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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Theoretical Politics Année : 2009

The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Résumé

The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Dates et versions

hal-00363218 , version 1 (20-02-2009)

Identifiants

Citer

Jean-François Laslier. The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, 21 (1), pp.113-136. ⟨10.1177/0951629808097286⟩. ⟨hal-00363218⟩

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