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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2005

Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: How much should we know about indifference surfaces?

Kotaro Suzumura
  • Fonction : Auteur
Koichi Tadenuma
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference hypersurfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes "within the Edgeworth box" is not enough, and knowledge of substantially non-local information is necessary.
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Dates et versions

hal-00246987 , version 1 (07-02-2008)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00246987 , version 1

Citer

Marc Fleurbaey, Kotaro Suzumura, Koichi Tadenuma. Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: How much should we know about indifference surfaces?. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 124, pp.22-44. ⟨hal-00246987⟩

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