



**HAL**  
open science

## Diversity - a New Mode of Incorporation?

Thomas Faist

► **To cite this version:**

Thomas Faist. Diversity - a New Mode of Incorporation?. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2008, 32 (1), pp.171-190. 10.1080/01419870802483650 . hal-00513312


**HAL Id: hal-00513312**

**<https://hal.science/hal-00513312>**

Submitted on 1 Sep 2010

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



**Diversity - a New Mode of Incorporation?**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2008-0125.R2
Manuscript Type:	Discussion Article
Keywords:	Diversity, incorporation, Multiculturalism, Transnational, assimilation, Equality



## DISCUSSION ARTICLE

**Diversity – a New Mode of Incorporation?***Abstract*

Lately, cultural diversity in Western societies has, in terms of religions, languages, ethnic we-  
groups, transnational ties, and countries of origin, once more undergone immense growth.  
Modes of migrant incorporation reflect endeavours to respond this change. While some  
approaches such as assimilation and multiculturalism emphasize the social integration of  
migrants in the host societies, the vague term diversity harbours innovative measures in two  
respects. Firstly, diversity not only addresses the incorporation of migrants, but also how  
societies and particularly their organizations deal with cultural pluralism. Secondly, diversity  
can then be understood both as an individual competence of migrants as members of  
organizations and the civil sphere, and as a set of programmes which organizations adopt to  
address cultural pluralism. Also, novel forms of diversity have emerged, such as  
transnationality. Yet in the absence of a rights-based foundation the question arises how social  
inequality can be dealt with.

Keywords: Diversity; transnationalism; assimilation; multiculturalism; civil society;  
inequality.

## The Growth of Diversity

Diversity has grown, as evidenced by the increasing heterogeneity of migration in terms of countries of origin, ethnic and national groups, religions, languages, migratory channels, and legal status. In recent years the number of countries of origin from which people migrate has multiplied. For example, while there were only around a dozen countries of origin in the 1960s to Germany, in 2004 approximately 50 per cent of migrants came from 10 countries of origin including Turkey, Poland, Russia, the US, and the states of the former Yugoslavian territory. The remaining 50 per cent of migrants came from over 100 different countries (BAMF 2005: 121). As to the composition of the migrant population, the proportion of newer, smaller groups to older, larger groups of migrants has grown. The changes in the northern German city of Hamburg between 2003 and 2006 are representative of many large German and European cities. In particular, the share of the population of Turkish descent is declining whereas the share of migrants from Poland is particularly on the increase and, most interestingly, some groups that were hitherto not particularly strongly represented, such as migrants from the Ukraine, the Philippines, Togo, Vietnam and India, show particularly large growth within just a few years (Statistikamt Nord 2007). Similar tendencies, often in an even more pronounced manner, apply to other European cities such as London, Lisbon, Barcelona, Milan, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen (Alexander 2004: 60). The general population structure has also become more heterogeneous through migration. From a historical perspective, current developments represent a reverse of the trend towards cultural homogenization that took place from the First World War until the early 1950s. As to the demographic effects, taking Spain – a country of just over 46 million people – the population of immigrant origin has soared from around half a million in 1996 to over five million; that is, from less than one per cent to eleven percent in about 10 years. Linguistic and religious differentiation patterns now tend to overlap in western European cities, at least at both ends of the societal hierarchy

1  
2  
3 (Kraus 2008). This ‘new medievalism’ can be seen as an expression of a partial, successive  
4  
5 disaggregation of territory, political control, and cultural practices. Lately, astute observers  
6  
7 have labelled the accumulation of these phenomena regarding migration channels, countries  
8  
9 of origin, linguistic heterogeneity, religious diversity, and policy responses as ‘super-  
10  
11 diversity’ (Vertovec 2007).  
12

13  
14  
15 Not surprisingly, growing diversity has been taken up in manifold public and  
16  
17 academic contexts. For example, visible signs of difference have been connected to gender  
18  
19 equality, and allegedly failed efforts to incorporate migrants, as debates on the headscarf in  
20  
21 virtually all European countries show. While such incidents have attracted a great deal of  
22  
23 media attention, the politicization and frequently undue dramatization of such issues disguise  
24  
25 the fact that a substantive transformation is currently taking place. Behind the talk of diversity  
26  
27 in relation to incorporation is, or at least is claimed to be, the understanding that organizations  
28  
29 of the majority society should not discriminate against their staff, their members, or their  
30  
31 clientele on the grounds of cultural characteristics, but rather should be sensitive and  
32  
33 responsive to these characteristics. From this perspective certain cultural skills such as  
34  
35 languages and social contacts are be regarded as personal competences and selling points,  
36  
37 useful, for example, in the diversity management of multinational businesses or even mid-  
38  
39 sized companies engaged in globalized markets. Hospitals can serve as an example from the  
40  
41 public sector: in many inner-city hospitals across Western Europe between twenty per cent  
42  
43 and forty per cent of patients are migrants or the children of migrants (Healy and McKee  
44  
45 2004). Above all, some organizations are adjusting their practices and routines, for instance  
46  
47 with respect to staff recruitment and interpreting services. In short, policies and organizational  
48  
49 routines have already begun to move beyond the issue of the adaptation of individual migrants  
50  
51 (assimilation) to the level of organizations in which life-chances regarding health, education,  
52  
53 and work are distributed and regulated.  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54

These changes raise the question of whether diversity is a new mode or paradigm different from assimilation and multiculturalism. I argue that diversity as a concept and a set of – not necessarily coherent – policies, programmes and routines straddles many worlds: it appeals to those who emphasize individual economic competence and self-reliance of migrants (‘neo-liberals’), those who cherish the public competence of immigrants in public affairs (republicans), as well as to those, like the European Commission, who push for structural reforms to turn incorporation in a two-way process (Commission of the European Communities 2003). In particular, the adaptation of organizations to ‘cultural’ factors, the economic use of ‘soft’ skills, and service delivery to a culturally heterogeneous clientele come to the forefront. While assimilation focuses on individual migrants passing into mainstream society and multiculturalism, in some varieties, emphasizes the rights of migrants as a means to increase their sense of recognition and belonging and also overall national unity, diversity approaches can be seen as concentrating on the level in between – on organizations. In the context migration we can even observe the emergence of new forms of diversity, namely transnationality as a way of life. Nonetheless, while the focus on the intermediate level of organizations may be an important addition in that it is linked to the ‘civil sphere’ of incorporation (Alexander 2006), the problem is that a rights-based foundation is missing. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges of diversity – social inequality – goes unchallenged. Beyond the organizational realm and that of economic efficiency, diversity needs to be grounded in both civil society as a set of socio-moral resources of citizenship and citizenship rights in order to become a politically legitimate approach. Otherwise diversity will remain a depoliticized management technique.

55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

The following analysis first traces the many meanings of the term diversity which explain part of its appeal. Second, the account moves to more clearly carve out diversity as a political concept in comparing it to two other broad paradigms of migrant incorporation, namely assimilation and multiculturalism. Both the semantic and conceptual parts serve third,

1  
2  
3 to understand the constitution of diversity through diverse sets of policies, programmes, and  
4  
5 routines, both internal to national states, and externally by focusing on the new enthusiasm  
6  
7 around migrants as development agents. Fourth, policy responses to diversity have been  
8  
9 accelerated by the transnationalization of the life-worlds of migrants as well as relatively  
10  
11 immobile persons and by the universalization of individual rights, which provide  
12  
13 opportunities for migrants to maintain multiple ties into various states. The account concludes  
14  
15 with the main challenge ahead, namely to connect diversity as a management technique with  
16  
17 an approach taking into account democratic contestation.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

### 24 **The Multiple Layers of Diversity**

25  
26 Definitions of diversity are seldom enlightening: 'Diversity refers to any mixture of items  
27  
28 characterized by differences and similarities' (Thomas 1996, p. 5). We know since Ludwig  
29  
30 Wittgenstein that the meaning of a term can be inferred from the way it is used. Diversity is  
31  
32 currently in vogue in many public debates and academic disciplines ranging from cultural  
33  
34 anthropology to micro-economics and biogenetics, as in 'biodiversity'. In the socio-political  
35  
36 and economic realms it can be found – to present an incomplete list – in the context of  
37  
38 ethnicity, culture, gender mainstreaming, age, class, sexual orientation, religion, professional  
39  
40 function, educational background, mental and physical capabilities, and health (e.g., Wood  
41  
42 2003). In the context of migration it is often used to refer to a plurality of languages, religions,  
43  
44 and ethnic groups.  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 A preliminary analysis of the term diversity brings forth three meanings pertaining  
52  
53 to three different societal levels. The first meaning refers to diversity as a characteristic of  
54  
55 societies. 'Diverse societies' is a term often used self-descriptively and synonymously with  
56  
57 multicultural societies such as Canada. More particularly, it relates to the deconstruction of  
58  
59 notions of normality and dominant cultures as well as perceived inclusion through recognition  
60  
(Fraser and Honneth 2003). Often, on this first level diversity is a synonym for cultural

1  
2  
3 pluralism to be accommodated by multicultural policies. At the next level, and this is the one  
4 that dominates, diversity concerns organizations. This includes the observation that  
5 organizations of the mainstream society adapt their practices and routines take cultural  
6 heterogeneity into consideration. Finally, at the individual level, diversity refers to the  
7 intercultural competences of a person in forms such as multilingualism. A connection  
8 between the latter two dimensions ensues when organizations – in particular commercial  
9 organizations or public services – attempt to enhance their efficiency by recruiting staff on the  
10 basis of such competences as part of ‘managing diversity’. Semantically there is an interesting  
11 similarity with multiculturalism. In its typical articulation, it is generally presented in a  
12 fashion that manages to blend or blur its utility as an analytic concept with its expression as a  
13 normative precept, similar to multiculturalism (cf. Wieviorka 1998).  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

### 32 **Modes of Incorporation: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Diversity**

33  
34 Does the reinterpretation and linguistic shift in the meaning of diversity at all three levels also  
35 indicate a paradigm shift from assimilation and multiculturalism to diversity? Assimilation as  
36 a final result of incorporation processes is often based on the assumption of different  
37 integrative stages; for instance, cognitive relating to the norms of the immigration society,  
38 structural relating to education and employment, and civil-societal relating to participation of  
39 immigrants in all spheres of life. However the social integration of migrants is conceptualised,  
40 whether as a sequence of steps or an array of simultaneous processes, one objective or  
41 prediction is the gradual disappearance of cultural markers as a distinguishing social criterion  
42 for the exploitation of chances in life in immigration societies over, say, two or three  
43 generations. Assimilation, or at least older notions of assimilation from the 1920s until the  
44 1960s, emphasizes the way in which migrants orient themselves to certain roles and the  
45 accompanying behavioural expectations related to those roles that the majority society holds  
46 of migrants (Gordon 1964). A diversity perspective, by contrast, takes the already existing  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 skills and experiences of migrants as the starting point and interprets them as competences to  
4  
5 be used by organizations. It thus assumes that the institutions of the majority society must also  
6  
7 adapt and accommodate for migrant experiences, implicitly referring to the need for mutual  
8  
9 adjustment, albeit in an asymmetric way. More recent assimilation theories, such as 'new  
10  
11 assimilationism' no longer assume that there is a societal core to which migrants orient  
12  
13 themselves unquestioningly (Alba and Nee 2003).  
14  
15

16  
17 In the mode of incorporation which can be loosely called multiculturalism, the  
18  
19 emphasis does lie on the recognition of cultural differences, allowing immigrants full  
20  
21 participation in national societies as cultural minorities. Such policies include enabling  
22  
23 measures for individuals belonging to minorities with a long history of subjection to  
24  
25 discrimination, affirmative action measures in education and employment, as well as  
26  
27 collective measures such as quota representation of migrants in political parties or state  
28  
29 subsidization of institutions such as schools or hospitals run by ethnic groups.  
30  
31  
32

33  
34 Whether as official state policies or as implicit approaches to cultural and in  
35  
36 particular ethnic pluralism, multiculturalism in practice has meant that such a mode of  
37  
38 incorporation would serve the interests of the state in promoting national unity. In this way  
39  
40 Canada and Australia were the first to implement multicultural policies. In Canada,  
41  
42 multiculturalism in practice has meant that ethnic groups are permitted to maintain aspects of  
43  
44 their ancestral heritages, and that at times the state has played an interventionist role in  
45  
46 protecting ethnic group claims, especially regarding the French-speaking minority and  
47  
48 aboriginal people. Patterning their legislation after the Canadian model, Australia became the  
49  
50 second country to establish an official multicultural policy with two key elements. First, based  
51  
52 on the assumption that multiculturalism necessitated a reduction in racism, the government  
53  
54 assumed a more proactive role in the protection of the rights of individual minority members  
55  
56 than it had in the past. Second, multiculturalism viewed the core of Australian national  
57  
58 identity as embedded in the notion of diversity. This implied that national identity was not to  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 be construed as fixed in the past, but rather as fluid and future-oriented. Multiculturalism in  
4  
5 Australia did not promote minority group rights, but rather articulated at the level of the  
6  
7 individual rights and obligations (Castles 1997, p. 15). In the United States, multiculturalism  
8  
9 – though not used in official public policy – took its substantive form in policies that came to  
10  
11 constitute ‘the minority rights revolution’. A distinctive feature of these efforts was that they  
12  
13 ‘targeted groups of Americans understood as disadvantaged but not defined by socioeconomic  
14  
15 class’ (Skrentny 2002, p. 4). Two particular policies stand out as being of singular  
16  
17 importance: affirmative action and bilingual education. At least in terms of their design these  
18  
19 policies resemble those enacted in Australia insofar as the focus is on individual members of  
20  
21 disadvantaged groups and not the groups themselves. In the United Kingdom highly  
22  
23 restrictive immigration policies were enacted to stem the flow of new arrivals. At the same  
24  
25 time there was a concerted effort, grounded in the Race Relations Act and administratively  
26  
27 promoted by the Commission for Racial Inequality and Race Relations Councils, to reduce  
28  
29 racism and intergroup tensions (Solomos 2003). None of this was viewed explicitly in terms  
30  
31 of advancing a multicultural agenda, but as in the US, Britain increasingly exhibited a  
32  
33 multicultural sensibility. Similar to the Canadian case, the advocates of multiculturalism  
34  
35 thought it possible and desirable to promote and sustain diversity while forging a shared sense  
36  
37 of what it means to be British (Modood 2005, p. 171).

38  
39 Yet multiculturalism as a concept and as a set of practices has also generated  
40  
41 intense ideological debates. Some critics contend that the multicultural moment is over as  
42  
43 state policy and social practice (Barry 2001; Joppke 2004). It is important to take a glance at  
44  
45 these criticisms because they give clues to the success of the diversity agenda. Group rights  
46  
47 are particularly controversial, although they are hardly ever conceded to migrant groups. For  
48  
49 example, in the Netherlands, whereas multiculturalism as ‘ethnic minorities policy’ in the  
50  
51 1980s and early 1990s aimed above all to incorporate immigrants into the Dutch welfare state  
52  
53 by strengthening equal individual rights and supporting migrant associations, public debate in  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 the 1990s focused on one aspect only – alleged group rights (Entzinger 2003). This was part  
4  
5 of a shift in public policy to emphasize the ‘good’ immigrant citizen as one who is  
6  
7 economically self-reliant and adapts quickly to Dutch values and language.  
8  
9

10 More generally, critics of multicultural policies often remark that the emphasis of  
11  
12 individual and collective characteristics in people subject to discrimination accentuates the  
13  
14 very features on which their exclusion is based. The result is that, rather than being overcome,  
15  
16 exclusion is then perpetuated by the minorities themselves through their representation and  
17  
18 mobilization – to say nothing of the danger of backlash or populist counter-reactions. What  
19  
20 follows is a politics of resentment between different groups, and the institutional  
21  
22 differentiation of identities hampers the development of an overarching trust. This means that  
23  
24 multiculturalism is divisive and as such threatens national unity (Schlesinger 1992). For  
25  
26 others, the differentialist focus of multiculturalism results in the erosion of the possibility of  
27  
28 progressive alliances and coalitions (Gitlin 1995) and helps to place a politics of redistribution  
29  
30 on the back burner (see Banting und Kymlicka 2004 for a rejoinder to such arguments).  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 Diversity as a potential mode of incorporation circumvents such criticisms, first, in  
37  
38 not emphasizing the rights of migrants or national-cultural minorities but on the ‘positive’  
39  
40 effects of cultural plurality and competence for private companies and public service delivery.  
41  
42 Correspondingly, there is a semantic shift from the recognition of collective identities to that  
43  
44 of individual competences. This facilitates a connection both to the individualization  
45  
46 discourse and to notions of individual entrepreneurial spirit. Second, the diversity discourse is  
47  
48 not simply focused on migrants who are just one of many categories to be considered. This  
49  
50 helps to connect multiple programs, such as ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘diversity  
51  
52 management’. Moreover, cultural difference is only one characteristic: others include gender  
53  
54 or sexual orientation. In sum, from a semantic point of view, the change regards not so much  
55  
56 the modes of incorporation as such but the emphasis taken. Therefore, the evidence should not  
57  
58 simply be read as the supplanting of earlier concepts such as assimilation and  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 multiculturalism with that of diversity. One could rather speak of a continuing vibrancy of  
4  
5 multicultural sensitivities. Yet in order to avoid obvious criticisms, some of the debate and  
6  
7 practices have shifted from a rights-based to a competence-based agenda.  
8  
9

10 A caveat is in order. There is no uni-linear, uncontested, or clear trend towards a  
11  
12 diversity-based mode of incorporation. Not only are modes of incorporation in flux, there are  
13  
14 always counteracting tendencies. For example, there is a flurry of neo-assimilationist thought  
15  
16 in academia (e.g., Brubaker 2001) and in public discourses. Nevertheless, diversity-type  
17  
18 arguments have found affinities in citizenship and incorporation debates. Take, for example,  
19  
20 integration and citizenship courses, which are in some European states mandatory for  
21  
22 acquiring citizenship, such as in Denmark and the Netherlands. Such countries have adopted  
23  
24 civics courses and national citizenship tests for migrants and such initiatives have spread  
25  
26 quickly throughout Europe over the past few years. In essence, good citizens are now not only  
27  
28 those who support themselves economically and have no criminal record, but also must prove  
29  
30 that they speak the national language (Spencer and di Mattia 2004). The newest aspect of this  
31  
32 development is the widespread discussion in public policy circles of the idea of ‘earned  
33  
34 citizenship’, the precursors of which can be found in the Canadian citizenship regime. Here  
35  
36 the acquisition of citizenship is made contingent on voluntary work and appropriate social  
37  
38 behaviour.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47

### 48 **The Constitution of Diversity**

49  
50 Diversity is not a pre-social category but always loaded with attributed meanings. It is the  
51  
52 perceived, evaluated form of (cultural) difference. It is thus constructed by societal agents by  
53  
54 drawing demarcation lines between classifications with social meanings and sometimes  
55  
56 defining certain classifications as the dominant ones. In all the observations made so far,  
57  
58 diversity has appeared to be mainly a characteristic with positive connotations for economic  
59  
60 efficiency, social trust, and the common good. Yet one should not forget that its many

1  
2  
3 meanings give ample room for divergent interpretations. For example, in political debates and  
4  
5 academic analyses, evidence of increasing heterogeneity is often associated with fears of  
6  
7 domination by 'foreign' influences. In the United States, the argument is widely discussed  
8  
9 that the disuniting of nations follows: In terms of the ethnic composition of the US, the  
10  
11 consequence of the current migratory wave has been that the 'Latino' populations have grown  
12  
13 significantly. This has alarmed contemporary nativists, seeing diversity as a threat,  
14  
15 assimilation on the wane and concluding that the 'great American success story may face an  
16  
17 uncertain future.' (Huntington 2004, p. 184)  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 On a more nuanced level, there is a lively and empirically-based debate going on  
23  
24 regarding the societal consequences of diversity. For example, some community studies in US  
25  
26 cities correlate the degree of ethnic-cultural heterogeneity in certain districts with selected  
27  
28 social indicators, finding low levels of civil-societal commitment, lower life expectancy,  
29  
30 higher morbidity, and higher crime rates significantly correlating with high levels of ethnic  
31  
32 and racial heterogeneity. From this perspective, 'positive' social capital, i.e. networks of trust  
33  
34 and reciprocity, do not immediately seem to be consistent with increased ethnic-cultural  
35  
36 diversity (Putnam 2007). At a macro-structural level, too, econometric studies endeavour to  
37  
38 provide evidence that around half of the variance in welfare state expenditure between the US  
39  
40 and Europe can be attributed to the higher degree of ethnic diversity in the US (Alesina et al.  
41  
42 2003). This would suggest that increased heterogeneity is a major causal factor of low  
43  
44 measures of welfare statehood. Meanwhile, however, a growing number of enthusiasts claim  
45  
46 that under certain circumstances cultural diversity can lead to greater innovative potential, as  
47  
48 exemplified in the 'creative class' of young, highly qualified professionals who congregate in  
49  
50 ethnically mixed residential districts (Florida 2005). What is usually not highlighted is that  
51  
52 these districts are also quite homogenous regarding socio-economic class positions; this time  
53  
54 not at the lower end.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 The two contradicting viewpoints both have a common flaw. They name ethnic  
4 diversity as the actual cause of the desired or lamentable situation of social cohesion, without  
5 actually examining to what extent macro-structural changes, say, on the labour market, may  
6 affect people's scope to shape their leisure and community life. One could equally plausibly  
7 assume that the acceleration of work life and especially the financial necessity of taking on  
8 two jobs have given rise to behavioural change in political and community life (Kivisto and  
9 Faist 2007, pp. 95-101). There is thus a failure to mention how diversity is structurally  
10 embedded and how diversity develops through macro-structural transformation and the  
11 changing landscape of social inequality.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 It is therefore necessary to describe and account for how organizations constitute  
25 diversity by processing ascribed characteristics, exemplified by the programmes and policies  
26 of mainstream but also migrant organizations. The key terms here are diversity management  
27 or managing diversity in the private sector, and an interculturalist approach or intercultural  
28 opening in the public sector. Diversity can be analysed from a perspective internal to national  
29 states, looking at organizations in immigrant countries. Programmes of diversity management  
30 change the decision-making structures, routines, and personnel of organizations in sustained  
31 ways (e.g., Frohnen 2005 on the Ford Motor Company). Organizations transform entities  
32 from culturally indifferent to culturally plural. Culturally plural organizations display cultural  
33 diversity as a resource, offer training programmes to increase the intercultural competence of  
34 staff, implement criteria for personnel recruitment, and offer special services to clients and  
35 customers. It is above all membership in organizations which signifies shifting boundaries  
36 between the private and the occupational realm. Culturally indifferent organizations usually  
37 respect a rather strict divide between private and occupational; markers such as ethnic  
38 heritage belong to the personal realm. Diversity programmes, by contrast, connect  
39 membership roles in organizations with knowledge and skills from the personal realm. In  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 addition to 'ethnic' markers such as knowledge of certain languages, it is also life-style,  
4  
5 cultural, or sexual preferences that serve to increase economic efficiency and productivity.  
6  
7

8 Diversity also refers to the broader question of how immigration changes the  
9  
10 societies themselves. For example, in healthcare there is a drive towards culturally sensitive  
11  
12 concepts such as 'transcultural psychiatry', or an increased recognition of culturally  
13  
14 conditioned expectations of medical and nursing staff. The responses of organizations such as  
15  
16 hospitals to this approach include not only increasing the proportion of migrant employees,  
17  
18 intercultural training courses for staff, but also culturally sensitive catering and nursing,  
19  
20 rooms for religious meditation and for culturally specific death vigils, and the provision of  
21  
22 visiting rooms to accommodate large family visits. Also, ways of communication between  
23  
24 nursing staff and patients turn into an issue. Means to address this aspect include, for  
25  
26 example, multilingual signposting and labelling, multilingual educational and information  
27  
28 material, and interpreting services. Measures reach beyond the hospital in, for example,  
29  
30 cooperation and networking with migrant organizations and religious institutions. In some  
31  
32 cases new staff in established organizations creates their own professional organizations, as in  
33  
34 the case of the German-Turkish Association for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy. More  
35  
36 crucially, interculturalist issues are now discussed within interdisciplinary organizations such  
37  
38 as the German Association for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Neurology (Albrecht and Borde  
39  
40 2007).  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47

48 As already indicated by the example of multinational companies, the distinction  
49  
50 between activities internal and external to national societies has become fluid. Over the past  
51  
52 few years, for example, migrants have been constituted as new development agents in  
53  
54 development cooperation by immigration and emigration countries. The fundamental idea  
55  
56 behind this kind of transnational diversity management is that due to their loyalties and ties as  
57  
58 well as their local knowledge of the needs of so-called developing countries, migrants are  
59  
60 important mediators for initiating development or conflict mediation. Financial transfers back



1  
2  
3 home, the transfer of ideas – ‘social remittances’ – and knowledge, but also capabilities and  
4  
5 competences – the insider advantages that migrants have such as linguistic competences,  
6  
7 social contacts, familiarity with bureaucratic processes – are thought to benefit development  
8  
9 cooperation. Taking recourse to the competences of migrants as development brokers and  
10  
11 mediators with knowledge of local conditions is part of a new ‘mantra’ (Kapur 2004) of  
12  
13 migration and development.  
14  
15

16  
17 It is not new that – beyond sending financial remittances – migrants do remain in  
18  
19 contact with those back home. This has been verified in numerous cases over the past century  
20  
21 (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918, vol. 5). Nonetheless, technological opportunities and  
22  
23 multicultural sensitivities have enlarged the space for cross-border interactions. Novel is,  
24  
25 however, the greater incentives for civil society agents to replace the old, state-centred,  
26  
27 development policy paradigm of the 1960s and build on the market paradigm of the 1980s  
28  
29 and the 1990s. Programmes based on such approaches have been pushed, for example, by  
30  
31 international organizations such as the World Bank and national states as well as development  
32  
33 cooperation organizations. European immigration countries concentrate their development  
34  
35 cooperation policies on countries bordering the EU in the south and the east, such as the Joint  
36  
37 EU-Africa Strategy. EU policies and public policies of member states increasingly couple  
38  
39 development cooperation with migration control and put more emphasis on the legitimacy of  
40  
41 national economic interests in highly qualified workers. In emigration countries, the image of  
42  
43 migrants has changed from that of ‘turncoats’ to heroes. Many states, for instance Russia,  
44  
45 Ghana, Mali, Mexico, and the Philippines, have meanwhile established diaspora ministries.  
46  
47 Measures taken include tax relief for emigrants who, for example, live and work in Silicon  
48  
49 Valley and invest in India, and symbolic-practical policies such as the tolerance of dual  
50  
51 citizenship help to uphold the loyalty of emigrants (Faist 2008).  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59

60 The deployment of migrants as development agents can be observed on two levels,  
on both of which there are increased endeavours by international organizations, states and



1  
2  
3 NGOs to create incentives for migrants to become involved in promoting development. On  
4  
5 one level, diasporic migrants return as highly qualified workers for brief assignments to their  
6  
7 countries of origin, or develop small-scale projects on their own initiative – for example  
8  
9 medical doctors in the health sector. On a second level it is individual migrants and migrant  
10  
11 collectives, from families to migrant self-organizations, who not only support relatives and  
12  
13 friends in their country of origin but also become involved in activities such as building wells  
14  
15 or schools. In some European countries there are now state programmes that combine the  
16  
17 periodic return of migrants and their involvement with development cooperation. It should be  
18  
19 noted, however, that such programmes – the *co-développement* scheme in France for instance  
20  
21 – were originally created to encourage the return of migrants to their home countries, and are  
22  
23 built on close and politically asymmetric ties from colonial times. Today, such schemes go  
24  
25 further and combine incorporation, development, and migration control policies by supporting  
26  
27 local projects run by migrants.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32

33  
34 In the light of these new policy measures for promoting migrants as development  
35  
36 agents and brokers, certain attributes of migrants that were hitherto regarded as drawbacks –  
37  
38 ‘fence sitting’, for example – are re-interpreted as mobility competences and thus selling  
39  
40 points. In short, cross-border ties and associated resources, that is the very transnationality of  
41  
42 migrants, become a characteristic of diversity. This characteristic refers to, for instance,  
43  
44 commitments in migrants’ regions of origin, which were formerly seen as an indicator for  
45  
46 non-integration in immigration states. Incorporation in the country of immigration, from the  
47  
48 perspective of such policies, is by all means compatible with transnational involvement and  
49  
50 commitments in the country of origin. Empirical studies show that incorporation in the  
51  
52 country of immigration is virtually a pre-requisite for meaningful involvement in  
53  
54 development policy activities. Transnational activists as a rule still have their local roots in  
55  
56 their regions of origin and use them as a basis for transboundary involvement. This is testified  
57  
58 by the activities of African organizations in Germany that are involved in development  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 cooperation and help with the building of schools or water supply, for example (Sieveking,  
4  
5 Faist and Fauser 2008). Research findings from the US also show that as a rule, immigrants  
6  
7 from Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic active in development politics have a  
8  
9 good knowledge of the language, a high professional status, and numerous social contacts in  
10  
11 the country of immigration (Portes, Escobar and Radford 2007).  
12  
13

14  
15 It is interesting to observe the problems associated with transnationality as a  
16  
17 diversity characteristic on the organizational level. Empirical findings on Salvadorian migrant  
18  
19 organizations in Southern California indicate that, firstly, internal conflicts in immigrant  
20  
21 groups rarely allow effective transnational work, and secondly, development objectives and  
22  
23 interests are sometimes subject to dispute between migrants and those who remained behind  
24  
25 (Waldinger, Popkin and Magana 2008). This suggests that the problems encountered in  
26  
27 cooperation with migrant organizations are in principle no different from the problems that  
28  
29 emerge between established development aid organizations and the addressees of cooperation.  
30  
31 This evidence underscores the limits to diversity as a paradigm for overcoming structural  
32  
33 problems of development cooperation.  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

### 41 **Transnationality as Diversity**

42  
43 In terms of countries of origin, languages, religions, legal status, and political management, it  
44  
45 cannot be expected that cultural diversity as an important organizational and societal feature is  
46  
47 likely to decline in the near future. Two epochal developments especially point to this: in  
48  
49 addition to multicultural sensitivities it is the transnationalization of migration and its  
50  
51 consequences, and the universalization of legal claims at the national and international level  
52  
53 over the past decades. In turn, the transnationalization of social life worlds and the  
54  
55 universalization of rights have resulted in transnationality as a new form of diversity – adding  
56  
57 and interacting with known ones such as gender, religion, language and social class.  
58  
59  
60

*Transnationalization of Social Life Worlds*

What we are observing is a gradual breakdown of the integrative Weberian ‘cage’ for migrants both in the urban or regional centres and on a transnational level. Cross-border transactions thus imply an increased trans-border integration of social practices (transnationalization), and cross-border elements of common horizons of meaning and senses of belonging or common identifications (transnationality). Many migrants maintain ties to their countries of origin, or links to other regions after settling in immigration countries. A variety of close, continual ties arise within families in the case of chain migration, in religious communities, in ethnic diasporas, via (migrants’) human rights organizations, and through academic or business cliques. In Germany, for example, a significant minority of immigrants corresponds to the type of multicultural-transnational integration, being socio-economically successful but not assimilating culturally (between approximately ten to fifteen per cent, see Fincke 2008).

Such cases are known as transnational social spaces, whereby at some point not geographical mobility, but rather the continued contacts between migrants and relatively immobile correspondents across borders are decisive. Of course, such transnational ties are nothing new and have existed for a long time. In the age of nationalism Max Weber used the term ‘communities abroad’ (Weber 1980, p. 234), thereby referring to groups and associations of German migrants in North and South America during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The technological possibilities of communication have burgeoned since then, and discourses on diffusion mechanisms have not only transnationalized but even universalised.

Concomitantly, the metaphors used to describe migrant incorporation have changed. Notions of the assimilation of migrants found their analogy in the image of uprooted migrants, as in the analysis of European immigrants to the US in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in *The Uprooted* by historian Oscar Handlin. Much later, from a transnational perspective, the emphasis lay on translation, excellently described in the novel *Satanic Verses* by Salman

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Rushdie (1997). This is pointing to the contribution of migrants and minorities to national literary canons. For instance, what could be called German-Turkish or French-Moroccan literature is nowadays looked upon not simply as hybrid but as a contribution towards the regeneration of the respective national literatures. Such literature has meanwhile internalized an ethnographic perspective and reconstructs migration histories through reminiscence and recalcitrance. Once certain patterns formerly only attributed to specific, migration-related elements or to minority cultures enter mainstream canons, they are taken for granted as part of a wider repertoire (Ezli 2006). Examples include the work of German-Turkish authors such as Feridun Zaimoğlu (*Leyla*) and film directors Fatih Akın (*Auf der anderen Seite/The Edge of Heaven*) and Abdellatif Kechiche (*La graine et le mulet*). These trends reinforce transnationality as a diversity characteristic in national cultural canons.

### *Universalization of Legal Rights*

Parallel to the transnationalization of social worlds and transnationality as diversity, the significance of human rights conventions in liberal democracies is growing and impacting on the incorporation of migrants. The development of minority regimes can be observed, for example, in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and through the Council of Europe. It is about the universalization of *quasi*-rights, the demand that governments protect and promote cultural diversity.

Dual citizenship as an institutionalized form of transnational membership is a prime example of this kind of universalization (Faist 2007). A few decades ago, dual nationality was not tolerated by any state at all, but today over half of all states worldwide tolerate in some way multiple citizenship. Reasons for the lack of tolerance were fears for the loyalty of those with dual nationality in the case of conflicts (e.g., a war between the two states in question); potential disadvantages for individuals (e.g., military service); and concern about integration in the host country for which the elimination of ties to the country of origin

1  
2  
3 was deemed crucial if it was to succeed. By contrast, the new course which has been adopted  
4  
5 in recent decades does not insist on ‘political monogamy’, as it were, or loyalty to one state  
6  
7 only, but takes multiple ties into account. Even in states where as a rule multiple citizenship  
8  
9 for migrants is not provided for – for instance in Germany, Austria, and Iceland – the number  
10  
11 of migrants undergoing naturalization while preserving their original nationality is continually  
12  
13 on the rise.  
14  
15

16  
17 The central point of departure for the greater tolerance of dual citizenship was  
18  
19 international law, especially in relation to categories such as women or stateless persons.  
20  
21 Gender equality made its way into international law, for example, through the Convention on  
22  
23 the Nationality of Married Women of 1957, and later into the legislation of national states.  
24  
25 Women no longer have to relinquish their own nationality if they marry a man with a different  
26  
27 nationality. Going one step further, this means that children of binational marriages  
28  
29 automatically receive dual citizenship. This principle was codified in the European  
30  
31 Convention on Nationality of 1993, which reformed the much stricter Convention on the  
32  
33 Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple  
34  
35 Nationality of 1963. In all European states, the toleration of dual citizenship has meanwhile  
36  
37 become the rule for children from binational marriages and for marriage partners.  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43  
44 The universalization of rights and its impact on transnationality as a diversity  
45  
46 characteristic result not so much from the recognition of transnational ties as such, but the  
47  
48 elimination of sexual discrimination and the right to nationality that were, and still are, of  
49  
50 significance. On the part of migrants and their significant others transnationality is in itself a  
51  
52 strategy of survival and betterment. In emigration countries, on the other hand, dual citizenship  
53  
54 functions as one of a number of instruments used to uphold or win back the loyalty of their  
55  
56 citizens (Faist and Kivisto 2007).  
57  
58  
59  
60

### **Outlook: Bringing in Social Inequality and Civil Society**

The exploration of ways towards incorporation in and through diversity will prove to be a central challenge of the 21st century in dealing with the tension between expectations of homogeneity or heterogeneity and demands for social equality. The emphasis on diversity signals a turning point and a move away from the rather more sceptical evaluations of diversity in the late 19th and 20th centuries. At that time, prevalent social and political theory took a sceptical stance towards the relation between diversity on the one hand and equality and democracy on the other hand. John Stuart Mill, for instance, can be seen as a classic proponent of the sceptical standpoint (Mill 2006; see also Weber 1988). Not until the late 1980s did reasoning in favour of the compatibility of liberal universal ideas and cultural difference gain hold in Will Kymlicka's concept of multicultural citizenship (1995). The turn to diversity is a further continuation, this time in organizations and civil society.

Concepts of diversity zero in on organizational adaptation to cultural pluralism and the utilization of individual competences in order to either facilitate full inclusion in civil society – keywords are terms such as intercultural opening of public administration – or competition in markets – characterized by concepts such as diversity management. These various discourses of diversity have raised challenges for social inequality and democracy, known already by debates on multiculturalism. Organizations use and thus constitute markers such as ethnicity, religion, gender, and class in order to 'mainstream' their structures and routines. Such characteristics may signal social inequality and uneven distribution of power between groups made up or split along ethnic, gender, class, or religious lines. Through applying diversity programmes, inequality along such lines may be reified, or newly created and legitimized. For example, managing diversity programmes run the danger of reinforcing categories such as ethnicity (Wrench 2005). Thus the risk is high that cultural differences are perpetuated by diversity programmes, while racial or ethnic inequality in access to positions and within organizations is regarded as a problem to be addressed by management techniques.

1  
2  
3 The danger involved thus would be that cultural difference is separated from issues such as  
4 social inequality by compartmentalizing it as managing individual competence for  
5 organizational efficiency. In essence, future research needs to heed the conclusion arrived at  
6 in empirical analyses of fields such as labour markets that ‘far too little attention has been  
7 paid to the relationship between diversity and inequality and to the contextual importance of  
8 intergroup relations in the larger society’ (DiTomaso, Post and Parks-Yancey 2007, p. 474).  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16

17  
18 Ultimately, diversity programmes in organizations which mainly focus on the  
19 management of diversity tend to occlude not only the genesis and reproduction of social  
20 inequalities but also public contention and thus the struggle for equal rights. Struggles around  
21 both recognition and redistribution constitute a mode of democratic incorporation and  
22 citizenship practices. This applies equally to cultural, political, and social rights. To avoid  
23 disconnecting diversity programmes from actual political developments and societal practices,  
24 the diversity paradigm needs to be connected to democratic contention. This means that  
25 diversity has to be linked with actually voiced demands for equal chances of participation in  
26 order to understand the problems connected with social inequality (Faist 2010). It is a central  
27 feature of all democratic societies that political processes are shaped by demands for material  
28 and symbolic equality (De Tocqueville 1988).  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43  
44 Thus, if the current discussion on diversity is to go beyond the narrow emphasis on  
45 organizational change and the efficient use of individual competence, based on increasing  
46 significance of diversity as a set of personal characteristics and policies, the insights gained  
47 from sociological research on multiculturalism need to be heeded and be further developed.  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52 At least from the perspective of decision-makers and most of the political advocates of  
53 multiculturalism, the other objective of multicultural and thus also diversity policies is to  
54 bring heretofore-marginalized groups into the political sphere and the societal mainstream. As  
55 is evidenced in actual practices of multiculturalists, there is constant reference to a civil-  
56 society discourse. In other words, multiculturalism in a democracy constitutes a mode of  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 incorporation that is characterized by a particular type of civil participation. This type of  
4  
5 engagement is part of what Alexander (2006) calls the 'civil sphere'. The focus of the civil  
6  
7 sphere is the political realm, which is prior to the official relations between states and citizens  
8  
9 and rests primarily on the resources of the citizens themselves. Diversity thus adds another  
10  
11 layer in bringing in not only 'rights' but also the civil sphere. Central resources of the civil  
12  
13 sphere are solidarity and trust without which democracy cannot be conceived. This insight is  
14  
15 particularly relevant for the debates on diversity because, at first sight, it seems that the  
16  
17 organizational level on which diversity programmes are conceptualized and implemented is a  
18  
19 realm outside the civil sphere and thus democratic deliberation. However, there is a nexus: it  
20  
21 is only in this organizational and associational realm that the civil sphere can effectively take  
22  
23 hold.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29           The extension of multiculturalism to diversity also points toward a new relationship  
30  
31 between the universal and the particular. In a multicultural society 'incorporation is not  
32  
33 celebrated as inclusion, but as the achievement of diversity' (Alexander 2006: 452). This then  
34  
35 makes possible a politics of difference in place of the previous goal of a unified and  
36  
37 homogeneous core. From this perspective the politics of diversity is thus also a politics of  
38  
39 multiculturalism, albeit with new facets in bringing in more fully the neglected organizational  
40  
41 realm comprising both private companies and public administration. In the end, the discussion  
42  
43 on diversity is a clear sign that the claim that multiculturalism is on the wane is not borne out.  
44  
45 Multiculturalism as a mode of civic incorporation is likely to become more important in the  
46  
47 future. The new discussions on diversity also indicate that multiculturalism extends beyond  
48  
49 the borders of national states, both regarding norms-making in the international realm and the  
50  
51 life-world of migrants and relatively immobile persons in the transnational realm.  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



**References**

- 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8 ALBA, RICHARD and NEE, VICTOR 2003 *Remaking the American Mainstream:*  
9  
10 *Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15 ALBRECHT, NIELS-JENS and BORDE, THEDA (eds) 2007 *Interkulturelle Öffnung des*  
16  
17 *Gesundheitssystems. Migration - Gesundheit - Kommunikation*, Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22 ALESINA, ALBERTO, DEVLEESCHAUWER, ARNAUD, EASTERLY, WILLIAM,  
23  
24 KURLAT, SERGIO, and WACZIARG, ROMAIN 2003 'Fractionalization', *Journal of*  
25  
26 *Economic Growth*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 155-194  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32 ALEXANDER, JEFFREY C. 2006 *The Civil Sphere*, New York: Oxford University Press  
33  
34  
35  
36 ALEXANDER, MICHAEL 2004 'Comparing Local Policies towards Migrants: An  
37  
38 Analytical Framework, a Typology and Preliminary Survey Results', in Rinus Penninx et al.  
39  
40 (eds), *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*.  
41  
42 Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 57-84  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48 BAMF 2005: *Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag*  
49  
50 *der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2005)*, Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und  
51  
52 Flüchtlinge (BAMF)  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57 BANTING, KEITH and KYMLICKA, WILL (eds) 2004 *Multiculturalism and the Welfare*  
58  
59 *State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford  
60 University Press

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 BARRY, BRIAN 2001 *Culture and Equality*, Cambridge: Polity Press  
7  
8  
9

10 BRUBAKER, ROGERS 2001 'The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on  
11 Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the US', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*,  
12 vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 431-548  
13  
14  
15  
16

17  
18  
19  
20 DiTOMASO, NANCY, POST, CORINNE, PARKS-YANCY, ROCHELLE 2007 'Workforce  
21 Diversity and Inequality: Power, Status, and Numbers', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol.  
22 33, pp. 473-501  
23  
24  
25  
26

27  
28  
29 ENTZINGER, HAN 2003 'The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the  
30 Netherlands', in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds), *Toward Assimilation and*  
31 *Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59-  
32 86  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38  
39  
40  
41 EZLI, ÖZKAN 2006 'Von der Identitätskrise zu einer ethnografischen Poetik: Migration in  
42 der deutsch-türkischen Literatur', *Text + Kritik*, special issue *Literatur und Migration*, pp.  
43 61-73  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 FAIST, THOMAS (ed) 2007 *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Societal*  
52 *Integration*, Avebury: Ashgate  
53  
54  
55

56  
57  
58 FAIST, THOMAS 2008 'Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the  
59 Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus', *Population, Space and Place*, vol.  
60 14, no. 1, pp. 21-42

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 FAIST, THOMAS 2010 'The Transnational Social Question: Social Rights and Citizenship in  
7 a Global Context', *International Sociology*, vol. 25, no. 1 (forthcoming)

8  
9  
10  
11  
12 FAIST, THOMAS and KIVISTO, PETER (eds) 2007 *Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective:*  
13 *From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20 FAVELL, ADRIAN 1998 *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of*  
21 *Citizenship in France and Britain*, Basingstoke: Macmillan

22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27 FINCKE, GUNILLA 2008 *Abgehängt, chancenlos, unwillig? Eine empirische Reorientierung*  
28 *von Integrationstheorien zu MigrantInnen der zweiten Generation in Deutschland*, PhD  
29 Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Free University of Berlin, Germany

30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 FLORIDA, RICHARD L. 2005 *Cities and the Creative Class*, New York: Routledge

37  
38  
39  
40  
41 FRASER, NANCY, and HONNETH, AXEL 2003 *Redistribution or Recognition? A*  
42 *Political-Philosophical Exchange*, London: Verso Books

43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48 FROHNEN, ANJA 2005 *Diversity in Action: Multinationalität im globalen Unternehmen am*  
49 *Beispiel Ford*, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag

50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55 GITLIN, TODD 1995 *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by*  
56 *Culture Wars*, New York: Metropolitan Books

- 1  
2  
3 GORDON, MILTON 1964 *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and*  
4  
5 *National Origins*, New York: Oxford University Press  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 HANDLIN, OSCAR 2002 *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made*  
11  
12 *the American People*, 2nd edn, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17 HEALY, JUDITH and McKEE, MARTIN (eds) 2004 *Accessing Healthcare: Responding to*  
18  
19 *Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24 HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 2004 *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National*  
25  
26 *Identity*, New York: The Free Press  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31 JOPPKE, CHRISTIAN 2004 'The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory  
32  
33 and Policy', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 237-257  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38 KAPUR, DEVESH 2004 'Remittances: The New Development Mantra?', G-24 Discussion  
39  
40 Paper Series, No. 29, Washington, DC: The World Bank  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45 KIVISTO, PETER and FAIST, THOMAS 2007 *Citizenship: Discourse, Theory and*  
46  
47 *Transnational Prospects*, Oxford: Blackwell  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52 KRAUS, PETER 2008 *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity-Building in*  
53  
54 *Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59 KYMLICKA, WILL 1995 *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*,  
60  
Oxford: Oxford University Press

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 MILL, JOHN STUART 2006 *Considerations on Representative Government*, Ann Arbor, MI:  
7  
8 University of Michigan Library, Scholarly Publication Office [first published in 1861]  
9

10  
11  
12 MODOOD, TARIQ 2005 *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain*,  
13  
14 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press  
15

16  
17  
18  
19  
20 PORTES, ALEJANDRO, ESCOBAR, CRISTINA, and RADFORD, ALEXANDRIA W.  
21  
22 2007 'Immigrant transnational organizations and development: A comparative study',  
23  
24 *International Migration Review*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 242–281  
25  
26

27  
28  
29  
30 PUTNAM, ROBERT 2007 'E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First  
31  
32 Century – The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 30,  
33  
34 no. 2, pp. 137–174  
35

36  
37  
38  
39 RUSHDIE, SALMON 1997 *The Satanic Verses*, New York: Consortium  
40  
41

42  
43  
44 SIEVEKING, NADINE, FAUSER, MARGIT and FAIST, THOMAS 2008 *Gutachten zum*  
45  
46 *entwicklungspolitischen Engagement der in NRW lebenden MigrantInnen afrikanischer*  
47  
48 *Herkunft*, Working Paper 38/2008, COMCAD - Center on Migration, Citizenship and  
49  
50 Development. Bielefeld, [http://www.comcad-](http://www.comcad-bielefeld.de/downloads/workingpaper_38_Sieveking&Fauser&Faist.pdf)  
51  
52 [bielefeld.de/downloads/workingpaper\\_38\\_Sieveking&Fauser&Faist.pdf](http://www.comcad-bielefeld.de/downloads/workingpaper_38_Sieveking&Fauser&Faist.pdf)  
53  
54  
55

56  
57  
58 SKRENTNY, JOHN D. 2002 *The Minority Rights Revolution*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap  
59  
60 Press of Harvard University Press

1  
2  
3 SOLOMOS, JOHN 2003 *Race and Racism in Britain*, 3rd edn, London: Palgrave  
4  
5 Macmillan  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 SPENCER, SARAH and DI MATTIA, ANNA 2004 'POLICY BRIEF: Introductory  
11  
12 Programmes and Initiatives for New Migrants in Europe', in: '*Turning Principles into*  
13  
14 *Actions*'. A report written for The Ministerial Integration Conference in Groningen, 9-11  
15  
16 November 2004, pp. 10-32  
17  
18  
19

20  
21  
22 STATISTIKAMT NORD 2007 *Statistisches Jahrbuch Hamburg 2007-2008*, Hamburg  
23  
24  
25

26 THOMAS, ROOSEVELT R. JR., 1996 *Redefining Diversity*, New York: Amacom  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 THOMAS, WILLIAM I., and ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN 1927 *The Polish Peasant in Europe and*  
32  
33 *America*, 5 Vols, New York: Alfred A. Knopf [first published in 1918-1921]  
34  
35  
36

37  
38 TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS de 1988 *Democracy in America*, edited by J.P. Mayer and translated  
39  
40 by George Lawrence, New York: Harper & Row [first published in French in 1835 und 1841]  
41  
42  
43

44  
45 VERTOVEC, STEVEN 2007 'Super-diversity and its implications', *Ethnic and Racial*  
46  
47 *Studies*, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 1024–1054  
48  
49  
50

51  
52 WALDINGER, ROGER, POPKIN, ERIC, and MAGANA, HECTOR AQUILES 2008  
53  
54 'Conflict and contestation in the cross-border community: hometown associations  
55  
56 reassessed', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 843-870  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 WEBER, MAX 1988 *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik* (1895). In:  
4  
5 Winckelmann, J. (ed): *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, 5th edn, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr  
6  
7 (Paul Siebeck) [first published in 1921]  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 WEBER, MAX 1980 *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, 5<sup>th</sup>  
13  
14 edn. by J. Winckelmann, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) [first published in 1922]  
15  
16

17  
18  
19 WIEVIORKA, MICHEL 1998 'Is Multiculturalism the Solution?' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*,  
20  
21 vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 881-910  
22  
23  
24

25  
26  
27 WOOD, PETER 2003 *Diversity: The Invention of a Concept*, San Francisco, CA: Encounter  
28  
29 Books  
30  
31

32  
33  
34 WRENCH, JOHN 2005 'Diversity Management can be bad for you', *Race & Class*, vol. 46,  
35  
36 no. 1, pp. 73-84  
37  
38  
39

40  
41  
42  
43 THOMAS FAIST is Professor in the Department of Sociology at Bielefeld University.

44  
45 ADDRESS: Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD), Bielefeld  
46  
47 University, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany.  
48  
49

50  
51 Email: [thomas.faist@uni-bielefeld.de](mailto:thomas.faist@uni-bielefeld.de)  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60