, written
13
14 under the *kunya* of Esa al-Hindi, was published by a Birmingham bookshop, the
15
16 Maktabah al-Ansar, an important source for the dissemination of so-called 'salafi-jihadi'
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18 material in the UK. His book exudes a piercing political sensibility, one occasionally
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20 poetic in it flourishes. His language as an operative is quite different:
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26 Even in suicidal missions we might not live long enough to deliver a very highly
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28 radioactive RDD [radioactive dispersal device] that uses gamma-emitting sources
29
30 and is not shielded. If we tried to protect ourselves by shielding the source, the
31
32 weight of the RDD could significantly increase thereby increasing the difficulty
33
34 of delivering the device and causing successful dispersion of the radioactive
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36 material.²
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43 The formal register of this operational language is quite different from what is often seen
44
45 as the irrational fanaticism of 'jihadis'. Barot openly calls his plans terrorist ones,
46
47 intended to cause terror and chaos in London (unusually for this genre, he also refers to
48
49 'suicidal' actions.) The Madrid public transport bombings and the death of 191
50
51 commuters were considered by him to be a 'respectable' operation³.
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56 As early as 1999, before the invasion of Iraq and the 2001 attacks in New York,
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58 Barot was promoting 'flank operations' that were to be undertaken in western countries
59
60 using great stealth (Al-Hindi 1999, p.116-7). He was proposing *this* strategy in the late

1
2
3 1990s because of the awesome importance of Mullah Omar's Islamic Emirate of
4
5 Afghanistan. For global visionaries who inhabited a specific political-intellectual
6
7 universe, Taliban Afghanistan had world-historic significance. It was apprehended as a
8
9 near perfect state and society by many like Barot and Omar Khyam, a central figure in
10
11 the 2004 'fertiliser' bomb plot. It was also viewed as an ideal base for military training
12
13 that had to be protected from western interference. Hence, the attention of key western
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15 countries had to be deflected away from Afghanistan through operations undertaken on
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17 their soil.
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24 Can migrant politics or the politics of migration make sense of Dhiren Barot and
25
26 the tendencies he represents? This *Special Issue* is about the political mobilization of
27
28 migrant groups and the paths through which migrants do or do not become politically
29
30 'incorporated', 'integrated' or 'assimilated'. The absence of political 'incorporation' is not
31
32 equivalent to a path towards political violence (as if the binary of democracy / terror
33
34 completes all political possibilities, or sets apart two ideas that might be related in some
35
36 circumstances.) However, it is unclear that nation-focused and state-centric approaches
37
38 can properly account for non-violent transnational migrant politics, let alone the real and
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40 alleged plots to commit violence against formal civilians that we have seen recently.
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If the paradigmatic events for migration studies are movements from the rural to
the urban and from the 'periphery' to the west, Dhiren Barot's key journeys exemplify
the exact opposite. These 'jihadi' journeys make sense because affiliates are 'integrated'
and competently 'worlded'. This 'worlding' can be reliant on peripheral urban to
peripheral rural migration that bypasses the cosmopolitan metropolitan experience; or it
can be based in largely metropolitan settings, and in travel from and through them rather
than migration to them⁴; or it can depend on the social competencies required to

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2
3 navigate global cities, the ‘developing’ megacity and the most economically peripheral of
4 rural spaces. The social ‘worlds’ of Dhiren Barot’s included Britain, India, Pakistan and
5 Kashmir, but also Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and the US. The relevance of
6 migration and migrant politics recedes amidst these different modes of transnational
7 political competence and the new relations they make available or now engender –
8 including new associations between very large transnational military, security and police
9 institutions and the smallest of personal spaces in distant civil societies.

21 ANALYTICAL ISSUES

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26 Since the London public transport bombings of 7 July 2005 by Mohammed Siddique
27 Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and others, there have been copious analyses of what is
28 characterised as ‘global terrorism’ and these dovetail with many post-2001 commentaries
29 on Al Qaeda and terrorism. The now common phraseology regarding ‘global terrorism’,
30 ‘terror networks’ or ‘global jihad’ is as evident in sober terrorism studies as it is in screeds
31 that fantasise ‘Londonistan’, ‘Eurabia’ or a civilizational war in which something called
32 ‘Islam’ is determined to annihilate the west. Similarly, ‘jihadi’ ideology is seen as
33 coextensive with action: the word of the fanatic has become the violence it conjures.
34 However, generalising approaches that invoke ‘global terrorism’ can elide many key
35 distinctions between movements, groups, tendencies, ideologies and regions, and can
36 become analytically pejorative in situations where specificity might be definitive. We
37 might summarize some of the sociological problems as follows.

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57 *Topologies of omnipresence.* The spatial and organizational topology of the ‘global jihadi
58 movement’ are characterised in many inconsistent ways. It is a protean, shape-shifting
59 transnational entity that refuses to settle on any one organizational form, but it is also
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3 characterised as a social movement (e.g Wiktorowicz 2003) or a network (e.g. Castells
4 2004), or an hierarchical organization with a clear identity (e.g. Gunaratna 2002); or it is
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6 a fluid and dynamic entity comprised of socially ephemeral units (e.g. Sageman 2004) but
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8 which is nevertheless politically and ideologically rigid and doctrinaire and has enduring
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10 parts; or it is an entity hidden within social interstices but can also be manifest – both
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12 covert and spectacular; or it is operationally highly competent, patient and sophisticated,
13
14 or incompetent, amateur and relies on luck and determination; or it is an entity having
15
16 clearly recognised boundaries; or it is a dispersed, cellular assemblage, both acephalous
17
18 and polycephalous, locally autonomous and having no recognisable boundaries that
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20 distinguish it from the societies, religions or ‘civilizations’ in which it is manifest; or it has
21
22 no existence except as a brand (‘Al Qaeda’) or franchise (Bergen 2002), an ideology
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24 (Burke 2004), a propaganda-media outfit (As-Sahab) or, simply, a metaphor that has
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26 causal powers across discontinuous times and spaces.
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36 The *inability of current taxonomy* to describe convincingly the varieties of politicized religion
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38 or contain them within categorical boundaries (on this, see Roy 2004.) Hence, each
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40 tendency is considered *sui generis* (such as Al Qaeda) or compressed into a tripartite
41
42 taxonomy (reformist, radical, revolutionary; moderate, radical, extremist; Islamist, salafi,
43
44 salafi-jihadi.) Taxonomic problems proliferate, especially when south Asian political
45
46 movements enter the analytical fray, and they usually do. Some analytical issues are a
47
48 consequence of insufficient historical distance and an Al Qaeda-focused analysis starting
49
50 from 2001 (such that the *significant* history of religious militias is taken to commence
51
52 then) and working backwards into the Afghan jihad and the history of the Muslim
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54 Brotherhood or Wahhabi salafism from a perspective already settled by the 2001 events.
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56 This approach can generate an historical account overdetermined by ‘terror, terror,
57
58 terror’ (Fisk 2006), one that necessarily solicits a distinctive political, ethical or emotional
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3 partiality. Taxonomic issues also reflect difficulties in ascribing ideological boundaries to
4
5 the phenomena. Thus, much discourse moves fluidly from political Islamists to
6
7 terrorists, from civilian resistance to military occupation to anti-civilian terrorism, from
8
9 hijab to human bomb. Boundary issues might be empirically real (a few 'liberal' Brelwi
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11 movements also engage in sectarian violence and possess militias engaged in 'jihad'), but
12
13 also reflect deeply political issues – for example, both Israel and India have developed
14
15 ferocious military strategies regarding colonized Palestine and Indian-controlled Kashmir
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17 as part of the US-led 'global war on terror'.
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24 The *dominance of the network analogy* and the *assumption of organizational consonance*. The
25
26 overwhelming view is that there is a transnational *network* – a sociologically corrigible
27
28 'global terrorist network' which penetrates diasporas in the west. The desire to impute
29
30 organizational consonance across the network is manifested in the plethora of terms ('the
31
32 global jihadi movement', 'global terrorism', 'terror networks') that attempt to describe a
33
34 unitary transnational entity, even if regional discriminations are subsequently elaborated.
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37 The assumption that there exists a global network that demonstrates organizational
38
39 consonance and ideological familiarity can nourish a political view of a tentacular global
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41 structure – or a high velocity phantasmatic *intensity* – that can strike civilians anywhere. It
42
43 is not obvious that a geosocial topology based on the 'network' is necessarily valid, and
44
45 its analytical use can displace other sociological dynamics, including non-linear
46
47 transnational 'sovereignties' and the involvement of shadow states and parastatal militia
48
49 combines (Bhatt 2007). Further, the network narrative of 'global terrorism' functions
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51 partly because of the absence of data about the current form, capacity, intentions or
52
53 precise whereabouts of the genuine Al Qaeda. Alternatively, well-described empirical
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55 instances are universalized, or very different 'networks', events, histories and regional
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57 settings are conflated. The aim is often to demonstrate an association between events or
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3 groups and Al Qaeda, either by showing a direct link, or by showing the involvement of a
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5 diverse armed groups that are designated by the US, UN, EU or UK as 'terrorist', and
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7 said to be 'Al Qaeda-linked' or 'related'. This is not to deny the existence of important
8
9 transnational links, including ones to operatives who are incontrovertibly associated with
10
11 Al Qaeda or who seek to accomplish major and horrifying atrocities.
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17 *A definitive ideological lineage and the assumption of ideological familiarity.* The ubiquitous claim is
18
19 of a definitive ideological genealogy that explains the phenomenon. The claim rests
20
21 alongside the desire to attribute ideological familiarity to all 'jihadi' phenomena. The
22
23 ideological lineage is seen to commence from the medieval al-Ghazzali and Ibn Taymiyya
24
25 and travels via al-Wahhab to Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and finally
26
27 to Bin Laden via the interpolation of al-Zawahiri and the ideology of Egyptian Islamic
28
29 Jihad. The influences are usually post-1960s salafism, post-1970s Muslim Brotherhood
30
31 ideology and the Afghan jihad (though the Taliban or Deobandi sects are usually seen to
32
33 contribute little independent *intellectual* content.) The influence of 'jihadi' ideology is
34
35 characteristically imagined in viral, epidemiological terms. It is popularly seen to animate
36
37 several 'jihadi personalities': the grimly calculating, the frenzied, the deprived, the
38
39 damaged, the sexually aggravated and the brainwashed. Hence also, the adiaphoric
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41 personality transforming instantly into the hostile one manifesting a fanatical haemophilia
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43 that has something to do with concupiscence and repression, primordial revenge and
44
45 death fantasy.
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54 *The foregrounding of one type of political violence,* usually human bombs that target European
55
56 and north American formal civilians. The focus on human bombs, martyrology and
57
58 gross events (such as beheadings in Iraq and Afghanistan) can distance attention from
59
60 the routine violence of religious armed groups and elide the wide forms of political,

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3 gender-based and sectarian violence enacted by them in different circumstances.
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6 Similarly, the common doublet of ideas regarding ‘terrorism as tactic’ and ‘terrorism as
7
8 spectacle’ for a mass mediated global audience, can displace other ways of understanding
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10 political violence that are not completed by analytical recourse to either instrumental
11
12 rationality or fanatical totalitarianism. Anti-civilian political violence need not exemplify a
13
14 strategy or tactic, but this also does not imply that it is simply the manifestation of a
15
16 xenocidal ideology. (Additionally, it is not the commitment to a metaphysics of violence
17
18 that is exceptional – numerous political tendencies, from varieties of neoconservatism to
19
20 revolutionary Marxism and revolutionary feminism make an ideological pledge to some
21
22 form of political violence against some formal civilians in some circumstances for the
23
24 greater good of all humanity, even if the pledge is perpetually deferred.)
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31 **ATERRITORIAL PARAMILITIAS**

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35 Since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the 2005 London bombings, there
36
37 have been important transformations in orientations towards political violence among
38
39 many political Islamists, theological and political salafis and several important ‘salafi-
40
41 jihadi’ clerics who formerly supported wider forms of political violence against civilians
42
43 but have partially modified some of their former judgements. The latter significantly
44
45 include major ‘salafi-jihadi’ clerics, such as the Jordanian Abu Mohammed Asim al-
46
47 Maqdisi⁵, and the stern London-based Syrian advocate of jihad and *takefir*, Abu Basir al-
48
49 Tartusi, who said after the London bombings, though with qualification, that martyrdom
50
51 operations were closer to suicide, a sin (*As Sharq Al-Awsat* 27.08.2005; *As Sharq Al-Awsat*
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53 01.09.2005).⁶ Theological salafism has also come under pressure from Saudi Arabia,
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55 which has made a concerted global effort to present Wahhabism and salafism as
56
57 equivalent to peace and contrary to ‘terrorism’. However, ‘terrorism’ and ‘innocence’
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3 have motile meanings. Hence, this Saudi effort routinely backfires because of the highly
4
5 sectarian xenologies of many Saudi Arabian and other Gulf clerics, as well as their
6
7 regularly ambiguous qualifications about different kinds of political violence.
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12 More generally, the relations between ‘salafi-jihadi’ clerics and operatives has
13
14 transformed, often substantially and in many detailed ways and some themes can be
15
16 outlined here. The broadest field of ‘salafi-jihadi’ theological opinion on legitimate forms
17
18 of violence (including against Muslim and non-Muslim civilians, against women, children
19
20 and the elderly, through beheadings and other mutilations, by human bombs and though
21
22 insurgencies directed against states or formal civilian groups) is readily available.
23
24 Opinions are supplemented by a potent philosophical anthropology, now definitive of
25
26 several forms of salafism and ‘salafi-jihadism’, in which disavowal, enmity and
27
28 dissociation constitute the natural human dispensation and xenological solidarity a
29
30 natural condition (for example, Al-Fawzaan, 1997; Al-Qahtani, 1993). Even if
31
32 judgements are abrogated by clerics who initially gave them, the abrogation can be
33
34 dismissed as resulting from US or Saudi pressure. Operatives also readily make
35
36 theological opinions: as major respected clerics have receded, the distinction between
37
38 who is an operative and who a cleric has diminished, as has the difference – if there ever
39
40 was a clear difference – between a jurisprudential opinion, a political opinion and an
41
42 operational judgement. Somewhat in parallel, the strategic distinction between small
43
44 group acts against formal civilians and the incitement of popular violent insurgencies
45
46 against armed occupiers or other formal civilians is frequently blurred. Hence, committed
47
48 operatives do not necessarily require further theological legitimation for the
49
50 ‘uncontentious’ bulk of operations, including against civilians. While there are strong
51
52 countervailing trends that continue to appeal to the magical and supernal aspects of jihad
53
54 (for example, Al Sahli, 2003; Surur, not dated), the orientation of operatives has shifted
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3 from the theological, mystical or miraculous to the rational, strategic and operational, and
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5 this can be seen as a declension of the theological. These factors do not mean religious
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7 jurisprudence is unimportant, but rather the relevant opinions are commonly understood
8
9 to legitimise a wide field of operations against formal civilians, despite the prevalence of
10
11 contrary religious opinions. Except for the most jurisprudentially contentious of acts, the
12
13 choice between religious opinions is largely about political or strategic judgement rather
14
15 theology. Strategically, there is a range of evolving ideas, ranging from the imperative to
16
17 generate insurgencies to autonomous, covert cellular structures or independent lone
18
19 individuals operating in the west, as suggested by key ideologues such as Abu Musab as-
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21 Suri (Naji 2006; see also Lia 2007), or small groups making use of readily obtainable
22
23 materials, as advocated by figures like Dhiren Barot.
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31 **ONLY CONNECT**

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35 These broader changes are relevant to the UK where there has been a string of high
36
37 profile trials of those accused under expansive UK counter-terrorism legislation. Key
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39 trials have followed major police and security service operations. These include the
40
41 massive Operations Crevice (the 'fertilizer' plot), Overt (the 'transatlantic airline bombing
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43 plot'), Rhyme (the group associated with Dhiren Barot), Mazhar (an important Internet
44
45 group), Overamp (a group from London, with connections to individuals from the failed
46
47 21 July 2005 London public transport bombings), Vivace (the latter failed bombings),
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49 Baguette (a Manchester group), Bivalve (an arrest at Luton airport) among numerous
50
51 others. In 2007, there were 257 arrests related to terrorism legislation or associated
52
53 offences, of which 126 individuals were released without charge (Carlile 2008, p.67.)
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56 From 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2007, there were 1,228 arrests related to terrorism
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58 legislation or related offences, of which 669 individuals were released without charge.⁷ In
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3 a few years, there may be up to a thousand such prisoners and their already evident
4 political mobilization as ‘prisoners of war’ – the war being the ‘global war on terror’ –
5 will become important. Alongside are vocal demands from some prisoners regarding
6 racism, anti-Muslim prejudice, human rights and the physical attacks upon them by other
7 inmates. One might foresee something approaching the shape of the ‘H-Block’
8 campaigns of the Provisional IRA during the 1970s and 1980s, if the currently small
9 prisoner campaigns gain symbolic momentum. Comparisons have been made with ‘gang
10 structures’, including those of sectarian Republican and Loyalist prisoners. Political
11 demands have not just arisen from the prisoners themselves: Shehzad Tanweer, one of
12 the July 2005 bombers, in a predictably slick video released in July 2006 by As-Sahab, Al
13 Qaeda’s media wing, threatens an intensifying series of attacks in Britain unless it pulls its
14 troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, stops military and financial support to the US and
15 Israel, and releases all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh and ‘your other concentration
16 camps’ (As-Sahab, 2006). Dhiren Barot has been attacked in prison with boiling oil and
17 water and has complained bitterly about what he sees as the racism and Islamophobia he
18 has faced from the criminal justice system and the media (Barot, 2007). Omar Khyam,
19 convicted as the key organizer of the ‘fertilizer’ plot, has also been attacked, as have other
20 Muslim prisoners.

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48 Of importance is the extent to which suspects, evidence or events in separate
49 trials, including current or pending trials, are reportedly associated (raising a range of
50 ethical issues about research in this area.) Describing sociologically just the British links
51 through terms such as ‘social movement’, ‘network’, ‘organization’ or ‘group’ is only
52 partially sufficient and the network analogy undersupplies us with an convincing social
53 topology of the UK ‘clusters’ and their transnational associations. If it is relatively
54 uncomplicated to show a network of ‘clusters’, it is far less easy to demonstrate the
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3 genuine significance of ‘the network’, coherence within it, systematic organization across
4 it, or the relevance of key personalities in animating it. Personal and familial bonds,
5
6 organizational associations, and co-presence at events, militia training camps, cities and
7
8 villages are evident in various cases. Online associations are regularly demonstrated.
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11 However, the ‘clusters’ are not necessarily existing socio-political groups but ones made
12
13 distinct through criminal investigations (the network made visible through forensic,
14
15 criminal and legal process is not necessarily the same as the geosocial network.) Much of
16
17 the apparent configuration of UK clusters has resulted from intelligence obtained from
18
19 (and therefore managed and constrained by the exigencies of) Pakistan’s intelligence
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21 services, through the confessions of a few key individuals or through confessions
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23 obtained through torture.
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31 Other important aspects remain to be described accurately: changing
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33 transnational ‘jihadi’ pathways (especially post-2003), the anthropology of the militia and
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35 ideological camps and their substantial variety, the nature of different courses of
36
37 instruction and training (though some of this is well known), the role of rural guides,
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39 instructors and camp *amirs*, the significance of peripatetic mercenaries, financial
40
41 exchange, and other dynamics related to inter-militia relations. Virtually unremarked is
42
43 the dense and sophisticated *aesthetic* universe created by religious militias. The aesthetic
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45 dimensions vary regionally but include consistent themes, motifs, lilt, nasheed,
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47 calligraphy, poetry and images.
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54 Some information relevant to the UK is necessarily curtailed here and is
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56 described using public sources. But it is more accurate to speak of disparate ‘operational’
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58 and propaganda ‘clusters’ in the UK, some of which overlap others, some of which show
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60 tenuous links with other ‘clusters’ or individuals, others which are (or currently appear to

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3 be) relatively independent, and others which show an indirect relation through the co-
4 presence of individuals at common events in the UK (though the latter regularly lead to
5 an overemphasis on Al Muhajiroun and the Supporters of Sharia.) Several key clusters
6 demonstrate associations with each other via (the mediation of) Pakistani militias
7 operating in Kashmir. Direct associations with 'Al Qaeda' have been either shown or
8 regularly alleged, as in the 2005 bombings and the 'fertiliser', the 2006 transatlantic
9 airline, the 2007 Birmingham 'Muslim soldier beheading' plots and the 2007 Glasgow
10 airport attack. However, what is meant by 'Al Qaeda' can be a figure from a militia
11 operating in Kashmir. Some clusters are small and tight, others sprawling and
12 unbounded, vanishing into quotidian sociality. If one can speak of a prominent
13 ideological shape, it includes the importance attached to Kashmir (and symbolically,
14 Palestine), the attacks on Afghanistan, the 2002 Gujarat carnage, and the ideologies of
15 Pakistani militias. Of key significance are ideological groups organised around (now
16 former) key bookshops in the UK. In addition to the symbolic standing of Ayman al-
17 Zawahiri, Bin Laden, the late al-Zarqawi and the late Ibn al-Khattab (today's Che
18 Guevara), key inspirational figures include Abdullah Azzam, Masood Azhar, Hafiz
19 Mohammed Saeed, Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, but there is a very wide
20 range of other figures exemplifying a diverse ideological universe. Some political and
21 highly technical material is ubiquitous.

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50 The diversity of the UK clusters, their relative unboundedness and the nature of
51 their international associations are illustrated by briefly considering three real or alleged
52 plots though, as we see, one plot quickly segues into others. Some of those arrested
53 during Operation Crevise (the 'fertilizer' plot) have been associated with the 7 July 2005
54 bombers and with two others later arrested and charged in relation to the latter. These
55 associations between the July 2005 bombings and the fertilizer plot focus on Mohammed
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3 Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer's associations with some of the Crevice plotters in
4 the UK. Individuals associated with the London bombings were also at camps in
5 Mansehra or Malakand reportedly at the same time as individuals associated with the
6 Crevice plot. Mohammed Siddique Khan of the 7 July London bombings and Mukhtar
7 Said Ibrahim of the failed 21 July 2005 bombings were also associated via a training camp
8 abroad, and the latter was also associated with another recently convicted UK-based
9 group. Members of the 21 July failed plot were also reportedly associated with others in
10 south London. Hence, both through the Crevice group and the '7/7' bombers, the
11 associations expand in many disparate directions. Characteristically, as shown in the
12 Crevice trial, online communications involved dummy Yahoo accounts and draft email
13 documents were used for communication.
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31 Both the '7/7' and Crevice clusters relate to religious militias operating in
32 Kashmir. It is important to register the political potency of Kashmir for UK citizens
33 whose parents or grandparents may have come from south Asia. Kashmir's 'liberation' is
34 comprehensively entwined with secular Pakistani nationalism and regional Muslim
35 religious absolutism. Kashmir is similarly prominent in secular Indian and Hindu
36 religious nationalism. If 'Kashmir' bears symbolic power of considerable magnitude, this
37 can intensify communal dynamics among south Asians in the UK. It can also lead to the
38 view that partaking of armed 'jihad' in Kashmir is a noble venture, irrespective of
39 whether the venture is religious or secular. Omar Khyam, whose immediate family is
40 secular, was said by him to have held a celebration for him because of his involvement
41 with groups active in Kashmir (his extended family in Pakistan included staff in the
42 military and intelligence services who found him at a camp and brought him home.)
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Dhiren Barot's book is about his experiences in Kashmir and eulogises the Lashkar-e
Tayyiba (LeT), the most powerful militia operating in Kashmir. Barot's book also speaks

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3 highly of the Harakat-ul Ansar, Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM) and Al-Badr, militias
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6 operating in Kashmir that range from Deobandi to Islamist.
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10 Another sprawl of associations between primarily propaganda clusters
11 demonstrates an alternative topology. Following Operation Mazhar, Younis Tsouli from
12 Ealing and two associates were convicted in 2007 for inciting others to commit acts of
13 terrorism (*Economist* 12.07.2007). Tsouli, under the name 'irhabi007' ('irhabi' meaning
14 'terrorist', '007' referring to a fictional drinking and womanizing secret agent of the
15 British state, an unusual coalescence of ambitions), had been active in numerous online
16 activities. He was also said to be associated with Al Qaeda's military affiliate in Iraq and
17 published al-Zarqawi's propaganda (*Guardian* 5.07.2007). Tsouli was initially arrested
18 because of phone records obtained during the arrest of a Swedish man in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina. An online associate of Tsouli's group was said to have attempted to
20 smuggle plans for a rocket launcher (a Hamas Qassam rocket) into the UK. Other
21 online associates are linked to activities in the US, Canada and elsewhere.
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40 One association leads to At-Tibyan, an important (if intriguing) online publisher
41 of English language translations of key 'salafi-jihadi' texts. At-Tibyan's theopolitical
42 material provides a wide field of 'salafi-jihadi' judgements of the kind described earlier
43 (though it has so far avoided publicising the more visceral judgements.) Another group
44 of UK individuals has been associated with At-Tibyan in a legal case. At-Tibyan has also
45 published material which was formerly to be published by Azzam.com, a website run by
46 Babar Ahmed (among others) who is facing extradition to the US. Babar Ahmed's case
47 relates to connections that range from the US to Chechnya (USA v. Babar Ahmad 2004,
48 p.9). Since its closure, Azzam.com's material has been published by the Maktabah al-
49 Ansar bookshop in Birmingham, which also published Dhiren Barot's book on Kashmir.
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3 The bookshop was reportedly co-owned by Moazzam Begg, who contemplated Taliban
4 Afghanistan as a desirable holiday destination for his family, was held captive at
5
6 Guantanamo Bay and later released. An individual who worked at the bookshop was
7
8 arrested and later released without charge in relation to the 2007 Birmingham ‘Muslim
9
10 soldier beheading’ plot. This latter plot reportedly links to militias operating in Kashmir;
11
12 it also relates to the shipping of equipment to Afghanistan, a theme in several cases.
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14 These connections can be expanded much further in several directions and from various
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16 ‘nodes’, generating a sprawl of assemblages for which the network or the movement
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18 analytic seem like overdescriptions.
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27 A third series of associations can be considered, starting with the ‘transatlantic
28 airline liquid bomb’ plot in 2006. The arrest of Rashid Rauf in Pakistan led to the UK
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30 arrests, enormous alarm across the Atlantic and the creation of new hand-luggage rules
31
32 concerning liquid products (*Independent* 19.08.2006). Of significance in this (and several
33
34 other) plots were the numerous ‘martyrdom’ videos that individuals had produced. The
35
36 language of political retribution and reprisal permeates these videos, as it does those of
37
38 the July 2005 bombers, and this requires an explanation that moves beyond primitive
39
40 vengeance. This plot also led to associations with militias in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
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42 including the important Jaish-e Mohammed militia operating in Kashmir.
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50 Significantly, the connections vanish into the fug of military-militia dynamics in
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52 Pakistan. For example, Rashid Rauf was initially characterised in Pakistan as a key ‘Al
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54 Qaeda figure’ and allegedly associated with various UK plots. However, he managed to
55
56 walk free from police custody (*Dawn* (Karachi), 18.12.2007) though he is now thought to
57
58 have been killed in a US drone airstrike in North Waziristan. Similarly, Mohammed
59
60 Naeem Noor Khan, a complex ‘key Al Qaeda’ figure from Pakistan, whose arrest led to

1
2
3 the arrests of Dhiren Barot, Babar Ahmed and others, was released without charge in
4 Pakistan (*Observer* 08.08.2004; *Guardian* 23.08.2007.) This recurring pattern, which applies
5
6 in a different way in the case of Omar Saeed Sheikh (below), is incorrigible unless the
7
8 shadow state, the secret state and their associations with the ‘militia swarm’ are included
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10 in the pattern of transnational connections. The smoke and mirrors in the way the
11
12 Pakistani military and intelligence services manage the militias are an essential attribute of
13
14 the sociological description.
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22 **THE DYNAMICS OF THE ‘JIHADI CORRIDOR’**

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26 Hence, virtually every major plot or operation in the UK is associated with paramilitary
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28 or explosives training by Pakistani militias operating in Kashmir, or to training visits
29
30 associated with Kashmir or Afghanistan. The future relevance of this pattern of militia
31
32 training is unclear, in the sense that training abroad is not necessarily a requisite for
33
34 further attacks. However, the pattern of militia training can be seen as a sociological
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36 space that is called here, for convenience, a ‘jihadi corridor’ from the UK to Pakistan. It
37
38 is one of several ‘corridors’ that have existed from Britain to other countries. A key one,
39
40 which remains surrounded by considerable speculation, was the progenitor UK ‘convoy
41
42 of mercy’ to Bosnia in the 1990s that also lead to the development of further patterns of
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44 travel from the UK to Chechnya. Other ‘corridors’ linked the UK to Pakistan and then
45
46 Afghanistan (through the Bosnia route, or directly.)
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54 If we consider the ‘corridors’ as sociological spaces, then their disruption or
55
56 change can have significant consequences. The exigencies within Pakistan – diverting
57
58 returning militants from Afghanistan to Kashmir in the early 1990s, but also the
59
60 subsequent impact within Pakistan from militias active in Kashmir – were noted by

1
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3 figures like Dhiren Barot. One argument is that operations shifted to the UK after 2001
4
5 because the 'corridor' from Pakistan to Afghanistan (more an expressway during the
6
7 1990s) became progressively curtailed for foreigners and the 'corridor' from Pakistan- to
8
9 Indian-controlled Kashmir, which cannot exist without military knowledge and
10
11 connivance, was compromised after the nuclear brinkmanship between India and
12
13 Pakistan following the Kargil episode during 1998-1999 (see also Abbas 2005). There is
14
15 also evidence that individuals associated with Al Qaeda directed individuals to commit
16
17 acts in the UK following the Iraq invasion (Burke 2008), seen as the last straw, as
18
19 reported in the Operation Crevice trial. This does not explain why activities started in the
20
21 UK before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, including the Wood Green ricin plot (2002-
22
23 3) or the involvement of Richard Reid and Saajid Badat in the failed 'shoebomber' plot
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25 (2001). Nor does it explain why individuals from the UK were regularly attending
26
27 training in south Asia and returning home without fighting abroad well before 2003.
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36 Evidence for the training of British citizens by Pakistani militias operating in
37
38 Kashmir is consistent. Mohammed Siddique Khan reportedly trained in a Harakat-ul
39
40 Mujahideen (HuM) camp in Mansehra district in the summer of 2001 with others from
41
42 the UK (*Guardian* 21.05.08, 22.05.08.) Shehzad Tanweer reportedly received training
43
44 from a 'Jaish-e Mohammed camp' (JeM) near Islamabad and both Siddique Khan and
45
46 Tanweer reportedly met with Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) (*Guardian* 01.08.05; *Daily Times*
47
48 (Lahore) 17.07.2005). During the Crevice trial, two individuals reportedly the same as
49
50 Siddique Khan ('Ibrahim') and Tanweer ('Zubair') went to a training camp in Malakand
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52 district, Pakistan. Visits to training camps run by HuM and LeT (among others) were
53
54 described during the Crevice trial. During this trial, Omar Khyam interestingly dismissed
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56 the LeT as linked to the Pakistani intelligence services. Also of significance was the
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58 seemingly disordered way a group paid for training to be organised by a *manvi* and his
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‘militia’, reflecting the relative ease with which this was possible and its contingent nature. Mukhtar Said Ibrahim, of the failed 21 July 2005 bombings, reportedly attended an HuM training camp in Pakistan. He also attended the same training camp as Mohammed Siddique Khan in North Waziristan agency (*Guardian* 12.07.07). Rashid Rauf, one of the plotters in the ‘transatlantic airline plot’ in 2006 (among others) was associated with Masood Azhar of the Jaish-e Mohammed militia operating in Kashmir, and was reportedly a member of a splinter from the latter. The association with Masood Azhar included family ties between Rauf and Azhar (*The Post* (Pakistan) 27.07.2007; *International Herald Tribune* 18.12.2007; *Guardian* 28.01.2008). A series of arrests in Pakistan that precipitated the UK ‘airline plot’ arrests included allegations of connections to Matiur Rehman of the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) (*Observer* 13.08.06). Other militias have also been implicated. These connections do not preclude direct associations with individuals in Al Qaeda, which have reportedly included Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, Abu Obaidah al-Masri, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Suleiman al-Jazairi, and individuals such as Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, Dhiren Barot, Mohammed Junaid Babar and named others living in the UK and Europe.

THE PAKISTANI ‘MILITIA SWARM’

While ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘resurgent Taliban’ remain in that order the key symbols in the demonology associated with religion, a third ‘actor’, the Pakistani religious militia swarm, has been largely evaded in analyses outside south Asia (Mir 2004; Abou Zahab & Roy 2004; Abbas 2005; Rana 2005; Swami 2007; Hussain 2007.) Also significant is the impact that alliances between militias might have regionally and internationally. Sometimes, the militias merge or work together as militia combines such that it is unclear whether they are separate entities, or are distinct from what is called ‘Al Qaeda’. Conversely, what is

1
2
3 often referred to as 'Al Qaeda' is often these militia organizations. Another key
4
5 dimension relates to militant regional movements referred to collectively as 'the Pakistan
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7 Taliban' and which inhabit the same geographical space as that used by Al Qaeda fighters
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9 (the two tribal agencies of Waziristan) or by the militias already discussed (Swat and other
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11 parts of NWFP.)
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17 Al Qaeda's 'International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders',
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19 initiated by Bin Laden in 1998, now includes five Pakistani militias: LeT, HuM, JeM,
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21 Harakat-ul Jihadi-i Islami (HuJI) and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ). Notwithstanding the
22
23 Indian government's sustained propaganda, the LeT reportedly ran the alliance following
24
25 the US-led attacks on Afghanistan and Al Qaeda after 2001 (*Times of India* 12.08.2006;
26
27 Raman 2005; *Asia Times Online* 12.08.2004.) While key Pakistani militias are members of
28
29 Al Qaeda's International Islamic Front, future militia assemblages might have the
30
31 potential to become its symbolic competitors. The 'Brigade 313' and 'Lashkar-e Omar'
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33 alliances variously included LeT, JeM, LeJ, the interesting Harakat-ul Mujahideen al-
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35 Alami / Jundullah group and HuJI. Such combines represent a highly dynamic militia
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37 version of a sectarian Ahl-e Hadis – Deobandi political alliance, one now complicated by
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39 other regional militant movements ('the Pakistani Taliban'). Sections of the Pakistan
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41 government, military or secret state have, at different times, actively fostered (rival)
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43 militia movements. At other times they are banned but allowed to operate relatively
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45 freely under a new name (LeT / Jamaat-ud Dawa / Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation, JeM /
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47 Khuddam-ul Islam). At other times still the militias have been at virtual war with
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49 sections of the state or government.
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59 The background of the main militias is important to address briefly since, in one
60 sense, they have regularly contained some British links. The first mainly Pakistani militia

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3 fighting during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the Harakat-ul Jihad-ul Islami
4 (HuJI). This was formed in 1980 by the Jamiat Ulama-e Islami (JUI), a national
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6 federation of Deobandi clerics (a faction of which created the Taliban movement), and
7
8 the Tablighi Jamaat, the transnational missionary organization misleadingly considered
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10 apolitical and quietist (Mir 2004, p. 117; Sikand 2003). A major offshoot of HuJI was the
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12 Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), formed in 1985, which is also associated with Tablighi
13
14 sections. In the early 1990s, HuJI, HuM and another militia merged under the name
15
16 Harakat-ul Ansar (HuA). One of its key leaders and a formidable ideologue was Masood
17
18 Azhar. His publications, tapes and CDs circulated widely in the UK during the 1990s and
19
20 he visited the UK on several speaking and fundraising tours. Azhar's writings and
21
22 speeches, including *Zaad-e Mujabid* (Khubaib Sahib not dated) an ideological book for
23
24 mujahideen on preparation for 'jihad', written while in jail in India, and his *The Virtues of*
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26 *Jihad* (Azhar not dated) are widely available in Britain (possession of the former was
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28 important in a further conviction emerging from the July 7 bombings.)
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38 Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British public schoolboy and LSE student, while
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40 on a 'convoy of mercy' to Bosnia in the early 1990s, become involved with the Harakat-
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42 ul Ansar (Mir 2004, pp.56-66). Masood Azhar of the HuA was arrested in Indian-
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44 controlled Kashmir in 1994 and Omar Saeed Sheikh was later arrested in India for
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46 plotting to kidnap westerners in order to force the Indian government to release Azhar.
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48 Following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999, supposedly by an 'HuA'
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50 front group, Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh were released and returned to
51
52 Pakistan. One of the hijackers was Amjad Farooqi who became a key figure in the
53
54 Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), the militia offshoot of Sipah-e Sahaba (SSP), an extremely
55
56 violent sectarian organization in Pakistan that turned to massacring Shia leaders in
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58 Kashmir (Abbas 2005, p. 208.) In a very important sense, the SSP's violence established
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1
2
3 a key precedent for many of the tendencies described in this essay. On release, Masood
4
5 Azhar announced the formation of the Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM). Like the LeT, the
6
7 Jaish-e Mohammed is a massive *social, political* and *militia movement*. Omar Saeed Sheikh
8
9 was convicted for the kidnapping and murder by beheading in 2002 of the *Washington*
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11 *Post* journalist, Daniel Pearl, who was investigating the involvement of Richard Reid, the
12
13 failed UK shoe bomber, with these militias and with the Tablighis (*Guardian* 23.02.2005;
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15 *USA versus Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh* 2002; *Mariane Pearl versus Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh*
16
17 *and others* 2007). Amjad Farooqi, now dead, was named as involved in the murder, and
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19 Khaled Sheikh Mohammed said that he beheaded Daniel Pearl. The various tendencies
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21 that culminated in this murder show, perhaps emblematically, the early involvement of
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23 individuals from the UK, the convergence of several ideological and sectarian groups, the
24
25 presence of militias independent of Al Qaeda and individuals from the latter.
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33 The militias are politically rather than just militarily definitive: several Deobandi
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35 groups during and in the aftermath of the Afghan jihad had developed a powerful
36
37 ‘global’ ideology. For example, the Jaish-e Mohammed’s motto is ‘jihad against the
38
39 infidels and struggle against infidelity to faith [i.e. against other Muslims]’ (Azhar, quoted
40
41 in Rana 2005, p.225.) In this curt statement, Azhar’s ideology illustrates two key
42
43 dynamics: firstly, the tripartite struggle – locally in Indian-controlled Kashmir, against
44
45 India itself (to ‘reclaim’ it as ‘Muslim territory’ that was once part of the ‘Caliphate’), and
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47 planet-wide to establish God’s justice and truth everywhere; secondly the need to
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49 discipline Muslims ‘internally’ while fighting unbelief ‘externally’. These south Asian
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51 ‘global’ ideologies cannot be viewed as unsystematic and disorganised in comparison
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53 with the lineage of violent salafism arising from Saudi Arabia and Egypt from the 1970s,
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55 nor are the former a simple consequence of the latter. (Distinctively, they contain the
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57 idea of a Hindu-Zionist-Crusader alliance encircling and threatening Muslims globally.)
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6 This argument also applies in the case of the most powerful Pakistani militia, the
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8 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), an offshoot of one sect of the Ahl-e Hadis movement in
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10 Pakistan and so ideologically closer to Wahhabism. The LeT was created by Hafiz Saeed
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12 in 1990 as the military wing of the Markaz-ud Dawa wal Irshad founded by him and the
13
14 late Abdullah Azzam, a Muslim Brotherhood figure who is usually portrayed as bin
15
16 Laden's political mentor. Like HuJI, the progenitor Deobandi militia, the LeT from its
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18 inception was operating beyond Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan. LeT members have
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20 been found in Chechnya, China, India⁸, Bosnia, south-east Asia and recently in Iraq (Mir
21
22 2004, pp.104-5; Rana 2005, p.334). LeT fundraisers have been active in the UK for
23
24 many years. Allegations have been made that LeT and JeM activists in the UK formed
25
26 an important first step in the 'jihadi corridor' to Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, and
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28 the LeT has been directly implicated in the training of individuals from the UK.
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33 Ideologically, the LeT makes little distinction between its desire to plant 'the flag of
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35 Islam' in Delhi, London and Washington and its struggle in Kashmir. India, but also
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37 Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists are key symbols in its demonology. Similarly, the idea that
38
39 killing Americans, 'looting their wealth' and 'enslaving their women' was permissible,
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41 since they were infidels warring against Islam and Muslims, was well-established among
42
43 Ahl-e Hadis or Deobandi militias by the early 1990s and did not require Al Qaeda's
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45 interpolation.
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52 During the 1990s, religious militias in south Asia spoke not just of the Afghan,
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54 Kashmir, Chechnyan or Bosnian jihad but the idea of jihad in an abstract sense, one
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56 linked to a planetary struggle against *kufr* and *kaffir*, or to a cosmic struggle to establish
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58 God's truth and justice worldwide and to save the entire humanity from *kufr*. The
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60 political language inverts the order of priorities: the Kashmir jihad becomes important

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3 because of the anterior necessity of 'global jihad'. There is therefore an interesting set of
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5 dialectics between the territory of the planet, all the lesser 'Caliphate territory' conceived
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7 to be historically 'Muslim' and apparently having borne the law and footprint of the
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9 believer (Roy 2004, p.112), and the regional struggle against military occupation. The
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11 Kashmir jihad is coextensive with the jihad to 'reclaim' all of India, which is equivalent to
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13 the jihad to establish planetary peace under God's law.
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16 17 18 19 20 **CONCLUSION**

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24 The 'geographical' movement from a north-west London suburb to Pakistani militia
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26 movements operating in Kashmir highlights elements of a sociological process and a
27
28 political form that governs those who aspire to become involved with a territorial
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30 religious absolutist paramilitias. The novel connections between British youths and
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32 Pakistani militias operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan reflect a militarized political
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34 association between very small groups in the 'diaspora', militias abroad, and elements of
35
36 the shadow state. Through their travels, a small group of young British men have
37
38 enabled a range of associations between youths in the UK and militias abroad. Their
39
40 movements have engendered new associations between international military and
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42 security apparatuses, groups in the 'diaspora' and a variety of states and parastatal bodies,
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44 associations that will spawn new political dynamics long after the 'global war on terror' is
45
46 over. This situation adds an altogether different dimension to the 'politics of the
47
48 diaspora', since militias largely created and partially managed by the Pakistani secret state
49
50 have trained British youths who want to undertake anti-civilian operations in the UK. It
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52 is a highly contentious but moot point whether Al Qaeda's agency was necessary for the
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54 major plots or operations in the UK. As the new US administration, with British
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56 assistance, undertakes more intensive and direct military assaults within Pakistan's
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3 sovereign territory, other potent communal dynamics, converging with secular-nationalist
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5 ones, will proliferate.
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10 It has become possible for many to apprehend 'salafi-jihadi' politics solely
11 through the perspective of resistance to military occupation or the exigencies of a war
12 situation. But consider these words of Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e Mohammed:
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15 ...it is to express to the unbelievers that all Muslims are like one body, so to touch
16 or cause harm to any part of the body is like challenging the whole body.
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19 Similarly, to lift the hand against a Muslim's life, wealth or honour is similar to
20 challenging the whole nation of the Muslims. (Azhar not dated, p. 132.)
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31 This philosophy of unconstrained spatial and temporal consequentialism may converge
32 with that of Al Qaeda but is also independent of it. It takes each individual on the planet
33 as in principle embodying responsibility for actions and consequences anywhere and
34 anywhere. Rather than the dehumanization of the enemy that 'salafi-jihadis' are regularly
35 accused of, it is a recognition of fully human political capacity. It is not that concerns
36 about genuine military occupations are removed from this latter political form, but that
37 they are intended to make sense only in that form. This is quite different from the
38 formalities of political Islamist or communitarian Muslim identity politics in the UK. It
39 demonstrates instead a desire by a small virtuous group to usurp the law of humanity and
40 settle upon a precise identification between *cosmos* and *nomos* (Arendt, 1973). Key ideas
41 about virtue (the 'character of character') and approbation (akin to the honouring of
42 moral character) recur in 'salafi-jihadi' discourse. A politics of virtue and character can
43 exist relatively unbridled by the impersonal rule-imperative forms of 'the political' that
44 are otherwise hosted by modernity. These ideas of virtue and approbation have
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3 remained the 'dangerous supplement' as well as the heady companion to normative
4 modern political forms based on abstract judgement and impersonal procedure. They
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6 equally show considerable distance from domestic and transnational 'migrant' politics
7 typically based on rights, distribution and recognition: if the secular father was arrested
8 for making petrol bombs in anticipation of an attack by neo-Nazis or racist police in the
9
10 midst of violent urban events occurring nationally, the anti-secular son is arrested for
11 wanting to cause explosions among civilians for reasons that are at once secular and are a
12
13 product of a political religion, one in which the worlds of the living have become mixed
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15 up with the worlds of the dead.
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NOTES

¹ 'Rough presentation for Gas Limos project', chapter 4, page 16. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot and obtained from computers searched during Operation Rhyme.

² 'Final presentation', page 3. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot and obtained from computers searched during Operation Rhyme.

³ 'Rough presentation for Gas Limos project', page 35. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot and obtained from computers searched during Operation Rhyme.

⁴ It is not an accident that a key media organiser for Al Qaeda and an important communicator of its ideas is Adam Pearlman, a 'white' American of part-Jewish, part-Christian parentage. It would thwart current 'profiling' measures in Europe and America if future attacks are undertaken by white, female or mixed groups with no south Asian or middle-Eastern members directly involved in the attack itself.

⁵ Maqdisi's writings are available at www.tawhed.ws / www.almaqdese.net, including his *Hadhibi Aqeedatuna* and *Millat Ibrahim*.

⁶ See <http://www.en.altartosi.com/suicide.htm#B>. Tartusi's statement of creed is at <http://www.en.altartosi.com/Creed.pdf>.

⁷ <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/>, accessed 29 June 2008.

⁸ The massacre of civilians in Bombay in November 2008 was undertaken by the LeT, which has also previously attacked the Indian Parliament and the Red Fort in Delhi.