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
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Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax Country: Evidence from Sweden

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13 **Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax Country:**
14 **Evidence from Sweden[§]**
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17 by

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19 Per Engström* and Bertil Holmlund**
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24 21 February 2007
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32 **Abstract**

33 Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to
34 underreport their incomes. This paper uses recent Swedish income and expenditure data to
35 examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed individuals. A key
36 hypothesis is that underreporting of incomes among the self-employed would be visible in the
37 data as “excess food consumption”, for a given level of observed income. Our results confirm
38 the underreporting hypothesis. In particular, we estimate that households with at least one
39 self-employed member underreport their total incomes by around 30 percent. Under-reporting
40 appears to be much more prevalent among self-employed people with unincorporated
41 businesses as among those with incorporated businesses.
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46 *Keywords:* Tax evasion, self-employment, Engel curves.

47 *JEL-codes:* D12, H24, H25, H26.
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1. Introduction

It is widely believed that self-employed people can more easily underreport their taxable incomes than wage earners are able to do. Several researchers have tried to estimate the extent of underreporting by using information on consumption expenditure and reported income. The key idea is that expenditure on food is accurately reported by all people participating in an expenditure survey, or at least that there is no systematic misreporting that is related to employment status. If the self-employed underreport their incomes, this would be visible in the data as “excess food consumption” among self-employed people, for a given level of observed income.

The expenditure-based approach to estimation of tax evasion and the size of the black economy was pioneered by Pissarides and Weber (1989) and has been applied in a number of other studies. Pissarides and Weber examined British data from 1982; Apel (1994) provided evidence for Sweden using data from 1988; Johansson (2000) used Finnish data from the mid-1990s; Schuetze (2002) examined consumption and income in Canada over the period 1969-1992; Lyssiotou et al (2004) investigated consumption and income using British data from 1993. The studies by Apel, Johansson and Schuetze follow the Pissarides and Weber approach closely, whereas Lyssiotou et al develop a somewhat different methodology based on consumer demand systems. An alternative nonparametric methodology is developed by Tedd (2004).

The available empirical studies generally support the basic hypothesis: self-employed people do tend to underreport their incomes relative to wage earners. There is, however, considerable dispersion in the estimates of underreporting. Pissarides and Weber (1989) estimate the mean underreporting to around 55 percent, whereas Apel (1994) report a mid point estimate of around 35 percent. Schuetze (2002) reports underreporting in the interval 11 to 23 percent, whereas Johansson (2000) estimates underreporting by some 27 percent on average. Lyssiotou et al (2004) estimate that true income for blue collar self-employed people is more than 100 percent greater than reported income, whereas true income for white-collar self-employed people exceeds reported income by 64 percent.¹ The implications of these various estimates for the relative size of the black economy depend on the relative importance of self-

¹ There exist also other studies using different methods that also indicate that tax evasion is more prevalent among groups with more opportunity to evade. See e.g. Slemrod et al (2001) and Joulfaian and Rider (1998). Blumenthal et al (2001) examine how normative appeals affect tax compliance using a randomized experiment.

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3 employment in the economy. Pissarides and Weber conclude that black economy activities
4 related to self-employment amount to 5 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom, whereas
5 Lyssiotou et al arrive at an estimate close to 11 percent. These estimates for the UK are much
6 higher than those reported by Apel for Sweden and Johansson for Finland . The dispersion in
7 estimates is thus considerable, and the reasons for the different estimates are not well
8 understood.
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15 This paper takes a new look at consumption expenditure and reported income among self
16 employed people and wage earners in Sweden, the country with the highest tax-to-GDP ratio
17 in the world.² There is a popular presumption that the incentives for tax evasion would be
18 particularly pertinent in a high-tax economy, although this presumption is not unambiguously
19 implied by theory.³ We use two samples, the first for the years 1999-2001 and the second for
20 2003-2004. Our results confirm the underreporting hypothesis. Specifically, we estimate that
21 the degree of income underreporting hovers around 30 percent of household income for a
22 household with at least one self-employed member.
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31 We also examine whether the degree of underreporting varies by the legal form of self-
32 employment and find noteworthy differences between incorporated and unincorporated
33 businesses: self-employed in the latter category seems much more prone to underreporting
34 than those in the incorporated category. We interpret these differences as the outcome of
35 differences in regulations that entail higher costs of tax evasion associated with incorporated
36 business activities. These results based on expenditure patterns are consistent with observed
37 earnings differences between paid employees and self-employed individuals. Controlling for
38 human capital characteristics and industry affiliation, we find that self-employed individuals
39 with unincorporated businesses report substantially lower incomes than employees as well as
40 lower incomes than self-employed in the incorporated category.
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54 ² According to OECD data, the tax-to-GDP ratio in Sweden stood at 50.7 percent in 2004 which is the highest
55 ratio among OECD countries; Denmark came second at 49.6 percent. Agell et al (1996) provide an overview and
56 evaluation of the major 1991 reform of the Swedish tax system.


57 ³ The theoretical literature on tax evasion does not provide clear predictions regarding the relationships between
58 tax rates and tax compliance. In the seminal contribution by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), an increase in the
59 tax rate has an ambiguous effect on tax evasion: there is a substitution effect that works in the direction of
60 increased evasion but there is also an income effect that works in the opposite direction if agents' absolute risk
aversion is decreasing in income. See also Sandmo (2005) for a survey of the theory of tax evasion. The
empirical research on tax rates and tax evasion has produced mixed results; see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).

The next section discusses briefly the Pissarides and Weber methodology. Section 3 of the paper presents the data, section 4 gives the results and section 5 concludes.

2. Estimating Tax Evasion from Expenditure Data

The Pissarides and Weber approach can be illustrated by means Figure 1. Let c denote log food consumption, $c = \ln C^F$, and y log disposable income, $y = \ln Y^D$. The figure shows two log-linear consumption-income profiles (Engel curves), one for self-employed people (*SE*) and one for wage earners (*WE*). By assumption, the elasticity of consumption with respect to income is equal for the two groups; the Engel curves have thus the same slopes. However, we allow the intercepts to differ so as to capture the possibility of underreporting of income among self-employed people. Imagine two individuals, one self-employed and one wage earner, who both report consumption level c^* . The wage earner reports income level y^w whereas the self-employed person reports income y^s . Suppose that consumption is truthfully reported by both types and that income corresponds to true income for the wage earner but not for the self-employed person. If preferences are the same, we can infer that the self-employed person's true income is y^w rather than reported y^s . The extent of underreporting is thus given by $y^w - y^s$.

Figure 1. Engel curves for wage earners (*WE*) and self-employed people (*SE*)



Now suppose that we pool the data for self-employed people and wage earners and estimate an equation of the form:

$$(1) \quad c_i = X_i\alpha + \beta y_i + \gamma SE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where subscript i denotes individual i , X is a vector of variables affecting consumption (in addition to income), SE a dummy variable for self-employed persons and ε a random error term. The parameter γ captures the vertical distance between the two Engel curves;

$\gamma > 0$ implies some underreporting of income among self-employed people. The degree of underreporting (in logs) is obtained as $y^w - y^s = \gamma / \beta$. For example, if $\gamma = .05$ and $\beta = 0.5$, we get $\gamma / \beta = 0.10$, which says that self-employed people underreport their incomes by around 10 percent. The percentage difference is generally obtained as

$D \equiv 100 \times [\exp(\gamma / \beta) - 1]$. We might alternatively express underreporting as $k \equiv \exp(\gamma / \beta)$, which gives the number by which a self-employed person's disposable income has to be multiplied so as to get the true disposable income. With $\gamma = .05$ and $\beta = 0.5$, we get $k = 1.105$.

The estimate of underreporting obtained from eq. (1) pertains to disposable income. We could also express underreporting in terms of gross income. Let Y^* denote true gross income, U the amount of underreported income and define $\kappa \equiv Y^* / (Y^* - U)$ as the ratio between true and reported gross income. It follows that $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$, where t is the effective tax rate.⁴

Clearly, we have $\kappa < k$.

Estimation of (1) raises several issues that are discussed in Pissarides and Weber (1989) and some of the subsequent literature. One issue is how income should be interpreted and treated in the estimation. The most relevant income concept is arguably permanent income rather than current income. However, existing data sets include only data on current incomes.

Pissarides and Weber, as well as much of the subsequent literature, have attempted to resolve this problem by treating current income as endogenous and pursued instrumental variable

⁴ By effective tax rate we mean $t = 1 - (\text{disposable income} / \text{total factor income})$. Transfers to households add to disposable income and thus reduces the effective (average) tax rate. Reported disposable income, Y^D , is given as $Y^D = Y^* - t(Y^* - U)$. We have $\kappa \equiv Y^* / (Y^* - U)$ and k is the ratio between true disposable income and reported disposable income. We thus get $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$.

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3 estimation. A potential problem with this approach is that it relies on perhaps arbitrary
4 exclusion restrictions for identification: one needs to find variables that affect disposable
5 income without directly affecting also food consumption. We will present results from OLS
6 as well as from IV estimations; in fact, the results are very similar.
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10 11 12 **3. The Data**

13 We have used data from the Swedish Household Budget Survey (Hushållens utgifter, HUT)
14 from 1999-2001, 2003 and 2004.⁵ Data for 1999-2001 are based on surveys to households that
15 include the second quarter of 1999 up to the first quarter of 2002. Around 9000 randomly
16 selected households were approached over these years, but only slightly above 50 percent of
17 those did actually participate in the surveys. In 2003 and 2004, 4000 households were
18 approached each year and the response rate was 58 percent both years. The response rates are
19 thus fairly low, although not exceptionally low for these kinds of time intensive surveys.
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28 The 1999-2001 surveys are produced and presented by Statistics Sweden as one survey and
29 we will refer to it as HUT 1999-2001. The other two surveys are produced and presented by
30 Statistics Sweden as two separate surveys. We will concatenate the surveys for 2003 and 2004
31 and refer to the resulting linked data set as HUT 2003-2004. The HUT data contain no panel
32 elements.
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38 The participating households were asked to report their consumption expenditures during
39 randomly selected two-week periods. In addition, supplementary questions were asked
40 regarding expenditures over the past 12 months. Various other questions were asked so as to
41 get information on household characteristics, including employment status and occupation.
42 Information about disposable incomes is obtained from official income and tax registers and
43 merged with the expenditure data.
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51 The two key variables are annual food consumption and annual disposable income. We follow
52 the literature by focusing on food consumption on the assumption that this is truthfully
53 reported and that expenditure functions for food are similar for employees and self-employed
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⁵ The design and main results of the HUT-studies are presented in reports from Statistics Sweden (2003, 2004, 2005).

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3 people. Our measure of food consumption is reported in the data as “food purchases”.⁶
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5 Disposable income is based on all types of (register-based) incomes, including transfers.
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7 Taxes are deducted from gross income so as to get household disposable income.
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10 We focus on consumption and incomes among employees and self-employed people. Self-
11 employment status can be defined in several ways. Most previous studies in this genre have
12 classified households by using information on income shares attributed to paid employment
13 and self-employment.⁷ A problem with this approach, besides the difficulty of choosing the
14 borderline, is that it may be sensitive to the legal form of the business. A person who runs an
15 incorporated business may be formally employed by the company and receive the main part
16 of the compensation in the form of wage income.
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24 We prefer to make use of self-reported information on employment status of the individual
25 household members. As a requirement for sample inclusion we require either that (i) at least
26 one member of the household is employed or self-employed, or that (ii) two members are
27 employed or self-employed. The self-employed category includes incorporated as well as
28 unincorporated businesses and the data contain information about the legal form. We have
29 excluded farmers, however, assuming that their food purchases exhibits a pattern relative to
30 income that differs from other self-employed people. Following Pissarides and Weber (1989)
31 and others in the literature, we also restrict the analysis to households with married or
32 cohabiting couples. The bigger sample, fulfilling criterion (i), comprises around 3000
33 households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The smaller sample (ii) includes a little
34 more than 2000 households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The share of self-
35 employed varies between 13 and 16 percent according to the adopted definitions.⁸ A first look
36 at the data is given in Table 1.
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49 The table displays average food consumption and disposable incomes among employees and
50 self-employed in our sample. A household is here classified as self-employed if at least one
51 member is self-employed. Average incomes are slightly higher among employees, whereas
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56 ⁶ We have obtained similar results for broader measures of food consumption, such as food purchases plus meals
57 out.

58 ⁷ Pissarides and Weber (1989) define households as self-employed if income from self-employment accounts for
59 at least 25 percent of total income.

60 ⁸ The fraction of self-employed in total employment is 10 percent according to the labor force surveys of 2000.
Note that our sample is restricted to couples. Moreover, our measure of the rate of self-employment in
households is not directly compared to the labor force survey data based on individuals.

food consumption is higher among the self-employed. It is thus clear that food consumption relative to income is higher, on average, among self-employed people. The difference amounts to around 4 percentage points.⁹ This pattern is what we would expect according to the hypothesis that self-employed people are more likely to underreport their true incomes. Of course, this is just a first look at the data and we need to control for other variables that may affect consumption. This is the topic for the next section.

Table 1. Means of variables, standard deviations in parentheses.

	1999 -- 2001				2003 -- 2004			
	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed		Households with at least two members employed or self-employed		Households with at least one member employed or self-employed		Households with at least two members employed or self-employed	
	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed
$\ln Y^D$	12.736 (0.330)	12.656 (0.484)	12.788 (0.309)	12.721 (0.469)	12.860 (0.327)	12.774 (0.476)	12.924 (0.290)	12.812 (0.432)
$\ln C^F$	10.783 (0.464)	10.852 (0.453)	10.818 (0.434)	10.865 (0.418)	10.646 (0.501)	10.682 (0.553)	10.689 (0.498)	10.708 (0.525)
C^F / Y^D	0.161 (0.095)	0.204 (0.266)	0.155 (0.078)	0.194 (0.281)	0.122 (0.058)	0.158 (0.171)	0.119 (0.055)	0.155 (0.172)
# persons in household	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5
# obs.	2684	379	2052	314	2516	425	1874	363

Notes: Disposable income (Y^D) and food consumption (C^F) are in units of SEK, 2001 prices for 1999-2001 and current prices for 2003-2004. A household is classified as self-employed if at least one member is self-employed. A few households with income above two million SEK are excluded.

⁹ The food consumption ratios are substantially lower in 2003-2004 than in the previous surveys, a pattern also visible in the aggregate data published by Statistics Sweden. The likely main reason for the differences is that the measurement techniques have changed. According to Statistics Sweden (2003), the surveys for 1999-2001 produced an upward bias in food consumption by inducing households to include some non-food items in their reports of food purchases.

4. Estimation Results

We have estimated a number of models along the lines of eq. (1). That is, we regress log food consumption on log disposable income and a bunch of control variables. The latter include age and age squared, type of housing, number of children under age 20, average years of education among adult household members, and region of residence.¹⁰ We can think of the controls as variables that affect the budget constraint as well as preferences. For example, the presence of children affects the composition of household consumption by raising the demand for food. Regional price differences are accounted for by means of dummies pertaining to the degree of urbanization. The level of education may affect the quality of food consumption and thereby also food expenditure.

We use two alternative definitions of self-employment status. One variable (SE_1), with associated parameter γ_1 , is a dummy for households where at least one member is self-employed. The second variable ($SETOT$), with associated parameter γ_2 , is the number of persons who are self-employed in the household; this variable takes only three values in our sample, viz. 0, 1 or 2.

Preliminary analyses revealed very similar results for the 1999-2001 sample and the 2003-2004 sample. We have therefore decided to concatenate all data, thus obtaining a data set comprising five years.¹¹ The estimation results for the basic specification are set out in Table 2. In the IV estimations we use two variables to achieve identification, viz. income from capital and property taxes. Property taxes are closely related to the market value of owned housing (including housing used for recreational purposes). The two instruments are both highly significant in the first stage regressions, as revealed by their t -values. The Sargan tests for instrument validity imply that we cannot reject the null of independence of the instruments and errors.

A comparison across the columns in Table 2 shows that the coefficients pertaining to self-employment status are fairly robust as well as statistically significant at conventional levels. The interpretation is that self-employed households are characterized by “excess food

¹⁰ Age is the age of the “household head”, which is the person with the highest income in the household; type of housing is a dummy for single family housing; regions are so called H-regions, which capture the degree of urbanization.

¹¹ The tax system pertaining to wage earners and self-employed people remains effectively constant during the period of investigation (except possibly minor changes of some municipal tax rates.)

consumption” by 5 to 7 percent. That is, they spend 5 to 7 percent more on food relative to wage earners with the same reported income.

The extent of underreporting, as measured by $k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$, varies in a fairly narrow band around 1.30. That is, the degree of underreporting amounts to 30 percent. Our estimates of underreporting are in the same (big) ballpark as those reported in most previous studies (with the exception of Lyssiotou et al, 2004).

Table 2. Estimation results for the pooled data. Dependent variable: $\ln C^F$

	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed				Households with at least two members employed or self-employed			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	IV (7)	IV (8)
$\ln Y^D (\beta)$.233 (10.75)	.234 (10.87)	.259 (3.52)	.258 (3.50)	.219 (8.36)	.222 (8.48)	.185 (2.26)	.184 (2.25)
$SE_1 (\gamma_1)$.065 (3.55)		.070 (3.53)		.056 (2.92)		.054 (2.60)	
$SETOT (\gamma_2)$.064 (3.98)		.069 (3.90)		.055 (3.32)		.054 (2.92)
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$	1.32	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.29	1.28	1.34	1.34
<i>t</i> -values for instruments in the first stage			15.04 17.32	15.14 17.29			11.79 15.07	11.93 15.08
Sargan			.599	.595			.912	.912
R^2	.204	.204	.203	.204	.192	.193	.191	.191
# obs.	6004	6004	5965	5965	4603	4603	4574	4574

Notes: SE_1 : at least one self-employed; $SETOT$: number of self-employed {0,1,2}. The other controls are age, age squared, number of children, single family house, average years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region and a dummy for 2003-2004. The instruments used in the IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. The *t*-values for the first stage in the IV estimations pertain to property taxes and income from capital, respectively. Sargan shows the Sargan test statistic for instrument validity. Absolute *t*-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses.

These estimates of underreporting are expressed in terms of disposable income. Using the fact that the ratio between true and reported gross income is given by $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$, we obtain $\kappa \approx 1.23$ in our data. Effective tax rates are fairly low in our sample, reflecting the fact that taxes to a substantial degree are used to finance transfers to households.

Self-employment status according to our definitions does not exactly correspond to the share of household income that can be attributed to self-employment. Recall that $k=1.30$ means that households with self-employed members underreport their disposable incomes by 30 percent. However, self-employed households typically include also employees with wage incomes so 30 percent is not an estimate of how much underreporting of *self-employment income* there is. To arrive at such an estimate, we define self-employment income as including (i) entrepreneurial income¹² and (ii) wage income for households with incorporated businesses (on the assumption that owners of incorporated businesses are employed by their companies). Let μ denote the ratio between this (adjusted) measure of reported gross income from self-employment and total reported gross income among self-employed households. Underreporting of income from self-employment can be derived as

$$(2) \quad D^s = \frac{U}{U + Y^s} = \frac{\kappa - 1}{\mu + \kappa - 1}$$

where Y^s is reported income from self-employment in self-employment households (assuming that underreporting is only relevant for self-employment income).

In our data for 2003-2004, we have $\mu \approx 0.43$ so we obtain $D^s \approx 0.35$ using $\kappa = 1.23$.¹³ Thus, we can conclude that households with at least one self-employed member underreport their incomes from self-employment by roughly 35 percent. Note that this is a conservative estimate since μ is an upper bound of self-employment income relative to total income.

Heterogeneous Effects

Among the self-employed in our sample, around 50 percent runs an incorporated business. Those with incorporated businesses are presumably employed by their company and paid by

¹² In Swedish, this concept is known as “inkomst av näringsverksamhet”.

¹³ It is not possible to disentangle income sources in the 1999-2001 data so we focus on 2003-2004.

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3 the company. Indeed, our data reveal that wage incomes account for a much higher share of
4 gross income among self-employed households with incorporated businesses than among
5 those with unincorporated businesses.
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10 Incorporated businesses are circumscribed by other and more elaborate legal rules than those
11 relevant for unincorporated business activities. The transactions pertaining to the corporation
12 and those pertaining to the owner should be kept apart. An annual financial report, which
13 becomes public information, should be delivered for each financial year. Moreover, a certified
14 auditor must be appointed and the auditor's report on the financial transactions of the
15 company is public information. For unincorporated businesses, on the other hand, the
16 borderline between the owner's and the company's financial transactions is fuzzy and the
17 transactions are less easily scrutinized by outsiders. These differences in the legal form of
18 self-employment are likely to influence incentives for tax evasion. There is a presumption that
19 the more stringent legislation pertaining to incorporated businesses means higher costs of tax
20 evasion. It is also plausible that incorporated self-employed people have greater access to paid
21 tax assistance and thus are more informed about the tax rules.
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33 We have examined whether the legal form of self-employment matters by including variables
34 for incorporated and unincorporated businesses, respectively. The definitions are analogous to
35 those already defined. For example, *SE_1* (inc.) takes the value of one when at least one
36 household member runs an incorporated business. The results are given in Table 3.
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42 There is a clear pattern in the results suggesting that self-employment associated with
43 incorporated businesses involves less tax evasion than self-employment in general. Self-
44 employed with incorporated businesses underreport some 15 to 20 percent of their incomes,
45 although these estimates are typically only marginally significant. Self-employed with
46 unincorporated businesses underreport at the rate of 40 to 50 percent.¹⁴ These results are
47 consistent with the hypothesis that incorporated businesses face higher costs of tax evasion as
48 a result of more detailed regulations. However, the differences between groups are only
49 marginally significant.
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¹⁴ Skatteverket (2006) presents evidence based on tax audits that implies underreporting of a similar magnitude for this group of self-employed.

Table 3. Underreporting by the legal form of self-employment. Dependent variable: $\ln C^F$.

	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed				Households with at least two members employed or self-employed			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	IV (7)	IV (8)
$\ln Y^D$.237 (10.92)	.237 (10.97)	.269 (3.58)	.268 (3.56)	.224 (8.56)	.225 (8.61)	.195 (2.33)	.194 (2.32)
SE_1 (inc.)	.039 (1.58)		.040 (1.62)		.028 (1.09)		.030 (1.16)	
SE_1 (uninc.)	.089 (3.47)		.098 (3.37)		.084 (3.12)		.079 (2.55)	
$SETOT$ (inc.)		.041 (1.92)		.042 (1.96)		.031 (1.40)		.032 (1.45)
$SETOT$ (uninc.)		.086 (3.76)		.095 (3.65)		.080 (3.40)		.078 (2.82)
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$ (inc.)	1.18	1.19	1.16	1.17	1.13	1.15	1.17	1.18
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$ (uninc.)	1.46	1.44	1.44	1.43	1.45	1.43	1.50	1.49
p -value for inc.=uninc.	.147	.134	.121	.101	.114	.106	.198	.163
t -values for instruments in the first stage			14.98 16.70	14.96 16.77			11.81 14.58	11.81 14.67
Sargan			.595	.595			.912	.912
R^2	.204	.204	.204	.204	.192	.193	.192	.192
# obs.	6004	6004	5965	5965	4603	4603	4574	4574

Notes: SE_1 : at least one self-employed (incorporated, unincorporated); $SETOT$: number of self-employed (incorporated, unincorporated). The controls are age, age squared, number of children, single family house, average years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region and a dummy for 2003-2004. The instruments used in the IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. The t -values for the first stage in the IV estimations pertain to property taxes and income from capital, respectively. Sargan shows the Sargan test statistic for instrument validity. Absolute t -values based on robust standard errors in parentheses.

We can also in this case ask how large proportion of self-employment income that is hidden from the authorities. Among households with unincorporated businesses, entrepreneurial income accounts on average for roughly 40 percent of total household income. To get an estimate of the amount of hidden entrepreneurial income, we use (2) and arrive at $D^s \approx 0.50$. That is, self-employed households with unincorporated businesses hide around 50 percent of their true incomes. Relative to total labor income, i.e., reported wages and salaries plus reported entrepreneurial income, the amount of hidden entrepreneurial income amounts to 3 percent.¹⁵ This is a lower bound estimate of hidden income from self-employment since it ignores tax evasion among those with incorporated businesses.

We have also checked for heterogeneous age effects by including interactions between the self-employment variables and a dummy for household heads over the median age (which is 44 in the data). However, we did not find any evidence that the propensity to underreport varies by age. Analogously, we have checked whether the effect varies by gender by interacting self-employment status and a gender dummy (equal to one if the self-employed person is a woman). We found no statistical significance for this interaction variable. We also checked whether skilled blue-collar workers are more prone to tax evasion relative to other employees, a hypothesis motivated by anecdotal evidence as well as some previous empirical findings (see Pissarides and Weber, 1989, and Persson, 2006). However, we could not find any systematic evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Corroborating Evidence: Income and Employment Status

An arguably straightforward approach to examine tax evasion by employment status would be to look at differences in reported income between employees and self-employed individuals with similar measurable human capital and other characteristics. That is, we could estimate models of the form

$$(3) \quad \ln Y_i = Z_i \delta + \sigma SE_i + \eta_i$$

where Y is gross income, i.e., income before taxes and transfers, Z a vector of personal characteristics and SE a dummy for (individual) self-employment status. A negative sign of

¹⁵ According to data from Statistics Sweden, the amount of reported entrepreneurial income (inkomst av näringsverksamhet) accounts for about 3 percent of total reported labor income as defined above. The amount of hidden entrepreneurial income relative to total reported income is thus given as $U = 0.03 \left[D^s / (1 - D^s) \right] \approx 0.03$.

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3 σ would be consistent with underreporting of income among the self-employed.¹⁶ Of course,
4 a negative estimate could also reflect compensating income differences, which may be present
5 to the extent that individuals place a positive value of self-employment status because it may
6 confer non-pecuniary benefits such as personal independence (“being your own boss”
7 etcetera).¹⁷ On the other hand, the self-employed are known to work longer hours than the
8 typical employees, a fact that would contribute to higher annual earnings.¹⁸
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16 We have estimated a number of equations of the type given by (3) on data for 2004, focusing
17 as before on married (or cohabiting) individuals aged 20 to 64. The specifications include,
18 inter alia, some 50 industry dummies as well as six regional dummies. The results are
19 displayed in Table 4. The estimates in the first three columns are based on a narrow income
20 concept, whereas the last three columns are based on a broad concept that includes all
21 incomes from labor and capital.
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28 The estimates imply that self-employed individuals earn substantially lower incomes than
29 wage earners. For given characteristics, the level of (reported) income is around 40-50 percent
30 lower among the self-employed individuals with unincorporated businesses.¹⁹ For individuals
31 with incorporated businesses, the negative “effect” is smaller (in absolute value) and at best
32 only marginally significant
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39 The patterns set out in Table 4 are consistent with what we found in the analysis of
40 consumption behavior, i.e., strong evidence of underreporting for households with
41 unincorporated businesses but only weak evidence for households with incorporated
42 businesses. The results in Table 4 might, however, reflect compensating income differences
43 associated with employment status as well as underreporting of incomes. Although this seems
44 likely, it is not clear why the legal form of a business ownership should matter much for job
45 satisfaction.
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52 ¹⁶ Persson (2005) compares earnings among employees and self-employed using Swedish data for 2002 and find
53 substantially lower reported earnings among the self-employed even after having standardized for industry
54 affiliation. The paper does not distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated businesses, however.

55 ¹⁷ See Hamilton (2000) for a study of the returns to self-employment in the United States. Hamilton finds a
56 substantial “earnings penalty” associated with self-employment, a result that he interprets as evidence of
57 nonpecuniary self-employment benefits. Blanchflower (2004) surveys the literature on self-employment and
58 reports that job satisfaction is higher among self-employed than among wage earners.

59 ¹⁸ According to the Swedish labor force surveys for 2004, paid employees worked on average 35 hours per week
60 whereas self-employed people worked 43 hours.

¹⁹ The estimates in column (1) imply $\exp(-.701) - 1 \approx -0.5$, whereas the estimates in column (4) imply
 $\exp(-.500) - 1 \approx -0.4$.

Table 4. Income and self-employment status 2004. Dependent variable: $\ln Y$.

	Y: wages plus entrepreneurial income			Y: total factor income		
	Both sexes (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Both sexes (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)
Age	.118 (8.63)	.092 (5.58)	.142 (6.31)	.115 (8.63)	.096 (5.51)	.129 (6.30)
Age squared/100	-.123 (7.73)	-.097 (5.08)	-.148 (5.56)	-.119 (7.69)	-.099 (4.95)	-.132 (5.55)
Education (yrs)	.066 (9.93)	.077 (8.81)	.056 (5.47)	.069 (10.54)	.077 (8.45)	.063 (6.38)
Female	-.449 (13.13)			-.440 (3.10)		
# children	-.043 (2.92)	.008 (.045)	-.075 (3.05)	-.044 (3.10)	-.017 (.92)	-.068 (2.86)
SE – uninc.	-.701 (3.51)	-.642 (2.92)	-.766 (2.01)	-.500 (2.97)	-.392 (2.26)	-.751 (1.93)
SE – inc.	-.191 (1.79)	-.194 (1.64)	-.226 (.94)	-.060 (.55)	-.054 (.45)	-.144 (.55)
R^2	.256	.243	.178	.265	.227	.190
# obs.	2548	1306	1242	2551	1307	1444

Notes: All specifications include region dummies as well as a full set of (feasible) industry dummies (maximum 52). Total factor income include – in addition to wages and entrepreneurial income – dividends, interest payments and capital gains. Robust standard errors, absolute t -values in the parentheses.

5. Concluding Remarks

Our study of food expenditure and incomes among employees and self-employed has produced results that are broadly consistent with findings from previous studies. There is strong evidence of “excess food consumption” among the self-employed, for a given level of disposable income. A plausible interpretation is that the pattern reflects underreporting of

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3 incomes among the self-employed. The magnitude of underreporting is non-trivial: our
4 estimates suggest that the households with at least one member underreport their total
5 incomes at the average rate of 30 percent and their incomes from self-employment by around
6 35 percent. Our results also imply that tax evasion is most pronounced among self-employed
7 who run unincorporated businesses. We interpret this finding as indicating higher costs of tax
8 evasion for owners of incorporated businesses since their transactions are more easily exposed
9 to public scrutiny.
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17 Our look at income differentials between employees and self-employed people yields results
18 consistent with the analysis of consumption data. Reported incomes among the self-employed,
19 and in particular those with unincorporated businesses, are substantially lower than incomes
20 among employees even after controlling for human capital characteristics and industry
21 affiliation at a fairly detailed level. Although this pattern could reflect many different forces,
22 including compensating earnings differences, it seems likely that tax evasion behavior is part
23 of the story. In fact, longer work hours among the self-employed would tend to create an
24 earnings advantage (rather than a penalty) for the self-employed.
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33 One might have expected that estimates of tax evasion for Sweden should be on the high side
34 considering the high tax rates. However, tax rates are not all that matter for tax evasion. First,
35 the standard theory does not offer clear-cut predictions regarding the impact of tax rates on
36 tax evasion; see Allingson and Sandmo (1972). Second, there are other factors that may be at
37 least as important. In theory, features of the legal system are important, viz. the probability of
38 being caught if failing to comply with the tax rules and the punishment imposed in such a
39 case. In empirical work, it has been noted that the relative size of the hidden economy appears
40 to vary across countries in a way that cannot exclusively be explained by tax rates.²⁰
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49 There is no obvious policy prescription that follows from our results. However, the fact that
50 tax evasion seems to depend on the legal form of self-employment is of potential policy
51 relevance. The regulatory framework pertaining to small firms is subject to ongoing policy
52 discussions, often emphasizing the need to simplify the regulations so as to facilitate
53 entrepreneurship. One issue concerns whether independent auditing should be required for all
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60 ²⁰ One example is the paper by Bovi (2003), where the determinants of underground (OECD) economies are examined. Bovi finds that the underground economy is mainly affected by variables capturing “institutional failures” and to a lesser degree taxation and market regulations.

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3 incorporated businesses, including (very) small firms. The details of the regulatory framework
4 matter for incentives for tax evasion, a consideration that should be acknowledged in the
5 policy discussions.
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13 **Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax Country:**
14 **Evidence from Sweden[§]**
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20 Per Engström* and Bertil Holmlund**
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24 October 17, 2007
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32 **Abstract**

33 Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to
34 underreport their incomes. This paper uses recent Swedish income and expenditure data to
35 examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed individuals. A key
36 hypothesis is that underreporting of incomes among the self-employed would be visible in the
37 data as “excess food consumption”, for a given level of observed income. Our results confirm
38 the underreporting hypothesis. In particular, we estimate that households with at least one
39 self-employed member underreport their total incomes by around 30 percent. Under-reporting
40 appears to be much more prevalent among self-employed people with unincorporated
41 businesses as among those with incorporated businesses.
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46 *Keywords:* Tax evasion, self-employment, Engel curves.

47 *JEL-codes:* D12, H24, H25, H26.
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1. Introduction

It is widely believed that self-employed people can more easily underreport their taxable incomes than wage earners are able to do. Several researchers have tried to estimate the extent of underreporting by using information on consumption expenditure and reported income. The key idea is that expenditure on food is accurately reported by all people participating in an expenditure survey, or at least that there is no systematic misreporting that is related to employment status. If the self-employed underreport their incomes, this would be visible in the data as “excess food consumption” among self-employed people, for a given level of observed income.

The expenditure-based approach to estimation of tax evasion and the size of the black economy was pioneered by Pissarides and Weber (1989) and has been applied in a number of other studies. Pissarides and Weber examined British data from 1982; Apel (1994) provided evidence for Sweden using data from 1988; Johansson (2000) used Finnish data from the mid-1990s; Schuetze (2002) examined consumption and income in Canada over the period 1969-1992; Lyssiotou et al (2004) investigated consumption and income using British data from 1993; and Besim and Jenkins (2005) used on data from Cyprus. The studies by Apel, Johansson, Schuetze and Besim and Jenkins follow the Pissarides and Weber approach, whereas Lyssiotou et al develop a somewhat different methodology based on consumer demand systems. An alternative nonparametric methodology is developed by Tedds (2004). Alanon and Gomez-Antonio (2005) present yet another methodology – a structural model with latent variables – and apply it to Spanish data.

The available empirical studies generally support the basic hypothesis: self-employed people do tend to underreport their incomes relative to wage earners. There is, however, considerable dispersion in the estimates of underreporting. Pissarides and Weber (1989) estimate the mean underreporting to around 55 percent, whereas Apel (1994) report a mid-point estimate of around 35 percent. Schuetze (2002) reports underreporting in the interval 11 to 23 percent, whereas Johansson (2000) estimates underreporting by some 27 percent on average. Lyssiotou et al (2004) estimate that true income for blue collar self-employed people is more than 100 percent greater than reported income, whereas true income for white-collar self-

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3 employed people exceeds reported income by 64 percent.¹ The implications of these various
4 estimates for the relative size of the black economy depend on the relative importance of self-
5 employment in the economy. Pissarides and Weber conclude that black economy activities
6 related to self-employment amount to 5 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom, whereas
7 Lyssiotou et al arrive at an estimate close to 11 percent. These estimates for the UK are much
8 higher than those reported by Apel for Sweden and Johansson for Finland. The dispersion in
9 estimates is thus considerable, and the reasons for the different estimates are not well
10 understood.
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19 This paper takes a new look at consumption expenditure and reported income among self-
20 employed people and wage earners in Sweden, the country with the highest tax-to-GDP ratio
21 in the world.² There is a popular presumption that the incentives for tax evasion would be
22 particularly pertinent in a high-tax economy, although this presumption is not unambiguously
23 implied by theory.³ We use two samples, the first for the years 1999-2001 and the second for
24 2003-2004. Our results confirm the underreporting hypothesis. Specifically, we estimate that
25 the degree of income underreporting hovers around 30 percent of household income for a
26 household with at least one self-employed member.
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35 We also examine whether the degree of underreporting varies by the legal form of self-
36 employment and find noteworthy differences between incorporated and unincorporated
37 businesses: self-employed in the latter category seems much more prone to underreporting
38 than those in the incorporated category. We interpret these differences as the outcome of
39 differences in regulations that entail higher costs of tax evasion associated with incorporated
40 business activities. These results based on expenditure patterns are consistent with observed
41 earnings differences between paid employees and self-employed individuals. Controlling for
42 human capital characteristics and industry affiliation, we find that self-employed individuals
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51 ¹ There exist also other studies using different methods that also indicate that tax evasion is more prevalent
52 among groups with more opportunity to evade. See e.g. Slemrod et al (2001) and Joulfaian and Rider (1998).
53 Blumenthal et al (2001) examine how normative appeals affect tax compliance using a randomized experiment.

54 ² According to OECD data, the tax-to-GDP ratio in Sweden stood at 50.7 percent in 2004 which is the highest
55 ratio among OECD countries; Denmark came second at 49.6 percent. Agell et al (1996) provide an overview and
56 evaluation of the major 1991 reform of the Swedish tax system.

57 ³ The theoretical literature on tax evasion does not provide clear predictions regarding the relationships between
58 tax rates and tax compliance. In the seminal contribution by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), an increase in the
59 tax rate has an ambiguous effect on tax evasion: there is a substitution effect that works in the direction of
60 increased evasion but there is also an income effect that works in the opposite direction if agents' absolute risk
aversion is decreasing in income. See also Sandmo (2005) for a survey of the theory of tax evasion. The
empirical research on tax rates and tax evasion has produced mixed results; see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).

with unincorporated businesses report substantially lower incomes than employees as well as lower incomes than self-employed in the incorporated category.

The next section discusses briefly the Pissarides and Weber methodology. Section 3 of the paper presents the data, section 4 gives the results and section 5 concludes.

2. Estimating Tax Evasion from Expenditure Data

The Pissarides and Weber approach can be illustrated by means Figure 1. Let c denote log food consumption, $c = \ln C^F$, and y log disposable income, $y = \ln Y^D$. The figure shows two log-linear consumption-income profiles (Engel curves), one for self-employed people (SE) and one for wage earners (WE). By assumption, the elasticity of consumption with respect to income is equal for the two groups; the Engel curves have thus the same slopes. However, we allow the intercepts to differ so as to capture the possibility of underreporting of income among self-employed people. Imagine two individuals, one self-employed and one wage earner, who both report consumption level c^* . The wage earner reports income level y^w whereas the self-employed person reports income y^s . Suppose that consumption is truthfully reported by both types and that income corresponds to true income for the wage earner but not for the self-employed person. If preferences are the same, we can infer that the self-employed person's true income is y^w rather than reported y^s . The extent of underreporting is thus given by $y^w - y^s$.

Now suppose that we pool the data for self-employed people and wage earners and estimate an equation of the form:


$$(1) \quad c_i = X_i\alpha + \beta y_i + \gamma SE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where subscript i denotes individual i , X is a vector of variables affecting consumption (in addition to income), SE a dummy variable for self-employed persons and ε a random error term. The parameter γ captures the vertical distance between the two Engel curves;

$\gamma > 0$ implies some underreporting of income among self-employed people. The degree of underreporting (in logs) is obtained as $y^w - y^s = \gamma / \beta$. For example, if $\gamma = .05$ and $\beta = 0.5$,

we get $\gamma / \beta = 0.10$, which says that self-employed people underreport their incomes by around 10 percent. The percentage difference is generally obtained as $D \equiv 100 \times [\exp(\gamma / \beta) - 1]$. We might alternatively express underreporting as $k \equiv \exp(\gamma / \beta)$, which gives the number by which a self-employed person's disposable income has to be multiplied so as to get the true disposable income. With $\gamma = .05$ and $\beta = 0.5$, we get $k = 1.105$.

Figure 1. Engel curves for wage earners (*WE*) and self-employed people (*SE*)



The estimate of underreporting obtained from eq. (1) pertains to disposable income. We could also express underreporting in terms of gross income. Let Y^* denote true gross income, U the amount of underreported income and define $\kappa \equiv Y^* / (Y^* - U)$ as the ratio between true and reported gross income. It follows that $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$, where t is the effective tax rate.⁴

Clearly, we have $\kappa < k$.

Estimation of (1) raises several issues that are discussed in Pissarides and Weber (1989) and some of the subsequent literature. One issue is how income should be interpreted and treated in the estimation. The most relevant income concept is arguably permanent income rather than current income. However, existing data sets include only data on current incomes.

⁴ By effective tax rate we mean $t = 1 - (\text{disposable income} / \text{total factor income})$. Transfers to households add to disposable income and thus reduces the effective (average) tax rate. Reported disposable income, Y^D , is given as $Y^D = Y^* - t(Y^* - U)$. We have $\kappa \equiv Y^* / (Y^* - U)$ and k is the ratio between true disposable income and reported disposable income. We thus get $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$.

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Pissarides and Weber, as well as much of the subsequent literature, have attempted to resolve this problem by treating current income as endogenous and pursued instrumental variable estimation. A potential problem with this approach is that it relies on perhaps arbitrary exclusion restrictions for identification: one needs to find variables that affect disposable income without directly affecting also food consumption. We will present results from OLS as well as from IV estimations; in fact, the results are very similar.

Another issue concerns our interpretation of underreporting as tax evasion. This interpretation is the conventional one, but the borderline between (illegal) tax evasion and (legal) tax avoidance is fuzzy. A self-employed person has greater opportunities to underreport taxable income by deducting business expenses. Such deductions may be legal even if they pertain to purchases of goods that can also be used privately, such as computers. It is therefore possible that our estimates of underreporting capture tax avoidance as well as tax evasion; empirically we cannot separate avoidance from evasion.

3. The Data

We have used data from the Swedish Household Budget Survey (Hushållens utgifter, HUT) from 1999-2001, 2003 and 2004.⁵ Data for 1999-2001 are based on surveys to households that include the second quarter of 1999 up to the first quarter of 2002. Around 9000 randomly selected households were approached over these years, but only slightly above 50 percent of those did actually participate in the surveys. In 2003 and 2004, 4000 households were approached each year and the response rate was 58 percent both years. The response rates are thus fairly low, although not exceptionally low for these kinds of time intensive surveys.

The 1999-2001 surveys are produced and presented by Statistics Sweden as one survey and we will refer to it as HUT 1999-2001. The other two surveys are produced and presented by Statistics Sweden as two separate surveys. We will concatenate the surveys for 2003 and 2004 and refer to the resulting linked data set as HUT 2003-2004. The HUT data contain no panel elements.

The participating households were asked to report their consumption expenditures during randomly selected two-week periods. In addition, supplementary questions were asked

⁵ The design and main results of the HUT-studies are presented in reports from Statistics Sweden (2003, 2004, 2005).

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3 regarding expenditures over the past 12 months. Various other questions were asked so as to
4 get information on household characteristics, including employment status and occupation.
5 Information about disposable incomes is obtained from official income and tax registers and
6 merged with the expenditure data.
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11 The two key variables are annual food consumption and annual disposable income. We follow
12 the literature by focusing on food consumption on the assumption that this is truthfully
13 reported and that expenditure functions for food are similar for employees and self-employed
14 people. Our measure of food consumption is reported in the data as “food purchases”.⁶
15 Disposable income is based on all types of (register-based) incomes, including transfers.
16 Taxes are deducted from gross income so as to get household disposable income.⁷
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24 We focus on consumption and incomes among employees and self-employed people. Self-
25 employment status can be defined in several ways. Most previous studies in this genre have
26 classified households by using information on income shares attributed to paid employment
27 and self-employment.⁸ A problem with this approach, besides the difficulty of choosing the
28 borderline, is that it may be sensitive to the legal form of the business. A person who runs an
29 incorporated business may be formally employed by the company and receive the main part
30 of the compensation in the form of wage income.
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39 We prefer to make use of self-reported information on employment status of the individual
40 household members. As a requirement for sample inclusion we require either that (i) at least
41 one member of the household is employed or self-employed, or that (ii) two members are
42 employed or self-employed. The self-employed category includes incorporated as well as
43 unincorporated businesses and the data contain information about the legal form. We have
44 excluded farmers, however, assuming that their food purchases exhibits a pattern relative to
45 income that differs from other self-employed people. Following Pissarides and Weber (1989)
46 and others in the literature, we also restrict the analysis to households with married or
47 cohabiting couples. The bigger sample, fulfilling criterion (i), comprises around 3000
48 households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The smaller sample (ii) includes a little
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57 ⁶ We have obtained similar results for broader measures of food consumption, such as food purchases plus meals
58 out.

59 ⁷ Disposable income thus includes transfers consisting of taxable transfers, such as sick pay and unemployment
60 benefits, and tax-free transfers, such as child allowances and social assistance payments.

⁸ Pissarides and Weber (1989) define households as self-employed if income from self-employment accounts for
at least 25 percent of total income.

more than 2000 households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The share of self-employed varies between 13 and 16 percent according to the adopted definitions.⁹ A first look at the data is given in Table 1.

Table 1. Means of variables, standard deviations in parentheses.

	1999 -- 2001				2003 -- 2004			
	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed		Households with at least two members employed or self-employed		Households with at least one member employed or self-employed		Households with at least two members employed or self-employed	
	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed	Employees	Self-employed
$\ln Y^D$	12.736 (0.330)	12.656 (0.484)	12.788 (0.309)	12.721 (0.469)	12.860 (0.327)	12.774 (0.476)	12.924 (0.290)	12.812 (0.432)
$\ln C^F$	10.783 (0.464)	10.852 (0.453)	10.818 (0.434)	10.865 (0.418)	10.646 (0.501)	10.682 (0.553)	10.689 (0.498)	10.708 (0.525)
C^F / Y^D	0.161 (0.095)	0.204 (0.266)	0.155 (0.078)	0.194 (0.281)	0.122 (0.058)	0.158 (0.171)	0.119 (0.055)	0.155 (0.172)
# persons in household	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5
# obs.	2684	379	2052	314	2516	425	1874	363

Notes: Disposable income (Y^D) and food consumption (C^F) are in units of SEK, 2001 prices for 1999-2001 and current prices for 2003-2004. A household is classified as self-employed if at least one member is self-employed. A few households with income above two million SEK are excluded.

The table displays average food consumption and disposable incomes among employees and self-employed in our sample. A household is here classified as self-employed if at least one member is self-employed. Average incomes are slightly higher among employees, whereas food consumption is higher among the self-employed. It is thus clear that food consumption relative to income is higher, on average, among self-employed people. The difference

⁹ The fraction of self-employed in total employment is 10 percent according to the labor force surveys of 2000. Note that our sample is restricted to couples. Moreover, our measure of the rate of self-employment in households is not directly compared to the labor force survey data based on individuals.

amounts to around 4 percentage points.¹⁰ This pattern is what we would expect according to the hypothesis that self-employed people are more likely to underreport their true incomes. Of course, this is just a first look at the data and we need to control for other variables that may affect consumption. This is the topic for the next section.

4. Estimation Results

We have estimated a number of models along the lines of eq. (1). That is, we regress log food consumption on log disposable income and a bunch of control variables. The latter include age and age squared, type of housing, number of children under age 20, average years of education among adult household members, and region of residence.¹¹ We can think of the controls as variables that affect the budget constraint as well as preferences. For example, the presence of children affects the composition of household consumption by raising the demand for food. Regional price differences are accounted for by means of dummies pertaining to the degree of urbanization. The level of education may affect the quality of food consumption and thereby also food expenditure.

We use two alternative definitions of self-employment status. One variable (SE_1), with associated parameter γ_1 , is a dummy for households where at least one member is self-employed. The second variable ($SETOT$), with associated parameter γ_2 , is the number of persons who are self-employed in the household; this variable takes only three values in our sample, viz. 0, 1 or 2.

Preliminary analyses revealed very similar results for the 1999-2001 sample and the 2003-2004 sample. We have therefore decided to concatenate all data, thus obtaining a data set comprising five years.¹² The estimation results for the basic specification are set out in Table 2. In the IV estimations we use two variables to achieve identification, viz. income from capital and property taxes. Property taxes are closely related to the market value of owned

¹⁰ The food consumption ratios are substantially lower in 2003-2004 than in the previous surveys, a pattern also visible in the aggregate data published by Statistics Sweden. The likely main reason for the differences is that the measurement techniques have changed. According to Statistics Sweden (2003), the surveys for 1999-2001 produced an upward bias in food consumption by inducing households to include some non-food items in their reports of food purchases.

¹¹ Age is the age of the "household head", which is the person with the highest income in the household; type of housing is a dummy for single family housing; regions are so called H-regions, which capture the degree of urbanization.

¹² The tax system pertaining to wage earners and self-employed people remains effectively constant during the period of investigation (except possibly minor changes of some municipal tax rates.)

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3 housing (including housing used for recreational purposes). The two instruments are both
4 highly significant in the first stage regressions, as revealed by their t -values. The Sargan tests
5 for instrument validity imply that we cannot reject the null of independence of the instruments
6 and errors.
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11 A comparison across the columns in Table 2 shows that the coefficients pertaining to self-
12 employment status are fairly robust as well as statistically significant at conventional levels.
13 The interpretation is that self-employed households are characterized by “excess food
14 consumption” by 5 to 7 percent. That is, they spend 5 to 7 percent more on food relative to
15 wage earners with the same reported income.¹³
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23 The extent of underreporting, as measured by $k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$, varies in a fairly narrow band
24 around 1.30. That is, the degree of underreporting amounts to 30 percent. Our estimates of
25 underreporting are in the same (big) ballpark as those reported in most previous studies (with
26 the exception of Lyssiotou et al, 2004).
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32 These estimates of underreporting are expressed in terms of disposable income. Using the fact
33 that the ratio between true and reported gross income is given by $\kappa = k(1-t) + t$, we obtain
34 $\kappa \approx 1.23$ in our data. Effective tax rates are fairly low in our sample, reflecting the fact that
35 taxes to a substantial degree are used to finance transfers to households.
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59 ¹³ The other included explanatory variables exhibit patterns that appear reasonable. The number of children has a
60 positive and highly significant effect, years of education enters with a significantly positive effect, age kicks in
positive and significant whereas age squared enters negative and significant. Type of housing is not significant
and the regional variables do not indicate any significant regional differences in food consumption behavior.

Table 2. Estimation results for the pooled data. Dependent variable: $\ln C^F$

	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed				Households with at least two members employed or self-employed			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	IV (7)	IV (8)
$\ln Y^D (\beta)$.233 (10.75)	.234 (10.87)	.259 (3.52)	.258 (3.50)	.219 (8.36)	.222 (8.48)	.185 (2.26)	.184 (2.25)
$SE_1 (\gamma_1)$.065 (3.55)		.070 (3.53)		.056 (2.92)		.054 (2.60)	
$SETOT (\gamma_2)$.064 (3.98)		.069 (3.90)		.055 (3.32)		.054 (2.92)
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$	1.32	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.29	1.28	1.34	1.34
t -values for instruments in the first stage			15.04 17.32	15.14 17.29			11.79 15.07	11.93 15.08
Sargan			.599	.595			.912	.912
R^2	.204	.204	.203	.204	.192	.193	.191	.191
# obs.	6004	6004	5965	5965	4603	4603	4574	4574

Notes: SE_1 : at least one self-employed; $SETOT$: number of self-employed $\{0,1,2\}$. The other controls are age, age squared, number of children, single family house, average years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region and a dummy for 2003-2004 (additional year dummies are statistically insignificant). The instruments used in the IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. The t -values for the first stage in the IV estimations pertain to property taxes and income from capital, respectively. Sargan shows the Sargan test statistic for instrument validity. Absolute t -values based on robust standard errors in parentheses.

Self-employment status according to our definitions does not exactly correspond to the share of household income that can be attributed to self-employment. Recall that $k=1.30$ means that households with self-employed members underreport their disposable incomes by 30 percent. However, self-employed households typically include also employees with wage incomes so 30 percent is not an estimate of how much underreporting of *self-employment income* there is. To arrive at such an estimate, we define self-employment income as including (i) entrepreneurial income¹⁴ and (ii) wage income for households with incorporated businesses (on the assumption that owners of incorporated businesses are employed by their companies). Let μ denote the ratio between this (adjusted) measure of reported gross income from self-employment and total reported gross income among self-employed households. Underreporting of income from self-employment can be derived as

$$(2) \quad D^s = \frac{U}{U + Y^s} = \frac{\kappa - 1}{\mu + \kappa - 1}$$

where Y^s is reported income from self-employment in self-employment households (assuming that underreporting is only relevant for self-employment income).

In our data for 2003-2004, we have $\mu \approx 0.43$ so we obtain $D^s \approx 0.35$ using $\kappa = 1.23$.¹⁵ Thus, we can conclude that households with at least one self-employed member underreport their incomes from self-employment by roughly 35 percent. Note that this is a conservative estimate since μ is an upper bound of self-employment income relative to total income.¹⁶

Heterogeneous Effects

Among the self-employed in our sample, around 50 percent runs an incorporated business. Those with incorporated businesses are presumably employed by their company and paid by the company. Indeed, our data reveal that wage incomes account for a much higher share of

¹⁴ In Swedish, this concept is known as “inkomst av näringsverksamhet”.

¹⁵ It is not possible to disentangle income sources in the 1999-2001 data so we focus on 2003-2004.

¹⁶ We have examined whether the basic results are affected by relaxing our maintained assumption that the Engel curves for employees and self-employed have the same slopes. There is some evidence from the OLS estimations that the Engel curve for employees is slightly steeper, but this has negligible effects on the estimated degree of underreporting for the main part of the income distribution. The IV estimates do not indicate any differences in slopes.

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3 gross income among self-employed households with incorporated businesses than among
4 those with unincorporated businesses.
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9 Incorporated businesses are circumscribed by other and more elaborate legal rules than those
10 relevant for unincorporated business activities. The transactions pertaining to the corporation
11 and those pertaining to the owner should be kept apart. An annual financial report, which
12 becomes public information, should be delivered for each financial year. Moreover, a certified
13 auditor must be appointed and the auditor's report on the financial transactions of the
14 company is public information. For unincorporated businesses, on the other hand, the
15 borderline between the owner's and the company's financial transactions is fuzzy and the
16 transactions are less easily scrutinized by outsiders. These differences in the legal form of
17 self-employment are likely to influence incentives for tax evasion. There is a presumption that
18 the more stringent legislation pertaining to incorporated businesses means higher costs of tax
19 evasion. It is also plausible that incorporated self-employed people have greater access to paid
20 tax assistance and thus are more informed about the tax rules.
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31 We have examined whether the legal form of self-employment matters by including variables
32 for incorporated and unincorporated businesses, respectively. The definitions are analogous to
33 those already defined. For example, *SE_1* (inc.) takes the value of one when at least one
34 household member runs an incorporated business. The results are given in Table 3.
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40 There is a clear pattern in the results suggesting that self-employment associated with
41 incorporated businesses involves less tax evasion than self-employment in general. Self-
42 employed with incorporated businesses underreport some 15 to 20 percent of their incomes,
43 although these estimates are typically only marginally significant. Self-employed with
44 unincorporated businesses underreport at the rate of 40 to 50 percent.¹⁷ These results are
45 consistent with the hypothesis that incorporated businesses face higher costs of tax evasion as
46 a result of more detailed regulations. However, the differences between groups are only
47 marginally significant.
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¹⁷ Skatteverket (2006) presents evidence based on tax audits that implies underreporting of a similar magnitude for this group of self-employed.

Table 3. Underreporting by the legal form of self-employment. Dependent variable: $\ln C^F$.

	Households with at least one member employed or self-employed				Households with at least two members employed or self-employed			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	IV (7)	IV (8)
$\ln Y^D$.237 (10.92)	.237 (10.97)	.269 (3.58)	.268 (3.56)	.224 (8.56)	.225 (8.61)	.195 (2.33)	.194 (2.32)
SE_1 (inc.)	.039 (1.58)		.040 (1.62)		.028 (1.09)		.030 (1.16)	
SE_1 (uninc.)	.089 (3.47)		.098 (3.37)		.084 (3.12)		.079 (2.55)	
$SETOT$ (inc.)		.041 (1.92)		.042 (1.96)		.031 (1.40)		.032 (1.45)
$SETOT$ (uninc.)		.086 (3.76)		.095 (3.65)		.080 (3.40)		.078 (2.82)
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$ (inc.)	1.18	1.19	1.16	1.17	1.13	1.15	1.17	1.18
$k \equiv \exp(\gamma_j / \beta)$ (uninc.)	1.46	1.44	1.44	1.43	1.45	1.43	1.50	1.49
p -value for inc.=uninc.	.147	.134	.121	.101	.114	.106	.198	.163
t -values for instruments in the first stage			14.98 16.70	14.96 16.77			11.81 14.58	11.81 14.67
Sargan			.595	.595			.912	.912
R^2	.204	.204	.204	.204	.192	.193	.192	.192
# obs.	6004	6004	5965	5965	4603	4603	4574	4574

Notes: SE_1 : at least one self-employed (incorporated, unincorporated); $SETOT$: number of self-employed (incorporated, unincorporated). The controls are age, age squared, number of children, single family house, average years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region and a dummy for 2003-2004. The instruments used in the IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. The t -values for the first stage in the IV estimations pertain to property taxes and income from capital, respectively. Sargan shows the Sargan test statistic for instrument validity. Absolute t -values based on robust standard errors in parentheses.

We can also in this case ask how large proportion of self-employment income that is hidden from the authorities. Among households with unincorporated businesses, entrepreneurial income accounts on average for roughly 40 percent of total household income. To get an estimate of the amount of hidden entrepreneurial income, we use (2) and arrive at $D^s \approx 0.50$. That is, self-employed households with unincorporated businesses hide around 50 percent of their true incomes. Relative to total labor income, i.e., reported wages and salaries plus reported entrepreneurial income, the amount of hidden entrepreneurial income amounts to 3 percent.¹⁸ This is a lower bound estimate of hidden income from self-employment since it ignores tax evasion among those with incorporated businesses.

We have also checked for heterogeneous age effects by including interactions between the self-employment variables and a dummy for household heads over the median age (which is 44 in the data). However, we did not find any evidence that the propensity to underreport varies by age. Analogously, we have checked whether the effect varies by gender by interacting self-employment status and a gender dummy (equal to one if the self-employed person is a woman). We found no statistical significance for this interaction variable. We also checked whether skilled blue-collar workers are more prone to tax evasion relative to other employees, a hypothesis motivated by anecdotal evidence as well as some previous empirical findings (see Pissarides and Weber, 1989, and Persson, 2006). However, we could not find any systematic evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Corroborating Evidence: Income and Employment Status

An arguably straightforward approach to examine tax evasion by employment status would be to look at differences in reported income between employees and self-employed individuals with similar measurable human capital and other characteristics. That is, we could estimate models of the form

$$(3) \quad \ln Y_i = Z_i \delta + \sigma SE_i + \eta_i$$

where Y is gross income, i.e., income before taxes and transfers, Z a vector of personal characteristics and SE a dummy for (individual) self-employment status. A negative sign of

¹⁸ According to data from Statistics Sweden, the amount of reported entrepreneurial income (inkomst av näringsverksamhet) accounts for about 3 percent of total reported labor income as defined above. The amount of hidden entrepreneurial income relative to total reported income is thus given as $U = 0.03 \left[\frac{D^s}{1 - D^s} \right] \approx 0.03$.

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3 σ would be consistent with underreporting of income among the self-employed.¹⁹ Of course,
4 a negative estimate could also reflect compensating income differences, which may be present
5 to the extent that individuals place a positive value of self-employment status because it may
6 confer non-pecuniary benefits such as personal independence (“being your own boss”
7 etcetera).²⁰ On the other hand, the self-employed are known to work longer hours than the
8 typical employees, a fact that would contribute to higher annual earnings.²¹
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16 We have estimated a number of equations of the type given by (3) on data for 2004, focusing
17 as before on married (or cohabiting) individuals aged 20 to 64. The specifications include,
18 inter alia, some 50 industry dummies as well as six regional dummies.²² The results are
19 displayed in Table 4. The estimates in the first three columns are based on a narrow income
20 concept, whereas the last three columns are based on a broad concept that includes all
21 incomes from labor and capital.
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28 The estimates imply that self-employed individuals earn substantially lower incomes than
29 wage earners. For given characteristics, the level of (reported) income is around 40-50 percent
30 lower among the self-employed individuals with unincorporated businesses.²³ For individuals
31 with incorporated businesses, the negative “effect” is smaller (in absolute value) and at best
32 only marginally significant
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39 The patterns set out in Table 4 are consistent with what we found in the analysis of
40 consumption behavior, i.e., strong evidence of underreporting for households with
41 unincorporated businesses but only weak evidence for households with incorporated
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47 ¹⁹ Persson (2005) compares earnings among employees and self-employed using Swedish data for 2002 and find
48 substantially lower reported earnings among the self-employed even after having standardized for industry
49 affiliation. The paper does not distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated businesses, however.

50 ²⁰ See Hamilton (2000) for a study of the returns to self-employment in the United States. Hamilton finds a
51 substantial “earnings penalty” associated with self-employment, a result that he interprets as evidence of
52 nonpecuniary self-employment benefits. Blanchflower (2004) surveys the literature on self-employment and
53 reports that job satisfaction is higher among self-employed than among wage earners.

54 ²¹ According to the Swedish labor force surveys for 2004, paid employees worked on average 35 hours per week
55 whereas self-employed people worked 43 hours.

56 ²² We include industry dummies because a large literature has confirmed persistent industry wage differentials;
57 these may reflect compensating wage differentials but also rent sharing that varies across industries with
58 different characteristics. We have, however, chosen to exclude industry dummies as controls in the food
59 consumption regressions since self-employment varies highly with respect to industry; the estimated industry
60 coefficients may therefore pick up much of the differences in underreporting of income.

²³ The estimates in column (1) imply $\exp(-.701) - 1 \approx -0.5$, whereas the estimates in column (4) imply
 $\exp(-.500) - 1 \approx -0.4$.

Table 4. Income and self-employment status 2004. Dependent variable: $\ln Y$.

	Y: wages plus entrepreneurial income			Y: total factor income		
	Both sexes (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Both sexes (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)
Age	.118 (8.63)	.092 (5.58)	.142 (6.31)	.115 (8.63)	.096 (5.51)	.129 (6.30)
Age squared/100	-.123 (7.73)	-.097 (5.08)	-.148 (5.56)	-.119 (7.69)	-.099 (4.95)	-.132 (5.55)
Education (yrs)	.066 (9.93)	.077 (8.81)	.056 (5.47)	.069 (10.54)	.077 (8.45)	.063 (6.38)
Female	-.449 (13.13)			-.440 (3.10)		
# children	-.043 (2.92)	.008 (.045)	-.075 (3.05)	-.044 (3.10)	-.017 (.92)	-.068 (2.86)
SE – uninc.	-.701 (3.51)	-.642 (2.92)	-.766 (2.01)	-.500 (2.97)	-.392 (2.26)	-.751 (1.93)
SE – inc.	-.191 (1.79)	-.194 (1.64)	-.226 (.94)	-.060 (.55)	-.054 (.45)	-.144 (.55)
R^2	.256	.243	.178	.265	.227	.190
# obs.	2548	1306	1242	2551	1307	1444

Notes: All specifications include region dummies as well as a full set of (feasible) industry dummies (maximum 52). Total factor income include – in addition to wages and entrepreneurial income – dividends, interest payments and capital gains. Robust standard errors, absolute t -values in the parentheses.

businesses. The results in Table 4 might, however, reflect compensating income differences associated with employment status as well as underreporting of incomes. Although this seems likely, it is not clear why the legal form of a business ownership should matter much for job satisfaction.

5. Concluding Remarks

Our study of food expenditure and incomes among employees and self-employed has produced results that are broadly consistent with findings from previous studies. There is strong evidence of “excess food consumption” among the self-employed, for a given level of disposable income. A plausible interpretation is that the pattern reflects underreporting of incomes among the self-employed. The magnitude of underreporting is non-trivial: our estimates suggest that the households with at least one member underreport their total incomes at the average rate of 30 percent and their incomes from self-employment by around 35 percent. Our results also imply that tax evasion is most pronounced among self-employed who run unincorporated businesses. We interpret this finding as indicating higher costs of tax evasion for owners of incorporated businesses since their transactions are more easily exposed to public scrutiny.

Our look at income differentials between employees and self-employed people yields results consistent with the analysis of consumption data. Reported incomes among the self-employed, and in particular those with unincorporated businesses, are substantially lower than incomes among employees even after controlling for human capital characteristics and industry affiliation at a fairly detailed level. Although this pattern could reflect many different forces, including compensating earnings differences, it seems likely that tax evasion behavior is part of the story. In fact, longer work hours among the self-employed would tend to create an earnings advantage (rather than a penalty) for the self-employed.

One might have expected that estimates of tax evasion for Sweden should be on the high side considering the high tax rates. However, tax rates are not all that matter for tax evasion. First, the standard theory does not offer clear-cut predictions regarding the impact of tax rates on tax evasion; see Allingson and Sandmo (1972). Second, there are other factors that may be at least as important. In theory, features of the legal system are important, viz. the probability of being caught if failing to comply with the tax rules and the punishment imposed in such a case. In empirical work, it has been noted that the relative size of the hidden economy appears to vary across countries in a way that cannot exclusively be explained by tax rates.²⁴

²⁴ One example is the paper by Bovi (2003), where the determinants of underground (OECD) economies are examined. Bovi finds that the underground economy is mainly affected by variables capturing “institutional failures” and to a lesser degree taxation and market regulations.

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3 There is no obvious policy prescription that follows from our results. However, the fact that
4 tax evasion seems to depend on the legal form of self-employment is of potential policy
5 relevance. The regulatory framework pertaining to small firms is subject to ongoing policy
6 discussions, often emphasizing the need to simplify the regulations so as to facilitate
7 entrepreneurship. One issue concerns whether independent auditing should be required for all
8 incorporated businesses, including (very) small firms. The details of the regulatory framework
9 matter for incentives for tax evasion, a consideration that should be acknowledged in the
10 policy discussions.
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