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**From National-Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism?
Democratisation and reconstruction of national pride: The
case of Spain (1981-2000)**

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From National-Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism?

Democratisation and reconstruction of national pride: The case of Spain (1981-2000)¹

ABSTRACT: Attachment to the nation is often seen as a stable attitude that provides a “reservoir of diffuse support” for a country, beyond any specific institutional setting. However, I argue that certain, deep, social and political changes in a country may imply a reconstruction of nationhood, that should modify the social bases of support for the nation. I test this hypothesis in the Spanish case, by tracing the changes in the impact of ideology, religion and region of residence on the intensity of national pride during and after the transition from Francoism to democracy. Results show an evolution that is congruent with my theoretical expectations, even if the process seems to be incomplete and, for certain variables, highly mediated by political cycles.

Keywords: Spain, Nationalism, National identity, Democratisation, national pride

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3 In this article I want to trace the evolution of the social determinants of the Spanish
4 national pride from 1981 to 2000, in order to see whether the democratisation, and
5 democratic consolidation processes have modified them. The interest of tracing this
6 evolution lies in that it can shed light on the nature and dynamics of change of the
7 citizens' attachment to the nation. Attachment to one's nation is usually considered as a
8 substantially stable attitude, able to grant support for a state beyond political cycles.
9 However, I argue that it is a political attitude and as such is, up to some extent,
10 endogenous to the political process: My contention is that a deep political change, such
11 as a regime change, may require a reconstruction of the nationalising policies and
12 discourses set up by the elites, that will, in turn, modify the individuals' attitudes
13 towards the nation.¹

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15 To test this hypothesis I focus on the Spanish case, given that there has recently
16 been a regime change and we have survey data that covers reasonably well the period of
17 transition and democratic consolidation. Moreover, as I show below, Spain is a clear
18 case in which the new democratic elites had to adapt the contents of the State-led
19 nationalism in order to accommodate it to the new context, given the strong ideological,
20 religious and cultural biases of the previous regime.

21
22 In the first section I discuss the role of national pride as a fundamental
23 component of the political support framework, and advance some theoretical arguments
24 that support my hypothesis. In the second one, I briefly review the Spanish case, and the
25 evolution of the Spanish nationalist discourses during, and after the transition to the
26 democracy. In the third section, I further refine the hypothesis and discuss the causal
27 mechanisms linking each of my main variables of interest with national pride. In the
28 fourth one I present the data, variables and measures used in the analysis, and the next

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3 one is the empirical analysis itself. The sixth section is devoted to the discussion of the
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5 results and the presentation of the main conclusions that stem from them.
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10 **1.-Regime change, nationhood reconstruction and national identities' shift**

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12 There seems to be a general agreement on the literature around the idea that
13
14 identification with the political community is an essential attitude for a country, as long
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16 as it may provide “reservoir of diffuse support that can maintain a political system
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18 through temporary periods of political stress” (Dalton 1998, p. 19).² This is so because
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20 it grants support for the state beyond the institutional setting of a given moment and,
21
22 thus, could be the basis for loyalty to the state despite a regime change.
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27 Therefore, the development of a generalized affective attachment to the nation
28
29 must be (and, indeed, has been) a primary concern of any State wishing to last for long.
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31 The wide literature on nation-building processes has clearly shown how the states have
32
33 developed nationalising policies in order to grant this diffuse support from its citizens,
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35 acting as active agencies of national socialisation. The mechanisms used by these
36
37 policies are educational systems, presence of national symbols in everyday life,
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39 development and spread of national languages, etc. In normal conditions, consolidated
40
41 democracies do not engage in explicitly nationalistic mobilisation of the population, but
42
43 even in those cases, there are several daily mechanisms to reproduce nationhood, that
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45 have been labelled as “banal nationalism” by Michael Billig (1995).
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50 However, a deep change in the social or institutional structure of a country (such
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52 as a regime change or a massive settlement of immigrants, for example) may imply a
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54 shift in the orientation of the nationalising policies, in order to adapt them to the new
55
56 context. This new orientation of the policies and discourses, alongside with the changes
57
58 in the object itself (the nation), are aimed at modifying citizens' perception and attitudes
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3 towards it. Two well known examples of (successful or not) similar processes may be
4
5 the post-War (and post-unification) debates on the German nationhood that lead to
6
7 formulations such as Dolf Sternberger's and Jurgen Habermas' 'constitutional
8
9 patriotism' or the much more recent claims that, at the roots of the 2005 riots in the
10
11 French 'banlieues', there was a failure of the dominant French version of nationhood in
12
13 incorporating second generation immigrants into Frenchness. This need for re-
14
15 elaboration of the nationalising policies and discourses set up by the states in order to
16
17 adapt them to new social and/or political conditions is, as I discuss below, closely
18
19 linked to the role of state-led nationalism as a fundamental tool of granting social
20
21 cohesion and legitimacy for the State, at least during the XXth century.
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27 This may seem incongruent with the idea that attachment to the nation is a sort
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29 of reservoir of support for the state beyond the specific institutional setting of a given
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31 moment. But we must consider that States and elites do not limit themselves to telling
32
33 their citizens *what* nation they have to identify with, but also aim at influencing people
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35 on *how* they have to think that nation and their belonging to it. In normal democratic
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37 conditions, the 'official' version of nationhood tends to be constructed in such a way
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39 that it can accommodate, at least, the mainstream of the ideological spectrum of the
40
41 country; but this is not the case in most authoritarian regimes, that tend to monopolise
42
43 the patriotism.³ The monopolisation of patriotism is a process of identification between
44
45 the ruling group (the regime) and the nation in itself (Bar-Tal 1997) that therefore
46
47 implies a close linkage between attachment to the nation and conformity with the
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49 *monopolistic* group or regime.
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55 When the *monopolistic* regime breaks up, the new institutions and elites must
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57 reconstruct patriotism in order to adapt it to the new context. The basis of attachment to
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59 the nation can no longer be linked to the old regime's ideology, and if the new regime is
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3 a democracy these bases should be as inclusive as possible, in order to grant stability to
4 the state. Specially when there are relevant actors that call into question the continuity
5 of the state itself (as it was the case in Spain), the monopolisation of patriotism implies
6 a severe risk for it, so revisiting the 'official' version of nationhood becomes a central
7 concern for the new ruling elites.
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15 We must keep in mind that nationalism as an ideology has as its main goal
16 influencing individuals' attitudes towards the nation by fostering attachment with a
17 given nation and a given nationness. So, in addition to the studies on the elites discourses
18 and motivations, research on nationalism must turn its view to the individual level in
19 order to capture the effects of these shifts in the nationalising discourses and policies in
20 actually transforming individuals' attitudes towards the nations. The general hypothesis
21 that stems from that is that different regimes will develop different kinds of
22 nationalising policies and discourses, that will exert varying influences on the
23 configuration of the citizens' attitudes towards the nation.
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36 This can be easily illustrated in the case of the members of cultural and national
37 minorities inside a state, that can be recognised, assimilated or marginalized by different
38 models of nationalising policies and discourses. Confronted to these alternative
39 nationalising models, the members of the minorities will develop different attitudes and
40 strategies, that we could summarise in the famous Hirschman's trichotomy of exit,
41 voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970). This may also hold for other kinds of groups and,
42 in general, the population of a state: despite a general identification with, or sense of
43 belonging to the nation, the degree of affective attachment with it will depend on the
44 specific foundations of these policies and discourses. For example, if they include
45 ideological or religious biases, we must expect these biases to be reproduced at the
46 individual level, and, therefore citizens with congruent religious or ideological
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3 backgrounds will develop more intense attachment to a nation defined in these terms. If
4 this is true, then, when the contents of the discourses and policies change, so will do the
5 citizens attitudes. This is precisely the process that I aim at empirically reconstructing in
6 this article by analysing the case of Spain.
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12 13 14 15 **2.-Transition to democracy and redefinition of nationhood in Spain**

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17 Spain has experienced deep social and political changes in the last decades. The
18 authoritarian and strongly nationalist regime of Franco was followed by the
19 consolidation of a democratic regime that took the form of a constitutional monarchy
20 and a highly decentralized institutional setting, as stated in the 1978 Constitution. The
21 new Spanish democracy adhered less than one decade later to the EEC. Since then,
22 Spain has experienced the longest democratic period in its history, and an increasing
23 convergence with Europe in terms of economic development.
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34 A central issue faced by the Spanish transition to democracy was, undoubtedly,
35 the so-called 'national question', that had also been crucial during the second Republic
36 and the 1936-39 civil war. In parallel with the democratisation process, the definition of
37 the Spanish nation had to evolve from the traditionalist national-Catholicism of the
38 regime towards a new, democratic and inclusive conception of nationhood: after forty
39 years of strong nationalist dictatorship, the common wisdom stated that the
40 democratisation of Spain and the resolution of the conflicts with peripheral (mainly
41 Catalan and Basque) nationalisms were intimately united. The recognition of the
42 internal diversity of Spain, and the decentralisation of the State required a deep
43 redefinition of the Spanish nationhood in itself. The long-lasting debates on this issue
44 during the constituent period are enough to assess its crucial role during the transition
45 years (for a detailed account, see Bastida 1998).
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3 What was at stake, then? Why the redefinition of the Spanish nationhood was so
4 crucial to the transition process? We can say that the Francoist regime had operated,
5 during 40 years, a ‘monopolization of patriotism’ (Bar-Tal 1997) by imposing a specific
6 view of the Spanish nation as the unique, truly patriotic, conception of it, as shown by
7 the systematic stigmatisation of the opposition as the ‘anti-Spain’. This monopolisation
8 was based on a specific version of the Spanish nationalism, that had as its main features
9 the identification of the nation with Catholicism, and a traditionalist and organicist view
10 of the nation. It emphasized the identification of Spain with its Castilian ‘ethnic core’
11 and rejected any recognition of its internal plurality, mainly by reducing the cultural
12 differences to mere folkloristic expressions of regional specificities (Saz 2003; Muro
13 and Quiroga 2005).⁴
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29 National-Catholicism as the official ideology of the state was incompatible with
30 the development of a democratic regime, and the incipient Spanish democracy looked
31 for renewed bases of national legitimacy in order to grant Spaniards’ loyalty to the
32 nation beyond the regime change. So a deep redefinition of Spain’s nationhood was
33 needed, in order to overcome a profound legitimacy crisis, linked to increasing
34 peripheral nationalist demands, but also to the preferences of democratic forces, that
35 claimed for a secular, modern and decentralized conception of the Spanish nation.
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45 The reconstruction of the Spanish nationalism has been extensively analysed by
46 several scholars, focused on the parliamentary debates held during the constituent
47 process (Bastida 1998) or on the main theoretical formulations of the 1975-2000 period
48 (Núñez Seixas 2001; Muro and Quiroga 2005). This literature shows that the terms of
49 the debate were heavily influenced by the nature of the democratisation process: It was
50 not a break-up of the regime, but rather a compromise between its reformist wing and
51 the mainstream democratic opposition (basically constituted by left-wing Spanish forces
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3 and the moderate Basque and Catalan nationalists). The need for compromise between
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5 both groups of actors was the main constraint to this bargaining, that left many unsolved
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7 issues in this field, as shown by the enduring conflicts between the centre and the
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9 peripheral nationalists. That is what Núñez Seixas (2001) has termed the ‘unfulfilled
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11 renovation’ of the Spanish nationalism.
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15 In the Spanish case there is a growing literature that tracks this reconstruction at
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17 the elite level but, more surprisingly, much less attention has been paid to the individual
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19 bases of attachment to Spain and its transformations –even if there are significant
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21 exceptions, the most outstanding one being the article by Kenneth Bollen and Juan Díez
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23 Medrano (1998) that, however, does not adopt a longitudinal perspective.
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27 In this article I want to focus on this level of analysis in order to check whether
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29 this process of reconstruction, in more democratic terms, of the mainstream Spanish
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31 nationalism has effectively transformed the social determinants of the individuals’
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33 affective attachment with Spain. I contend that, at the end of the francoism, there were
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35 strong religious, ideological and territorial biases influencing the individual levels of
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37 national pride as a result of the, until then, dominant version of Spanish nationalism,
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39 and want to check whether there has been a reduction on the intensity of these biases
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41 due to the transformation, in a more integrative and democratic sense, of the Spanish
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43 nationalist discourses.
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50 **3.-Hypotheses and mechanisms: a dynamic model of pride in Spain**

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52 I have so far argued that we should expect certain deep political changes, such as regime
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54 changes, to modify the contents of the state-led nationalist policies and discourses, and
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56 that this was the case in Spain after the francoist regime. I want to test if, as I expect,
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3 these changes had a correspondence at the individual level in modifying citizens'
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5 attitudes towards the nation.
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8 As we have seen, in Spain, the francoist nationalism was clearly biased towards
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10 the traditionalist, Castilian, right-wing and catholic segments of the Spanish society,⁵
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12 while the renewed, democratic Spanish nationalism had to promote attachment to the
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14 nation among all the citizens beyond their religious, ideological or territorial
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16 backgrounds. This is why, to test the hypothesis, I will trace the evolution of the impact
17
18 of ideology, religion and region on national pride.
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22 At the beginning of the democratic period I expect a significant influence of
23
24 these variables on Spaniards' national pride: the right-wing identifiers, the catholics and
25
26 the residents in regions without a distinct cultural background are expected to show
27
28 higher levels of pride. And, if an integrative version of Spanish nationalism had
29
30 successfully developed affective attachment among its citizens, we should also find a
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32 *progressive reduction in the impact of these variables on the degree of national pride*
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34 as the time goes on and the Spanish democracy becomes progressively consolidated.
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41 The basic model I suggest, then, is as follows:
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$$43 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

$$44 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

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$$48 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

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$$58 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

$$59 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

$$60 \text{pride}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ideology} + b_2 \text{catholicism} + b_3 \text{region} + b_4 \text{cohort} \quad (1)$$

$$b_{1,2,3} = b_0 - b_1 \text{time} \quad (2)$$

53 The argument expressed by the formula is that I expect national pride to be a
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55 function of ideology, religion, region and cohort, but –and this is my main point-, I also
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57 expect the coefficients that link ideology, catholicism and region with national pride
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3 ($b_{1,2,3}$) to progressively weaken, as an effect of a renovation of the mainstream Spanish
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6 nationalism.

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8 However, the mechanisms underlying the relationship among these explanatory
9
10 factors and national pride may not be so simple, and we should also consider alternative
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12 explanations that may be affecting it. We cannot assume the influence of ideology,
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14 religion and region on national pride to be exclusively due to ‘domestic’ mechanisms
15
16 related to the specific configuration of Spanish nationalism.
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19 On one hand, a certain bias of the right towards nationalism, and the left towards
20
21 ‘internationalism’ may be a more general phenomenon. On the other hand, majoritarian
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23 religion as a tying bond among members of a nation has been an important criterion of
24
25 in-group demarcation in many countries, given that religion may act as any other
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27 cultural marker used to distinguish among members and non-members of the group. So
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29 my expectation is not a complete extinction of the impact of ideology and religion on
30
31 national pride, but rather a significant weakening of it.
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35 The case of the culturally distinct regions is even more complex. Several
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37 comparative studies have established that members of minority ethno-national groups
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39 do not tend to develop strong ties with the state (Smith and Jarkko 1998), especially
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41 when it is controlled by a “titular” group that alienates minorities from it, as it was the
42
43 case with the francoist Spain, that could be labelled as a ‘nationalising state’ (Brubaker
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45 1996). The decentralization of the state and the official recognition of minority
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47 languages had, as one of its main aims, the goal of integrating the minorities in the
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49 “new” Spain, but there are two phenomena that make me to be cautious about this
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51 expectation: on one hand, the continuous conflicts between peripheral nationalisms and
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53 the state that give a sense of incompleteness of this process of redefinition. Some
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3 scholars (Muro and Quiroga, 2004; Núñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel, 2001) have interpreted
4 these conflicts as an enduring trait of the Spanish nationalism.
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8 On the other hand, alongside with the reinstatement of democracy, the process
9 of decentralisation in Spain permitted the institutionalisation of the alternative minority
10 nationalisms, that in Catalonia and the Basque Country soon reached the control of the
11 newly established autonomous governments, and developed certain policies leading to
12 an 'alternative nation-building' process, opposed to the Spanish one (Linz 1973). These
13 alternative nation-building processes, if successful, will make residents in these
14 territories (especially younger cohorts) to feel less attached to Spain as a nation than
15 their counterparts in the rest of Spain (Martínez-Herrera 2002). This process could
16 counter-balance, up to some extent, the integrative effects of a new version of Spanish
17 nationalism *vis à vis* national minorities. So there are, at least, two processes going on
18 simultaneously that may be affecting the relationship between the variables in opposed
19 directions, that could counter-balance each other.
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39 *Cohort analysis*

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41 To understand the dynamics of change and formation of national pride, I also
42 consider the generation variable in the analysis. Through cohort analysis, I intend to
43 approach the issue of how –and when- national pride is constructed and to what extent it
44 is a stable or unstable attitude. The reconstruction of nationhood at the elite level may
45 have not been able to modify attitudes towards the nation among older generations, but
46 it may produce substantially different patterns of attachment among younger
47 generations, as predicted by the famous 'impressionable years' hypothesis (Krosnick
48 and Alwin 1989).
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3 I expect older generations to show more intense affective attachment to Spain,
4 given that they were socialised in a strongly nationalist environment. Younger cohorts, -
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7 those that reached adulthood during the regime's crisis, the transition or the democracy-
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10 will show lower levels of pride: as I have said, the intensity of state-led nationalism
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12 substantially decreased after the end of the dictatorship. The increasingly important
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14 presence of competitors to the nationalist regime, since the beginning of the protest
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16 cycle of late francoism, may have contributed to a progressive depression in levels of
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18 pride among younger cohorts and, furthermore, a lower national pride among younger
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20 cohorts is a phenomenon already observed by comparative research (Smith and Jarkko
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22 1998).
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29 **4.-Data, variables and measurement.**

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31 In order to reconstruct the evolution of the Spanish national pride, I use data from the
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33 World Values Survey and the European Values Survey from the years 1981, 1990,
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35 1995, 1999 and 2000.
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39 The first available survey is from 1981. This may be a limit, given that Franco
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41 had died six crucial years before, and the Constitution had been put in force in 1978. It
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43 could be argued that the process of reconstruction of Spanish national pride may already
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45 have been accomplished by then, so we would be missing the crucial years of the
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47 transformation. However, it seems difficult to argue that the institutional transformation
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49 of the state would have had immediate, direct effects on the citizens' attitudes towards
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51 the nation. So I treat 1981 as the starting point of the analysis, and assume that the
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53 situation by then imperfectly reflects the consequences of francoism.
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3 *The dependent variable*
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5 The dependent variable measures pride in being Spanish. It is measured in a 4-
6 point scale, ranging from “Very Proud” to “Not Proud at all”. There are more
7 sophisticated measures of attachment to the nation, but they are not available for such a
8 long time period in Spain, and this is an essential feature of my design. Moreover, some
9 tests have concluded that this question is a quite good measure for affective attachment
10 to the nation -it approaches reasonably well the results of more sophisticated indicators
11 (Heath, Tilley and Exley 2005). Another strong reason for using national pride to
12 measure affective attachment to the nation is that it has been extensively used by the
13 literature.
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27 Equating ‘pride in being Spanish’ with national pride could be somewhat
28 misleading given that certain (mainly leftist and peripheral) groups seem to hold a
29 multinational conception of Spain and, then, by declaring their pride in being Spaniards,
30 could be expressing pride in a (multinational) state rather than national pride. However,
31 the consideration of Spain as a nation, as stated by the 1978 Constitution, is widely
32 shared among Spaniards, so I assume -as the literature has done until now- that the
33 question ‘how proud are you to be Spaniard?’ is measuring national pride.
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Another objection that could be done to the use of national pride as a measure of
attachment to the nation is that it may also be affected by period effects, given that it
does not only measure the affective attachment to the nation but also, up to certain
degree, an evaluation of the effective performance of the ‘object’. If this is true, we
should expect certain contexts (such as economic cycles, political events or sports
successes, for example) to depress or exacerbate pride in one’s nation, or even alter the
relationship among our variables of interest and national pride. However, by asking
about general national pride (and not, as in other instances, about pride in specific

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3 objects such as the army, sports teams or the social security system), the affective (and
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5 supposedly more stable) component of pride gains prominence *vis à vis* the evaluation
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7 of the nation's performance.
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10 11 12 *The independent variables* 13

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15 The variable measuring ideology is the usual ten-point scale ranging from far
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17 left to far right. Measuring the religious identification is more complex, and there are
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19 various approaches to the issue: some surveys use frequency of attendance to religious
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21 services, others ask on the importance of religion in one's life, etc. However, I use a
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23 simple question asking whether the respondent identifies as a catholic, a non-believer or
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25 a member of another religious group. Using this approach may be problematic to some
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27 extent, mainly by two reasons: it is a less fine approach to the issue (we are not able to
28
29 discriminate among degrees of identification with Catholicism) and, moreover, the
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31 variation is quite reduced (on average, around 84% of Spaniards identify themselves as
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33 Catholics in the surveys used). However, I contend that using this straightforward
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35 measure is useful and interesting because it captures the subjective identification with a
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37 cultural trait that has been used as one of the main national markers by Spanish
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39 nationalism. For the shake of clarity, and given that, by the moment, the proportion of
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41 people that identifies as members of non-catholic religious groups is negligible in Spain,
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43 I dichotomise this variable in two groups: catholics and non-catholics.
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51 To cover the regional differences, I just use dummies for those autonomous
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53 communities with a different from Spanish official language, given that it is a strong
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55 marker of cultural distinctiveness.⁶ Using territorial location instead of individual traits
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57 may lead to somewhat biased results if we intend to infer the effect of cultural
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59 distinctiveness: Some of those regions are internally heterogeneous and have huge
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3 shares of immigrants from the rest of Spain. In any case, it must be clear that, by using
4 territory as explanatory variable I aim at estimating the role of those regions as
5 differentiated socialisation contexts, rather than the effect of individual ethnocultural
6 traits, that would imply the assumption of an essentialist view on the formation of
7 national identities that has been extensively discredited by the literature.
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15 The cohort analysis is based on the cohort division proposed by Montero, Torcal
16 and Gunther (1998, p. 36). Using relevant events or periods of Spanish political history
17 and the age of entrance into political maturity as criteria, they differentiate among six
18 cohorts: the oldest one (Cohort 1) comprises those born before 1922, that arrived to
19 political maturity during the end of the Alfonso XIII monarchy, the Republic or the civil
20 war. The next one (Cohort 2) is the autarchy cohort, comprising those born between
21 1923 and 1937. Cohort 3 includes those born between 1938 and 1952, that arrived to
22 political adulthood during the years after the autarchy and the first years of economic
23 development of the regime (the “regime consolidation cohort”). Cohort 4 (born between
24 1953 and 1962) arrived to maturity during the regime’s crisis years, and cohort 5 (1963-
25 1967) represents the so-called “transition generation”. The youngest cohort (cohort 6),
26 is the democracy one, and comprises those citizens born after born after 1968.
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45 **5.-Analysis**

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48 First of all, in Table 1 I show the distribution of frequencies among the four categories
49 in each year. As we can see, the levels of national pride in Spain are quite high, with
50 around 80 per cent of the sample in the top two categories. There seems to be no
51 specific trend, towards a decline or increase in aggregate levels of national pride, even if
52 some variations may be indicating the influence of certain period effects, as I was
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3 expecting above. We must take this into account and see whether this period effects do
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5 alter the relationship among our variables of interest.
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10 **(Table 1 about here)**
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15 In order to assess whether national pride in Spain has become less dependent on
16 ideology, religion and region or not, I proceed in two steps: first, I jointly use three
17 waves of the WVS/EVS survey in order to determine whether the profile of proud
18 Spaniards is significantly different at the end of the analysed period or not. Then, I
19 analyse separately all the surveys in order to have a richer picture of the trends and
20 evolution patterns.
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29 I assume that the four-point scale of national pride is measuring a latent,
30 continuous variable that represents intensity of pride in one's country. However, I do
31 not use Ordinary Least Squares regression to model pride, because the four-point scale
32 is not a continuous variable and, thus, in doing so I would be violating one of the
33 assumptions of OLS regression. To face this problem, and given the ordinal nature of
34 the dependent variable, I use the ordinal logit model, that is suited for these kind of
35 variables and, furthermore, it does not force me to assume that the distances among the
36 points in the scale are equivalent. So I model national pride in the following equation as
37 the log odds ratio: $Y_i = 1, 2, 3, \text{ or } 4$. In the function
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$$p(Y_i = Y) = a + b_1X_{1i} + b_2X_{2i} + b_3X_{3i} + b_4X_{4i} + e_i,$$

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3 “i” indicates respondent i, Y = respondent i’s national pride, X_{1i} = respondent i’s
4 religious identification, X_{2i} = respondent i’s ideology, X_{3i} = respondent’s cohort and X_{4i} ,
5 his or her region of residence.⁷
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10 Table 2 shows three merged models, that include several interaction terms to test
11 the hypotheses on the evolution of the impact of religion and ideology on national pride
12 (this method is fully described in Firebaugh 1997). The first one compares the situation
13 in 1981 with that of 2000, the second one compares 1981 and 1990 and the third one,
14 1990 and 2000. These models do not include variables on regions because the 1981
15 WVS survey did not use the autonomous communities criteria and thus, they are not
16 comparable.⁸ Moreover, instead of using dummies for cohorts, for the shake of clarity, I
17 use the birth year as a continuous variable, in order to easily introduce interactions with
18 year.
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34 **(Table 2 about here)**
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39 These three models show several interesting results.⁹ The first one is that
40 Catholicism, ideology and birth year exert a highly significant influence on national
41 pride in the expected direction for all the models: there is a religious, ideological and
42 generational bias in the Spanish national pride. Moreover, the coefficients of year
43 indicate that, controlling for the other variables in the model, the overall levels of pride
44 have been increasing in these twenty years, despite the substantial reduction in the
45 intensity of the state-led nationalism. This may be reflecting the integration of
46 previously alienated segments of the society. However, in order to test the hypotheses,
47 we have to look at the interactions between year and the two main variables of interest
48 in these models.
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3 Here we can see if, as expected, the impact of Catholicism and ideology has
4 decreased during the time period considered here. In the first model we see a highly
5 significant, positive relationship between national pride and the interaction of year and
6 Catholicism, that indicates a stronger effect of self-identification as a catholic on
7 national pride in 1981 than in the year 2000. The same stands for ideology. These
8 results seem to confirm my main hypotheses concerning the progressive (but not
9 complete) *secularisation* and *deideologisation* of national pride in Spain.
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20 In the second and third models I divide this 20-year period in two 10-year
21 periods in order to approach with more refinement the dynamics of change. The impact
22 of religion on national pride seems to have been continuously decreasing for the whole
23 period. On the contrary, we see that the *deideologisation* process is located in the 1981-
24 1990 period, while in the second decade the effect of ideology on national pride has not
25 changed significantly: it could have reached its limit or, more interestingly, it could be
26 showing a reverse tendency in the last years: if we divide the 1990-2000 period in two
27 five-year periods, we see that between 1990 and 1995 the impact of ideology on
28 national pride continued to decrease (the interaction term has a significant coefficient of
29 .086, with a standard error of .043), while between 1995 and 2000 it increased slightly
30 (-.097, standard error of .055, significant at the 0,1 level). Below I discuss the
31 implications of this finding.
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48 So this first analysis seems to roughly confirm my main hypotheses. However,
49 in order to have more details on what is going on under these results and test the other
50 hypotheses referring to region and cohort, I have also run a separate regression for each
51 year for which there is an available survey. Table 3 shows the coefficients, standard
52 errors and some statistics of fit for each of the models run for each year:
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3 **(Table 3 about here)**
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8 These results show a quite complex picture. The religion¹⁰ variable is highly
9 significant and has a considerable influence on national pride during the whole period,
10 being one of the most relevant factors to explain variation in pride. However, as shown
11 by the previous models –and the coefficients of these models–, its strength has tended to
12 weaken progressively.
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19 To clarify the results, in the next table I show the predicted probabilities of pride
20 for Catholics and non-Catholics, holding the other variables constant at their means:
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27 **(Table 4 about here)**
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32 In this table we can see how being catholic increases the probability of being
33 very proud of Spain: in 1981, it was more than twice for catholics than for non-
34 catholics. The differences have decreased slightly but still remain significant. Due to the
35 concentration of an overwhelming majority of the sample in the top two categories, the
36 relevant differences are located between them, so the probability for the three lower
37 categories is always greater for the non-catholics.
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45 The relationship between ideology and pride is more complex: it was very strong
46 and significant at the beginning of the period (1981), in 1990 it was still significant
47 (albeit apparently weaker) and in 1995 it had lost its significance. Later on, in 1999 and
48 2000 it retrieved its influence on national pride. These results are congruent with those
49 obtained in the merged models, and seem to suggest that this relationship is mediated by
50 period effects. I will discuss it later on. Again, the table of predicted probabilities will
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3 make it clearer (I show only the extreme and central points in the left-right scale to
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5 reduce the size of the table and make it more interpretable):
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10 **(Table 5 about here)**
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15 Territorial differences are especially strong and consistent in the case of the
16 Basque Country, showing huge and highly significant coefficients during the whole
17 period –it is, by far, the variable with a stronger relationship with national pride-.
18 Residence in Catalonia also depresses Spanish national pride, but its impact is
19 consistently lower than in the Basque case, and in 1995 it had disappeared. Also
20 residents in the Canary Islands do show lower degrees of pride during almost all the
21 period. The other regions in the analysis show more uneven patterns, although the
22 general tendency is to present negative coefficients, that indicate a negative relationship
23 with Spanish national pride. This suggests that cultural distinctiveness exerts some
24 negative influence on affective attachment with the nation-state, but this impact appears
25 to be consistent only in certain cases, after a process of politisation of differences. This
26 processes have only been successful in Catalonia and the Basque Country (and partly in
27 the Canary Islands), where minority nationalist parties have been ruling autonomous
28 institutions since they were re-established in 1979. Table 6 shows the predicted
29 probabilities of national pride for residents in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and the
30 rest of Spain. The other variables in the model are held constant.
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55 **(Table 6 about here)**
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3 In this table it can clearly be appreciated that residence in these two territories
4 substantially depresses pride in Spain. This is especially true in the Basque Country,
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6 where the probability of being “very proud” of Spain has never been greater than 0.2,
7
8 while in the rest of Spain, it has ranged among 0.47 and 0.69. The case of Catalonia is
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10 less pronounced than the Basque one, but it still shows huge differences with respect to
11
12 the rest of Spain.
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17 Cohort analysis, despite some irregularities (that might be due to the reduced N
18 of some cohorts), suggests that cohorts that reached adulthood during the regime’s
19 crisis, the transition or after the establishment of democracy show lower levels of
20 national pride than the older ones. A quite linear tendency emerges, each cohort being
21 less proud than the previous one.
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30 Due to the well-known age-period-cohort specification problem, we cannot be
31 completely sure that this effect is not due to social ageing rather than political
32 generations. However, there are two reasons that lead me to contend that, despite its
33 apparent linearity, the mechanism linking birth year and national pride is not related to
34 social ageing but rather to cohort effects dependent on different socialisation contexts:
35 first, a mechanism linking national pride and social ageing is much less plausible than
36 the cohort effects, determined by the socialisation contexts, as stated by previous works
37 (Heath, Tilley and Exley 2005). And second, as the cohorts age they do not show a
38 tendency of increasing national pride –nor we find a progressive convergence among
39 them-, as can be seen in Fig. 1:
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55 **(Figure 1 about here)**
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6.-Discussion and conclusions

So the results have roughly confirmed my hypotheses: the influence of religion and ideology on Spanish national pride significantly declined during the analysed period. However, not all the variables behave exactly in the same way and the general picture is rather complex: the details are much more nuanced, and this transformation is not complete (as I had already predicted), nor homogeneous.

We have observed a constant tendency towards a progressive ‘secularisation’ of the Spanish national pride through a reduction of the impact of Catholicism on national pride. This tendency is congruent with the marginalisation of the explicit national-Catholic discourse from the public sphere (Núñez Seixas 2001) since the end of the Francoist dictatorship. However, in the year 2000, we still find a significant impact of religion on national pride, that may be indicating that Catholicism acts as a stable cultural marker for in-group definition in Spain, and thus it is not exclusively related to changes in the public discourse. The identification of Spanish nation with Catholicism has deep roots, and national Catholicism has been a very important component of contemporary Spanish nationalism since its origins in XIXth century, even among its liberal exponents (Álvarez Junco 2002).

When Spaniards are explicitly asked by the importance of religion as a national marker, less than a half of respondents consider it important or very important.¹¹ This may reflect that the explicit identification between Catholicism and nationhood in Spain is slowly disappearing from the public discourse, but it still remains an important marker for individual attachment with Spain. The growing diversity, in religious terms, of the Spanish population (due to the increasing settlement of immigrants and the process of secularisation) may contribute, in the near future, to a further loss of impact of religion on national pride. However, some explicit links of the official catholic

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3 church with the unitarianist Spanish nationalism, such as the recent consideration, by a
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5 significant sector of the Spanish bishops, of the national unity as a ‘moral good’¹² may
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7 act as a counter-balancing factor and help to maintain a certain degree of religious bias
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9 in the Spanish national pride.
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13 On the other hand, the evolution of the relationship between ideology and
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15 national pride in Spain seems to be more complex. From 1981, to 1990 (and 1995) the
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17 process of reduction of the influence of ideology on national pride was constant,
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19 reaching a point in which it had lost its significant impact. The long-lasting left-wing
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21 governments (1982-1996) may have contributed to this process, by fostering attachment
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23 to the nation among left-wing identifiers and, perhaps, also reducing it among rightists.
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27 However, since 1995, ideology retrieved its influence on national pride, and in
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29 1999 and 2000 it was quite strong. This change of tendency coincides with the arrival to
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31 the government of the Popular Party, that may have reverted the deideologisation of
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33 Spain by identifying its right-wing government with the defence of the nation, opposing
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35 both external threats (for example, the Moroccan ‘invasion’ of the islet of Perejil in
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37 front of the Spanish-ruled northern-African city of Ceuta during the summer of 2002)
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39 and internal conflicts with peripheral nationalists, that were possibly more intense in the
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41 2000-2004 period than ever before since the return to democracy in Spain.
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46 This reversal of the tendency seems to indicate that the relationship between
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48 ideology and national pride is mediated by certain period effects, related to changes in
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50 the mainstream nationalist discourses following short-term political changes. This
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52 somewhat surprising result opens room for further research on attachment to the nation,
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54 that is usually seen as rather autonomous from short-term political changes.
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58 Finally, residence in culturally distinct territories has an uneven influence on
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60 national pride: only in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country (and the Canary

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3 Islands) it significantly reduces pride in Spain. In the other cases (Valencia, Galicia,
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5 Balearic Islands) the influence is lower, or there is no influence at all. Although the lack
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7 of data for every time-point on specific cultural practices, such as minority language
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9 usage makes it impossible to estimate the effects of this individual traits, the results
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11 suggest that the mechanism that links residence in those territories and lower levels of
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13 pride in Spain is not linguistic or cultural distinctiveness by itself but rather the
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15 existence of relevant peripheral nationalist elites that have set up alternative nation-
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17 building projects, that may hinder attachment to Spain. If the Basque and Catalan cases
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19 are commonly referred to as examples of failure of the Spanish nation-building process,
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21 the Galician, Valencian and Balearic ones should be considered, at least partially, as
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23 examples of successful Spanish nation-building despite the presence of distinctive
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25 languages.
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32 This results appear to support the idea that national identities are politically and
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34 socially constructed (or 'deconstructed'), and do not derive directly from some *objective*
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36 ethnocultural traits of individuals. The lack of data on autonomous communities for
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38 1981 does not allow us to test the hypotheses on the evolution of the relationship
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40 between residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country and Spanish national pride.
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42 However, the data on 1990-2000 are clear enough in showing that, regardless of the
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44 previous evolution, this variables do exert a strong influence in depressing the average
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46 levels of pride in Spain being –especially in the Basque case- by far, the strongest
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48 predictor of national pride in the models.
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53 We still can't be sure whether the lower pride in Spain of residents in Catalonia
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55 and the Basque Country is the product of a Spanish nationalism that, by defining in
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57 ethnocultural terms the Spanish nation, alienates them from feeling attached to it, or
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59 rather the result of the alternative nation-building set up by Basque and Catalan
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3 autonomous governments. Further research would be needed to determine the influence
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5 of the distinct forces in shaping the individual attitudes of Catalans and Basques
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7 towards Spain. In any case, we have shown that the negative relationship between
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9 residence in these territories and pride in Spain has not disappeared at all after more
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11 than twenty years of democracy and decentralisation of Spain.
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15 Despite the different paths, by the year 2000 the ideological, religious and
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17 territorial biases on national pride were still strong and significant. How should we
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19 interpret these results? Are they reflecting an unfulfilled, or precarious, process of
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21 redefinition of the Spanish nationalist discourse after the end of the Francoism? Or
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23 simply indicate that the process of change, at the individual level, is slower –and less
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25 linear- than predicted? Or has Spain simply reached a ‘normal’ situation in which the
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27 majoritarian religion acts as a national marker just as in other countries, and the
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29 relationship between ideology and attachment to the nation is mediated by intervening
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31 political variables?
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35 Further research would be needed to provide a satisfactory answer to these
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37 questions, and probably all these options are partially true. In any case, in this article I
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39 have shown that national pride is not completely autonomous from the political sphere,
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41 and that deep political changes such as a transition from an authoritarian regime to a
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43 democracy do modify people’s attitudes towards their nation. Attachment to the nation
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45 is a political phenomenon and, as such, it is socially and politically constructed (and
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47 reconstructed): the agency of the elites, and the institutional settings, do exert a strong
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49 influence in shaping individual attitudes towards the nation, even in the short term.
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¹ This is not to deny, however, that popular movements and public opinion are strong determinants of the shifts in elite discourses, that acquire a special relevance within the context of democratisation.

² Dalton even goes beyond this general statement and underlines the fact that in Czechoslovakia the levels of national pride in 1990 (three years before its split) were remarkably low. For similar arguments, see also Norris (1999) or the seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963).

³ This is not to say that in democracies the conceptions of nationhood are constant and immutable. In some cases, there are groups within democracies that aim at monopolising the patriotism, just as authoritarian regimes do (some examples could be the Israeli religious right-wing, the McCarthyism in the USA of the BJP's *Hindutva* in India). But also when there are no such monopolistic attempts, social or political changes (such as integration in supra-national structures or massive settlement of immigrants) may lead to substantial changes in the dominant versions of nationhood.

⁴ The nature of francoist Spanish nationalism is certainly more complex: As underlined by Ismael Saz (2003), there were two main components of it: the fascist (falangist) one and the traditionalist one. The latter became hegemonic during the regime's consolidation, so we consider it as "the" regime's version of nationalism.

⁵ We must not forget that the regime had its origins in a civil war, and thus represented the "winners" of the war. The 1936-1939 war was a complex conflict in which several division lines were confronted: democracy vs. authoritarianism, left-wing vs. right-wing, Catholicism vs. anticlericalism, center vs. periphery, etc.

⁶ Despite its lack of a distinct language, I also include a dummy for the Canary islands, given their specificities (geographic distance, presence of movements with an anticolonialist rhetoric during a certain period, etc).

⁷ Cohort and region are actually introduced in the model as dummy variables for each value.

⁸ This is a limit, given that the first year in which we are able to test the effect of living in a culturally distinct region is 1990, more that a decade later of the autonomous governments' establishment. I will test the effects of regions in the separate analysis.

⁹ Several variables in the models do violate the parallel regressions (proportional odds) assumption. However, I have run a Generalized Ordered Logit model, that does not impose this assumption, and no substantive result changed: certainly, the coefficients for some variables tend to be greater (and more

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significant) for the extreme categories (this model computes a separate regression for each Pr ($y \leq m$)|Pr
($y > m$) comparison). For the shake of clarity, I go ahead with the ordinal logit models. The same stands
for the rest of the models in the article.

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¹⁰I have also run the model using a variable that measures intensity of religious practice given that it is a
more refined measure of religiosity. However, when using this variable I find only significant differences
among those that never attend religious services and those that do attend mess, but not among different
frequencies of attendance.

¹¹ 46.7 per cent in ISSP 1995 and 43.2 per cent in ISSP 2003 consider “important” or “very important” to
be a Catholic for being “truly Spanish”.

¹² See, for example, *El País* 24/06/2006 p.25

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Tables

Table 1: *Frequencies of National Pride*

Year of survey	1981	1990	1995	1999	2000	Total
Not at all proud	4,41	4,87	3,13	2,95	2,21	4,01
Not very proud	8,73	8,06	4,66	7,78	5,19	7,41
Quite proud	36,20	41,65	26,76	45,17	30,27	37,62
Very proud	50,67	45,42	65,45	44,10	62,33	50,96
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Mean</i>	<i>3,33</i>	<i>2,28</i>	<i>3,54</i>	<i>3,30</i>	<i>3,53</i>	<i>3,35</i>

Table 2: Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride. Coefficients (and standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	1981/2000	1981/1990	1990/2000
Catholicism	0,447 (0,168) ***	0,886 (0,099) ***	0,433 (0,169) ***
Ideology	0,169 (0,040) ***	0,156 (0,018) ***	0,166 (0,040) ***
Birth Year	-0,015 (0,002) ***	-0,020 (0,002) ***	-0,021 (0,002) ***
Year	-2,236 (0,280)***	-1,045 (0,207) ***	-1,240 (0,241)***
Catholic*Year	0,818 (0,237) ***	0,350 (0,191) *	0,454 (0,196) **
Ideology*Year	0,132 (0,049) ***	0,138 (0,034) ***	-0,010 (0,044)
_cut1	-32,983 (4,796)	-39,992 (3,619)	-43,699 (3,880)
_cut2	-31,634 (4,794)	-38,786 (3,618)	-42,568 (3,878)
_cut3	-29,549 (4,789)	-36,642 (3,612)	-40,374 (3,872)
Pseudo R ²	0,076	0,064	0,0601
MK/Z R ²	0,146	0,153	0,142
LR Chi ² (7df)	390,430	624,460	490,430
N	2471	4413	3812

NB

- p<0,1 **p<0,05 *** p<0,01
- Year is a dummy variable with value 1 for the first year of each model and 0 for the last one.
- McKelvey and Zavoina's R² is the measure of goodness of fit that, in ordinal logit models, better approaches actual R² in an OLS regression model on the underlying latent variable (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)

Table 3: Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride (1981-2000)

Coefficients (and standard errors)

Year	1981	1990	1995	1999	2000
Survey	WVS	WVS	WVS	EVS	WVS
Catholic	1.260*** (.171)	0.824*** (.101)	0.719*** (.201)	0.805*** (.189)	0.442** (.178)
Ideol	0.300*** (.030)	0.130*** (.019)	0.044 (.042)	0.175*** (.036)	0.148*** (.043)
Cohort1		1.026*** (.173)	1.267*** (.411)	0.946*** (.353)	0.619 (.378)
Cohort2	-0.331 ** (.161)	0.975*** (.135)	0.980*** (.253)	0.637*** (.211)	0.852*** (.218)
Cohort3	-0.267* (.161)	0.526*** (.127)	0.606*** (.222)	0.497** (.198)	0.525*** (.202)
Cohort4	-0.743*** (.156)	0.101 (.128)	-0.012 (.229)	0.215 (.209)	0.311 (.206)
Cohort5	-0.240 (.484)	-0.024 (.144)	-0.166 (.240)	0.132 (.244)	-0.006 (.251)
Catalonia		-1.063*** (.106)	0.109 (.408)	-1.329*** (.206)	-1.308*** (.188)
Basque C.		-2.247*** (.170)	-2.195*** (.399)	-2.018*** (.301)	-2.673*** (.362)
Galicia		-0.749*** (.136)	0.093 (.322)	-1.198*** (.244)	-0.190 (.295)
Valencia		-0.421*** (.127)	-0.333 (.255)	-0.264 (.229)	-1.357*** (.216)
Navarra		-1.323*** (.318)	-1.704*** (.522)	-1.187* (.616)	0.019 (.687)
Balears		-0.627** (.256)	0.202 (.540)	-0.213 (.537)	-0.175 (.550)
Canarias		-1.195*** (.194)	-1.268*** (.202)	-0.555 (.336)	-1.326*** (.342)
_cut1	-1.110 (.240)	-1.945 (.166)	-2.910 (.336)	-2.434 (.283)	-3.333 (.319)
_cut2	.281 (.230)	-.723 (.157)	-1.887(.301)	-.933 (.239)	-2.029 (.266)
_cut3	2.325 (.240)	1.647 (.158)	.180(.285)	1.739 (.242)	.401 (.248)
Pseudo R ²	0.085	0.096	0.0852	0.093	0.104
MK/Z R ² ¹	0.196	0.219	0.180	0.202	0.212
LR Chi ²	286.9	614.23	126.10	166.71	176.55
N	1536	2877	837	855	935

NB

- p<0,1 **p<0,05 *** p<0,01
- Year is a dummy variable with value 1 for the first year of each model and 0 for the last one.
- McKelvey and Zavoina's R² is the measure of goodness of fit that, in ordinal logit models, better approaches actual R² in an OLS regression model on the underlying latent variable (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)
- I use Cohort 6 as the reference category, except for 1981, where the reference category is cohort 1 (the oldest cohort), because there are no individuals of the youngest cohort in the sample. In the regions, I compare each of the culturally distinct regions with the rest of the state.

Table 4: Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain for Catholics and non Catholics*

	1981		1990	
	Non Catholic	Catholic	Non Catholic	Catholic
Not at all	0,10	0,03	0,07	0,03
A little	0,21	0,08	0,14	0,07
Fairly	0,47	0,38	0,53	0,45
Very	0,23	0,51	0,25	0,44
	1995		1999	
	Non Catholic	Catholic	Non Catholic	Catholic
Not at all	0,04	0,02	0,04	0,02
A little	0,06	0,03	0,12	0,06
Fairly	0,37	0,25	0,58	0,48
Very	0,52	0,69	0,26	0,44
	2000			
	Non Catholic	Catholic		
Not at all	0,02	0,01		
A little	0,05	0,03		
Fairly	0,40	0,32		
Very	0,53	0,64		

* Table constructed using the prttab post-estimation stata command (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)

Table 5: Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain by left-right self-placement*

	1981			1990		
	1	5	10	1	5	10
Not at all	0,10	0,03	0,01	0,06	0,04	0,02
A little	0,21	0,09	0,02	0,12	0,08	0,04
Fairly	0,47	0,40	0,16	0,52	0,47	0,36
Very	0,22	0,48	0,81	0,30	0,41	0,57
	1995			1999		
	1	5	10	1	5	10
Not at all	0,03	0,02	0,02	0,04	0,02	0,01
A little	0,04	0,04	0,03	0,12	0,07	0,03
Fairly	0,30	0,27	0,24	0,58	0,50	0,33
Very	0,63	0,67	0,72	0,26	0,41	0,63
	2000					
	1	5	10			
Not at all	0,03	0,01	0,01			
A little	0,06	0,04	0,02			
Fairly	0,43	0,32	0,20			
Very	0,48	0,63	0,78			

*Table constructed using the prttab post-estimation stata command (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)

Table 6: *Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain by region**

	1990			1995		
	Rest of Spain	Basque	Catalan	Rest of Spain	Basque	Catalan
Not at all	0,03	0,22	0,08	0,02	0,16	0,02
A little	0,06	0,27	0,15	0,03	0,19	0,03
Fairly	0,43	0,42	0,53	0,26	0,46	0,24
Very	0,47	0,09	0,24	0,68	0,19	0,71
	1999			2000		
	Rest of Spain	Basque	Catalan	Rest of Spain	Basque	Catalan
Not at all	0,02	0,11	0,06	0,01	0,14	0,04
A little	0,05	0,25	0,16	0,03	0,23	0,09
Fairly	0,45	0,53	0,58	0,27	0,50	0,50
Very	0,48	0,11	0,20	0,69	0,13	0,37

*Table constructed using the `prtab` post-estimation stata command (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)

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
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