



**HAL**  
open science

## Towards a Transatlantic Dialogue in the Study of Immigrant Political Transnationalism

Marco Martiniello, Jean-Michel Lafleur

► **To cite this version:**

Marco Martiniello, Jean-Michel Lafleur. Towards a Transatlantic Dialogue in the Study of Immigrant Political Transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2008, 31 (04), pp.645-663. 10.1080/01419870701784471 . hal-00513305


**HAL Id: hal-00513305**

**<https://hal.science/hal-00513305v1>**

Submitted on 1 Sep 2010

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



**Towards a Transatlantic Dialogue in the Study of Immigrant  
Political Transnationalism**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2007-0012.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	Transnationalism, Political Participation, comparative research, United States, Europe, Political transnationalism



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8 Towards a Transatlantic Dialogue in the Study of Immigrant Political  
9  
10 Transnationalism  
11

12  
13  
14  
15 Marco MARTINIELLO

16  
17 (FNRS Research Director, CEDEM, University of Liège)

18  
19  
20 Jean-Michel LAFLEUR

21  
22 (FNRS Research Fellow, CEDEM, University of Liège)  
23  
24

---

25  
26  
27 The political involvement of migrants in their country of origin, combined with the  
28 governments of sending countries' reciprocal intervention in the political activities of  
29 migrants in the receiving countries, partly explain what is commonly described as  
30 transnational politics. Yet, as the literature shows, this generic term covers a wide  
31 range of political activity. The purpose of this special issue is to establish to what  
32 extent the place in which immigrants settle (namely the region or country) might  
33 determine the types of political activity in which they engage. More precisely, we  
34 aim to ascertain whether and for what reasons different forms of transnational  
35 political activity develop in the United States and Europe. To achieve this rather  
36 ambitious goal, through looking at a series of case studies from Europe and the USA  
37 we try to identify the full range of such activities, while at the same time noting  
38 various similarities in the actions undertaken by communities based in the same  
39 area.<sup>i</sup>  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

57  
58 The underlying challenge of this collective effort is thus to demonstrate the  
59 usefulness of a transatlantic dialogue and transatlantic comparisons in the study of  
60

1  
2  
3 immigrant political transnationalism. Before trying to argue in favour of such an  
4  
5 exercise, however, it is necessary to question the value of making comparisons  
6  
7 between the USA and Europe in the first place. Despite it having become fashionable  
8  
9 in the past decade, does it really make sense to compare US and European  
10  
11 experiences in this area given the huge historical and present-day differences  
12  
13 between these two parts of the world? First, the USA is nowadays often presented as  
14  
15 a 'nation of immigrants', as a nation-state built by immigrants even though this was  
16  
17 not always the case in the past (Zolberg 2006). But Europe, on the other hand, while  
18  
19 undoubtedly a *de facto* immigration continent (Thränhardt 1992; Martiniello 2007),  
20  
21 is seen as a non-state (Wiener 1998) formed by different nations built before the  
22  
23 large-scale immigration that was basically unwanted as a permanent component of  
24  
25 the nation. Second, the historical 'racial divide' originating in slavery between black  
26  
27 and white, which continues to play a major role in debates and policies in the USA,  
28  
29 finds no equivalent fracture in Europe.  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 This is not of course to say that racism does not exist in Europe, but that the  
37  
38 heritage of slavery plays differently in current debates on immigration, ethnicity and  
39  
40 race on each side of the Atlantic. Third, the European continent hosts several former  
41  
42 colonial and imperial powers, while the USA is a former colony that has  
43  
44 progressively become an imperial power. Fourth, the role of religion in both societies  
45  
46 seems quite different. Whereas many European countries became more secularized  
47  
48 in the twentieth century, the USA seems to remain globally a more religious country.  
49  
50 Fifth, Europe, at least the older member states of the EU, is characterized by a  
51  
52 relatively strong welfare state, though there is some debate about its future, whereas  
53  
54 the social safety net remains less protective in the USA and this difference is relevant  
55  
56 in the context of debates on immigration. Sixth, NAFTA and the EU are very  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 different integration processes and, for the purposes of this special issue, we regard  
4 the difference in terms of freedom of circulation and movement of people as well.  
5  
6 Finally, national unity is not a political issue in the USA, whereas in Europe unity of  
7  
8 member states is regularly questioned, especially by ultra nationalist and separatist  
9  
10 forces in several of its member states (like, for example, Belgium, Italy and Spain).  
11  
12

13  
14  
15 Beyond these differences, however, there are similarities between the USA  
16  
17 and Europe in terms of migration, ethnicity and race. First, both regions are magnets  
18  
19 for millions of potential migrants, many of whom take huge risks to cross  
20  
21 increasingly militarized borders. Second, similar contradictory trends can be  
22  
23 observed on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in urban settings, towards social,  
24  
25 economic, ethnic, racial and religious fragmentation on the one hand and towards  
26  
27 cohesion, group border crossings and interculturalism on the other. Finally, similar  
28  
29 limits to public action, in the field of migration and in post-migration policies, are  
30  
31 noted in the USA and Europe.  
32  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 It seems as if the historical distinction between traditional countries of  
38  
39 immigration (the USA, Canada and Australia) and nations that existed as such prior  
40  
41 to migration (the EU member states) is becoming increasingly blurred. The USA and  
42  
43 Europe are both *de facto* regions affected by international migration. On both sides  
44  
45 of the Atlantic Ocean, immigration and integration are hot political, policy and  
46  
47 public issues. Old immigration policies and old patterns of integration and  
48  
49 assimilation seem obsolete; in the USA and in Europe any issue that touches on  
50  
51 transnationalism acts as a potent indicator of this obsolescence. This makes  
52  
53 comparison a valuable tool in one's attempt to make sense of global phenomena that  
54  
55 might affect the two parts of the industrial and post-industrial world differently.  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 If one is to define immigrant political transnationalism appropriately, it is first  
4 necessary to discuss the broader concept of transnationalism. After looking at earlier  
5 uses of the term, we focus on its reappearance in the context of globalization, in  
6 which different scientific disciplines describe specific forms of cross-border  
7 exchanges. Then, having examined the context, development and controversies that  
8 transnationalism creates we turn to a precise form of transnational activity, namely  
9 immigrant political transnationalism. Here again, we discuss different viewpoints  
10 expressed in the literature and support a definition of the concept that is both precise  
11 and operational.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24  
25 In the next section of the paper we ask what scientific use immigrant political  
26 transnationalism may have for the study of migrants' political activities. We also  
27 articulate the limits of the concept and suggest some directions for future research in  
28 which knowledge is currently weak. Finally, we examine the comparability of  
29 transnational political phenomena as studied in the USA and Europe and discuss how  
30 this special issue contributes to the greater comparability we believe is necessary.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

### 41 **Transnationalism: context and definition**

42  
43  
44  
45

46 The interest of different social-science disciplines (including economics, sociology,  
47 political science and anthropology) in studying globalization and its impact on  
48 society has shed light on the concept of transnationalism in such a way that a variety  
49 of definitions now exist. All these definitions, however, agree that transnationalism is  
50 a way of describing cross-border exchanges.  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

57 The emergence of transnationalism as a scientific concept for studying  
58 migration is actually considerably older than the 1990s, when the term is often  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 believed to have been coined. In fact, as early as 1916 Randolph Bourne wrote an  
4 article that cast doubt on the melting-pot hypothesis and argued instead for the  
5 creation of a 'Trans-national America'.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 The 1990s thus saw a reappearance of the concept in new research  
11 programmes, in the creation of new journals and in the publication of numerous  
12 books and special issues of journals. This infatuation with the term was especially  
13 visible in North America. The quantity of literature produced on the topic soon  
14 revealed a major controversy over its origins, nature and pertinence. Is  
15 transnationalism a concept, a theory, a field, an approach or a discipline? Does it  
16 describe a new reality or is it an old wine in a new bottle? Who engages in  
17 transnational activities? These are only some of the questions that animate  
18 discussions on it and that illustrate one of Kivisto's (2001, p. 550) criticisms that 'the  
19 concept suffers from ambiguity as a result of competing definitions that fail to  
20 specify the temporal and spatial parameters of the term and to adequately locate it  
21 *vis-à-vis* other concepts'.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 A frequently quoted definition of immigrant transnationalism is that of Basch,  
39 Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton who define it as  
40  
41  
42

43  
44  
45 the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social  
46 relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call  
47 these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today  
48 build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders (1994,  
49 p. 7).  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

This definition contains three major elements in the apprehension of immigrant transnationalism. First, it implies that, contrary to assimilationist views, the links between the individual and the nation-state are not exclusive but multiple. Migrants involved in transnational activities develop simultaneous social, political or economic involvements in the country of origin and in the country of destination. Obviously, this potentially sparks off debates about state sovereignty in much the same way as the question of double (or multiple) citizenship had done before.

Second, the space within which migrants work, conduct their social, political and religious lives or even raise a family cannot be clearly divided between the home and receiving country. Here, the work of Thomas Faist must be mentioned, for he sees transnational social spaces as ‘combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places’ (1998, p. 8). Transnational spaces are thus not static but rather dynamic entities that can change over time. However, to qualify as transnational, it is not necessary for migrants to move physically within this new space. The mere impact of the economic, social, political or religious activity can be qualified as such (Lafleur 2005). To call a migrant’s actions transnational does not therefore require that he or she lives in two spaces simultaneously. Few migrants, except perhaps the so-called Asian astronauts, can actually pretend that they do (Faist 1998). According to this last criterion, communities such as German Kurds or Cuban Americans may conduct transnational activities even though they face difficulties moving back and forth between the host and home country.

Third, this definition implies that transnationalism potentially concerns every aspect of a migrant’s life – family life, work, political involvement and associative



1  
2  
3 activities can all have transnational implications. Yet, the intensity of transnational  
4  
5 political activity may vary substantially from one individual to another. Indeed, a  
6  
7 migrant's life can also have no or very few transnational implications.  
8  
9

10 Basing themselves on the work of Merton, Portes et al. (1999, p. 218–9)  
11  
12 suggest that the creation of a new scientific concept can only be justified if the  
13  
14 activities under study happen on a stable and recurring basis, involve a significant  
15  
16 share of the migrant community and if other concepts fail to capture the new reality.  
17  
18 This has several implications. Occasional transborder contacts, doing business once  
19  
20 in a while or keeping the right to vote in the home country are insufficient in  
21  
22 themselves (these sporadic activities may, however, reinforce existing transnational  
23  
24 linkages). Furthermore, to mobilize the concept of transnationalism, a significant part  
25  
26 of the community has to be involved in these practices. The idea is that the concept  
27  
28 'should designate a distinct class of activities or people' that are not covered by  
29  
30 another concept and therefore transnationalism should aim to describe a new reality.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 The question of the concept's novelty and how it differs from other  
37  
38 international, postnational, supranational or diasporic practices is central to the  
39  
40 literature on transnationalism (see Castles 2002; Kennedy and Roudometof 2002).  
41  
42 Some scholars point out that migrants have always kept links with their country of  
43  
44 origin, even at times when communication technologies were less developed than  
45  
46 they are today. For instance, early Italian migrants to the United States were called  
47  
48 'birds of passage' because of their frequent returns to Italy (Piore 1979). Others –  
49  
50 like Stephen Castles (2002; 2003) – go even further back in time and state that what  
51  
52 some scholars call 'transnational communities' are merely modern forms of what  
53  
54 used to be called diasporas. Vertovec (2004b), however, has pointed out that one  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 should not fall into the trap Merton described as the ‘fallacy of adumbration’, which  
4  
5 implies that one looks into the past for proof that a practice is not new.  
6  
7

8 While it is clear that transnational practices present some similarities with  
9  
10 these old activities, globalization and technologies have added two new  
11  
12 characteristics to diasporic practices. These are intensity and sustainability. Indeed,  
13  
14 these old diasporic practices of maintaining links with the country of origin have,  
15  
16 thanks to globalization, the potential to concern larger parts of a migrant community  
17  
18 and be sustained through time (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Pries 2001). Not the least  
19  
20 of the changes brought about by globalization is the development of communication  
21  
22 technologies and the greater affordability of transport that facilitate both the  
23  
24 movements and various exchanges between the country of residence and the country  
25  
26 of origin (Vertovec 2004a). This nuance to the novel character of transnationalism  
27  
28 does not answer the concerns of Waldinger and Fitzgerald because it insists ‘on a  
29  
30 qualitative distinction between an ill-defined and unperiodized now and then. [By]  
31  
32 claiming discontinuity, the students of immigrant transnationalism have effectively  
33  
34 dehistoricized the present’ (2004, p. 1187).  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

41 Another major debate found in the scientific literature refers to the nature of  
42  
43 transnationalism. Long before the emergence of this literature, Sayad (in a seminal  
44  
45 article written in 1975) repeatedly stressed the importance of studying emigration to  
46  
47 understand immigration more fully. In other words, migrants are not citizens who cut  
48  
49 the links with the home country on the day of arrival in the host country. Without  
50  
51 naming it as such, Sayad thus introduced transnationalism as a research perspective  
52  
53 in the study of migration.  
54  
55  
56

57 Defining transnationalism as a perspective or scientific concept is the  
58  
59 appropriate choice at this stage. Albrow (1998) supports this idea while emphasizing  
60

1  
2  
3 that transnationalism is a field to which different disciplines contribute but by no  
4 means a discipline by itself. Caglar (2001, p. 607) too perceives transnationalism as a  
5 new lens that serves to analyse these new movements stimulated by globalization. To  
6 avoid the difficulty attached to community-based comparisons (see below), we  
7 recommend that research should now focus on *transnational practices* rather than on  
8 *transnational communities*. Kivisto (2001, p. 561) rejects this recommendation on  
9 the grounds that 'the study of immigrants can never be simply the study of  
10 individuals and families, but must at all points take account of the corporate life  
11 within which individuals and families are embedded'. While we agree that the study  
12 of immigrants' transnational activities must be connected to the social context in  
13 which they take place, we nonetheless maintain that it is scientifically dubious to  
14 *essentialize* transnationalism because, although all migrants can potentially and to  
15 different degrees be involved in transnational activities, no migrant community is by  
16 nature transnational. Because community-based studies naturally tend to emphasize  
17 those factors that are specific to a community, they tend to essentialize  
18 transnationalism, while studies that focus on practices could provide researchers with  
19 a clear object with which to conduct comparative work from a non-essentialist  
20 perspective.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46 Facing those transnational practices, one may further distinguish a more  
47 general *transnational condition* that emerged in the context of globalization (Portes  
48 et al. 1999). It refers to the increasing duality that characterizes certain migrants'  
49 lives. Speaking two languages, having two passports, owning a house in two  
50 countries or earning money by doing business between two spaces are different  
51 characteristics of the transnational condition.  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## **Immigrant political transnationalism: migrants and politics in the era of globalization**

In the study of migration, the concept of political transnationalism has been used to describe a great variety of activities, such as those of citizens being members of associations active in two different countries, political parties running campaigns across borders, and lobbying national authorities of one country in order to influence its foreign policy toward the community's country of origin. Portes et al. (1999, p. 221) sum up their view of political transnationalism as 'the political activities of party officials, governmental functionaries, or community leaders whose main goals are the achievement of political power and influence in the sending or receiving countries'.

Following this definition, the concept of political transnationalism has also been mobilized in the study of public policies of sending states that influence the migrants' level of homeland political participation (for example, citizenship and external voting policies). In a critique of Smith and Guarnizo's (1998) division of transnational practices between 'transnationalism from above' associated with the activities of corporations and states and 'transnationalism from below' associated with migrants, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004, p. 1180) argue that '[d]escribing the actions of states as transnational, however, deprives the concept [of immigrant transnationalism] of analytic leverage, as it meant to distinguish cross-border, non-state actors from states and to show how the two constrain and shape one another'.

In line with this comment, this special issue hence puts the focus on the transnational political activities of migrants and, as is illustrated in different papers, supports the idea that the action of the state and the migrants are sometimes closely

1  
2  
3 intertwined, leading states to revise their policies based on the pressure exerted by its  
4  
5 emigrants. It is, however, necessary to add that state policies can also influence  
6  
7 migrant political activism that is determined by factors such as a modified political  
8  
9 opportunity structure foreign to the immigrants.  
10  
11

12  
13 Several scholars have tried to classify immigrant transnational activities. One  
14  
15 of the most interesting of these attempts has been made by Østergaard-Nielsen, who  
16  
17 identifies three broad categories of transnational political activity. The first,  
18  
19 homeland politics, consists of the political activities in which migrant communities  
20  
21 engage in the host country on issues that exclusively concern the home country.  
22  
23 Through 'transnational activism', the migrant community shows its support or  
24  
25 hostility for the political regime of its homeland or, as Guarnizo et al. (2003, p. 1239)  
26  
27 put it, the term 'is a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-  
28  
29 distance social obligations and belonging and seek to transform political practices in  
30  
31 their sending countries'.  
32  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 The second, immigrant politics, refers to the political activities undertaken by  
38  
39 the community to improve its social status in the host country. Immigrant politics  
40  
41 includes attempts to fight discrimination or to gain more political, economic or social  
42  
43 rights. However, not all immigrant politics is transnational but it may become so  
44  
45 when the authorities in the home country take an interest in the debate on the  
46  
47 integration of their emigrants in the host country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 21) or  
48  
49 when communities proceeding from the same country of origin but residing in  
50  
51 different destination countries organize their demands across borders.  
52  
53  
54

55  
56 The third, translocal politics, differs from the other two categories in that it  
57  
58 does not necessarily involve the governments of either the host or home country. It  
59  
60 refers to the initiatives of migrant communities or individuals who seek to provide

1  
2  
3 concrete support to specific localities in the home country (generally in the area from  
4 which they originate). Using Moroccan development networks as an example,  
5 Lacroix (2003, p. 126–7) has shown that states are eager to have a say in these  
6 migrants' projects in the home country. On the one hand they see it as a useful means  
7 of developing rural areas and on the other they want to be involved because they are  
8 concerned that migrant associations might encroach on some of their powers.  
9

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Even though this typology is helpful in understanding the full diversity of transnational political activities, it should not be accepted without criticism. For instance, it fails to make clear how translocal politics differs from homeland politics. Also, relying too heavily on this typology could give the impression that, from a normative viewpoint, immigrant transnational political activity is always desirable, plays a positive role or is well regarded by the political actors of both the receiving and sending countries. This statement is not supported by the recent violent confrontations between Kurds and Turks in various European countries, and the host state's reaction to them. These events have shown how homeland politics may challenge security and cohesion in the receiving country. At a different level, the perception that the emigrant vote played a decisive role in recent elections in Italy and Galicia has led observers to raise doubts about the legitimacy of external voters and about the positive effect of transnational political participation on consolidated democracies.

To return to Østergard-Nielsen's typology, the mere act of designing a category risks giving the impression that spaces of political action are clearly separated from one another, which is obviously not the point we are trying to make here. The same community can engage in immigrant and homeland politics jointly. In other words, the fight for a better status as a migrant in the host country is not

1  
2  
3 incompatible with political action in the home country. However, if one is to look at  
4  
5 different practices in relation to the concept of transnationalism, one has necessarily  
6  
7 to show how they differ from traditional migrant political practices. Relying on the  
8  
9 earlier definition by Portes and on the work of Østergard-Nielsen, we suggest the  
10  
11 following operational definition of the concept of immigrant political  
12  
13 transnationalism.  
14  
15

16  
17 Immigrant political transnationalism covers any political activity undertaken  
18  
19 by migrants who reside mainly outside their homeland and that is aimed at gaining  
20  
21 political power or influence at the individual or collective level in the country of  
22  
23 residence or in the state to which they consider they belong. Such power or influence  
24  
25 may be achieved by interacting with all kinds of institutions (local, subnational,  
26  
27 national or international) in the country of residence and/or the home country, by  
28  
29 supporting movements that are politically active in the country of origin or by  
30  
31 intervening directly in the country of origin's politics.  
32  
33  
34

35  
36 When analysing political power in the country or countries of residence, one  
37  
38 may speak of immigrant political transnationalism when the activities are conducted  
39  
40 by migrants of the same national origin but residing in different destination  
41  
42 countries, or when the state authorities of the sending country interfere with their  
43  
44 emigrants' activities in the country of residence.  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 **Advantages and limits of the concept of immigrant transnationalism in**  
52  
53 **developing research on migrants' political participation**  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Once having attempted to clarify the concepts with which this special issue deals, we  
4  
5 can better identify their strengths and weaknesses in the development of fresh  
6  
7 research on migrant's political practices in Europe and the United States.  
8  
9

10  
11 One of the major assets of the concept is that it underlines the link between  
12  
13 globalization and immigrant practices. Technological progress in communication  
14  
15 technologies, the increasing intensity and velocity of exchanges of all sorts (goods,  
16  
17 services and information) and the development of affordable long-distance travel  
18  
19 have provided migrants with new means with which to connect with their home  
20  
21 country. By stressing the duality of some migrants' lives, transnationalism questions  
22  
23 a traditional approach to migration that would focus solely on the country of  
24  
25 residence, which is a major weakness of traditional research in this field.  
26  
27  
28

29  
30 A further advantage of the concept of transnationalism is that it potentially  
31  
32 challenges methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). In the study of  
33  
34 migration, methodological nationalism translates into an exaggerated focus on the  
35  
36 country of residence. As mentioned earlier, Sayad has proved beyond doubt that  
37  
38 immigration cannot be understood fully if the study of emigration is neglected. The  
39  
40 social links created by transnational activities cross geographic, cultural and political  
41  
42 borders and thus oblige researchers to take the two spaces into account.  
43  
44 Transnationalism therefore gives one a chance of avoiding methodological  
45  
46 nationalism by encouraging researchers to consider the object of their research from  
47  
48 different national perspectives. Yet, replacing methodological nationalism with  
49  
50 methodological transnationalism is not without risks. Indeed, the dominance of  
51  
52 American researchers in the study of transnational practices also implies that  
53  
54 transnationalism is strongly rooted in the US experience. The risk is to neglect other  
55  
56 viewpoints such as the major findings by French scholars like Ma-Mung (1996),  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 Peraldi (2002), or Tarrus (2001; 2002). These authors, among others, have stressed  
4  
5 the importance of looking at migration as a circulation within social and economic  
6  
7 spaces that encompass both what are often called 'countries of origin' and 'countries  
8  
9 of residence'.  
10  
11

12  
13 The focus of transnationalism on two specific national spaces has revealed  
14  
15 another major advantage of the concept: it encourages researchers to conduct  
16  
17 detailed studies on specific communities that move across these borders (see for  
18  
19 instance Levitt 2001 or Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The tendency in these studies to  
20  
21 privilege richness of detail over generalization has, however, meant that little  
22  
23 comparative work has been done so far. It is accordingly very difficult to draw  
24  
25 general lessons from this variety of case studies.  
26  
27  
28

29  
30 One difficulty a researcher faces when comparing case studies has to do with  
31  
32 the relationship between immigrants' involvement in transnational activities and  
33  
34 their integration in the country of residence. In a study on transnational practices  
35  
36 among Mexican Americans, Roberts et al. (1999, p. 261) support the idea that these  
37  
38 practices are an answer both to social stratification and to individuals' lack of access  
39  
40 to opportunities in the host and home countries. Indeed, they argue that 'transnational  
41  
42 fields of activity are more consequential for poorer, less-skilled migrants and will  
43  
44 result in stronger transnational migrant communities. The highly-skilled professional  
45  
46 or large-scale entrepreneur has less need to depend on purely transnational fields of  
47  
48 action'. In later research on transnational political practices in Colombian,  
49  
50 Dominican and Salvadoran communities in the United States, Guarnizo, Portes and  
51  
52 Haller draw a different picture of Latino transnational activism. It shows that 'results  
53  
54 indicate that transnational political activities are not the refuge of marginalized or  
55  
56 poorly educated immigrants' and that, contrary to assimilationist views, the 'length  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 of residence in the United States does not reduce interest or involvement in home  
4  
5 country politics but actually increases it' (Guarnizo et al. 2003, p. 1238). More  
6  
7 recently, in an article comparing the involvement of Colombian, Dominican and  
8  
9 Mexican immigrant transnational organizations in development projects in the  
10  
11 country of origin, Portes, Escobar and Radford (2007) have underlined how the  
12  
13 socio-economic profile of the migrants involved in these activities, their level of  
14  
15 politicization or the implication of the sending state may vary between these  
16  
17 communities. While these comparative efforts contribute to a better comprehension  
18  
19 of why different communities living in the same receiving area develop different  
20  
21 practices, they do not answer one of Waldinger and Fitzgerald's (2004, p. 1191)  
22  
23 concerns about the influence of the political culture of the receiving country, for  
24  
25 which they recommend 'within-group comparisons across different national  
26  
27 incorporation systems'.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32

33  
34 This last example introduces another question related to transnationalism that  
35  
36 concerns the links between transnational political practices and citizenship. Can a  
37  
38 citizen be politically active in two national spaces? Can allegiance to the state be  
39  
40 split? What impact do these multiple political participations have on the migrants'  
41  
42 identity and sense of belonging? All these questions and their citizenship dimension  
43  
44 remain unsatisfactorily answered in the current literature on transnationalism.  
45  
46  
47

48 These questions relate strongly, however, to three dimensions of modern  
49  
50 citizenship as defined by Leca (1991) – a legal status that grants civic, political and  
51  
52 social rights and obligations to its holders; a set of social roles that allows an  
53  
54 individual to make choices in public affairs (like being a voter or activist); and  
55  
56 various civic qualities deemed necessary to be a 'good citizen' (one of which is that  
57  
58 all citizens agree to respect the primacy of a public interest).  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 While being critical of the concept of immigrant transnationalism, Kivisto  
4 recognizes that the attitude of some homeland governments to their emigrant  
5 populations has recently changed as many now try to create links with them. The  
6 consequence is that:  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11

12  
13 rather than condemning their decision to exit or enticing them to return, they  
14 [the homeland governments] instead work to create relationships with the  
15 immigrants that are beneficial to the homeland. To the extent that immigrants  
16 perceive these relationships to be mutually beneficial, the potential for a  
17 transnational social field arises (2001, p. 563).  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29 Similarly, Bauböck (2003) perceives that states are now involved in  
30 promoting new forms of political participation (for instance by extending the right to  
31 vote to emigrants or by reserving seats in parliament for their representatives).  
32 Sending states that promote the transnational political participation of their emigrants  
33 necessarily modify the three dimensions of citizenship. Legal status is the most  
34 visible change when, for instance, double nationality is allowed to emigrants but the  
35 social roles attached to citizenship are also affected by transnational political  
36 activities (for example by adding a symbolic value to the emigrant vote). Finally,  
37 with these practices and new citizenship opportunities, the migrant becomes a citizen  
38 who lives abroad yet still retains a stake in the country of origin's internal affairs.  
39 This explicit recognition is also an extension of the civic qualities deemed necessary  
40 to be a good citizen (which sometimes coincides with the home country government  
41 changing its attitude from seeing migrants as traitors to treating them as heroes).  
42 Bauböck (2003, p. 703) thus argues that political transnationalism consists of more  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 than political activities across borders. It also includes the ‘changing and increasingly  
4 overlapping boundaries of membership in political communities’. In other words, the  
5 real novelty is the increasing ability the state grants to migrants to combine internal  
6 and external memberships without having to choose in which country they want to  
7 be politically active. Two comments must, however, be made. First, as we mentioned  
8 earlier, this new ability does not necessarily result from the immigrants’ transnational  
9 activism but may well stem from a change of opportunity structure foreign to the  
10 migrant community. And second, there are also cases when dual citizenship does not  
11 entail dual membership of political communities (for example, before 2005,  
12 Mexico’s legislation permitted dual citizenship but formally forbade dual citizens  
13 from voting in Mexico).  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

### 32 **Towards a comparative approach in the study of transnational political** 33 **activities** 34

35  
36  
37  
38 In some respects, though we have come to the conclusion that formal political  
39 relations between the emigrant community and homeland present some novel  
40 characteristics compared with older practices, the persistence of political links with  
41 the home country is much older. Nonetheless, it seems as if, during the process of  
42 migrant inclusion in the host country’s political arena, a different place has been  
43 given to a migrant’s links with his or her home country. This is what we try to show  
44 in the following paragraphs in which we describe the evolution of immigrant  
45 transnational political participation in the United States and Europe.  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

57 In the United States, a significant place has traditionally been given to these  
58 linkages through ethnic lobbying. Tony Smith splits its history into three parts  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 (Smith 2000, p. 48). The first period is from 1910 to 1930. At that time, the major  
4 ethnic actors were of European descent (Germans, Scandinavians, Irish and later  
5  
6 ethnic actors were of European descent (Germans, Scandinavians, Irish and later  
7  
8 Italians). Before then, American foreign policy was completely in the hands of white  
9  
10 Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) Americans. Until the First World War, celebrating  
11  
12 one's ethnic origins was not considered incompatible with a migrant's attachment to  
13  
14 the American nation. American culture was deemed powerful enough to assimilate  
15  
16 migrant communities over time. Hyphenated Americans were therefore not  
17  
18 discouraged from keeping strong links with their home country.  
19  
20  
21

22  
23 During the First World War, migrants from countries at war with the United  
24  
25 States were suddenly suspected of being disloyal to their country of settlement. For  
26  
27 this reason, many German Americans were keen to demonstrate their attachment to  
28  
29 the United States by abandoning their customs and language or by changing their  
30  
31 names. The question of loyalty would become even more acute during the Second  
32  
33 World War when the so-called 'enemy-aliens' would strongly feel its consequences.  
34  
35

36  
37 The second period, which is from 1945 to the end of the cold war, is  
38  
39 epitomized by the internationalization of US foreign policy. Thus, the fight against  
40  
41 communism, wherever it existed, gave huge leverage to several lobbies on American  
42  
43 foreign policy. The importance of ideology to the USA and the common goals the  
44  
45 government shared with some lobbies explain this new influence. The Cuban  
46  
47 American lobby that developed at the turn of the 1980s is probably the best example  
48  
49 of an ethnic group having derived great benefit from the anti-communist ideological  
50  
51 context.  
52  
53

54  
55 The third period starts after the fall of the Berlin wall. For Smith, the Clinton  
56  
57 era represented a peak in ethnic group influence on American foreign policy. Some  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 examples of this influence are American involvement in the peace process in the  
4  
5 Middle East and military interventions in Somalia and Haiti.  
6  
7

8           What made the USA so receptive to the demands of ethnic groups? The rise  
9  
10 of multicultural policies in the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s may have had  
11  
12 something to do with it. This was also when candidates to a national election first  
13  
14 started to travel with their political campaigns to host countries with a view to  
15  
16 collecting migrant votes and funds. Similarly, recipient countries made it easier to  
17  
18 acquire dual nationality and they set up programmes and administrations to control  
19  
20 transnational activities (Roberts et al. 1999, p. 247).  
21  
22  
23

24           For Shain (1999, p. 51) multiculturalism is partly the result of the African  
25  
26 American struggle for civil liberties, which later benefited migrant communities.  
27  
28 Shain gives three other reasons for the rising influence of ethnic lobbying in the  
29  
30 twentieth century. First, the US liberal-democratic ethos enfranchises citizens no  
31  
32 matter where they are from. Second, the media have contributed to the empowerment  
33  
34 of migrant communities by publicizing their work and amplifying the impact of their  
35  
36 actions. More specifically, the ethnic media have strengthened some migrants' sense  
37  
38 of belonging to a community and their feelings that their community has specific  
39  
40 issues to address. The third and last element is the fragmentation of the US foreign  
41  
42 policy decision-making process. According to Shain, the US Congress, by its very  
43  
44 nature, influences positively the power of ethnic groups. It is split between two  
45  
46 parties, its members do not follow a strict line defined by the party, and this room for  
47  
48 manoeuvre empowers each individual member of Congress. These individuals, in  
49  
50 return, more easily submit to the influence of lobby groups (irrespective of whether  
51  
52 or not they are ethnic) (Shain 1999, p. 80). US legislation on electoral donations,  
53  
54 which encourages lobbies to finance political campaigns in exchange for candidates'  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 later support for the lobbies' interests, further increases this pressure (Smith 2000, p.  
4  
5 101).  
6  
7

8 Ethnic lobbying in Europe differs greatly from that in the United States. First,  
9  
10 European countries confronted large immigration movements later than the United  
11  
12 States. Second, migration to Europe after the Second World War was mostly  
13  
14 organized by state-run labour recruitment schemes, which aimed to ensure that no  
15  
16 worker settled permanently in Europe. For this reason, European nations waited for a  
17  
18 long time before considering the integration of their migrant communities.  
19  
20  
21

22 The Belgian case, to take just one example among others, illustrates this trend  
23  
24 very clearly. After the Second World War the Belgian authorities set up a labour  
25  
26 recruitment programme for alien workers. The programme was designed to allow  
27  
28 only temporary migrants and it therefore ensured a rotation within the migrant  
29  
30 community. As mentioned, this delayed the implementation of a real integration  
31  
32 policy by the authorities. As guest workers, these migrants were deprived of any  
33  
34 political rights in Belgium. Labour unions thus offered the best chance of defending  
35  
36 their interests as workers in the host country and they helped many migrants become  
37  
38 familiar with the Belgian political system (Martiniello 1998, p. 109–10). At the end  
39  
40 of the 1960s, migrant local consultative councils (MLCCs) were set up in 35 Belgian  
41  
42 cities to establish contact between local politicians and the migrant population. In  
43  
44 several cities, national groups got well organized and came up with an electoral list  
45  
46 that reflected divisions in the home country. The elections that followed gave  
47  
48 migrants an opportunity to elect their MLCC representatives. While this form of  
49  
50 political participation did little to improve the status of migrants, it did, however,  
51  
52 encourage some migrants to organize politically and to establish some links with  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Belgian political parties. It also created a favourable context in which Belgians of  
4  
5 foreign origins could participate in Belgian elections (Martiniello 1998, p. 112–13).  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 The Belgian case is an illustration of why European researchers approach  
11 migration differently from their US counterparts. In Europe, the focus has been on  
12 migrants' struggles to improve their status in the host country because, as temporary  
13 workers, they were not accepted as citizens. There was thus less call than in the  
14 United States for studies on ethnic lobbying and homeland politics (Østergaard-  
15 Nielsen 2003, p. 6). Yet, one should not infer from this that ethnic lobbying and  
16 homeland politics were non-existent in Europe. There are numerous examples of  
17 migrant communities in Europe keeping strong political ties with their homelands  
18 over long periods of time. As such, the interest in transnationalism that has  
19 developed in European academic circles has progressively narrowed the gap between  
20 US and European researchers.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 The strength of this special issue lies in the fact that it draws attention to  
37 differences and similarities in the preoccupations of researchers on both sides of the  
38 Atlantic, but also suggests different angles upon which comparative projects can be  
39 built.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45

46 We suggest that there are three elements that could be used to support the  
47 idea that continuing differences may exist between US and European research on  
48 political transnationalism.  
49  
50  
51  
52

53 First, a partial comparison of José Itzigsohn and Daniela Villacrés's article on  
54 political transnationalism and the practice of democracy with Antoine Dumont's  
55 article on Moroccan political transnationalism and Moroccan migrants'  
56 representation in France, could support the argument that ethnic groups in the USA  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 organize to gain political influence, be it in their host or home country, while the  
4  
5 question of the integration and citizenship of immigrants in Europe remains  
6  
7 unresolved.  
8  
9

10 Second, in her article Peggy Levitt shows that the current preoccupations of  
11  
12 these societies still in some respects imply a choice between different issues and  
13  
14 create different approaches to the study of political transnationalism. She examines  
15  
16 the influence of transnational religious practices on civic engagement. Showing how  
17  
18 different religious communities may import different visions, she makes an  
19  
20 innovative contribution to the American debate on the separation between state and  
21  
22 church.  
23  
24  
25

26  
27 The contributions of the three European researchers demonstrate the third  
28  
29 element, namely the tendency to analyse the transnational practices of well-  
30  
31 established communities or of those in which the host country has historical links  
32  
33 with the country of origin. In the European case, this often involves a preference for  
34  
35 research on the transnational political activities of former guest-worker communities  
36  
37 or of migrants proceeding from former colonies. Rarely does this lead to what  
38  
39 Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) call 'within-group comparisons' between Europe  
40  
41 and the United States.  
42  
43  
44

45  
46 Facing the apparently enduring differences between research on political  
47  
48 transnationalism in Europe and in the USA, the contributions to this special issue  
49  
50 also show a path for possible comparative research.  
51  
52

53  
54 Researchers on both sides of the Atlantic would undoubtedly gain from  
55  
56 looking at the question from the perspective of the host country, particularly its role  
57  
58 in democratization. An absence of democracy in the homeland and the specificity of  
59  
60 the migrants' position on that issue are recurring themes in Itzigsohn and Villacrés's

1  
2  
3 article, in Simon Turner's article on the role of the Burudian diaspora in the  
4 evolution of the home country, and in Michael Collyer's article on the reinvention of  
5 a traditional political structure in a transnational context.  
6  
7  
8

9  
10 The importance of the economic dimension in the development of  
11 transnational political practices represents yet another side to transatlantic  
12 comparative research. Mexicans abroad have clearly gained numerous advantages  
13 from the economic weight of the migrant community. In his article on the  
14 contradictions of diasporic institutionalization in Mexico, Robert Smith in fact shows  
15 that financial strength does not necessarily mean that rights will be fully effective. In  
16 the case of migrant communities in Europe too, several of their homeland authorities  
17 have been incited to increase the dialogue with communities abroad (especially on  
18 issues such as their right to vote) to stimulate or maintain the flow of remittances.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30

31 A last comparative perspective proposed in this special issue concerns what  
32 Bauböck (2003) has described as an increasing capacity to participate politically in  
33 several countries. The cases of Morocco, Mexico and Dominican Republic illustrated  
34 in this article (but also for instance of Italy) make it possible to make comparisons  
35 within a specific form of transnational political activity, namely electoral  
36 participation. The use of the right to vote in the home country and the consequences  
37 this has for citizenship in the host and home societies is still largely unexplored in  
38 Europe and in the United States.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50 To conclude this conceptual introduction, it is necessary to remember that the  
51 quantity of literature on transnationalism available today has been achieved in a  
52 relatively short amount of time. The fruitful debate between supporters and  
53 opponents of the concept in Europe and the United States has made this possible.  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60 With regard to political transnationalism, this special issue aims to demonstrate that,

1  
2  
3 despite strong historical differences between the United States and Europe, the  
4  
5 substantial growth of European literature on transnational political participation  
6  
7  
8 raises the possibility that a similar conceptual approach might lead to innovative  
9  
10 research in both regions. The purpose of the articles contained in this special issue is  
11  
12 therefore not only to open up the debate on the comparability of these activities but  
13  
14 also to provide ideas for possible comparative projects in the future.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## References

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 ALBROW, MARTIN 1998 'Frames and transformations in transnational Studies',  
7  
8 *Transnational Communities Programme Research Paper Series*,  
9  
10 [http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working\\_papers.htm](http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working_papers.htm)  
11  
12

13  
14  
15 BASCH, LINDA, GLICK SCHILLER, NINA and BLANC-SZANTON, Cristina  
16  
17 1994 *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and*  
18  
19 *Derritorialized Nation-states*, Longhorn: Gordon & Breach Publishers  
20  
21

22  
23  
24 BAUBÖCK, RAINER 2003 'Towards a political theory of migrant  
25  
26 transnationalism', *International Migration Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall, pp. 700–23  
27  
28  
29

30  
31 BOURNE, RANDOLPH 1916 'Trans-national America', *The Atlantic Monthly*, July,  
32  
33 pp. 86–97  
34  
35

36  
37  
38 CAGLAR, AYSE 2001 'Constraining metaphors and the transnationalisation of  
39  
40 spaces in Berlin', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 601–13  
41  
42  
43

44  
45  
46 CASTLES, STEPHEN 2002 'Migration and community formation under conditions  
47  
48 of globalisation', *International Migration Review*, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1143–68  
49  
50

51  
52  
53 -- 2003 'Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation',  
54  
55 *Sociology*, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 13–34  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 FAIST, THOMAS 1998 'International migration and transnational social spaces:  
4 their evolution, significance and future prospects', *InIIS-Arbeitspapier*, no. 9, pp. 1–  
5  
6 40  
7  
8

9  
10  
11  
12 GUARNIZO, LUIS, PORTES, ALEJANDRO and HALLER, WILLIAM 2003  
13 'Assimilation and transnationalism: determinants of transnational political action  
14 among contemporary migrants', *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 108, no. 6,  
15  
16 pp. 1211–48  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

22  
23  
24 KENNEDY, PAUL and ROUDOMETOF, VICTOR 2002 *Communities across*  
25  
26 *Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures*, London : Routledge  
27  
28

29  
30  
31 KIVISTO, PETER 2001 'Theorizing transnational immigration: a critical review of  
32 current efforts', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 549–77  
33  
34  
35

36  
37  
38 LACROIX, THOMAS 2003 'Les réseaux marocains d'aide au développement',  
39  
40 *Hommes et Migrations*, no. 1241, pp. 121–8  
41  
42

43  
44  
45 LAFLEUR, JEAN-MICHEL 2005 *Le Transnationalisme politique: Pouvoir des*  
46  
47 *Communautés immigrées dans leurs Pays d'accueil et Pays d'origine*, Louvain-la-  
48  
49 Neuve: Academia-Bruylant  
50  
51

52  
53  
54  
55 LECA, JEAN 1991 'La citoyenneté en question', in Pierre-André Taguieff (ed.)  
56  
57 *Face au Racisme: Analyses, Hypothèses, Perspectives*, vol. 2, Paris: La Découverte,  
58  
59 pp. 311–336  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

LEVITT, PEGGY 2001 *The Transnational Villagers*, Berkeley: University of California Press

MA-MUNG, EMMANUEL 1996 *Mobilités et Investissements des Émigrés, Maroc, Tunisie, Turquie, Sénégal*, Paris: L'Harmattan

MARTINIELLO, MARCO 1998 *Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies*, Utrecht: Ercomer

MARTINIELLO, MARCO 2007 'The new migratory Europe: towards a proactive immigration policy?' in Craig Parsons and Timothy Smeeding (eds) *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 298–326

ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, EVA 2003 *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany*, London : Routledge

PERALDI, MICHEL (ed.) 2002 *La Fin des Norias: Réseaux migrants dans les Économies marchandes en Méditerranée*, Paris: Éditions Maisonneuve et Larose.

PIORE MICHAEL 1979 *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1  
2  
3 PORTES, ALEJANDRO, ESCOBAR, CRISTINA. and RADFORD,  
4  
5 ALEXANDRIA 2007 'Immigrant transnational organizations and development: a  
6  
7 comparative study', *CMD Working Paper*, no. 05-07

8  
9  
10 <http://cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0507.pdf>  
11

12  
13  
14  
15 PORTES, ALEJANDRO, GUARNIZO LUIS and LANDOLT, PATRICIA 1999  
16  
17 'The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field',  
18  
19 *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 217–37  
20  
21

22  
23  
24 PRIES, LUDGER 2001 'The disruption of social and geographic space: Mexican–  
25  
26 US migration and the emergence of transnational social spaces', *International*  
27  
28 *Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 55–74  
29  
30

31  
32  
33  
34 ROBERTS, BRYAN, FRANK, REANNE and LOZANZO-ASCENCIO,  
35  
36 FERNANDO 1999 'Transnational migrant communities and Mexican migration to  
37  
38 the US', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 238–66  
39  
40

41  
42  
43 SAYAD, ABDELMALEK 1975 'Elghorba: le mécanisme de reproduction de  
44  
45 l'émigration', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 2 March, pp.50–60  
46  
47

48  
49  
50 SHAIN, YOSSIE 1999 *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US*  
51  
52 *and their Homelands*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 SMITH, TONY 2000 *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the*  
4  
5 *Making of American Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 190  
6  
7 pages.  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 SMITH, MICHAEL PETER and GUARNIZO, LUIS (eds) 1998 *Transnationalism*  
13  
14 *from Below*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers  
15  
16

17  
18  
19 TARRIUS, ALAIN 2001 'Au-delà des états-nations: des sociétés de migrants',  
20  
21 *Revue européenne des Migrations internationales*, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 37–61  
22  
23  
24

25  
26  
27 TARRIUS, ALAIN 2002 *La Mondialisation par le Bas: Les Nouveaux Nomades de*  
28  
29 *l'Économie souterraine*, Balland: Paris  
30  
31

32  
33  
34 THRÄNHARDT, DIETRICH (ed.) 1992 *Europe. A New Immigration Continent:*  
35  
36 *Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective*, Münster and Hamburg: Lit Verlag  
37  
38

39  
40  
41 VERTOVEC, STEVEN 2004a 'Cheap calls: the social glue of migrant  
42  
43 transnationalism', *Global Networks*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 219–24  
44  
45

46  
47  
48 VERTOVEC, STEVEN 2004b 'Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism',  
49  
50 *COMPAS Working Paper*, no. 3  
51

52  
53 <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Working%20papers/wp-04-03.shtml>  
54  
55

56  
57  
58 WALDINGER, ROGER. and FITZGERALD, DAVID 2004 'Transnationalism in  
59  
60 question', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 109, pp. 1177–95



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 WIENER, ANTJE 1998 *'European' Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a*  
7  
8 *Non-State*, Boulder : Westview Press  
9

10  
11  
12  
13 ZOLBERG, ARISTIDE 2006, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy and the*  
14  
15 *Fashioning of America*, New York : Russell Sage Foundation Books  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## Notes

---

<sup>i</sup> This special issue is the product of the cluster B3 initiative of the European Network of Excellence (IMISCOE) on 'Migration and citizenship: legal status, mobilisation and political participation'.

For Peer Review Only