



**HAL**  
open science

# The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and it Diaspora

Simon Turner

► **To cite this version:**

Simon Turner. The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and it Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2008, 31 (04), pp.742-765. 10.1080/01419870701784505 . hal-00513306


**HAL Id: hal-00513306**

**<https://hal.science/hal-00513306>**

Submitted on 1 Sep 2010

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



**The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and  
it Diaspora**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2007-0213
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	Burundi, Ethnicity, Conflict, Diaspora, political field, Hutu



# The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and its Diaspora

Simon Turner

Danish Institute for International Studies

## ***Introduction***

Genocide, civil war, oppressive politics and ethnic discrimination have haunted the small African nation, Burundi, since independence in 1962, periodically forcing large numbers of its population to leave the country and live in exile. Hundreds of thousands have been forced to live in camps in neighbouring countries – Tanzania, Congo, and Rwanda – while tens of thousands have made it to Europe and North America, especially to Belgium, the old colonial power. The peasants who crossed the border to Tanzania simply in search of safety, ended up in large part in camps that became seedbeds of political mobilization and military training (Malkki 1995; Turner 2001). Meanwhile the educated elite in Europe is involved in ‘long-distance politics’ (Anderson 1994; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001) lobbying politicians, churches and NGOs and supporting the rebellion ‘at home’. One might therefore claim that the political struggle – linked to the armed conflict - in Burundi has to a large extent taken place outside the borders of the nation-state itself. And it is therefore essential for any understanding of the conflict in Burundi to explore this transnational political field.

1  
2  
3 This field is not stable, however, as Burundi in recent years has experienced a political  
4 transformation, affecting the role of transnational politics. Negotiations between the  
5 government and various opposition groups, often armed and often with leaders in exile,  
6 have led to a power sharing agreement in a transition government, a new constitution and  
7 finally democratic elections in 2005. This has consequences for the role of exiled  
8 politicians, as political struggles now can take place within the democratic structures of  
9 the state rather than being forced into a transnational political field. In this paper I explore  
10 what happens when the political field expands beyond the limits of the national borders,  
11 and what happens when it shrinks back again. Whereas most studies tend to explore long  
12 distance politics from the 'long distance' perspective, I try to explore them from the  
13 receiving end as well. I try to see the political field from both these angles in order to  
14 overcome the bias that many diaspora studies have of only seeing things from the  
15 'outside'. I discuss the mutual influence of home and exile and the quest for political  
16 citizenship inside and outside the territory of the nation-state. Furthermore, I explore how  
17 the recent shift in Burundi from conflict to post-conflict affects the political field inside  
18 and outside the country. As the gravity of the political field shifts back into the territory  
19 of the nation-state, the diaspora has to reinvent itself and redefine its *raison d'être*.

20  
21  
22 In order to answer these questions I will compare a historical analysis of the political  
23 conflicts in Burundi with multi-sited ethnographies of transnational politics, carried out in  
24 Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Belgium from 1997 to 2005. In this manner, I will  
25 compare changes in political subjectivities in the diaspora with changes in the political  
26 field at home and explore the mutual influence.

### ***Conceptualizing the transnational political field***

When I first started fieldwork in a refugee camp in Western Tanzania in 1997-1998, it soon became clear to me that politics was a central preoccupation of the Burundian Hutu there and an organizing – at times violent - principle in the camp (Turner 1998; Turner 2001). Furthermore, it became apparent that the camp was not an isolated unity; worldviews and opinions among the refugees were shaped by party politics and deeply imbued in the political and armed conflict in their home country. It also became evident to me that the political entrepreneurs (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991) in the camp were involved in much larger networks spanning from Belgium and Denmark to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and to cadres inside Burundi itself. This led me to follow these networks – doing fieldwork in Denmark, Belgium, Bujumbura and Nairobi from 2002 to 2004 – and onto the track of theories of transnationalism and diaspora.

The work in the early 1990s by Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton is often accredited with launching the concept (and theory, some would claim) of transnationalism and the idea that people live lives across borders, belonging to more than one nation-state at once (Basch, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994), claiming to be a theory that could overcome the ‘methodological nationalism’ (Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2002) of traditional migration studies. Since the late 1990s there has been a debate on defining and refining the concept – leading to a number of sub-categories and concepts- and first and foremost to discussions of what qualifies and what does not qualify as ‘transnational’ (Levitt 2001a; Portes 2001; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999).<sup>1</sup>

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 Studying transnationalism begs the question of density and scope of transnational  
7  
8 relations. When is it possible to talk about a 'transnational social field' (Faist 2000) or a  
9  
10 'transnational political field' (Adamson 2002)? Is a weekly phone call to a relative  
11  
12 enough to qualify as a 'transmigrant', even though one works, rests and plays in only one  
13  
14 place (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec 2003)? In order to overcome this dilemma,  
15  
16 Itzigsohn et al distinguish between 'broad' and 'narrow' transnational practices  
17  
18 (Itzigsohn, Cabral, Medina, and Vazquez 1999), while others operate with 'core' and  
19  
20 'expanded' transnationalism (Levitt 2001a)(see also Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b)).  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 Rather than attempt the impossible task to define and refine concepts, I am trying to  
28  
29 explore not only *that* politics crosses borders, nor *why* it does so or to *which degree*.  
30  
31 What I find interesting, is *how* they do so and how the fact that they are transnational  
32  
33 affects politics in Burundi.<sup>2</sup> It is not enough, I find, to categorize this or that political  
34  
35 activity as either narrow or broad, core or expanded transnationalism. We need to move  
36  
37 beyond concept definitions and explore the dynamics of the transnational political field  
38  
39 and it affects and is affected by the politics of the Burundian state.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45

46 Inspired by Bourdieu (1991) I define the political field as a 'game' where politicians gain  
47  
48 a 'practical sense' of the game and learn how to comply with the unwritten rules of the  
49  
50 political field. By becoming competent players of the game, political entrepreneurs also  
51  
52 reproduce it. In a dialectical manner, the political field determines what can and cannot  
53  
54 be debated and fought over while at the same time the field is itself defined by these  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 power struggles. In other words, the field is created in the process of being contested.  
4  
5  
6 Fiona Adamson has used this concept in a transnational context and claims that the  
7  
8 ‘transnational political field (...) is open to contestation, mobilization and/or capture by  
9  
10 political entrepreneurs’ (Adamson 2002, 159). Hence, the transnational political field is  
11  
12 created as a terrain upon which various political actors attempt to discredit each other and  
13  
14 claim to be the true representatives of ‘the Burundian people’. What is interesting about  
15  
16 the transnational political field as opposed to other political fields, however, is that it cuts  
17  
18 across several political entities that grant citizenship and rights and that claim sovereignty.  
19  
20 Likewise, the fact that it is political, distinguishes it from other transnational practices,  
21  
22 because politics is exactly about citizenship, belonging and sovereign power; all terms  
23  
24 that are linked to nation-states.  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 The literature on transnationalism has long been eager to emphasize that we are not  
33  
34 approaching a post-national era, as the first theories of transnationalism – allegedly –  
35  
36 claimed (Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer 2004; Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec 2003; Willis,  
37  
38 Yeoh, and Fakhiri 2004). However, as Rainer Bauböck convincingly argues:  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 (T)hat political transnationalism is more than political activity across  
44  
45 borders and also refers to these changing and increasingly overlapping  
46  
47 boundaries of membership in political communities. (Bauböck 2003, 703)  
48  
49  
50  
51

52 In this sense, transmigrants have several places of belonging – in terms of livelihoods,  
53  
54 rights and belonging – and transnational politics oscillates between these levels as it  
55  
56 transgresses national borders. The strength of Bauböck’s argument is to bring politics to  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 the fore – rather than placing political transnationalism on a par with other transnational  
4 practices. We may, with Bauböck, argue that political transnationalism ‘also affects  
5 collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both  
6 receiving and sending societies.’ (Bauböck 2003, 700). Politics is by definition about  
7 citizenship, rights and belonging and can therefore not be divorced from aspects of  
8 statehood and national sovereignty. So, while transnational politics transgresses the  
9 sovereign borders of states, it is also about claiming citizenship and the right to belong,  
10 leading to a central tension in transnational politics between challenging the nation-state  
11 and making claims to the same state.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 Belonging to a nation – whether inside its territory or from afar – is, however, not merely  
28 a question of citizenship and rights. It relies on a ‘supplement’; on emotional ties to the  
29 *Patria*, the Motherland, ‘the soil’ (Anderson 1991; Balibar 1991). We may deconstruct  
30 the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1992), and reveal ‘methodological nationalism’ for  
31 what it is, but the fact remains that the illusion of people-place-identity is as strong as  
32 ever (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). In fact, the whole concept of transnationalism implicitly  
33 relies on the assumption that migrants *want* to engage in their country of origin, or at  
34 least feel obliged to do so, despite the fact that they have all the citizenship rights they  
35 need in their new country of residence.<sup>3</sup> In order to understand this aspect of  
36 transnationalism, I turn to the concept of diaspora.  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52

53 We have witnessed a shift in the use of the term diaspora over the past years with more  
54 and more groups being termed ‘diasporas’.<sup>4</sup> It might be argued that due to this inflation in  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 the use of the term, it has lost its original analytical value and must therefore either be  
4  
5 abandoned or at least narrowed back down again (Safran 1991). However, I believe –  
6  
7  
8 along with scholars like Kleist and Axel - that we must take the *emic* notion of diaspora  
9  
10 seriously and perceive it more as a process and an aspiration than as a sociological fact.  
11  
12 As Kleist (Kleist 2007) points out, the term is moving rapidly from academia to policy-  
13  
14 makers and to migrant groups themselves, who use the term to claim recognition.  
15  
16  
17 Whether or not we objectively can define the Somalis, the Sikhs or the Tutsi as a diaspora  
18  
19 is beside the point. The point is that it has become a powerful concept in identity  
20  
21 formation, the struggle for recognition, and claims-making. As Glenn Bowmann  
22  
23 demonstrates in relation to the Palestinian diaspora, the term becomes an ‘empty  
24  
25 signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that is so open and vaguely defined that it is able to  
26  
27 encompass all the troubles and tribulations of a diverse, dispersed and heterogeneous  
28  
29 population (Bowman 1994). In fact, there need not even be a homeland from which the  
30  
31 diaspora is dispersed, for there to be a ‘diasporic imaginary’ as Brian Keith Axel has  
32  
33 argued in relation to the Sikh diaspora (Axel 2004). The diaspora becomes a means of  
34  
35 identification that retrospectively creates the lost homeland. In Lacanian terms, identity  
36  
37 formation, or rather subjectivation, is always built up around a presumed original loss  
38  
39 (Zizek 1989). Ideology promises to bring back what was lost and heal the individual and  
40  
41 ‘the community’, removing the antagonisms of society (Laclau and Zac 1994). In this  
42  
43 sense, creating a migrant community relies on referring back to something lost; the  
44  
45 homeland (in Lacanian terms ‘l’objét petit a’). This does not need to be a real homeland  
46  
47 that was actually lost. Rather it is construed retrospectively as a stand in for a presumed  
48  
49 original loss. It is the return of the homeland (which is not the same as the return *to* the  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 homeland) that promises wholeness. Obviously, this homeland is unobtainable in the  
4  
5 sense that it will never in real life fulfill the expectations of wholeness and healing.  
6  
7  
8 However, without this lost homeland, the community could not stick together. Without  
9  
10 the 'glue' of loss, the differences in objective interests would surface and 'the  
11  
12 community' would cease to exist and simply become an assembly of individuals from  
13  
14 the same country. I propose therefore to see diaspora less as a noun – something to be  
15  
16 found and verified 'out there' – and more as an adjective – *diaporic* – or a verb – to  
17  
18 *diasporise*. To be *diaporic* is to aspire to being part of a community, centered on a loss.  
19  
20  
21 Similarly, to *diasporise* expresses an active process, resembling Kleist's proposal to  
22  
23 perceive diaspora as 'becoming' rather than 'being' (Kleist 2007).  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29  
30 In sum, I argue that diaspora politics is both about longing and about claiming political  
31  
32 rights. Being constituted around loss, exodus and exclusion, diaspora is closely linked to  
33  
34 longing for a lost home. But it also produces political subjectivities, I argue, that revolve  
35  
36 around exclusion from the *polis* at home and hence are about claiming rights to political  
37  
38 inclusion and hence political citizenship. By exploring the shifting political field inside  
39  
40 Burundi and how this affects the broader transnational field, I hope to shed light on the  
41  
42 relationship between political citizenship (both in the sense of rights and in the sense of  
43  
44 belonging) and the formation of diasporic identities.  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 These theoretical thoughts lead to the following methodological approach. Firstly, I  
52  
53 concentrate on the mutual relationship between political transnationalism and the nature  
54  
55 of politics of inclusion and exclusion in the sending society. The political field in Burundi  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 may at times extend far beyond the borders of Burundian territory, because political  
4  
5 opposition is exiled and only can operate in Kenya, Tanzania and Belgium. In these cases  
6  
7 politics spills over borders and the political field expands, but borders continue to matter  
8  
9 in defining who belongs and who does not belong to the *polis* – i.e. who can and who  
10  
11 cannot claim political citizenship. In the Burundian case the political field expands and  
12  
13 contracts depending on the nature of the political field inside Burundi. At times,  
14  
15 opponents must leave the country in order to participate in the political struggle, because  
16  
17 real political citizenship rights are so narrowly defined, in practice excluding large  
18  
19 sections of the population. At other times, the rights to participate in politics in Burundi  
20  
21 are expanded and the inclusive nature of the political field allows the point of gravity to  
22  
23 move back into Burundi. Obviously this is an interdependent mechanism, where exiled  
24  
25 Burundians in the transnational political field exert pressure on the Burundian state,  
26  
27 forcing it to reform. My second conceptual starting point concerns the historical nature of  
28  
29 analysis. In order to explore the perpetual interaction between the transnational political  
30  
31 field and the state, it is not sufficient to explore the relations at one moment in time. I  
32  
33 therefore explore the temporal changes that have taken place and demonstrate the waxing  
34  
35 and waning of the transnational political field and the influence that it has had on  
36  
37 Burundian politics and vice versa. Finally, I claim that there is a mutual positioning  
38  
39 taking place in the political field. Although the field might be transnational, actors within  
40  
41 the field are positioning themselves and each other according to who is inside and who is  
42  
43 outside Burundi. Claiming legitimacy in the field depends on one's position in relation to  
44  
45 being inside or outside Burundi. The nation remains a strong imaginary and is used in  
46  
47 political struggles to discredit opponents and competitors.  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

### ***Waves of exclusion – the genesis of a diaspora***

Depending on the ups and downs of the conflicts in Burundi, the political field extends beyond the national borders of the territory of the state. On the one hand, political violence in Burundi forced Burundians to live abroad, while on the other hand, refugees and emigrants engaged in ‘long distance politics’<sup>5</sup>, trying to influence the political situation at home in various ways. In the camps in Tanzania they trained young men and sent them across the border to fight, while the elite in Europe had the financial means and the freedom of speech to function as spokespersons of their party in relation to the ‘international community’. They lobbied host societies in a manner of ways, from approaching national politicians to performing dances at cultural events and informing school children about their country and its problems. In order to understand firstly how various diaspora groups emerged and secondly how they have changed, we need to explore the shifting political field in Burundi, exposing the dialectic relationship between the political situation in Burundi and the role of the diaspora.

Burundi is said to be comprised of three ethnic groups; the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%) and a small group of marginalised Twa (1%). The figures may not be exact and there is doubt whether one can actually talk of ethnic groups rather than casts or classes (Chrétien 1990; Lemarchand 1996). However, the groups are ‘real’ in the sense that hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in Burundi in the name of ethnicity. The Tutsi were privileged during first German and later Belgian rule, and were perceived by the colonial administrators as a race of rulers while the Hutu were considered by the Europeans to be

1  
2  
3 best suited for manual labour. Shortly after independence from Belgium in 1962, a small  
4  
5 group of low-caste Tutsi from the south of the country monopolised political and military  
6  
7 power, introducing a strongly modernist and anti-colonial ideology. They followed a  
8  
9 double-edged policy of keeping power tightly in the hands of a small Tutsi elite while  
10  
11 claiming that Burundians were a united people and that ethnicity was invented by the  
12  
13 colonial administration in order to divide and rule the Burundian people, and mention of  
14  
15 ethnicity was banned in the 1970s.<sup>6</sup>  
16  
17  
18  
19

20  
21  
22 In 1972 a small Hutu revolt in the southern part of the country resulted in massive  
23  
24 retaliation by government troops that systematically killed up to 150 000 Hutu, mostly  
25  
26 the educated (down to secondary school) and the elite who were assumed to be behind  
27  
28 the plot, leading some scholars to call it a 'selective genocide'.<sup>7</sup> This watershed event  
29  
30 forced hundreds of thousands of Hutu into exile. A few fortunate managed to get to  
31  
32 Europe – often because they already had scholarships in Belgium already. Here, they  
33  
34 were inspired by the 1968 student movement and the general anti-imperialist rhetoric of  
35  
36 the European Marxist Youth and formed various Marxist student unions, that later moved  
37  
38 into transnational politics.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

45  
46 By far the largest number of Hutu, however, fled across the borders to neighbouring  
47  
48 countries. In Rwanda, a 'Hutu regime' was in place, welcoming their fellow Hutu, and  
49  
50 allowing many to attend school and university there. The less fortunate ended up in  
51  
52 camps in Tanzania where these non-educated people who had not been involved in  
53  
54 politics and who had not previously identified themselves with ethnic labels, became  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 acutely aware of their 'Hutuness'. In the refugee camps, they realised that they had been  
4 targeted and forced to flee due to their ethnicity. In 1980 the first serious Hutu opposition  
5 party, Palipehutu (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu), was formed by Rémy Gahutu,  
6 who had been exiled in Rwanda but who was expelled from there due to his radical  
7 politics and the Rwandan government's need to maintain good relations with the  
8 government in Burundi. An agronomist by training, Gahutu was a skilled orator and a  
9 real 'man of the people'<sup>8</sup> and decided to start 'awakening the Hutu masses' in the most  
10 isolated refugee camp in Tanzania, Mishamo, where expected the population to be the  
11 most susceptible to his ideology.<sup>9</sup> According to Gahutu, the major task of Palipehutu was  
12 to combat the government's ideology of 'one nation - one people' and insist on the  
13 essential differences between the different 'races' and on the long historical roots of the  
14 conflict between Hutu and Tutsi which, according to him, dated back to the 14<sup>th</sup> century  
15 when Tutsi invaded the country from the North and subjugated the peaceful autochthon  
16 Hutu.

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the one party state controlled civil society down to the  
40 slightest detail, monitoring and punishing any dissent (Laely 1997). With such a limited  
41 room for political resistance inside the country, opposition politics was formulated in  
42 camps in Tanzania, among a young Hutu elite in Habyarimana's 'Hutu dominated'  
43 Rwanda and among a small Hutu elite in Belgium and elsewhere in Europe. In other  
44 words, *de facto* exclusion from political citizenship in Burundi led Hutu in exile to seek  
45 inclusion and claims to political citizenship from the outside. Palipehutu managed to re-  
46 cast and subvert Burundian history and set a political agenda that was neither possible nor  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 thinkable inside the country at that point in time. A narrow definition of citizenship and a  
4  
5 restrictive political field made it impossible to create an opposition inside the country. At  
6  
7  
8 the same time it was the sense of loss that exile had created that made this vision of a  
9  
10 homeland – an authentic homeland, liberated from the Tutsi - thinkable.  
11

12  
13  
14  
15 In the late 1980s the political situation in Burundi began changing, due in part to pressure  
16  
17 from donors to introduce ‘good governance’ (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000) and from  
18  
19 Palipehutu which had begun to infiltrate the country from Rwanda and Tanzania. In 1989  
20  
21 the government created a National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity  
22  
23 that produced a report acknowledging the existence of an ethnic conflict, although it was  
24  
25 treated very lightly (Ndikumana 1998). The press was given more freedom and a new  
26  
27 constitution was adopted in 1992. This constitution mentioned that Burundi was made up  
28  
29 of several population components, thereby indirectly admitting that there were several  
30  
31 ethnic groups in the country (Reyntjens 1995, 9). The same year, political parties were  
32  
33 legalised, as long as they were not based on region, ethnicity or religion, thereby  
34  
35 excluding Palipehutu, with its explicit ideology of Hutu liberation. Meanwhile Frodebu  
36  
37 (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi), a moderate ‘Hutu party’ with several Tutsi in the  
38  
39 leadership, managed to avoid mention of ethnicity and emphasised democracy and human  
40  
41 rights and won a landslide victory in June 1993. However, the optimism did not last long,  
42  
43 as the elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, was kidnapped and assassinated by Tutsi  
44  
45 officers in what Filip Reyntjens has called history’s most successful failed coup  
46  
47 (Reyntjens 1993). The Hutu reacted by putting up road blocks and killing up to 30 000  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Tutsi which prompted the army and Tutsi militias to clamp down and kill equal numbers  
4  
5 of Hutu.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 This caused a new wave of refugees out of the country. Some went to Rwanda and got  
11  
12 caught up in – and apparently quite heavily involved in – the genocide there less than six  
13  
14 months later, whereupon most fled to Tanzania or Zaire. Others went straight to the  
15  
16 massive refugee camps in Tanzania, where I did fieldwork in one – Lukole – in 1997-  
17  
18 1998. As I have written elsewhere (Turner 1998; Turner 2001), these refugees had quite  
19  
20 different and less radical views than the refugees of 1972. For various reasons they were  
21  
22 less obsessed by history and less inclined to think – explicitly at least – in terms of race  
23  
24 and were more concerned with democracy. Firstly, the political situation in Burundi had  
25  
26 changed, with the government acknowledging ethnicity to some degree in an attempt to  
27  
28 depoliticise the issue, hence making Palipehutu's main claim obsolete. Secondly, the  
29  
30 genocide in Rwanda and the involvement of Hutu in massive ethnic massacres in Burundi  
31  
32 meant that the Hutu no longer could claim the position as innocent victims of ethnic  
33  
34 violence, forcing them to downplay the ethnic card.  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 Following the violence in 1993, Hutu guerrilla movements appeared in early 1994.  
44  
45 According to several reliable accounts, the rebellion started spontaneously in several  
46  
47 parts of the country. Only later did the overall leadership, which was made up of Frodebu  
48  
49 leaders in neighbouring countries, take over the command of the rebellion. This was a  
50  
51 rather tumultuous period in Burundi's history where new lines of conflict emerged on top  
52  
53 of the ethnic conflict, as various rebel movements appeared and disappeared, at times  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 fighting one another as much as they were fighting the army. As opposed to the 1970s  
4 and 1980s, it was possible in the late 1990s to mention ethnicity in the political debate  
5  
6 inside the country. However, the security situation was bad and too open mouthed critics  
7  
8 disappeared or were forced to leave the country. These were not only government critics  
9  
10 but also critics of one or the other rebel movement. Also Tutsi began leaving the country  
11  
12 because they had criticised the government's handling of the conflict or its human rights  
13  
14 record. This in turn produced a more mixed diaspora, opposing the regime at home for  
15  
16 different reasons.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 The deteriorating security situation also resulted in a deteriorating economy (Ndikumana  
25  
26 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000). Peasants no longer planted crops for fear of  
27  
28 having to leave before harvest or of having it stolen by rebels or government forces. The  
29  
30 only economy that flourished was the contraband economy, run by the political and  
31  
32 military oligarchy (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999). This situation of economic stagnation  
33  
34 meant that also a number of young Tutsi began leaving the country and seeking asylum in  
35  
36 Europe and North America. This group of young Tutsi and a similar group of young,  
37  
38 urban, elite Hutu blurred the borderline between refugees and economic migrants. They  
39  
40 were less radical politically and in general less interested in politics altogether. Rather  
41  
42 than directing their frustrations into political projects, they were adventurers seeking  
43  
44 individual success. In this way we might question whether they were part of the diaspora  
45  
46 at all. The Hutu and Tutsi who managed in the following years to get to Belgium and  
47  
48 other European and North American countries, joined the small Hutu diaspora that had  
49  
50 been in exile since 1972 as well as a number of Hutu and Tutsi who had been sent to  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 study in Belgium in particular during the reform period in the late 1980s and early  
4  
5 1990s.<sup>10</sup>  
6  
7  
8  
9

### 10 11 ***Belgium – a divided, politicised diaspora*** 12

13  
14 In Belgium the small group of radical Hutu with Marxist and revolutionary inclinations,  
15 who had fled Burundi following the genocidal violence in 1972, were joined in the late  
16  
17 1980s by a number of Hutu post graduate students who were in Belgium on government  
18  
19 grants. At first there was mutual suspicion between them, as the old refugees were  
20  
21 convinced that these Hutu were ‘turncoats’ at best and spies for the regime at worst. One  
22  
23 of these students from that era tells me how he had almost expected the exiled politicians  
24  
25 in Belgium to have horns from the incredible stories he had heard about them. With the  
26  
27 reforms in the early nineties some Hutu returned from neighbouring countries as did a  
28  
29 few from Europe, and the political field moved back into Burundi where a lively debate  
30  
31 was taking place.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39

40 Many remained in exile, however, sceptical of the process. These people were  
41  
42 unfortunately proven right by the events, following the assassination of the president.  
43  
44 Now these people say: ‘what did I say’ and use it as a reason for not having faith in the  
45  
46 present peace process. Pascal, who was a student in Belgium at the time, went back to  
47  
48 Burundi for a visit in October 1993. He thanks God today that he had a return ticket and a  
49  
50 visa to Belgium in his hand. He returned to Belgium and sought asylum. He dare not  
51  
52 return now in case the same happens. Now he does not have the return ticket and the visa.  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 In the late 1990s the picture in Belgium became more mixed, as new groups of  
4  
5 Burundians arrived. Many were Hutu who had been politically active, but there were also  
6  
7 a number of Hutu and Tutsi human rights activists, journalists and other non-partisan  
8  
9 critics of the government. As opposed to previous 'cohorts' they were equally critical of  
10  
11 the opposition as well. Finally, many young Hutu and Tutsi from elite families arrived  
12  
13 simply because life was getting very difficult in Bujumbura and they saw better  
14  
15 opportunities in Belgium. However, rather than mixing freely and creating an alternative  
16  
17 to the antagonistic politics inside the country, they managed to create separate groups that  
18  
19 did not mix.<sup>11</sup> The following example illustrates these divisions:  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 Each year on October 21<sup>st</sup> the Burundian diaspora is invited to a mass at the Koekelberg  
28  
29 Cathedral in Brussels, followed by a reunion to commemorate the death of Melchior  
30  
31 Ndadaïe, the country's first democratically elected president who was killed by Tutsi  
32  
33 officers only three months after being elected. There are speeches by Ndadaïe's widow  
34  
35 and by party representatives and other dignitaries.  
36  
37  
38  
39

40 This is not shared by all the diaspora, however. On the well known internet site  
41  
42 [www.umuco.com](http://www.umuco.com) an invitation is posted by 'La Diaspora de la Communauté Tutsi en  
43  
44 Belgique' to commemorate 'the genocide against the Tutsi' to take place 23<sup>rd</sup> October,  
45  
46 2004. After the mass there will be testimonies by survivors and finally, during the drinks,  
47  
48 'dissemination of pictures and written documents on the genocide of Tutsi in Burundi.'  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 In Belgium, home to the largest Burundian population in Europe, people would always  
4 tell me, when I explained my research, that there are at least two diasporas. The Hutu and  
5 the Tutsi do not mix at all. They do not greet in the corridors at Louvain La Neuve, their  
6 favourite catholic university, and they do not frequent the same bars.<sup>12</sup>  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12

13  
14  
15 Apart from the ethnic cleavage there are cleavages among the Hutu as well. These are  
16 based primarily on time of arrival. I realised this when visiting the three principal cultural  
17 groups in Brussels. In theory, these groups are simply concerned with traditional  
18 drumming and dancing, and are open to all. However, it turns out that one has almost  
19 exclusively Tutsi members, another has Hutu members who arrived in relation to the  
20 massacres in 1972 – as well as their children who often are born in Belgium, while the  
21 last group consists primarily of Hutu who arrived after the troubles in 1993. Like in the  
22 refugee camp, the refugees who arrived here first are – broadly speaking – more  
23 uncompromising and radical in their opinions while the newcomers have a more nuanced  
24 view on the conflict.  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

41 Exclusion from the *polis* inside the country – the fact that Hutu were effectively denied  
42 political citizenship in Burundi, was essential to the emergence of a political diaspora in  
43 Belgium as it was in Tanzania. From outside the territory of Burundi this diaspora could  
44 make claims to citizenship rights, politicising the diaspora to the degree that even  
45 traditional drumming was linked to political factions within the diaspora. The political  
46 fault lines among Burundians in Belgium coincide to a large degree with time of arrival,  
47 stressing the point that the shape of the political field inside Burundi at the time of  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 departure is detrimental to the ways in which the diaspora performs its political position –  
4  
5 the earlier arrivals in general being more radical and uncompromising than the later  
6  
7 arrivals. The Hutu who had been in Belgium since 1972, had to a large extent remained  
8  
9 within the frame of mind of Palipehutu, believing that they were up against a Tutsi  
10  
11 government of malevolent genociders. The later arrivals, on the other hand, had  
12  
13 experienced democratic reforms and a domestic political field in Burundi which was less  
14  
15 polarised, and therefore perceived the conflict and its historical causes in more nuanced  
16  
17 and ambiguous ways, at odds with the Palipehutistes. Once in Belgium, their views did  
18  
19 not merge. On the contrary, each group stuck to its ideals and was not ready to  
20  
21 compromise. Apart from the different political contexts from which they left, the various  
22  
23 diaspora groups reinforce the antagonisms through mutual positioning as political others.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

### 30 ***Shifting the point of gravity back home***

31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 After years of negotiations mediated by Julius Nyerere and later by Nelson Mandela, a  
37  
38 large number of political parties and movements signed the Arusha Accords in August  
39  
40 2000. This set off a transition period with various reforms and power sharing agreements.  
41  
42 A free and vibrant press emerged, heavily supported by international NGOs who had  
43  
44 realised the importance of media propaganda in ethnic violence and wanted to counter  
45  
46 this. Despite the Arusha Accords and despite the fact that Hutu now were represented in  
47  
48 government, security was still bad as some rebel movements still kept fighting. When I  
49  
50 did fieldwork in Bujumbura in 2003 – well into the transition period - Hutu politicians,  
51  
52 returning from exile in order to take up positions in the government, were given 24 hour  
53  
54 protection by the South African defence force, and there was a night curfew in  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Bujumbura. However, one after one the rebel movements signed ceasefires and were  
4  
5 demobilised, many of their soldiers being integrated into the national defence force and  
6  
7 *gendarmerie* which had so far been dominated by the Tutsi, and despite some minor  
8  
9 setbacks, the peace process has been quite successful. In 2005 elections were held, giving  
10  
11 a former hard-liner rebel movement, CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défence de  
12  
13 la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défence de la Démocratie) led by Pierre Nkurunziza, an  
14  
15 overwhelming victory.<sup>13</sup> Only one small rebel group, FNL (Forces National de la  
16  
17 Libération) led by Agathon Rwaswa, has not yet been fully enrolled in the peace process  
18  
19 and continues to fight around the capital, Bujumbura. It signed a peace agreement with  
20  
21 the government September 7<sup>th</sup>, 2006, but the terms of the agreement remain vague  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27 (International Crisis Group 2006).<sup>14</sup>  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 In many ways, the diaspora is superfluous in this situation. In the past the Burundians in  
33  
34 Belgium saw it as one of their main *raisons d'être* to provide Burundians and the outside  
35  
36 world reliable alternative information, unrestricted by government censorship. However,  
37  
38 with a more or less free press, their information now seems both superfluous and often  
39  
40 out of touch. In other words, they no longer play a vital role in putting political pressure  
41  
42 on the government, putting them in a dilemma as to what their new role should be. When  
43  
44 I did fieldwork in Belgium and Denmark in 2002-2004, many of them still believed that  
45  
46 they had privileged access to 'the truth'. Those who were in Burundi had been fooled,  
47  
48 they maintained, into believing that they had freedom of expression and access to  
49  
50 unbiased news. In fact, this situation was more dangerous than in the 1980s where the  
51  
52 Tutsi so obviously showed their oppressive side, because now the Tutsi had constructed a  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 façade of openness and democracy, while hiding their true intentions and thus keeping  
4 the key to 'real' power.<sup>15</sup> In exile, they can keep their head clear and see through these  
5 conspiracies, they believe. In this sense a group of Burundians in Belgium and Denmark  
6 can maintain the illusion that they still play an important part in Burundi's political field.  
7  
8 They do not accept the fact that the political field has moved back inside the territory of  
9 the state and left them in limbo.  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19

20 Depending on where they are in the diaspora, Burundians have reacted very differently to  
21 the shrinking of the transnational political field. The refugees in camps in Tanzania have  
22 worried about their security and have only returned once the hilltops in Burundi were safe  
23 and once the Tanzanian authorities had made life too hard for them in the camps. Nairobi  
24 was once a regional 'hub' of political activity; the junction between the refugee camps  
25 and the elite in Europe. Many opposition politicians were based there, and it was in  
26 Nairobi that meetings were arranged, arms deals were sealed, and plans conceived.  
27  
28 Everyone came through Nairobi on their way from A to B. Now most of the politicians  
29 have returned to good positions in the Burundian government. The Burundians that I  
30 encountered in Nairobi in May 2004 were mostly young men – and quite a few young  
31 women - living clandestinely in Kawangware and Sattelite, a fairly new, semi-rural, very  
32 poor part of Nairobi. They had virtually no income and lived with the constant threat of  
33 being stopped by the police and having to give a bribe or going to jail. Their strong  
34 Pentecostal belief helped guide them and keep their spirits high while it functioned as a  
35 way of keeping discipline, helping them stay away from sex, alcohol and gambling.  
36  
37 Although they help each other like brothers through the hard times, their projects were  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 strictly personal, as they hoped for a ‘miracle’ that would get them a job, an education or  
4 a visa to Europe. The young ‘born-again’ men hesitated between staying and returning.  
5  
6 This is because in spite of Nairobi being a tough place to live, they were well aware that  
7  
8 life would also be tough on them in Burundi. And they feared for their lives in Burundi  
9  
10 because young Hutu men who have been in exile are often considered rebels or  
11  
12 *génocidaires* by those who remained. And most of these boys had been involved in the  
13  
14 rebellion one way or another before becoming born again Christians. In sum, Nairobi has  
15  
16 been depoliticised; the important politicians have mostly returned, the young men who  
17  
18 used to live in the camps and be part of the rebellion have turned to God and most of  
19  
20 those who arrive now, are looking for adventure and personal fortune in East Africa’s  
21  
22 metropolis.  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 In Belgium, Burundians are similarly faced with the dilemmas of a depoliticised  
33  
34 transnational space, although the contexts produce different personal dilemmas. Given  
35  
36 the present peace process, a few of the Hutu in Europe have returned to Burundi to ‘help  
37  
38 build the nation’ as they would put it. Many of these had been active exile politicians and  
39  
40 were offered positions in the new administration. The majority, however, have chosen to  
41  
42 stay in Europe for the time being. At political meetings they would criticise the Hutu  
43  
44 leadership in Burundi for giving in to the Tutsi, and they would claim that the Tutsi could  
45  
46 still take power in a military coup as they had done before. In fact they believed that the  
47  
48 Tutsi still held power because they controlled the army. In private conversations, people’s  
49  
50 choices to stay or go were more complex and involved a number of human factors. A  
51  
52 middle aged man and his wife who both are unemployed – in spite of him having a Ph.D.  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 in geology and her being a nurse - and live in a flat in a high rise building on the outskirts  
4 of Brussels say that they would return first thing there was peace. 'I'll be on the first  
5 plane', they say. But then they start reflecting more seriously on the issue. There is the  
6 question of healthcare and the children's schooling. And in Burundi he might be able to  
7 get a job in the state, but that would be badly paid. One might be able to survive off the  
8 wages up country but not in Bujumbura where living is expensive. And security is bad  
9 outside Bujumbura. Most refugees would have similar hesitations although to varying  
10 degrees. They feel lonely in Brussels where everyone is so busy. In Bujumbura there  
11 would always be visitors, a Tutsi housewife tells me but also admits that it was because  
12 you had domestic servants in Bujumbura, making socialising easier.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand,  
13 they are well aware that life is tough in terms of finding employment at the moment. Or  
14 as a successful young man who has been lucky to get a job as a doctor – after doing extra  
15 courses – tells me, while driving me home in his brand new Audi: 'It has taken us years  
16 to get this far in Belgium. Why throw it all over board and start all over again?'

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39 There is in other words, a difference between the private choices people make and the  
40 public reasons given for staying in Belgium in spite of political reforms in Burundi. This  
41 is due to the fact that everything is politicised in diaspora, and every choice has to be  
42 related to political strategies – just like the cultural groups or the commemorations.  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
Rather than say that they remain here because they have a nice house or for their  
children's sake, they claim that the Hutu who have returned either are on the payroll of  
the Tutsi or are too naïve to see that they are being tricked. In this manner, they manage

1  
2  
3 publicly to uphold the image of themselves as political dissidents that are forced to live in  
4  
5 exile, rather than being individuals who make pragmatic choices in life.  
6  
7  
8  
9

### 10 11 ***Bujumbura- the pragmatics of real politics*** 12

13  
14  
15  
16  
17 In June 2003, during the second half of the three year transition government - Domitien  
18  
19 Ndayezeye, a Hutu from Frodebu is president - I visit Nahimana<sup>17</sup> in his 'home' in  
20  
21 Bujumbura. It is a small, newly built hotel-apartment where he lives alone. Only the  
22  
23 South African soldiers outside indicate that a member of the National Assembly lives  
24  
25 here. This is obviously a temporary solution, as he has left his wife and children in  
26  
27 Holland. He is a Tutsi himself but a member of Frodebu and has always been a strong  
28  
29 critic of the *ancient regime*. Just like the refugees who are still in Belgium weighing the  
30  
31 pros and cons of returning, the choice for people like Nahimana has not been straight  
32  
33 forward. Many returning politicians leave their families abroad. Perhaps they do not quite  
34  
35 have faith in the peace process that they are part of, they are waiting to see what the  
36  
37 future may bring before jeopardising the safety of their families. Fleeing the country  
38  
39 alone is after all easier than as a family. Apart from concerns about security, there are  
40  
41 also more pragmatic concerns to be taken into account. Another member of the National  
42  
43 Assembly, Mr Butasi, has lived in camps in Zaire, then in Tanzania and finally in  
44  
45 Copenhagen where he stayed for two years but was never granted asylum. When in  
46  
47 Denmark, he sent money to his wife in the camp in Tanzania, so that she could go to  
48  
49 Lusaka. He returned to Bujumbura in February 2002 and has brought his wife and  
50  
51 youngest children from Lusaka but left the oldest in Lusaka. She has followed the  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 English language school system, and they don't want her to have to do the last year in the  
4  
5 French system in Bujumbura.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 In spite of the pragmatic circumstances around choosing to return, they see their choice  
11 as part of a heroic deed – a duty that History has given them. This opinion was backed up  
12 by the other members of the national assembly that had returned from exile that I  
13 systematically interviewed in June-July 2003. They have to return to help rebuild their  
14 country – whatever the personal costs. In their discourse they are in other words  
15 sacrificing themselves for the common good – running the risk of being killed, having to  
16 live with armed guards all the time, and living separated from their closest family.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29 When talking about the politicians in Europe, they agree that they are very radical and  
30 uncompromising. 'It is easy just to criticise when you are sitting comfortably in  
31 Belgium,' they say. Belgium is perceived to be the worst place for in-fighting and radical  
32 politics, because it is so closely linked to Burundi. Nahimana says 'to live in Belgium is  
33 like living in Burundi.' That is why he chose Holland. In other words, it seems to have  
34 brought all the divisions from Burundi with it but not the imperative to negotiate. 'But  
35 here we have to find solutions. We must compromise. That is what politics is about. You  
36 cannot achieve anything without compromise.' In the words of Butasi who puts the blame  
37 on 'democracy and liberty': 'In Belgium you can say whatever you want without it  
38 having consequences – neither for your security nor for political decisions. Here things  
39 are more *delicate*. Here, you have a big responsibility. Your words have consequences.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60 So you have to compromise.' He goes on to explain that politicians here are 'partenaires'

1  
2  
3 while those that are 'there' just criticise. But it takes time to adapt and gain this attitude  
4  
5 of reconciliation, he says and claims that he has also changed his opinions and approach  
6  
7 after returning. The reason behind this, he claims, is that the Burundians in Europe get  
8  
9 their information via the internet, by phone, etc. 'They prefer to believe the news that  
10  
11 they get from the rebels rather than what we tell them. The internet is their Bible!'  
12  
13

14  
15  
16  
17 The political leadership in Bujumbura is well aware of the power of the diaspora – to  
18  
19 which many of them used to belong – and the president and other high ranking politicians  
20  
21 regularly meet the diaspora in Europe in an attempt to have a dialogue and 'soften' them.  
22  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 This picture of the reconciliatory politics in Bujumbura is not all glossy, however.  
28  
29 Several Tutsi groups – such as Action Contre Génocide, PA Amasekanye, and a faction  
30  
31 of Uprona – see the returning Hutu politicians as *génocidaires* who planned a genocide  
32  
33 against the Tutsi in 1993. From another perspective, Hutu politicians who remained in the  
34  
35 country during 'the problems,' find that the returnees are taking all the limelight. They  
36  
37 feel that they struggled and suffered most, while the leaders in Europe had an easy life  
38  
39 where they did not risk being jailed or killed for their opinions. Now the exiles have  
40  
41 come back and taken all the attention due to their good connections, while those who  
42  
43 suffered the most are not acknowledged.  
44  
45  
46  
47

48  
49  
50 In sum, there are many perspectives on the role of exiles, stayees and returnees  
51  
52 respectively, depending on which angle one sees them from. The difficult personal  
53  
54 choices in relation to a transition period which could result in peace and prosperity but  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 could equally end in genocide and war are inserted into political discourses. The  
4  
5 perception of returnees range from anything from opportunists who want a piece of the  
6  
7 peace cake, over naïve pawns in the Tutsi game, to heroes who are rebuilding the nation  
8  
9 or *génocidaires* who have conned the international community into letting them into  
10  
11 power again. Similarly, the diaspora can be seen as sensible people who can see things  
12  
13 clearer from a distance and therefore see the dangers in the so-called peace process or  
14  
15 radicals who are out of touch and simply read their own internet sites, reconfirming their  
16  
17 own prejudiced views.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

### 26 ***The mutual relationship between inside and outside***

27  
28 This paper has attempted to illustrate the continuous and complex relationships between  
29  
30 homeland and diaspora. The diaspora has had an enormous influence on the political  
31  
32 process in Burundi, although it is impossible to measure such influence, as it covers a  
33  
34 whole range of factors that cannot be quantified. The most tangible influence is,  
35  
36 obviously, the armed rebellion, using bases in Congo and Tanzania, allying with various  
37  
38 militias from Rwanda and Congo and sending young men from camps. The influence of  
39  
40 the diaspora's lobbying activity in Europe is harder to assess. The elite in Europe has the  
41  
42 financial means and the freedom of speech to function as spokespersons of their party in  
43  
44 relation to the 'international community'. They lobby host societies in a manner of ways  
45  
46 from approaching national politicians to performing dances at cultural events and  
47  
48 informing school children about their country and its problems. The Burundi Committee  
49  
50 in Denmark (Burundikomiteén) in the 1980s is illustrative. Being founded by Danish  
51  
52 Baptists who have had missionary activities in Burundi since the 1920s, this small  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 organisation with only ten members (roughly half Danish and half Burundian) used its  
4  
5 connection to a Baptist member of the Danish parliament to arrange a meeting with the  
6  
7 parliamentary committee of foreign affairs. They also organised a visit by founder of  
8  
9 Palipehutu, Remy Gahutu, where he had meetings with several Danish parliamentarians.  
10  
11 The influence that internet sites, based in diaspora, might have on public opinion abroad  
12  
13 and at home is even more elusive. There is no doubt, however, that the diaspora is  
14  
15 detrimental to the survival of these sites. When, for instance, agora.com was banned in  
16  
17 Burundi in 2002 because it allegedly incited ethnic hatred, a Tutsi in Denmark decided to  
18  
19 host it in Denmark.  
20  
21  
22  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 There are influences the other way as well. As we have seen in the historical overview,  
28  
29 changes in the political field inside Burundi have forced the diaspora to redefine itself  
30  
31 according to the hegemonic political discourse inside Burundi. In the 1980s Palipehutu  
32  
33 gained strength, vindicating a discourse of ethno-national liberation. This was defined in  
34  
35 an antagonistic relation to the dominant discourse of the one party state, which claimed  
36  
37 that ethnicity did not exist. With the reforms in the early nineties, however, the regime  
38  
39 partially accepted the idea of ethnicity, rendering Palipehutu without a cause. In stead a  
40  
41 group of young intellectual Hutu who had studied in Rwanda set the agenda as moderates,  
42  
43 calling for democracy rather than liberation. Similar changes are taking place presently.  
44  
45  
46  
47 With former rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, as democratically elected president, the  
48  
49 Hutu diaspora is in disarray. Meanwhile a Tutsi diaspora is emerging, gradually shifting  
50  
51 from a number of individuals in Europe and North America to a more political diaspora.<sup>18</sup>  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 The question is whether it makes sense at all to talk about the homeland affecting the  
4 diaspora and vice versa. With a diaspora so dispersed, living in very different conditions  
5 – from refugee camps to clandestine lives in Nairobi to doctors in Belgium – and so  
6 politically split, the affects are bound to be equally divergent. Perhaps it is more fruitful  
7 to think of it as a single political field that happens to be spread, geographically, over  
8 several continents; a transnational political field. There are thus discrepancies in opinions  
9 but everyone engages in the same field – which is a central point of Bourdieu's concept  
10 of the political field. It is through these struggles that the field is created.  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 I am not implying that national boundaries are irrelevant, however. Firstly, they are  
25 instrumental in the ongoing mutual positioning in the political field. Political  
26 entrepreneurs discredit each other according to where they are located in the transnational  
27 political field. In rough lines, those in North America and Europe are accused by those  
28 inside the country of being 'out of touch with reality' while those inside Burundi are  
29 perceived of by the diaspora as being 'blinded by power and position'. In other words,  
30 while the inside and the outside conflate in transnational political practice, the *idea* of the  
31 inside versus the outside is upheld as a significant differentiating principle in the game of  
32 political positioning.  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51

### ***Conclusion: a transnational political field in flux or dissolution?***

52 Once people leave Burundian soil, they do not necessarily leave Burundi. On the contrary,  
53 during periods of political exclusion, it was necessary for the political opposition to leave  
54 the territory in order to enter the political field. This raises important questions about  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 political citizenship, and the nature of diasporic identities as opposed to other  
4  
5 transnational identities. Involving oneself in politics as a great many Burundians abroad  
6  
7 do, is to claim political citizenship rights to the nation-state. Being in exile, one is in a  
8  
9 sense excluded from such full rights but then again those who fled did so because they  
10  
11 did not enjoy full political citizenship in the first place. I have argued that a political  
12  
13 diaspora emerged due to exclusion from the national political citizenry. They organized  
14  
15 politically and thus shifted the point of gravity of the political field outside the national  
16  
17 borders.  
18  
19  
20

21  
22  
23  
24 In the case of the Burundian diaspora of the 1970s and 80s, they were making claims to  
25  
26 citizenship in/through exile. When excluded from the political field in Burundi – de facto  
27  
28 loosing citizenship – they moved to Belgium and elsewhere to claim their rights as  
29  
30 citizens. However, citizenship always contains two dimensions, on the one hand claims to  
31  
32 certain rights, on the other hand, it always includes an aspect of belonging. This has been  
33  
34 the central tenet of the nation-state – always connected by the hyphen, making rights to  
35  
36 the state and belonging to the nation inextricably locked together, albeit in a state of  
37  
38 tension.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

45  
46 There are two important theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this. Firstly, the two  
47  
48 aspects of citizenship have their (negative) equivalents in diaspora – with citizenship  
49  
50 being what diaspora lacks. Secondly, the shifts in the point of gravity in Burundi's  
51  
52 transnational political field lead to shifts in the nature of the diaspora as identity politics  
53  
54 takes over where claims making lets go.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 While citizenship arguably is about rights and belonging, diaspora is concerned with  
7  
8 making claims and longing. Diaspora identity revolves around loss and longing, as is well  
9  
10 established in the literature on the subject. However, linking it to citizenship and to the  
11  
12 nature of the political field might help us understand the nature of diaspora vis-à-vis other  
13  
14 transnational practices. Being linked to forced exodus, being linked to exclusion from the  
15  
16 political field at home, diasporic identities attempt to recreate the link to the lost nation –  
17  
18 which is exactly the location of ideology. Ideology attempts to cover the gap between the  
19  
20 real experienced world and longing – it creates political ideologies. However, these  
21  
22 ideologies of longing for the homeland translate into very concrete claims made on the  
23  
24 state. The Burundian diaspora claims the right to be included in the political citizenry of  
25  
26 the nation-state, in this sense conflating longing and claims-making.  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33

34 When the first wave of Hutu arrived in exile in the 1970s and 1980s, a strongly  
35  
36 politicized diaspora emerged due to the political system in Burundi. This first cohort  
37  
38 remained effectively outside political influence and hence could indulge in radical  
39  
40 identity politics without any connections to real-politics. We must remember, however,  
41  
42 that their position – however radical it may appear today – was in fact very realistic at the  
43  
44 time. Given the nature of the political field in Burundi at the time, a Hutu nationalist  
45  
46 discourse was the only viable alternative to the one party state's dominant ideology.  
47  
48 Exiles were politicized in both senses (claims making and longing), and their political  
49  
50 opinions were determined by the nature of the political field at the time. In the 1990s, the  
51  
52 political field was less bipolar and less split between inside and outside the country.  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Inside and outside merged and the point of gravity moved to the outside. In this period,  
4  
5 the diaspora was heavily politicized but more engaged in claims making than in identity  
6  
7 politics. In recent years, the point of gravity has gradually shifted back inside, and those  
8  
9 left in exile have no more claims to make on the state. So they remain in exile with their  
10  
11 'longing'. In the post-conflict situation, they need no longer make claims to rights from  
12  
13 abroad. They are granted full political citizenship inside Burundi. However, 'longing'  
14  
15 remains for those who remain in exile – for whatever reasons. They are involved in  
16  
17 identity politics while excluding themselves from real politics.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## References

- ADAMSON, FIONA 2002 'Mobilizing for the transformation of home: politicized identities and transnational practices', in Nadge Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds), *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, London: Routledge
- ANDERSON, BENEDICT 1991 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso [rev. and extended, 2nd edn]
- 1994 *Exodus*. *Critical Inquiry*. Issue 20
- APPADURAI, ARJUN 1996 *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press
- AXEL, BRIAN KEITH 2004 'The context of diaspora', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 19, no.1, pp. 26-60
- BALIBAR, ETIENNE 1991 'The nation form: history and ideology', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (eds), *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, London: Verso, pp. 86-107
- BASCH, LINDA G., SCHILLER, NINA GLICK and BLANC, CRISTINA SZANTON 1994 *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach
- BAUBÖCK, RAINER 2003 'Towards a political theory of migrant transnationalism', *International Migration Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 700-23
- BAYART, JEAN-FRANÇOIS, ELLIS, STEPHEN and HIBOU, BÉATRICE 1999 *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Oxford: Indiana University Press

- 1  
2  
3 BOURDIEU, PIERRE, and THOMPSON, JOHN B. 1991 *Language and Symbolic*  
4 *Power*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press  
5  
6  
7  
8 BOWMAN, GLENN 1994 'A country of words: conceiving the Palestinian nation from a  
9 position of exile', in Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *The Making of Political Ideologies*, London:  
10 Verso, pp. 138-71  
11  
12  
13  
14 CHRETIEN, JEAN-PIERRE 1990 'L'ethnisme au Burundi: tragédies et propagandes',  
15 *Politique Africaine*, vol ?, no ?, pp. 182-90  
16  
17  
18  
19 CLIFFORD, JAMES 1994 'Diasporas', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 9, no. ?, pp. 302-38  
20  
21  
22 COHEN, ROBIN 1997 *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, Seattle: University of  
23 Washington Press  
24  
25  
26  
27 ELLIS, PATRICIA, and KHAN, ZAFAR 2002 'The Kashmiri diaspora: influences in  
28 Kashmir', in Nadjie Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds), *New Approaches to Migration?*  
29 *Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, London: Routledge, pp.  
30 169-86  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36 FAIST, THOMAS 2000 *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and*  
37 *Transnational Social Spaces*, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
38  
39  
40  
41 FUGLERUD, ØIVIND 1999 *Life on the Outside - The Tamil Diaspora and Long*  
42 *Distance Nationalism*, London: Pluto Press [1st ed.]  
43  
44  
45  
46 GUARNIZO, LUIS and SMITH, MICHAEL PETER (eds) 1998 *Transnationalism from*  
47 *Below*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers  
48  
49  
50  
51 GUPTA, AKHIL and FERGUSON, JAMES 1997 *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations*  
52 *in Critical Anthropology*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2006 *Burundi: Democracy and Peace at*  
4  
5 *Risk*, Nairobi/ Brussels: International Crisis Group  
6  
7  
8 ITZIGSOHN, J. *et al.* 1999 'Mapping Dominican transnationalism: narrow and broad  
9  
10 transnational practices', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 316-39  
11  
12 JACKSON, PETER, CRANG, PHILIP and DWYER, CLAIRE 2004 'Introduction: the  
13  
14 spaces of transnationality', in Peter Jackson, Philip Crang and Claire Dwyer (eds),  
15  
16 *Transnational Spaces*, London: Routledge, pp. 1-24  
17  
18  
19 KLEIST, NAUJA 2007 'Spaces of Recognition - An Analysis of Somali-Danish  
20  
21 Associational Engagement and Diasporic Mobilization', PhD dissertation, Department of  
22  
23 Sociology, Copenhagen University, Copenhagen, Denmark  
24  
25  
26 LACLAU, ERNESTO and MOUFFE, CHANTAL 1985 *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy:*  
27  
28 *Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso  
29  
30  
31 LACLAU, ERNESTO and ZAC, LILIAN 1994 'Minding the gap: the subject of politics',  
32  
33 in Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *The Making of Political Identities*, London: Verso, pp. 11-40  
34  
35  
36 LEMARCHAND, RENÉ 1970 *Rwanda and Burundi*, London: Pall Mall Press  
37  
38  
39 -- 1996 *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
40  
41 LEMARCHAND, RENÉ and MARTIN, DAVID 1974 *Selective Genocide in Burundi*,  
42  
43 London: Minority Rights Group  
44  
45  
46 LEVITT, PEGGY 2001a 'Transnational migration: taking stock and future directions',  
47  
48 *Global Networks*, vol. 1, no 3, pp. 195-216  
49  
50  
51 -- 2001b *The Transnational Villagers*, Berkeley: University of California Press  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 LEVITT, PEGGY, DEWIND, JOSH and VERTOVEC, STEVEN 2003 'International  
4 perspectives on transnational migration: an introduction', *International Migration Review*,  
5  
6 vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 565-75  
7  
8

9  
10 MALKKI, LIISA H. 1992 'National geographic - the rooting of peoples and the  
11 territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees', *Cultural*  
12  
13 *Anthropology*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 24-44  
14  
15

16  
17 -- 1995 *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu*  
18  
19 *Refugees in Tanzania*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press  
20  
21

22 NDIKUMANA, LEONCE 1998 'Institutional failure and ethnic conflicts in Burundi',  
23  
24 *African Studies Review*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 29-47  
25  
26

27 -- 2000 'Towards a solution to violence in Burundi: a case for political and economic  
28 liberalisation', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 431-59  
29  
30

31 NGARUKO, FLORIBERT and NKURUNZIZA, JANVIER 2000 'An economic  
32 interpretation of conflict in Burundi', *Journal of African Economies*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.  
33  
34 370-409  
35  
36

37  
38 ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, EVA KRISTINE 2001 'Transnational political practices and  
39 the receiving state: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands', *Global Networks*,  
40  
41 vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 261-82  
42  
43

44 -- (ed.) 2003a *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and*  
45  
46 *Transnational Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
47  
48

49 -- 2003b 'The politics of migrants' transnational political practices', *International*  
50  
51 *Migration Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 760-86  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 PORTES, ALEJANDRO 2001 'Introduction: the debates and significance of immigrant  
4 transnationalism', *Global Networks*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp.181-94  
5  
6

7  
8 PORTES, ALEJANDRO, GUARNIZO, LUIS and LANDOLT, PATRICIA 1999 'The  
9 study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field', *Ethnic and*  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

REYNTJENS, FILIP 1993 'The proof of the pudding is in the eating - the June 1993  
elections in Burundi', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 563-83

-- 1995 *Breaking the Cycle of Violence*, London: Minority Rights Group

-- 2006 'Briefing: Burundi: a peaceful transition after a decade of war?', *African Affairs*,  
vol. 105, no. 418, pp. 117-35

SAFRAN, WILLIAM 1991 'Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and  
return', *Diaspora*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83-100

SCHILLER, NINA GLICK and WIMMER, ANDREAS 2002 'Methodological  
nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences', *Global*  
*Networks*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 301-34

SCHILLER, NINA GLICK, BASCH, LINDA and BLANC, CRISTINA SZANTON  
1995 'From immigrant to transmigrant - theorizing transnational migration',

*Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 48-63

SHEFFER, GABRIEL (ed.) 1986 *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, New York:  
St. Martin's

SKRBIS, ZLATKO 1999 *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and*  
*Identities*, Aldershot: Ashgate

1  
2  
3 TURNER, SIMON 1998 'Representing the past in exile: the politics of national history  
4 among Burundian refugees', *Refuge, Canada's periodical on refugees*, vol. 17, no. 6, pp.  
5  
6 22-30  
7  
8

9  
10 -- 2001 'The Barriers of Innocence - Humanitarian Intervention and Political Imagination  
11 in a Refugee Camp for Burundians in Tanzania', PhD dissertation, International  
12 Development Studies, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark  
13  
14

15  
16 -- 2005 'The Tutsi are afraid we will discover their secrets - on secrecy and sovereign  
17 power in Burundi', *Social Identities*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 37-55  
18  
19

20  
21 -- 2007a 'Burundians in Belgium: constructing, performing and contesting diaspora', in  
22 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (ed.), *Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and*  
23 *Transnational Engagement*, Geneva: IOM International Organization for Migration  
24  
25  
26

27  
28 -- 2007b 'The precarious position of politics in popular imagination: the Burundian case',  
29 *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 93-107  
30  
31  
32

33  
34 TYNER, JAMES A. and KUHLKE, OLAF 2000 'Pan-national identities: representations  
35 of the Philippine diaspora on the world wide web', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, vol. 41, no. 3,  
36  
37 pp. 231-52  
38  
39

40  
41 Van Hear, Nicholas 1998 *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping*  
42 *of Migrant Communities*, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press  
43  
44

45  
46 WAYLAND, S. 2004 'Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri  
47 Lankan Tamil diaspora', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 405-26  
48  
49

50  
51 WILLIS, KATIE, YEOH, BRENDA and FAKHIRI, ABDUL KHADER 2004  
52 'Introduction', in Brenda Yeoh and Katie Willis (eds), *State/Nation/Transnation*, London:  
53  
54 Routledge, pp. 1-16  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



ZIZEK, SLAVOJ 1989 *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London: Verso

<sup>1</sup> Thus Guarnizo and Smith (1998) launched the concept 'transnationalism from below', while Levitt (2001b) launched the concept 'transnational villagers', trying to find a level between below and above and Tyner and Kuhlke (2000) talk of 'pan-nationalism'. Finally, a growing number of studies explore why some migrants engage more in transnational activities than others exploring factors such as sending and receiving state policies (Faist 2000; Levitt, DeWnd and Vertovec 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a).

<sup>2</sup> Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b) distinguishes in a similar manner between the usual question of 'why' and her own interest in the 'how' and the 'then what' of transnational political engagement.

<sup>3</sup> Most recent literature actually shows that it is the most 'integrated' and 'successful' immigrants that engage in transnational activities. They are in other words not forced into it due to lack of rights and opportunities in the host society (Kleist 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).

<sup>4</sup> See Clifford (1994), Cohen (1997) and Van Hear (1998) for an overview.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of this concept see Anderson (1994), Appadurai (1996), Ellis and Khan (2002), Fuglerud (1999); Schiller, Basch and Blans (1995), Sheffer (1986), Skrbis (1999) and Wayland (2004).

<sup>6</sup> See Lemarchand (1970, 1996). However, while scholars like Ndikumana claim that 'governments engineered ideologies to deny the existence of ethnicity in order to mask the amplitude of ethnic discrimination.' (Ndikumana 1998, p 33), I have argued elsewhere that we must comprehend these apparent double standards as part of a larger anti-colonial ideology (Turner 2001, 2005).

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed analysis, see Lemarchand and Martin (1974).

<sup>8</sup> This is based on reading his manifesto and on numerous interviews with Burundians of all political observations. Of particular value were interviews with his co-founders in Belgium and Denmark, Joseph Murengerantwari and Etienne Karatase. Karatase was vice-president of Palipehutu and took over the leadership when Gahutu died in 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, this was the camp where Liisa Malkki (1995) found her fascinating 'mythico-histories' about the essential differences between Hutu and Tutsi since time immemorial. Although she does not

1  
2  
3  
4  
5 focus on politics, it is remarkable how much these mythico-histories are in line with Palipehutu ideology.

6  
7 See also Turner (1998, 2001) for a critique of her work.

8  
9 <sup>10</sup> For an analysis of these various 'cohorts', see Turner (2007a).

10  
11 <sup>11</sup> For a thorough analysis of these factions, see Turner (2007a).

12  
13 <sup>12</sup> In Brussels and in Antwerp I have been to bars where I was the only white person, everyone else being  
14 from the Great Lakes region. However, Hutu and Tutsi would rarely frequent the same places.

15  
16  
17 <sup>13</sup> The main contenders in the election were CNDD-FDD and Frodebu, which had previously been by far  
18 the largest 'Hutu' party in the country and had won a landslide victory in the previous elections in 1993.

19  
20 Thus, for the first time, political competition was between Hutu rather than between Hutu and Tutsi.

21  
22 Feeling the pressure, Frodebu launched a smear campaign, accusing CNDD-FDD of collaborating too  
23 closely with the Tutsi (Reyntjens 2006).

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>14</sup> Exploring contemporary politics in Burundi is like exploring a moving target. When research was  
28 initiated, Burundi was still engulfed in a bloody civil war. When much of the fieldwork for this article was  
29 gathered, the country was in the process of implementing a transition process. At the time of writing, the  
30 political landscaped has transformed dramatically once more, creating new conspiracy theories, new lines  
31 of tension and a new public political imagination.

32  
33  
34  
35  
36 <sup>15</sup> For issues of conspiracy and secrecy in Burundian politics, see also Turner (2005, 2007b).

37  
38  
39 <sup>16</sup> Most of the refugees in Europe, whether Hutu or Tutsi are from the elite and are used to comfortable  
40 lives with servants at home.

41  
42  
43  
44 <sup>17</sup> Pseudonym. Given the small size of the Burundian elite where 'tout le monde se connait', I have also  
45 changed other details in the life stories.

46  
47 <sup>18</sup> It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the various groups in Europe and North America.

48  
49 However, it seems that the Burundian diaspora is more politicized in Belgium than anywhere else. In  
50 Denmark, for instance, interaction between Hutu and Tutsi is much more common. Many Burundians say  
51 that going to Belgium is like not leaving the country, in the sense that the conflict follows you. In other  
52 countries it is easier to make a new beginning. While the diaspora is less politicized and more concerned  
53 with being successful in the host societies in USA and Canada, it is still divided along ethnic lines. Thus,  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60 Tutsi tend to settle in New Jersey while Hutu settle inside New York.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



For Peer Review Only