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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2004

Trusting Behavior in a Repeated Investment Game

Résumé

We compare a seven period repeated investment game to the one-shot investment game. On an average, in the repeated game, player A (the “trustor”) sends more and player B (the “trustee”) returns a larger percentage than in the one-shot game. Both the amount sent and the percentage returned increase up to period 5 and drop sharply thereafter. The “reciprocity hypothesis” for B players' behavior is compatible with the first five periods, but in the two end periods, most B players behaved strategically by not returning. The “reciprocity hypothesis” for A players' behavior is compatible for all periods of the game.

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hal-00459746 , version 1 (24-02-2010)

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François Cochard, Phu Nguyen Van, Marc Willinger. Trusting Behavior in a Repeated Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2004, 55 (1), pp.31-44. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.004⟩. ⟨hal-00459746⟩
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