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## The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation

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### The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation

Journal:	<i>Applied Economics</i>
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JEL Code:	D21 - Firm Behavior < D2 - Production and Organizations < D - Microeconomics, Q18 - Agricultural Policy Food Policy < Q1 - Agriculture < Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets < Q1 - Agriculture < Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, D80 - General < D8 - Information and Uncertainty < D - Microeconomics
Keywords:	risk, risk preferences, land allocation



**RESPONSES TO REFEREE 1****APE-06-0188****THE EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON LAND ALLOCATION**

We are very grateful for your careful review of the paper and your helpful comments and suggestions. We believe that the revisions suggested by your review have significantly improved the manuscript. While hoping that we have been able to address your concerns, we stand ready to make any additional changes that you deem necessary.

We proceed to respond to your comments below.

**General Comments**

**This is a good paper on an important topic. It is well-written and the analysis appears to have been competently executed. The paper falls down in several places in terms of its exposition and needs significant revision (see my comments below).**

**Specific Comments**

**(1) (page 1) You need to break this paragraph-it runs on here.**

The paragraph has been rewritten as suggested.

**(2) (page 2) As you correctly note later in the paper, it is not risk neutrality that is the common assumption but rather DARA preferences.**

Thank you for pointing out this issue. We have removed the statement that the conventional approach to the analysis of the effects of agricultural policies on farmers' decisions has assumed perfect markets, risk neutral producers and constant returns to scale (see the first paragraph in page 2). This approach has been simply presented as a feasible method. In the same paragraph we now also note that it has been common for policy analyses to assume aversion to risk.

**(3) (page 3) Again, you provide an explicit comparison below-but farmers are a wealthy lot and thus the expectation would be for small effects, even with strongly DARA preferences.**

*Responses to referee1*  
*APE 06-0188*

We completely agree with this referee comment, and have incorporated this in the main text (see last paragraph in page 3).

**(4) (page 3) Instead of saying “actual production,” you should note that it is current production that matters.**

We have replaced “actual” by “current.” Thanks for your detailed review.

**(5) (page 5) Here, and in other places in the paper, you refer to “ risk adversity” when you mean “risk aversion.”**

The words “adversity” and “adverse” have been replaced by “aversion” and “averse” respectively. We appreciate your patience in correcting our errors.

**(6) (page 7) You refer to idled land here and later in the analysis-how does the CRP program factor into land idling?**

Your point is a very interesting one and we recognize we should have made it clear from the beginning. As we now note in footnote 6 in page 7, the CRP does not affect our results. This is due to data collection methods. Specifically, the CRP does not factor into the land idling of the Kansas dataset and it is handled separately. Since the CRP consists of long-term contracts that promote the establishment of conserving covers on highly erodible land, it precludes adapting land use to changing market conditions and policy regulations. Therefore, it has not been incorporated into the idle land definition made in our paper. Thanks for noting this issue and allowing us to clarify it.

**(7) (page 12) Are you assuming constant yields and land quality across an agent's land holdings? What about the role of crop rotations?**

Your questions are important. You are right in noting that land quality is assumed to be constant across an agent's land holdings. We would like to note here that our empirical application is necessarily constrained by data availability. The collection of information on how land quality varies across different plots would allow us to assess the influence of land quality on land allocation decisions. Such information could be easily incorporated in our theoretical model by respecifying the production function (see footnote 4 on page 6). Allowing for changes in land quality across an agent's plots would probably confirm the well-known practice that farmers follow to set aside the land with the

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4 lowest quality and productively use the more fertile plots. We have added this discussion in our  
5 paper, both in footnote number 4 in page 6, and on the concluding remarks section.  
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9 We also agree that crop rotation issues might be relevant and represent another factor affecting land  
10 use decisions. Crop rotation is a reason for diversification and affects the relative profitability of a  
11 crop at a given field because of soil dynamics. Farmers being aware of this can establish constraints  
12 on land use patterns. Crop rotation can occur between program crops or between program and non-  
13 program commodities. Since program crops are grouped under a single output category, only inter-  
14 group rotation would affect our results. Unfortunately our database does not contain information on  
15 agronomic issues. As a result, crop rotation cannot be explicitly modelled, though it is implicitly  
16 accounted for. Were data available, agronomic restrictions could easily be introduced in the model by  
17 solving a constrained optimization problem. It is also true however, that rotation constraints did not  
18 change with policy reforms and, from this perspective, the effects of not explicitly modelling crop  
19 rotation should not be very relevant for our policy analysis.  
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30 The value of crop rotation might have changed with policy reforms. On the one hand, pre-reform  
31 coupled payments to program crops not allowing to put land to other agricultural uses, are very likely  
32 to have reduced the value of rotating non-program with program commodities. With the decoupling of  
33 payments and the allowance of planting flexibility, farmers are likely to have been more willing to  
34 rotate program with non-program crops. On the other hand, however, the reform-induced reduction in  
35 price supports to program crops is likely to have cut down the value of planting non-program crops for  
36 rotation purposes. This is because any extra yields in program crops obtained as a result of rotation  
37 will now have a lower market value. As a result, the overall impact of crop rotation is not very likely to  
38 have been relevant. We add this discussion in the conceptual framework section in our model (see  
39 pages 10 and 11). A discussion of the consequences of crop rotation for land use in Kansas is  
40 offered in the empirical application section (see pages 17 and 18).  
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52 **(8) (page 13) It is not clear here if you are discarding a lot of data in order to balance the panel.**  
53 **If so, are you not worried about sample selection bias?**  
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55 Our dataset does not offer information on PFC payments separate from other government payments,  
56 which constitute a central issue in our analysis. As a result, a method to estimate such payments was  
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*Responses to referee1*  
*APE 06-0188*

devised. Since data on PFC payment rates are available from the USDA, an estimation of the farm-level payments can be derived by approximating the base acreage and yield for each crop and farm. This requires to concentrate on those farms that have remained in the dataset long enough to allow a good estimation of the bases (we use the 1986-88 data for such purpose). The selection of these farms involves being left with 560 observations per year, while the incomplete panel would have had, on average, 1950 farms per year. Discarding observations, however, does not substantially alter the data means (see the table below).

Table 1. Means for the variables of interest

Variable	Balanced panel (n= 2,241)	Unbalanced panel (n = 7824)
$y_1$ (USD/acre). Program crop yields	106.54	106.40
$y_2$ (USD/acre). Non-program crop yields	118.74	116.25
$x_1$ (USD/acre). Variable input allocated to $y_1$	39.32	38.03
$x_2$ (USD/acre). Variable input allocated to $y_2$	28.17	29.39
$p_1$ (1998=1.00). Program crop price index	1.01	1.01
$p_2$ (1998=1.00). Non-program crop price index	0.91	0.91
$w$ (1998=100). Variable input price index	1.02	1.02
$\bar{\Pi}_1$ (USD/acre). Program crop quasi rents	67.55	68.39
$\bar{\Pi}_2$ (USD/acre). Non-program crop quasi rents	79.61	75.76
$\text{var}(\Pi_1)$ Variance of program crop quasi rents	180.81	172.16
$\text{var}(\Pi_2)$ Variance of non-program crop quasi rents	861.61	654.73

Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units

Table 1. Means for the variables of interest (continued)

Variable	Balanced panel (n= 2,241)	Unbalanced panel (n = 7824)
$\text{cov}(\Pi_1\Pi_2)$ Quasi rents' covariance	268.39	307.28
$W_0$ (USD). Farm's initial wealth	669,663.10	555,070.64
$L_1$ Proportion of land allocated to $y_1$	0.62	0.65
$L_2$ Proportion of land allocated to $y_2$	0.26	0.24
$L_3$ Proportion of land left idle	0.12	0.12
$A$ (acres). Total crop land	1075.90	1092.76

Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units

**(9) (page 14) You should briefly discuss the implications of the "behavioral method."**

Thanks for emphasizing the need to provide further detail of the behavioral approach which may not be well known by readers. We have done so on page 16, where we clarify that this approach is based upon the assumption that farmers behave as if production is characterized by constant returns to scale with fixed input/land ratios. These fixed proportions are assumed to be based on regional averages, though allowing for modifications for seasonal and farm-specific conditions. We also note that the implementation of the behavioral approach requires data which are generally available (land allocation by crop, purchases by input and sales by output). Finally, we emphasize that Just et al. (1990) show the validity of the behavioral approach and its superiority relative to other alternative approaches such as the profit maximization method.

**(10) (page 15) Again, the role of crop rotations should be considered here.**

As we explain in the response to your comment number 7, in the empirical application section, pages 17 and 18, we discuss the likely impacts of crop rotation issues on Kansas land use. We fully agree with this referee that the implications of agronomic restrictions for land use had to be considered.

*Responses to referee1*  
*APE 06-0188*

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**(11) (page 16) You need to provide a better definition of your variables (in Table 1). It is almost impossible to understand the empirical specification.**

Following your suggestion, table 1 now incorporates a brief definition of our variables, so that it is easier to follow the empirical specification. Details on the units of measure of the variables are also given.

**(12) (page 16) You should also provide an explicit presentation of the exact empirical specification that you are estimating. This should be shown in terms of the EU function.**

On page 19, we offer the exact empirical specification that is estimated in our empirical application as requested.

**(13) (page 17) You refer to "market prices" here when I think you are referring to deficiency payment supports.**

Thank you for your careful review, we have substituted "market prices" by "deficiency payments."

**(14) (page 18) You should mention the role of expectations about future policy benefits as a factor influencing production.**

The role of expectations about future policy benefits has been mentioned as a factor that may influence production. Specifically, in the concluding remarks section, we recognize the limitations of our research and consider the analysis of the effects of expectations on land use as a possible avenue for future research.

**(15) (page 18) I do not fully understand your characterization of set-asides as "self-insurance."**

This referee is right in pointing out that characterizing set-asides as a form of "self-insurance" was, at least, confusing and we have removed the sentence from the text.



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4 **(16) (page 18) It would help your exposition to provide a simulation of policy changes on**  
5 **production.**  
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7 Your suggestion of including a simulation of policy changes is certainly useful. We have done so in  
8 the last paragraph of the results section, where we simulate the impacts of the policy changes  
9 occurred during the period studied on land use.  
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14 Again, we thank you for your useful review.  
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21 **References:**  
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# THE EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON LAND ALLOCATION

TERESA SERRA, DAVID ZILBERMAN, JOSÉ M. GIL, AND

ALLEN FEATHERSTONE\*

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## Abstract

The purpose of this article is to study the impact of agricultural policy decoupling on land allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of decoupling on farms' crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986). Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001. Results show that US agricultural policy decoupling has resulted in a shift in land use away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher expected profits and idle land.

*Keywords:* risk, risk preferences, land allocation

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## THE EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON LAND ALLOCATION

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### Abstract

The purpose of this article is to study the impact of agricultural policy decoupling on land allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of decoupling on farms' crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986). Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001. Results show that US agricultural policy decoupling could have involved a shift in land use away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher expected profits and idle land.

*Keywords:* risk, risk preferences, land allocation

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the design of domestic agricultural policies in developed countries has given priority to methods that guarantee a price floor for agricultural commodities. Price support mechanisms can range from supply restrictions imposed on the domestic market, price subsidies, or public purchases of agricultural commodities to offset excess supply. A wide literature has shown that price support mechanisms may intensify production practices and bring about significant deadweight losses (Gardner, 1992).

The unfavourable consequences of agricultural protectionism became widely recognized by the 1980s. It became clear that agricultural intervention based on price guarantees and other market insulating policies led to overproduction, which in turn brought about market distortions and disagreements in multilateral trade policy negotiations. Recognition of these problems motivated multilateral and/or bilateral trade agreements that advocated for agricultural protectionism dismantling processes. In the framework of these agreements, different countries have reformed their domestic agricultural policies.

Economic theory views lump sum transfers as the most efficient method to redistribute income among individuals (Williamson, 1996). The trade-off between political pressures for continued support to farmers and the policymakers' will to reduce efficiency losses resulted in an increased use of decoupled agricultural policies. Decoupling is a term used to designate the break of the link between subsidies and production. Price supports are usually replaced by lump sum income transfers that do not depend on current production or prices.

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Several methodologies to assess the effects of agricultural policies on farmers' profit maximization decisions have been used. A feasible approach consists of assuming perfect markets (including credit markets), risk neutral producers and constant returns to scale. Under these assumptions, the literature has shown that the impacts of decoupled policies on production decisions are limited. However, if economic agents are not risk neutral, markets are imperfect, or returns to scale are other than constant, apparently decoupled payments could have more implications (see Phimister, 1995; Hennessy, 1998; or Rude, 2001). A number of studies that have assessed economic agents' risk preferences using different methods have found evidence in favour of risk aversion (see, for example, Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Chavas and Pope, 1985; Pope and Just, 1991; Abdulkadri, Langemeier and Featherstone, 2003 and 2006; or Wik et al., 2004). In light of these findings, it has been common for policy analyses to assume aversion to risk.<sup>1</sup> If uncertainty and risk preferences are introduced in the analysis of the impacts of decoupling, results suggest that apparently decoupled policies can influence production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Sandmo, 1971). It is thus very important to account for risk and risk preferences when assessing the effects of decoupling.

When coupled or partially coupled, income supports often involve restrictive supply management rules that limit farmers' capacity to respond to market conditions. For example, eligibility for public subsidies is usually made

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<sup>1</sup> The role of risk has also been considered when assessing farmer decisions other than strict profit maximization decisions. Key, Roberts and O'Donoghue (2006), for example, analyze the impacts of risk on farm operators' off-farm labor supply. In another line of inquiry, Abdulkadri, Langemeier and Featherstone (2006) study the impacts of excluding risk and risk preferences on cost structures.

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3 conditional upon producing specific crops, the program crops. In this regard,  
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5 decoupling involves increased planting flexibility in that direct payments are not  
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7 tied to the production of certain commodities. Farmers being allowed more  
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9 planting flexibility are likely to be more responsive to market conditions and  
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11 alter their crop mix accordingly. To the extent that planting flexibility includes  
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13 the possibility of agricultural land idling, farmers will also consider setting land  
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15 aside when making their decisions on land allocation.  
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20 There are other mechanisms through which the decoupling of agricultural  
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22 policies can influence land allocation decisions. These mechanisms are the  
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24 changes in relative market prices and farmers' risk attitudes. The reduction in  
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26 price supports is likely to make program crops less attractive relative to non-  
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28 program commodities and land idling. Also, to the extent that farmers' risk  
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30 preferences are influenced by wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Just and Pope, 1978;  
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32 Hennessy, 1998; Just and Zilberman, 1986) and to the extent that decoupled  
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34 payments and price changes have the potential to affect the wealth of participant  
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36 farmers, their willingness to assume risk may be altered. Because risk is a  
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38 fundamental component of agricultural production and because yield variability  
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40 can differ by crop type, government transfers might affect farms' land use by  
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42 means of altering farmers' risk attitudes. To the extent that farmers are wealthy  
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44 and decoupled payments only represent a small proportion of their wealth,<sup>2</sup> one  
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46 should expect small wealth effects from decoupled payments, even if farmers  
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48 display strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion.<sup>3</sup>  
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58 <sup>2</sup> In the sample of Kansas farms utilized in the empirical application, decoupled government  
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60 payments represent less than 2% of farmers' wealth (see the results section for more detail).

<sup>3</sup> An anonymous *Journal* reviewer raised this issue.

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Decoupled agricultural payments were introduced in the United States (US) with the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, which involved a substantial change in the way income support was provided to farmers. With the FAIR Act, market price supports and deficiency payments were being partially replaced by Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) Payments whose amount and entitlement would not depend on current production or prices, and a deficiency payment program that guaranteed a minimum support price for program crops including soybeans. Under the 1990 Act, with the exception of the flex acres, producers were required to plant the base acreage to the base crop in order to be eligible for deficiency payments. Entitlement to receive PFC was based on qualified acres historically enrolled in commodity programs, allowing land to be put to any agricultural use, including the production of any crop with the exception of fruits and vegetables (unless it was used in this way in the past), or idled.

The purpose of this article is to study the impacts of decoupling on land allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of decoupling on farms' crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of a model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986). We extend this model to study supply responses to decoupled payments and to include set aside among land use alternatives. Though various analyses have addressed the effects of decoupling on producers' decisions, no existing research has studied the impacts of decoupled payments on farms' land allocation using the extended Just and Zilberman (1986) model. Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001. Results

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3 suggest that US agricultural policy decoupling may result in a shift in land use  
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5 away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher  
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7 expected profits and idle land.  
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## 10 11 12 13 14 15 **II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK** 16

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19 The objective of our model is to assess the effects of decoupling on farm land  
20 allocation. We adopt the Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under  
21 uncertainty. Because agricultural producers are not likely to be neutral to risk,  
22 farmers' risk preferences are explicitly considered. Our model defines risk  
23 preferences as a function of wealth (Just and Zilberman, 1986; Pope and Just,  
24 1991; Hennessy, 1998). If economic agents are risk averse and their risk aversion  
25 decreases with wealth (Pope and Just, 1991; Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman,  
26 1997), an increase in decoupled payments is expected to alter the crop mix  
27 towards more risky crops that offer higher expected margins. The reduction in  
28 price supports for program crops that characterizes a decoupling process will  
29 reduce the attractiveness of these crops in favour of non-program commodities  
30 and/or idle land. Apart from the substitution effects, a change in output prices  
31 will also have an income effect that, under the assumption of decreasing absolute  
32 risk averse (DARA) preferences, is likely to increase risk aversion.  
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53 The 1996 FAIR Act involved the introduction of decoupled payments that  
54 allowed, with some restrictions, full planting flexibility. We extend the Just and  
55 Zilberman (1986) model to allow for these payments and the possibility to  
56 receive them even if agricultural land is left idle. Our model offers an improved  
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picture of farmers' behaviour by re-optimizing land allocation in response to policy. We model PFC payments as simple lump sum transfers, thus recognizing that under the new scenario farmers manage their crop mix in accordance with market conditions.

Consider a farm that produces two outputs, crop 1 and crop 2. Crop 1 represents a program crop where eligibility for government payments under the old policy regime required crop acres be planted to this crop. Crop 2 is a non-program crop. Yields per acre are defined as uncertain variables and expressed as  $\mathbf{Y} = (y_1, y_2)$ . For simplicity, it is assumed that producer uncertainty derives only from production, but not from market conditions. If additive production risk is assumed, the production function<sup>4</sup> of crop  $i$  can be expressed as  $y_i = y_i(x_i) + \varepsilon_i$ , where  $x_i$  is the per acre quantity of a variable input  $x$  allocated to the production of crop  $i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  is a stochastic error term with mean  $E[\varepsilon_i] = 0$  and variance  $\text{var}[\varepsilon_i] = \sigma_i^2$ . The first two moments of the joint distribution of yields are denoted by  $E \begin{bmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{y}_1 \\ \bar{y}_2 \end{bmatrix}$  and  $\text{cov} \begin{bmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \rho\sigma_1\sigma_2 \\ \rho\sigma_1\sigma_2 & \sigma_2^2 \end{bmatrix}$ , where  $\rho$  represents the correlation coefficient among the two crop yields. The quasi rents derived from crop  $i$  are expressed on a per acre basis as  $\Pi_i = p_i y_i - w x_i$ , where

<sup>4</sup> Our empirical application is necessarily constrained by data availability. The collection of information on how land quality varies across an agent's land holdings would allow to assess the influence of land quality on land allocation decisions. Such information could be easily incorporated in our model by respecifying the production function:  $y_{ij} = y_{ij}(x_{ij}, \gamma_{ij}) + \varepsilon_{ij}$ , where  $\gamma_{ij}$  would represent land quality in plot  $j$  of firm  $i$ . Allowing for changes in land quality across an agent's plots would probably confirm the well known practice that farmers follow to set aside the land with the lowest quality and productively use the more fertile plots.

$p_i$  represents crop  $i$  price and  $w$  is the variable input price, being the first two moments of the joint distribution of quasi rents  $E \begin{bmatrix} \Pi_1 \\ \Pi_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{\Pi}_1 \\ \bar{\Pi}_2 \end{bmatrix}$  and

$$\text{cov} \begin{bmatrix} \Pi_1 \\ \Pi_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \varpi_1^2 & \rho \varpi_1 \varpi_2 \\ \rho \varpi_1 \varpi_2 & \varpi_2^2 \end{bmatrix}, \text{ where } \varpi_i = p_i \sigma_i.$$

Total crop land ( $A$ )<sup>5</sup> is allocated to the production of the two crops considered or left idle<sup>6</sup> yielding the following vector of land allocation:  $\mathbf{A} = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ , where  $A = A_1 + A_2 + A_3$ ,  $A_3$  represents idle land and  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  symbolize land allocated to program and non-program crops respectively. The problem of land allocation can alternatively be expressed in proportions as  $\mathbf{L} = (L_1, L_2, L_3)$ , where  $L_i = \frac{A_i}{A}$  and  $L_1 + L_2 + L_3 = 1$ .

It is assumed that farmers make their decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected utility of their wealth  $\max_{L_1, L_2, L_3, x_1, x_2} E[u(W)] = \max_{L_1, L_3, x_1, x_2} E[u(W_0 + G + \Pi_1 A L_1 + \Pi_2 A (1 - L_1 - L_3))]$ , where  $W$  represents farms' total wealth,  $W_0$  stands for farms' initial wealth, and  $G$  are decoupled income-support payments. The quasi rent associated to idle land is assumed to be equal to zero.

<sup>5</sup> Because, for our sample of farms, crop land remained almost constant during the period of analysis,  $A$  is assumed to be fixed.

<sup>6</sup> The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) does not factor into the land idling consideration of this paper. Since it consists of long-term contracts that promote the establishment of conserving covers on environmentally sensitive cropland, it precludes adapting land use to changing market conditions or policy regulations.

Following previous literature, we assume risk neutrality in the input decision<sup>7</sup> which leads to independence of land allocation from variable input decisions (Just and Zilberman, 1986). Under this assumption the first order conditions of the land allocation problem can be expressed as:

$$\frac{\partial E[u]}{\partial L_1} = E \left[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial W} (\Pi_1 - \Pi_2) \right] \geq 0 \quad (1.1)$$

$$\frac{\partial E[u]}{\partial L_3} = E \left[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial W} (-\Pi_2) \right] \geq 0 \quad (1.2)$$

By approximating the marginal utility around the expected wealth ( $\bar{W} = W_0 + G + \bar{\Pi}_1 A L_1 + \bar{\Pi}_2 A (1 - L_1 - L_3)$ ) through a second-order Taylor series expansion, the first order conditions can be alternatively expressed as:

$$\frac{(\bar{\Pi}_1 - \bar{\Pi}_2)}{A} - R \{L_1 v_1 + (1 - L_3) v_2\} \geq 0 \quad (2.1)$$

$$\frac{-\bar{\Pi}_2}{A} - R \{L_1 (-v_2) + (1 - L_3) v_3\} \geq 0 \quad (2.2)$$

where  $R = R(\bar{W}) = - \left( \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial \bar{W}^2} \right) \left( \frac{\partial u}{\partial \bar{W}} \right)^{-1}$  represents the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Following Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman (1997) we

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<sup>7</sup> As Just and Zilberman note, the assumption of risk neutrality is very common in models with stochastic production and is necessary for the dual cost and production functions to be independent of risk preferences. This assumption allows to derive a theoretical framework that is more tractable at the empirical level.

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assume  $R$  to be a function of farms' expected wealth that can be represented by  $R = \eta \bar{W}^\beta$ , where  $\eta$  and  $\beta$  are parameters that represent a farmer's risk preferences. This is a flexible specification in that it does not restrict the specific type of farmers' risk preferences. Risk averse (neutral) [seeking] attitudes are represented by  $\eta > (=) [<] 0$ . We assume farmers to be risk-averse ( $\eta > 0$ ). The wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion corresponds to  $\beta$ . If farmers have decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion preferences,  $\beta > (=) [<] 0$ . In accord with previous studies (Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman, 1997; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2003) we assume here that farmers have DARA preferences ( $\beta < 0$ ). The expression  $v_1 = \varpi_1^2 - 2\rho\varpi_1\varpi_2 + \varpi_2^2 = \text{var}\left(\frac{\partial \bar{\Pi}_T}{\partial L_1}\right) > 0$  is the variance of the marginal profit derived from increasing land allocated to crop  $i=1$  and  $\bar{\Pi}_T = L_1\Pi_1 + (1-L_1-L_3)\Pi_2$ . The result of multiplying  $v_2 = \rho\varpi_1\varpi_2 - \varpi_2^2$  by  $(1-L_3)$  is  $\frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial \text{var} \Pi_T}{\partial L_1}$ , which represents one-half the marginal variance of profit when  $L_1 = 0$ , i.e. at zero capacity allocation. Finally,  $v_3 = -\varpi_2^2$  corresponds to the negative value of the variance of non-program crop quasi rents. Note that expressions (2.1) and (2.2) above involve the equalization of the marginal mean income effect derived from an increase in land allocated to crop  $i$  and the marginal risk effect discounted to a certainty equivalent using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

In order to determine the effects of decoupling on land allocation decisions, we use comparative statics. The consideration of a multi-product land allocation problem involves substantial complexity relative to a more simplified

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3 two-product model and yields comparative statics formulae that cannot be  
4 signed. In order to make comparative statics more simple, but also more clear,  
5 we simplify the model to a consideration of only two alternatives in the land  
6 allocation problem:  $L_1$  and  $L_i$ ,  $i = 2, 3$ .<sup>8</sup> It is important to note that model  
7 simplification is only limited to the comparative statics analysis in this section,  
8 and that the empirical implementation will be based upon the generalized three-  
9 product model.  
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20 Crop rotation issues might be relevant and represent a factor affecting  
21 land use decisions other than economic and political reasons.<sup>9</sup> Crop rotation is a  
22 reason for diversification and affects the relative profitability of a crop at a given  
23 field because of soil dynamics. Farmers being aware of this, can establish  
24 constraints on land use patterns. Crop rotation can occur between program crops  
25 or between program and non-program crops. Since program crops are grouped  
26 under a single output category, only the inter-group rotation would affect our  
27 results. Unfortunately, our database does not contain information on agronomic  
28 issues. As a result, crop rotation cannot be explicitly modelled, though it is  
29 implicitly accounted for. Were data available, agronomic restrictions could easily  
30 be introduced in the model by solving a constrained optimization problem. It is  
31 also true however, that rotation constraints did not change with policy reforms  
32 and, from this perspective, the effects of not explicitly modelling crop rotation  
33 should not be very relevant for our policy analysis.  
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56 <sup>8</sup> Note that this simplification is economically reasonable as it represents two possible corner  
57 solutions that can apply to our problem, i.e. that farmers decide not to set land aside or diversify  
58 the crop mix.  
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<sup>9</sup> This was suggested by an anonymous *Journal* reviewer.

The value of crop rotation might have changed with policy reforms. On the one hand, pre-reform coupled payments to program crops not allowing to put land to other agricultural uses, are very likely to have reduced the value of rotating non-program with program commodities. With the decoupling of payments and the allowance of planting flexibility, farmers are likely to have been more willing to rotate program with non-program commodities. On the other hand, however, the reform-induced reduction in price supports to program crops is likely to have cut down the value of planting non-program crops for rotation purposes. This is because any extra yields in program crops obtained as a result of rotation will now have a lower market value. As a result, the overall impact of crop rotation is not very likely to have been relevant. A discussion of the consequences of crop rotation for land use in Kansas is offered in the empirical application section.

Let's consider a land allocation problem that only includes program and non-program commodities. In such a scenario, the system of first-order conditions is reduced to:

$$\frac{(\bar{\Pi}_1 - \bar{\Pi}_2)}{A} - R\{L_1 v_1 + v_2\} = 0 \quad (3)$$

where  $v_1 = \text{var}\left(\frac{\partial \bar{\Pi}_T}{\partial L_1}\right)$ ,  $v_2 = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial \text{var} \Pi_T}{\partial L_1}$ , and  $\bar{\Pi}_T = L_1 \Pi_1 + (1 - L_1) \Pi_2$ . As

explained above, in a decoupling process lump sum payments are usually introduced to replace price supports. Our comparative statics analysis thus focuses on determining the sensitivity of the crop mix to changes to program

crop prices and to lump sum payments. The comparative statics results can be summarized in the following propositions (proofs are presented in the appendix).

PROPOSITION 1. *Land allocated to the program crop ( $i=1$ ) increases with an increase in decoupled payments ( $G$ ) if  $\rho > \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$ , or if  $-\infty < \rho < \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$  and*

*$|L_1 v_1| > |v_2|$ . On the other hand, land allocated to the program crop decreases with an increase in  $G$  if  $-\infty < \rho < \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$  and  $|L_1 v_1| < |v_2|$ .*

Proposition 1 can be economically interpreted as follows. An increase in decoupled payments improves farmers' wealth which in turn increases their willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the attractiveness of crop mix diversification as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This will only occur if yield correlation is negative or takes low positive values, and if an increase in program crop production substantially reduces the profit ( $\Pi_T$ ) variance. Otherwise diversification will not be pursued.

PROPOSITION 2. *For a negative value of the mean effect of production, land allocated to the program crop decreases with an increase in  $p_1$  if  $\rho < 0$  and*

*$\left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| > \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|$ , if  $0 < \rho < \frac{\bar{\omega}_1}{\bar{\omega}_2}$ , or if  $\rho > \frac{\bar{\omega}_1}{\bar{\omega}_2}$  and  $\left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| < \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|$ . Otherwise,*

*land allocated to crop 1 only decreases if the mean effect outweighs the risk effect.*

The economic meaning of proposition 2 can be expressed as follows. If the expected mean effect of production is negative, an increase in  $p_1$  only motivates an increase in  $L_1$  if this increase involves some gains in terms of risk management that outweigh the negative mean effect. If yields are negatively correlated, the gains in terms of risk management require a substantial reduction in the marginal variance of profit. However, if yields are highly and positively correlated (and thus diversification towards  $L_2$  is less attractive) a small increase in the marginal variance is tolerated, as long as the risk effect is of bigger magnitude than the mean effect.

PROPOSITION 3. *For a positive value of the mean effect of production, land allocated to the program crop increases with an increase in  $p_1$  if  $\rho < 0$  and*

$$\left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| < \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|, \text{ or if } \rho > \frac{\varpi_1}{\varpi_2} \text{ and } \left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| > \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|.$$

*Otherwise, land allocated to crop 1 only increases if the mean effect outweighs the risk effect.*

Proposition 3 thus shows that, because the expected mean effect is positive, no diversification in favour of non-program crops is pursued if yield correlation is high and positive. However, if  $\rho < 0$  an increase in  $L_1$  requires an important reduction in the marginal variance of profit.

In order to assess the effects of decoupling on idle land, we now consider a model that examines the allocation of land among program crop production and set aside. In such a model, the first order condition in (3) changes to (4) below:



$$\frac{\bar{\Pi}_1}{A} - RL_1\sigma_1^2 = 0 \quad (4)$$

Comparative statics allow to formulate the following two propositions:

PROPOSITION 4. *Idle land is reduced with an increase in decoupled payments.*

This is due to the fact that an increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers' degree of risk aversion increasing their willingness to assume more risk. Given that idle land involves no risk, this alternative becomes less attractive in favour of producing agricultural commodities.

PROPOSITION 5. *For a negative value of the mean effect of production, idle land increases with an increase in  $p_1$  to the detriment of  $L_1$ . However, if the mean effect of production is positive, idle land only increases if the risk effect outweighs the mean effect.*

In a situation where the mean effect of production is positive, farmers have the incentive to increase the amount of land allocated to program crops to the detriment of idle land, as long as the increase in production risk measured as a certainty equivalent does not outweigh the mean effect. However, if the mean effect is negative, an increase in  $p_1$  reduces program crop land in favour of idle land.

In summary, our comparative statics analysis shows that decoupled payments have the effect of reducing idle land. In contrast, the reduction in

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3 program crop price supports can motivate land set aside. Decoupled payments  
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5 can also stimulate a change in crop mix in favour of non-program commodities.  
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7 This shift requires yield correlation to be negative or take low positive values. A  
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9 decrease in program crop price supports can also boost non-program crops  
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11 acreage under certain conditions. It is relevant to note that, with the exception of  
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13 the influence of decoupled payments on idle land, the net effects of decoupling  
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15 depend on issues such as yield correlation, changes in the variance of profit, or  
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17 the magnitude of the mean and risk production effects. This causes the response  
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19 to a decoupled program to be inconclusive making it necessary to determine it  
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21 empirically.  
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### 32 **III. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION**

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36 As explained above, our empirical application is focused on the analysis of the  
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38 effects of the US agricultural policy reforms in 1996 on land allocation decisions  
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40 made by a sample of Kansas farms. Specifically, we are interested in observing  
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42 how the planting flexibility provisions and the decoupling of farm income  
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44 support influenced Kansas farms' land use.  
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48 Farm-level data are taken from farm account records from the Kansas  
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50 Farm Management Association database for the period 1998 to 2001.  
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52 Retrospective data for these farms are also used to define some lagged variables  
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54 used in the application.<sup>10</sup> The Kansas Farm Management Association database  
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56 collects information from individual farms on an annual basis through a  
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<sup>10</sup> To be able to do so, a complete panel of data is built out of our sample.

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3 cooperative record-sharing, farm management, and tax preparation arrangement.  
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5 Around 2,500 full-time commercial holdings with gross sales exceeding  
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7 \$100,000 provide data to this database. Various farm types and areas in Kansas  
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9 are represented in the dataset (Albright, 2001). The variables in the database  
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11 include, among other information, farm financial and production data, balance  
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13 sheet, cash flow and income statements. Our analysis is based on farm-level data,  
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15 but aggregates are also used to define important variables that are unavailable in  
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17 the farm-level dataset. These aggregates are taken from the United States  
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19 Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Agricultural Statistics  
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21 Service (NASS). USDA provided state-level PFC payment rates and NASS  
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23 facilitated country-level price indices and state-level output prices and quantities.  
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29 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
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31 Following our model specification, we consider a variable input  $x$  that includes  
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33 the per acre application of herbicides and fertilizer, representing the main  
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35 variable costs for the farms in the sample. Because input prices are not available  
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37 from the Kansas database, we define  $w$  as a country-level input price index.  
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39 Variable  $x$  is then defined as an implicit quantity index and derived through the  
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41 ratio of input use in currency units to the corresponding price index. The Kansas  
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43 dataset does not provide information on the consumption of variable inputs by  
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45 crop. We use Just et al. (1990) behavioural proposal to allocate variable input use  
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47 among different crops. The behavioral approach is based upon the assumption  
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49 that farmers behave as if their production functions are characterized by constant  
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51 returns to scale with fixed input/land ratios. Allowing for modifications for  
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53 seasonal and farm-specific conditions, these fixed proportions are assumed to be  
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55 based on regional averages. The only necessary data for implementing this  
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procedure are records on land allocation by crop, purchases by input and sales by output. Just et al. (1990) show the validity of the behavioral approach and its superiority to other alternative approaches.<sup>11</sup>

Two output categories are distinguished as quantity indices per acre ( $y_1$  and  $y_2$ ). Variable  $y_1$  represents program crops and includes the production of wheat, corn, and grain sorghum per acre. Variable  $y_2$  is the production of soybeans representing a non-program commodity. Together, wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans represent the main crops in Kansas. Paasche indices for both crops are computed using state-level output prices and production to define  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ .

Crop rotation, which we do not observe, is a relevant practice in Kansas with much benefit from using program crops in rotation with non-program crops. As explained above, apart from economic and policy issues, land use can also be affected by crop rotation. According to Dumler and Duncan (2005)<sup>12</sup> the passage of the 1996 FAIR Act may have favored rotation of program with non-program crops such as soybeans, without losing program payments. From this perspective, rotation issues would be an added reason to switch from program crops to soybeans or idle land. However, as noted above, the value of rotating non-program with program crops may have been reduced with the decline in program crop prices. In other words, any increase in soybeans production is more likely to

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<sup>11</sup> We should note here that another allocation mechanism based on profit maximization was also used, but yielded inconsistent results. This is not surprising in light of Just et al. (1990) findings that the behavioural method is superior.

<sup>12</sup> Halloran (2006), on the other hand, finds that for potato cropping systems, rotating program with non-program crops can improve economic viability and reduce risk.

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3 have been driven by a change in relative market prices than by agronomic  
4 reasons. As a result, the overall impacts are not likely to have been very relevant.  
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8  $A_i$  represents land allocated to alternative  $i=1,2,3$ , with  $A$  representing  
9 total crop acres,  $A_3$  the acres left idle, and  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  the crop acres planted to  
10 program and non-program crops respectively. By using  $y_i$ ,  $x_i$ ,  $p_i$ ,  $w$ , the value  
11 for  $\bar{\Pi}_i$  can be determined. Computing quasi rents at the farm-level involves  
12 some problems. First, not every farm produces crop  $i$ <sup>13</sup> every year and when this  
13 happens  $\bar{\Pi}_i$  cannot be determined at the farm-level. Second, the composition of  
14  $y_i$  can vary annually within a farm as land planted to wheat, corn and sorghum  
15 changes, which complicates the definition of a reasonable value for  $\bar{\Pi}_i$  at the  
16 farm-level. In light of these problems, we define quasi rents using annual sample-  
17 means for the production and input consumption variables.<sup>14</sup>  
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34 Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. Instead, a  
35 single measure including all government payments received by each farm is  
36 available. To derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, the acreage of  
37 program crops (base acreage) and the base yield for each crop are approximated  
38 using farm-level data. The approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and  
39 yield for each program crop and farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by  
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51 <sup>13</sup> The problem applies to crop  $i=2$ .

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53 <sup>14</sup> It is important to note here that other alternatives were also considered, including the use of  
54 farm-level  $\bar{\Pi}_i$  values whenever possible (and averages otherwise), or the use of the Kansas  
55 Farm Management Association crop budgets (<http://www.agmanager.info/crops/>). However,  
56 these alternatives yielded results in contrast to widely accepted previous research results and thus  
57 were discarded.  
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3 multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield, and the PFC payment rate. PFC  
4 payments per crop are then added to get total direct payments per farm.<sup>15</sup> A  
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6 farm's initial wealth is defined as the farm's net worth.  
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10 In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the following system  
11 of first-order conditions is estimated using two-stage nonlinear least squares:  
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$$14 \frac{(\bar{\Pi}_1 - \bar{\Pi}_2)}{A} - \eta \bar{W}^\beta \{L_1 (\text{var}(\Pi_1) + \text{var}(\Pi_2) - 2 \text{cov}(\Pi_1, \Pi_2)) + (1 - L_3)\} (\text{cov}(\Pi_1, \Pi_2) - \text{var}(\Pi_2)) = 0 \quad (5.1)$$

$$15 \frac{-\bar{\Pi}_2}{A} - \eta \bar{W}^\beta \{L_1 (-\text{cov}(\Pi_1, \Pi_2) + \text{var}(\Pi_2)) - (1 - L_3) (\text{var}(\Pi_2))\} = 0 \quad (5.2)$$

#### 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 **IV. RESULTS**

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34 Table 1 shows that, during the period studied, more than 62% of crop land was  
35 planted to program crops, 26% was devoted to non-program commodities, and  
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37 12% was left idle. Sample means also show that estimated PFC payments  
38 represent around 1.8% of farmers' initial wealth. Of interest is the fact that, for  
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40 the period of analysis, the expected market profit per acre derived from non-  
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42 program commodities outweighs the one obtained from program crops. Also,  
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44 during the period of study,  $\text{var}(\Pi_2) > \text{var}(\Pi_1)$ , which involves higher income risk  
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<sup>15</sup> This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated PFC payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second.

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3 derived from non-program crops.<sup>16</sup> Two-stage nonlinear least squares parameter  
4 estimates for the system of first-order conditions (see table 2) provide evidence  
5 that farmers in our sample are risk averse, and that the degree of risk aversion  
6 decreases with farmers' wealth, i.e., farmers exhibit DARA preferences.  
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12 Price, cross-price and payment elasticities of the proportion of land  
13 planted to program and non-program crops or left idle are presented in table 3.  
14 As expected, results suggest that an increase in its own price increases the  
15 quantity of land planted to program crops. Quite the opposite, the price elasticity  
16 of non-program crops is negative. This result is not surprising given the high  
17 income risk associated with  $y_2$  during the period of analysis. An increase in  $p_2$   
18 does not only involve an increase in mean income, but also a substantial increase  
19 in income variance. This lays out the necessary conditions for a failure in the  
20 'law of supply', that contends that the quantity supplied by price-taking  
21 producers will rise in response to an increase in output prices. An increase in  
22 profit risk above the increase in its mean will originate this failure. This result is  
23 in accord with the findings of Just and Zilberman (1986). Results indicate that  
24 cross-price effects are negative for program crop and positive for non-program  
25 crop prices. Hence, a decline in program crop deficiency payments motivates a  
26 change in land use away from program crops in favour of non-program  
27 commodities. In contrast, farmers will respond to an increase in non-program  
28 crop prices by increasing land devoted to other uses such as program crops. The  
29 response of idle land to changes to market prices is quite different depending on  
30 whether it is the program or the non-program crop price that is changed. An  
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58 <sup>16</sup>Differences in the variance of profits might partly reflect the fact that  $y_1$  is a composite output,  
59 and  $y_2$  is a single crop.  
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increase in program crop prices creates a strong incentive to reduce idle land to plant program commodities.<sup>17</sup> This shift in land use takes place because the increase in mean income originated by the increase in  $p_1$  outweighs the increase in income risk. However, an increase in  $p_2$  does not reduce idle land. Instead idle acreage is increased. As noted before, the high risk associated to the production of  $y_2$  for the period studied is increased with an increase in the output price. The relevance of the risk effect relative to the mean effect motivates farmers to set some land aside. Land use is also sensitive to government subsidies. An increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers' degree of risk aversion and stimulates undertaking risky activities. This involves a reduction in idle land in favour of crop land planted to both program and non-program commodities.

Hence, our results show that agricultural policy decoupling is likely to have motivated a change in farmers' crop mix. The extremely low values of subsidy elasticities relative to price elasticities allow to predict a reduction in the acreage planted to program crops in favour of non-program commodities and idle land. In order to better show the utility of our model, we carry out a simulation exercise that assesses the effects of shocking the model in accordance with the policy changes occurred during the period studied. During this period, marketing assistance loan rates declined approximately by 6.4%, while deficiency payments were cut by almost 29%. We assume the reduction in marketing assistance loan rates to be fully incorporated into the output prices received by farmers. As a result of the decline in program crop prices, our simulations suggest a reduction in program crop land on the order of 12% in favour of non-program crops, that

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<sup>17</sup> High idle land elasticities are partly due to the low initial values of this variable.



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3 increase their area by 13%, and idle land, that is augmented by 35%. The low  
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5 elasticity values of decoupled payments involve small changes in land allocation  
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7 as a result of a change in PFC payments. Both program and non-program crop  
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9 acres increase by less than 0.2%, while idle land is reduced by 1.3%. As a result  
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11 of these changes, the new land allocation vector at the data means is  $L_1 = 0.55$ ,  
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16  $L_2 = 0.29$ , and  $L_3 = 0.16$ .  
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## 23 **V. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

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27 This paper investigates the effects of decoupling on farmers' land allocation  
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29 decisions and, specifically, on the crop mix and idle land. Coupled policies  
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31 usually restrict farmers' capacity to respond to market conditions by imposing  
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33 restrictive supply management rules. In this regard, decoupling involves  
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35 increased planting flexibility and thus may motivate changes in land allocation.  
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37 Other aspects of decoupling can also influence land allocation decisions. These  
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39 aspects are the reduction in price supports for program crops and their  
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41 replacement by lump sum transfers, which are likely to involve changes in  
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43 relative market prices and in farmers' risk attitudes.  
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50 In order to show how these policy reforms could affect land use, we use  
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52 an extended version of the Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under  
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54 uncertainty. Our model offers an improved picture of farmers' behaviour by  
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56 allowing to optimize land allocation in response to policy and by considering  
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58 land idling among land use alternatives. Theoretical results show that, under the  
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60 assumption of DARA preferences, an increase in lump sum transfers will

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3 increase farmers' willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the  
4 attractiveness of crop mix diversification away from program crops and in favour  
5 of non-program commodities as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This  
6 involves that this diversification will only be pursued if yield correlation between  
7 program and non-program crops is negative or takes low positive values, and if  
8 an increase in land allocated to program crops involves a substantial reduction in  
9 the profit variance. Under certain conditions of yield correlation, profit variance  
10 and mean income, a decrease in program crop price supports will motivate  
11 diversification away from these crops. Idle land will decrease as a result of a  
12 reduction in program crop prices, only if the mean effect of production is  
13 negative or if it is positive and the risk effect outweighs the mean effect. An  
14 increase in decoupled subsidies will motivate farmers to assume riskier  
15 enterprises and reduce uncultivated land.  
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34 We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate our model and  
35 determine the effects of the FAIR Act on crop mix diversification. Our results  
36 show that decoupling may induce a change in farmers' crop mix by stimulating  
37 to reduce program crop acres in favour of non-program commodities and land  
38 idling.  
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46 Our work represents a first step in the analysis of the impacts of  
47 decoupling on land allocation. Our empirical analysis is however constrained by  
48 data availability. Due to data restrictions, we are not able to assess the role of  
49 agronomic restrictions such as crop rotation issues on land use, which constitutes  
50 a promising extension of our work. Another future line of inquiry would involve  
51 the consideration of the influence of land quality on land allocation decisions.  
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60 The collection of data on farmers' expectations about future policy benefits

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would allow an evaluation of the effects of policy expectations on land use and constitutes another possible extension of our analysis.

For Peer Review

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## APPENDIX

*Proof of proposition 1.* By totally differentiating equation (3), the following expression can be derived:

$$\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial G} = -\frac{1}{D} \frac{\partial R}{\partial \bar{W}} [L_1 v_1 + v_2] \quad (6)$$

where  $D > 0$  is the negative value of the second order condition of the optimization problem. If crop yields are negatively correlated (i.e.  $\rho < 0$ ),

$v_2 < 0$ , which involves that  $\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial G} > 0$  if  $|L_1 v_1| > |v_2|$ . If the correlation coefficient

is positive (i.e.  $\rho > 0$ ),  $v_2 > (<)0$  if  $\rho > (<) \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$ . We can thus conclude that if

$0 < \rho < \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$  and  $|L_1 v_1| > (<) |v_2|$ , then  $\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial G} > (<) 0$ . Otherwise, if  $\rho > \frac{\bar{\omega}_2}{\bar{\omega}_1}$ , land

allocated to program crops will increase with an increase in decoupled payments

$$\left( \frac{\partial L_1}{\partial G} > 0 \right).$$

*Proof of proposition 2.* By totally differentiating equation (3), the following expression can be derived:

$$\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\bar{y}_1}{D} \left[ \frac{1}{A} - \varepsilon_{R-\bar{W}} \frac{L_1 (\bar{\Pi}_1 - \bar{\Pi}_2)}{\bar{W}} \right] - \frac{R}{D} \left[ L_1 \left( \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right) + \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right] \quad (7)$$

where  $\bar{y}_1 \left[ \frac{1}{A} - \varepsilon_{R_{\bar{W}}} \frac{L_1 (\bar{\Pi}_1 - \bar{\Pi}_2)}{\bar{W}} \right]$  represents the mean effect of production per

unit of land, being  $R \left[ L_1 \left( \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right) + \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right]$  the variance effect discounted to a

certainty equivalent using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

Expression  $\frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1}$  represents the marginal variance of the marginal profit, and

$\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1}$  stands for a half of the change in the marginal variance of profit when

$L_1 = 0$ . The elasticity  $\varepsilon_{R_{\bar{W}}} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial \bar{W}} \frac{\bar{W}}{R} < 0$  represents the wealth elasticity of the

Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

If yield correlation coefficient is negative ( $\rho < 0$ ), then  $\frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} > 0$  and

$\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} < 0$ , i.e., the variance of the marginal profit increases, but the marginal

variance of profit decreases. In such a situation, the sign of the marginal risk

effect is positive if  $\left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| > \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|$  which involves  $\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial p_1} < 0$ . Otherwise, the

marginal effect is negative and the sign of  $\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial p_1}$  depends on the magnitude of the

mean effect relative to the marginal effect. If yield correlation is positive, then

$\frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} > (<) 0$  if  $\rho < (>) \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_2}$  and  $\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} > 0$ . This involves that if  $\rho > \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_2}$  and

$\left| L_1 \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial p_1} \right| < \left| \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial p_1} \right|$ , or if  $0 < \rho < \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_2}$ , then  $\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial p_1} < 0$ .

*Proof of proposition 3. See proof of proposition 2.*

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*Proof of proposition 4.* By totally differentiating equation (4), the following expression can be derived:

$$\frac{\partial L_1}{\partial G} = -\frac{L_1 \sigma_1^2}{D} \frac{\partial R}{\partial \bar{W}} > 0 \quad (8)$$

*Proof of proposition 5.* By totally differentiating equation (4), the following expression can be derived:

$$\frac{dL_1}{dp_1} = \frac{\bar{y}_1}{D} \left[ \frac{1}{A} - \varepsilon_R \frac{L_1 \bar{\Pi}_1}{\bar{W}} \right] - \frac{R}{D} [2L_1 p_1 \sigma_1^2] \quad (9)$$

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Table 1. *Summary statistics for the variables of interest*

Variable	Mean (Standard deviation) n= 2,241
$y_1$ (USD/acre) Program crop yields	106.54 (11.51)
$y_2$ (USD/acre) Non-program crop yields	118.74 (27.85)
$x_1$ (USD/acre) Variable input allocated to program crops	39.32 (1.48)
$x_2$ (USD/acre) Variable input allocated to non-program crops	28.17 (1.49)
$p_1$ (1998=1.00) Program crop price index	1.01 (0.06)
$p_2$ (1998=1.00) Non-program crop price index	0.91 (0.06)
$w$ (1998=100) Variable input price index	1.02 (0.03)
$\bar{\Pi}_1$ (USD/acre) Program crop quasi rents	67.55 (7.07)
$\bar{\Pi}_2$ (USD/acre) Non-program crop quasi rents	79.61 (6.58)

Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units

Table 1. *Summary statistics for the variables of interest*

Variable	Mean (Standard deviation) n= 2,241
$\text{var}(\Pi_1)$	180.81
Variance of program crop quasi rents	(22.43)
$\text{var}(\Pi_2)$	861.61
Variance of non-program crop quasi rents	(111.13)
$\text{cov}(\Pi_1\Pi_2)$	268.39
Quasi rents' covariance	(18.76)
$W_0$ (USD)	669,663.10
Farm's initial wealth	(587,319.18)
$G$ (USD)	12,014.92
Production Flexibility Contract Payments	(9,233.03)
$L_1$	0.62
Proportion of land allocated to program crops	(0.23)
$L_2$	0.26
Proportion of land allocated to non-program crops	(0.24)
$L_3$	0.12
Proportion of land left idle	(0.18)
$A$ (acres)	1075.90
Total crop land	(827.46)

Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units

Table 2. *Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the coefficients of risk aversion*

Parameter	Mean predicted value (Standard deviation)
$\eta$	0.034** (0.007)
$\beta$	-0.353** (0.017)
F-test ( $\eta = 0$ and $\beta = 0$ )	23,603**

Note: Two asterisks (\*\*) denote statistical significance at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level

Table 3. *Elasticity estimates*

Elasticity	Mean value (Standard deviation)
$\varepsilon_{L_1-p_1}$	1.9132** (0.1722)
$\varepsilon_{L_2-p_1}$	-2.0844** (0.1217)
$\varepsilon_{L_3-p_1}$	-5.5302** (0.6439)
$\varepsilon_{L_1-p_2}$	0.1668** (0.0517)
$\varepsilon_{L_2-p_2}$	-1.2794** (0.0816)
$\varepsilon_{L_3-p_2}$	1.9433** (0.0934)
$\varepsilon_{L_1-G}$	0.0064** (0.0003)
$\varepsilon_{L_2-G}$	0.0055** (0.0003)
$\varepsilon_{L_3-G}$	-0.0460** (0.0024)

Note: (\*\*) denotes statistical significance at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level