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**KATRINA: EXAMEN DES RAPPORTS D'ENQUÊTE**  
**Tome 2: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina -**  
**Lessons Learned - The White House**

Patrick Lagadec

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ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE

CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE



## KATRINA: EXAMEN DES RAPPORTS D'ENQUÊTE

Tome 2: "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned" -  
The White House

Patrick Lagadec

*Juin 2007, première version*

Cahier n° 2007-11

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## KATRINA: EXAMEN DES RAPPORTS D'ENQUÊTE

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Patrick Lagadec<sup>1</sup>

Juin 2007, première version

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**Résumé:** Le cyclone Katrina a donné lieu, notamment, à trois grandes enquêtes : Chambre des Représentants , Maison-Blanche, Sénat. Nous proposons ici un deuxième travail sur le rapport de la Maison-Blanche. Comme précédemment, sur d'autres productions de commissions d'enquête, le principe est de rendre compte des éléments les plus riches, en termes d'information factuelle, d'enseignements pour le pilotage de pareils événements. Il s'agit aussi, à chaque fois qu'il apparaîtra pertinent et possible, de tenter de prolonger la réflexion proposée pour nous préparer aux crises non conventionnelles.

**Abstract:** Hurricane Katrina has led to three main inquiries: House of Representatives, The White House, the Senate. This study examines the second of these reports. As previously done on other official inquiry reports, the goal is to determine and clarify the key factual findings and the most stimulating lessons for the handling and steering of such off-the-scale events. Moreover, whenever it seems relevant, we try to extend the reflection offered by the report to help prepare for unconventional crises.

**Mots clés :** Katrina, Rapports d'enquête, Crises non conventionnelles, Risques hors cadre, Plans d'urgence, Simulations, Évacuations, Communications, Sécurité publique, Armées, Santé, Hôpitaux, Hébergement, Logistique, ONG, Rapports Public-Privé

**Key Words :** Katrina, Official Inquiries, Unconventional Crises Risks, Emergency planning, Simulations, Evacuations, Communications, The Media, The Military, Law Enforcement, Medical Care, Hospitals, Shelter and Housing, Charitable Organizations, Public-Private Partnership

**Classification JEL:**

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**“We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina and possibly even worse.”**  
[p. 65]

**“Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21<sup>st</sup> Century catastrophic threats.”**  
[p. 52]

**“At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps that (...) must be populated by *leaders* who are prepared to exhibit innovation and take the initiative during extremely trying circumstances”.**  
[p. 72]

**“When training, Federal officials should not shy away from exercising worst-case scenarios that “break” our homeland security system.”**  
[p. 73]

*The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned*  
The White House  
23 February 2006 (217 p)

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>

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## *Avant-propos*

### **Crises : Nouvelles frontières**

11-Septembre, Anthrax, 11-Mars 2003 à Madrid, Canicule 2003, Katrina en 2005 – *The Perfect Storm*. Et maintenant, l'éventualité d'une pandémie grippale.

Les sociétés complexes sont aujourd'hui confrontées à des risques et des crises de classe nouvelle, sur de multiples fronts, imbriqués. Les niveaux de gravité sont pulvérisés, les théâtres d'opérations plus larges que jamais, les cartes d'acteurs foisonnantes et illisibles, les outils de référence ne sont plus guère pertinents quand on doit traiter de véritables mutations. Les institutions, les organisations, arrivent en limite de compétence – placées de plus en plus souvent hors domaine de pilotabilité comme on le dirait d'un avion sorti de son domaine de vol.

Il convient de prendre toute la mesure des multiples franchissements de seuil dont nous sommes les témoins.<sup>1</sup>

- *des sauts quantitatifs* : l'événement en arrive souvent à peser aussi lourd, ou plus encore, que la somme de tous les accidents passés de même nature ;
- *la sur-complexité* : c'est la multiplication concomitante de multiples chocs, qui traversent les catégories usuelles ;
- *une expertise dépassée* : en situation, elle se trouve plongée non plus seulement dans l'incertitude, mais bel et bien dans l'ignorance ;
- *l'hyper-connectivité* : elle provoque des effets dominos inédits ;
- *la vitesse* : elle surclasse tous les dispositifs prévus. Le virus circule à la vitesse du jet, ajustant ses déplacements aux facilités offertes par les hubs tarifaires (Toronto, 2003). Les grands black-out énergétiques ont raison de la moitié d'un continent en quelque vingt secondes (USA-Canada, août 2003). Les industriels de l'informatique soulignent qu'un black-out électronique planétaire pourrait se propager en moins d'une minute. Or, on le voit à chaque grand choc, le temps de réponse des grandes institutions – sauf heureuse exception – varie de 4 jours à deux semaines pour une mobilisation initiale, dans le cas des organisations les moins mal préparées ; les autres réagissent encore plus lentement – voire ne réagissent tout simplement pas ;
- *des crises de texture* : ce ne sont plus des installations spécifiques, ni même des infrastructures critiques qui sont en jeu, mais bien les textures profondes de nos sociétés, de type organique, avec leurs couplages et maillages serrés, leurs interdépendances cachées (cela fut notamment documenté de façon magistrale par Eric Klinenberg sur la canicule à Chicago en 1985<sup>2</sup>) ;
- *des crises de conviction* : les vraies vulnérabilités ne procèdent plus de simples considérations techniques, mais des cultures de nos sociétés face aux risques, de leurs

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<sup>1</sup> Patrick Lagadec : "Crisis Management in the Twenty-First Century, "Unthinkable" Events in "Unthinkable" Contexts", in Dynes, Quarantelli, Rodriguez, *Handbook of Disaster Research*, Springer, September 2006 ; H. Quarantelli, A. Boin, P. Lagadec : "Trans-System Ruptures: The New Disasters and Crises of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and the Implications for Planning and Managing", in R. Dynes, H. Quarantelli, H. Rodriguez, *Handbook of Disaster Research*, Springer, September 2006 ; Patrick Lagadec and Erwann Michel-Kerjan : « A New Era Calls for a New Model », *International Herald Tribune*, November 1, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Eric Klinenberg, *Heat Wave, A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002.

convictions, et de la façon dont elles formulent leurs peurs ou leurs volontés de relever les défis de leur histoire ;

- *des crises de leadership*, enfin : dès lors que les règles habituelles ne fonctionnent plus, le “management” ne peut plus suffire. Il faut redonner sens, vision, direction, cohérence à des ensembles soudains emportés dans des turbulences non prévues dans nos scripts de référence. Sans céder aux illusions et aux dangers de l’homme providentiel, il convient cependant de remettre les dirigeants en responsabilité.

Le caractère dominant de ces chocs “hors-cadres” est d’abord la confrontation à “*l’inconcevable*”. Non que les phénomènes en jeu soient par nature impossibles à comprendre ou à imaginer, mais parce que les acteurs restent prisonniers de visions, de cloisonnements, d’interdits, de modes d’action, qui n’ont pas été pensés pour un monde où dominent la surprise, la mutation et le chaotique.

Les acteurs sont violemment projetés dans un autre espace. Leurs repères sont soudainement inappropriés. Et lorsque la stratégie est prise en défaut, les défaillances tactiques se multiplient. Davantage : le fossé entre les repères habituels et les réalités à traiter est tel que les opérateurs subissent d’emblée un phénomène aux conséquences majeures mais le plus souvent ignoré : une *tétanisation* qui bloque les intelligences, la recherche de solutions nouvelles, la capacité d’écoute, la volonté de coordination, et même la simple application des savoir-faire habituels. Après-coup, toute analyse “au fil de l’eau” ne fait qu’enregistrer des motifs de consternation sur le mode : « Comment autant de gens ont-ils pu faire montre d’une aussi faible capacité de réaction ? ».

Ces difficultés critiques conduisent au déclenchement d’une dynamique funeste : le désarroi des décideurs, la défiance des citoyens, le découplage entre gouvernés et gouvernants. Ce fut ainsi le “cyclone” de Madrid en mars 2004 qui emporta le gouvernement Aznar. Ou le cri, après Katrina : “Nous avons été abandonnés », « This is not America ! ».

Aucune formule magique – y compris même la référence rituelle au “partenariat public/privé” – ne permet de contourner l’obstacle. Le diagnostic doit être pleinement accepté : pour affronter les grandes crises actuelles, faites de discontinuités déconcertantes et de dynamiques chaotiques (fondamentalement exclues de nos logiques managériales, y compris dans le domaine de la gestion des désastres) de nouvelles références intellectuelles, organisationnelles et culturelles doivent être construites.<sup>3</sup> De nouveaux outils sont à penser et à développer.<sup>4</sup>

Les questions sont foisonnantes :

- Quels décalages de compréhension et de pilotage pénalisent la gestion des crises ?
- Quelles pesanteurs historiques et culturelles, quelles routines, donnent leur force à ces décalages ?
- Quels sont les meilleurs enseignements de l’expérience pour une anticipation et un traitement de ces défis “hors-cadre”?

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<sup>3</sup> Patrick Lagadec: “The Borderline of Chaos”, *Crisis Response*, Vol 2, Issue 3, June 2006, p. 62-63. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/062-063\\_crj2\\_3\\_lagadec.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/062-063_crj2_3_lagadec.pdf)

Michel Nesterenko and Patrick Lagadec "Complexity and chaos", *Crisis Response*, vol. 3, issue 1, December 2006, pp. 62-64. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis\\_nester.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis_nester.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Pierre Bérroux, Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec: "Implementing Rapid Reflection Forces", *Crisis Response*, vol. 3, issue 2, pp. 36-37. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Implementing\\_Rapid\\_Reflection\\_Forces.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Implementing_Rapid_Reflection_Forces.pdf)

- Quelles initiatives bien précises peut-on lancer à court terme, pour apprendre et consolider organisations et systèmes face aux menaces de crises majeures ?
- Quels nouveaux rapports public/privé développer en vue de ces environnements ?
- Quelles répartitions et organisations de compétences entre les étages locaux, régionaux, nationaux, continentaux, intercontinentaux ?
- Quelles formations des décideurs et futurs décideurs mettre sur pied pour traiter de réalités aussi surprenantes et instables ?<sup>5</sup>
- Quelles préparations de tous les autres acteurs parties prenantes, ONG, élus locaux, syndicats, experts, citoyens – puisque ces crises de textures ne peuvent être traversées sans implications collectives puissantes ?

## **Tirer le meilleur des grands rapports d'enquête – le cas Katrina, tome 2**

L'importance de l'événement Katrina oblige à une réflexion en profondeur sur l'épisode et ses enseignements. Les angles d'interrogation comme les méthodes d'analyse à solliciter sont multiples, reflétant la complexité du phénomène et des questions qu'il pose.

Pour notre part, nous avons engagé la démarche, avec l'appui de la Direction du Contrôle des risques d'EDF – sous l'impulsion de Pierre Bérour.<sup>6</sup> En équipe, nous sommes rendus<sup>7</sup> à La Nouvelle-Orléans et dans le Mississippi (février 2006). Pour rencontrer les grands opérateurs du domaine de l'électricité, des télécommunications, de l'eau, des services postaux, des transports aériens et portuaires ; des responsables de médias, la Croix-Rouge – et explorer avec eux les leçons essentielles qu'ils retiennent de Katrina. Cette mission sur le terrain a été complétée par d'autres interviews et séminaires à Washington (mars, avril 2006), et a conduit à un premier rapport.<sup>8</sup> Une nouvelle mission<sup>9</sup> à La Nouvelle-Orléans a permis de nouvelles

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<sup>5</sup> Patrick Lagadec : "Enseigner la question des crises : Enjeux, Obstacles, Initiatives", *Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie*, janvier 2007, Ecole Polytechnique. <http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/2007-01.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Soucieuse de toujours rester en phase avec les défis de notre temps, EDF a pour politique de rechercher systématiquement les leçons des grands événements qui tranchent avec le quotidien. Ainsi :

- La crise du verglas au Québec en 1998, qui a donné des leçons stratégiques immédiates pour le traitement des grandes tempêtes en Europe en décembre 1999 – [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Lagadec\\_PS\\_49.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Lagadec_PS_49.pdf).
- La crise du SRAS à Toronto en 2003 – dans l'optique d'une pandémie grippale. Voir : Patrick Lagadec, William Dab : "Pilotage d'activités vitales en univers imprévisible – Les grands opérateurs de réseaux et le risque de pandémie : Mission Toronto – Enseignements du Sras, préparation à la pandémie grippale, 10-14 octobre 2005", Electricité de France, Direction du Contrôle des Risques, 10 Novembre 2005 [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF\\_Pandemie\\_Grippe\\_Toronto.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Pandemie_Grippe_Toronto.pdf)
- Le cyclone Katrina et les grands réseaux, voir note 7.

<sup>7</sup>La mission comprenait : Xavier Guilhou (XAG Conseil), Daniel Madet (EDF), Jean-Pierre Roche (Aéroports de Paris), Erwan Lagadec (Harvard University). La mission fut en outre appuyée par l'Amiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, Chef d'état-major de la Marine, le Préfet Christian Frémont, Préfet de la Zone de Défense Sud ; et, aux Etats-Unis, par son Excellence Jean-David Levitte, Ambassadeur de France, et par Pierre Lebovics, Consul Général de France à La Nouvelle-Orléans.

<sup>8</sup> Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, Erwan Lagadec : "Les Grands Réseaux Vitaux et Katrina, enseignements sur les crises hors-cadre et leur pilotage". Dans le cadre d'une mission Electricité de France, à la demande de Pierre Bérour, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques.

[http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF\\_Katrina\\_Rex\\_Faits\\_marquants.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Katrina_Rex_Faits_marquants.pdf)

Voir aussi Patrick Lagadec et Xavier Guilhou: "Katrina - Quand les crises ne suivent plus le script", *Préventique-Sécurité*, n° 88, Juillet-août 2006, pp. 31-33. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/PS88\\_Katrina\\_ok.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/PS88_Katrina_ok.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Avec l'appui et de la Direction du Contrôle des Risques d'EDF et de l'IRGC – International Risk Governance Council, Genève, <http://www.irgc.org/irgc/>.

rencontres, ou des approfondissements, notamment avec le “patron” des Coast Guards<sup>10</sup> locaux, le Captain Paskewich<sup>11</sup> (mars 2007).

Une autre voie d’examen, et c’est celle qui a conduit à ce travail, consiste à analyser en profondeur les grands rapports d’enquête. C’est là pour nous une pratique habituelle<sup>12</sup>, qui répond à plusieurs objectifs : tirer tout le parti de ces volumineux documents, d’une très grande richesse factuelle ; explorer de nouvelles lignes d’analyse, au-delà de ce qu’ont pu faire les commissions d’enquête. Et mettre ces réflexions au service du plus grand nombre : décideurs, experts, chercheurs, journalistes, étudiants.

Le cyclone Katrina, a donné lieu à de très nombreuses analyses, et notamment à trois grands rapports d’enquête. Celui de la Chambre des Représentants<sup>13</sup>, celui de la Maison-Blanche<sup>14</sup>, celui du Sénat<sup>15</sup>.

**Nous proposons ici un deuxième travail sur le rapport de la Maison-Blanche<sup>16</sup>, à la suite du tome 1, consacré à l’examen du rapport de la Chambre des Représentants, et avant le tome 3, qui traitera du rapport du Sénat.**

Nous adopterons une autre approche que pour le tome 1, en travaillant non plus chapitre après chapitre mais à partir de thèmes de réflexion transverse, qui permettent une autre saisie du cas. Ici encore, nous retiendrons les passages qui nous sont apparus les plus intéressants en termes d’information, et les plus stimulants pour le questionnement sur les nouvelles grammaires de crise. À chaque fois que cela nous est apparu pertinent, nous avons tenté un essai de réflexion permettant d’entraîner à l’examen et au pilotage des situations hors-cadre. Nous sommes bien conscient de la complexité des questions abordées. Aussi bien, comme pour le premier tome mis en ligne, nous proposons ici une version provisoire, destinée à susciter la réflexion, en en aucune manière à la fixer.

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<sup>10</sup> Nous prenons la liberté de mettre un pluriel sur ce collectif en anglais.

<sup>11</sup> Vidéo : “Katrina and the US Coast Guard”, Captain Frank M. Paskewich, PE, Commanding Officer, Captain of the Port, talking to Xavier Guilhou, Caroline Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, New Orleans, 9 March 2007 — programme de retour d’expérience sur les crises hors-cadre à l’échelle internationale conduit par Pierre Béroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques d’Electricité de France, mission confiée à Patrick Lagadec et Xavier Guilhou (1h16mn).

<sup>12</sup> P. Lagadec : “La canicule de l’été 2003. Auscultation des rapports d’enquête”, in “Retour sur les rapports d’enquête et d’expertise suite à la canicule de l’été 2003”, cahiers du GIS Risques Collectifs et Situations de Crise, Claude Gilbert et Isabelle Bourdeaux Editeurs, CNRS et Maison des Sciences de l’Homme-Alpes, n°4, Mai 2005, pp. 17-200. <http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/retoursurenquetescanicule.pdf>

P. Lagadec : “Le rapport de la Commission d’enquête britannique sur l’Encéphalopathie Spongiforme Bovine (ESB) au Royaume-Uni entre 1986 et 1996”, Cahiers du GIS Risques Collectifs et Situations de Crise, n°1, juillet 2001, 170 pages. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/retour\\_ESB.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/retour_ESB.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> *A Failure of Initiative*, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, US House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, 15 February 2006, 362 p. + Annexes).

<sup>14</sup> *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned*, The White House, 23 February 2006 (217 p).

<sup>15</sup> *Hurricane Katrina – A Nation Still Unprepared*, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Washington, DC., May 2006 (749 p.).

<sup>16</sup> Pour des raisons évidentes, nous nous abstenons de reprendre en détail dans ce tome 2 des éléments descriptifs de Katrina, déjà largement produits dans le tome 1, et nous nous concentrerons sur les messages clés appelant repérage et réflexion.

## *Avertissements*

### *À l'adresse du lecteur français*

*Lors des émissions de radio et télévision aux mois d'août-septembre 2005, nombre d'intervenants, experts ou commentateurs ont glosé sur le thème : « Les Américains ont trop de problèmes avec leur système fédéral et leur pauvre organisme de sécurité civile (FEMA). Nous, nous avons un système centralisé, les préfets et les plans Orsec ». Pareils commentaires sont tout à la fois stupides et indécents. Nous travaillons ici sur un désastre qui a touché une superficie égale à la moitié du territoire français, avec perte totale de tous les services vitaux, et impossibilité de reconstruction à court terme.*

*La seule attitude responsable est de commencer par écouter le cas et ses difficultés. En nous interrogeant en premier lieu sur ce qui sort de nos cadres de référence. Sauf à signer par avance nos propres capitulations en cas de phénomène également hors cadre qui pourrait toucher notre pays, ou l'Europe. Les capacités dont nous avons fait montre lors de l'épisode de la canicule 2003 – 20 000 morts en France, 70 000 en Europe – devraient nous inciter à quelque prudence. Nous engager à un nouveau regard scientifique sur ces enjeux, à une véritable mobilisation stratégique des dirigeants, dans tous les secteurs.*

### *À l'adresse du lecteur européen*

*Un ouvrage est actuellement en cours de rédaction et qui paraîtra à l'automne 2007. Il prend l'ouragan Katrina et vient le superposer sur le nord de l'Europe : nord de la France, sud-est de l'Angleterre et notamment Londres, Pays-Bas. Dans l'attente de sa parution, on pourra lire le présent travail relatif à Katrina, aux Etats-Unis, et s'interroger sur ce que serait la réactivité de l'Union Européenne en cas de phénomène de cette nature, sur la préparation des dirigeants, des réseaux vitaux, des ONG, des médias, à un choc de ce niveau de difficulté. Là encore, il serait bien présomptueux de partir de l'idée que, de ce côté de l'Atlantique, nous avons tout ce qu'il faut pour anticiper, réagir et reconstruire.*

## LA MISSION ET LE RAPPORT

Ce travail a été voulu par le Président Bush qui, dans son intervention solennelle à la Nation depuis La Nouvelle-Orléans le 15 septembre 2005, a prescrit un réexamen global de la réponse fédérale à Katrina. L'objet est de se préparer de meilleure manière pour être en mesure de répondre aux menaces, de nature terroriste ou naturelle, pouvant affecter le pays.

En conséquence, l'examen ne couvre que ce qui a trait à l'intervention de l'échelon fédéral. Le rapport redonne des éléments sur Katrina, mais il est surtout focalisé sur les transformations à apporter au système fédéral de traitement des crises. Dès lors, une attention est portée au cadre général tel qu'il existe en matière de planification fédérale ; et surtout, aux ajustements-transformations à apporter. Le rapport expose notamment 125 recommandations, à destination des responsables.

Ce retour d'expérience Maison-Blanche avait probablement plusieurs buts :

- donner les vues de l'acteur Maison-Blanche sur un dossier à haut potentiel de déstabilisation politique, surtout après les critiques de la Chambre des Représentants, et avant celles attendues du Sénat ;
- préciser aux responsables publics et intervenants d'urgence les dispositifs en vigueur ;
- contribuer à structurer une démarche de transformation des capacités du pays en matière de catastrophes hors-échelle.

La **vision ne manque pas d'ambition : Transformer la préparation du pays**. Il ouvre des pistes de réflexion intéressantes, parfois en rupture avec les cadres habituels dans le domaine de la sécurité et des catastrophes. **Cependant**, le registre de l'*ajustement* (le mot est employé) est tout autant une préoccupation des rédacteurs. Car il s'agit aussi, surtout ?, de « *fixer* » les **dispositifs arrêtés dans le sillage du 11-Septembre pour donner au Fédéral ses pleins leviers d'action**.

On notera aussi, ce qui est cohérent avec l'accent mis sur le régalien fédéral, **le caractère fermé du groupe** d'analystes, composé exclusivement de hauts responsables attachés à la Maison-Blanche ou aux branches les plus centrales du système de décision. Cette option a certainement de nombreux avantages en matière de consensus, de focalisation sur les ajustements techniques et tactiques appelés par l'épisode, de rapidité d'écriture. Mais les défis d'aujourd'hui exigeraient bien davantage. Il faudrait intégrer notamment des personnes venant du secteur privé (et en premier lieu des grands réseaux vitaux, désormais essentiels pour la sécurité nationale), des ONG (dont la puissance est en voie d'être reconnue, et de plus en plus utilisée), des médias (acteurs décisifs, on l'a vu à Katrina). Il ne serait pas non extravagant de songer à inclure des experts du domaine.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Par exemple :

- Les spécialistes du Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware (<http://www.udel.edu/DRC/>), et de l'Université du Colorado (<http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/>), forts de leurs décennies de travaux sur ces questions.
- Charles Perrow : *The Next Catastrophe – Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters*, Princeton, 2007.
- Ou des spécialistes qui ont suivi tout l'épisode de l'intérieur, y compris comme membres actifs de l'exercice Pam, tel Ivor van Heerden, Director of the LSU Hurricane Center (Ivor Van Heerden and Mike Bryan, *The Storm – What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina – The Inside Story from one Louisiana Scientist*, Viking, Penguin Group, New York, 2006) ; ou Douglas Brinkley, Tulane University (Douglas Brinkley: *The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast*, HarperCollins, New York, 2006).



### ***Décision et mandat : un examen global de la réponse fédérale à Katrina***

Even as parts of New Orleans were still under water, President Bush spoke to the Nation from the city's historic Jackson Square [New Orleans, September 15]. He stated unequivocally, that “[f]our years after the frightening experience of September the 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency. In his address, the President ordered a comprehensive review of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina so that we as a Nation could make the necessary changes to be “better prepared for any challenges of nature or act of evil men that could threaten our people”. The President’s charge has resulted in the material and conclusions of this Report. [Foreword, p. 1]

### ***Vision et ambition***

The President made clear that we must do better in the future. The objective of this Report is to identify and establish a roadmap on how to do that, and **lay the groundwork for transforming how this Nation**—from every level of government to the private sector to individual citizens and communities—pursues a real and lasting vision of preparedness. To get there will require significant change to the status quo, to include **adjustments** to policy, structure, and mindset. [Foreword, p. 2]

### ***Domaine effectivement exploré : l'échelon fédéral***

This review did not include an assessment of State and local responses. The President specifically requested that we review **the response of the Federal government**. (...) The scope of the review did not focus on recovery operations that continue to this day. (...) Instead, the review’s emphasis centers on identifying vulnerabilities and gaps in our response and “fixing government”. [Foreword, p. 2]

### ***Méthode : mission sur place et larges rencontres***

As part of the review, we visited the hurricane-ravaged Gulf Coast during mid November 2005. We met with government officials, business and community leaders, and volunteers. [Cover Letter, p. i]

### ***Destinataires : les responsables***

The Report [includes] (...) 125 specific recommendations (...). These recommendations are written for policy makers and emergency managers. [Foreword, p. 2]

### ***Auteurs : de hauts fonctionnaires, autour de Mme Townsend (Maison-Blanche)***

We assembled a team of experienced professionals (...). In addition, we enjoyed a tremendous partnership with each of [the] Cabinet Secretaries. [Cover Letter, p. i]

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***Le message : Transforming National Preparedness***

The Report (...) begins with a discussion of the magnitude and complexity of the response challenge by discussing “Katrina in Perspective” – providing an historical comparison both of the hurricane itself and the resultant flood. (...)

A National Preparedness “Primer” on the current Federal framework is then provided to give the reader an understanding of how the current system was supposed to function. This chapter points out some fundamental confusion in the Federal planning and identifies potential shortcomings in the applicability of our plans to catastrophic widespread incidents.

Two major chapters of the Report follow with an analytical, narrative chronology that provides a detailed account of Hurricane Katrina. The first discusses the storm’s development in the days “Pre-Landfall”, and the next chronicles both the “Week of Crisis” from August 29 through September 5, and concludes with the transition from response to recovery. (...)

We then present a detailed chapter on “Lessons Learned”. Here, we describe the seventeen most critical challenges that were problematic before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.

We conclude with the most important chapter: “**Transforming National Preparedness**”. It describes the imperative and remedies for fixing the problems that Hurricane Katrina exposed. The foundations of the recommended reforms result in two immediate priorities:

We must institutionalize a comprehensive National Preparedness System and concurrently foster a new, robust Culture of Preparedness.

The Report also contains several appendices, including 125 specific recommendations (...). These recommendations are written for policy makers and emergency managers and contain more technical information not appropriate for the narrative. We have also included some stories of successes and heroic efforts we encountered by responders, volunteers, agencies, and public officials that must not be overlooked. [Foreword, p. 2]

## **KATRINA, LE RÉVÉLATEUR D'UNE IMPRÉPARATION DE FOND**

Le facteur le plus perturbant de l'épisode tient à son caractère hors-cadres : nous ne sommes plus du tout dans le traitement d'un cyclone habituel. Ce déplacement de fond du théâtre d'opérations tient à la fois à un niveau de gravité très élevé, et à des sauts qualitatifs dans les difficultés à traiter, sur nombre de dimensions. L'addition d'une préparation conventionnelle insuffisante et d'une appropriation encore très limitée des transformations apportées au dispositif fédéral d'urgence a conduit au fiasco. Cependant, le rapport indique avec justesse – et cela ne fait qu'ajouter à la préoccupation – que Katrina n'était tout de même pas du niveau des grands cataclysmes potentiels à considérer aujourd'hui. Cela ne fait que dramatiser l'urgence d'une mutation de fond en matière de tenue de nos systèmes en cas de chocs effectivement démesurés.

La lecture du rapport donne à réfléchir sur les lourdeurs institutionnelles. On connaît bien le problème de la résistance au changement, nous sommes ici aux prises avec des résistances aux mutations, bien plus violentes encore. La ligne de plus grande pente est l'évitement du dossier, la persévérance dans la non-formation, l'ilotage des innombrables organisations... sous le parapluie général d'une planification d'urgence magistrale sur le papier mais irréaliste sur le terrain. Lorsque l'événement majeur en vient à frapper, les systèmes se mettent rapidement en désordre de bataille, incapables de trouver leurs marques, d'appliquer même ce qui était prévu, de monter des capacités ad hoc, de faire preuve d'inventivité. Certes, et c'est un leitmotiv dans le rapport, les plans ne sont pas encore au point, et on ne les connaît pas bien. Il semblerait même, si l'on suit bien les analystes, que les plus mal préparés soient les dirigeants en poste dans chaque niche bureaucratique.

Bien entendu, le problème n'est pas d'avoir un plan ayant réponse à tout, mais bien d'être culturellement prêt pour des actions en réseau, des actions innovantes et fortes en situation hors-cadres. Sinon, ne surnage – et le rapport de la Maison-Blanche est très illustratif sur ce point – que l'aspect « usine à gaz » des dispositifs, utilisés finalement davantage comme des paravents commodes que comme des outils d'action.

Une « nouvelle donne » s'impose en matière d'intelligence des risques en émergence et de leadership sur ces dossiers. On ne saurait en rester aux plaidoyers appelant à toujours plus de plans, prévoyant toujours plus de scénarios, plus de moyens tactiques, plus de centralisation.

### **1. Katrina, un autre monde**

Katrina s'impose d'emblée comme un phénomène qui échappe aux catégories habituelles et, plus fondamentalement, à la tentative de catégorisation rapide via des échelles de gravité. Il faut bien mesurer ce que comporte de dérangeant pareil constat. Nos approches des risques sont marquées par un réflexe de classification :

- catégorisation : la catastrophe naturelle, la catastrophe technologique, l'acte terroriste ;
- sous-catégorisation : le cyclone, l'inondation, le feu, etc. ;
- repérage sur des échelles de gravité : elles restent nécessairement simples n'intégrant que quelques paramètres ;
- découpage dans le temps : l'avant-désastre, le temps du désastre, la reconstruction ;
- découpage par fonctions : sauvetage, hébergement, santé, maintien de l'ordre, assurance, etc.

Pour l'intervention, l'hypothèse « naturelle » est que la catastrophe touche un lieu spécifique, bien circonscrit, d'importance limitée au regard du système qui peut porter secours, et pensé comme relativement homogène. Le système extérieur, lui, n'est pas touché – toujours selon les vues établies.

Katrina vient sérieusement bousculer ce modèle de référence. C'est là une des causes fondamentales du basculement dans le fiasco. Quand les hypothèses qui permettent de comprendre et d'agir sur le monde, de s'en protéger aussi, sont soudain détruites, les systèmes subissent une sorte *d'état de choc* qui se traduit par la tétanisation, l'attente, l'évitement, la confusion surajoutée. Et la solution n'est pas uniquement dans des catégorisations plus adaptées, certes utiles ; ou des catégorisations multipliées, piège habituel. L'enjeu central est de **pouvoir fonctionner encore alors que les catégories habituelles ne fonctionnent plus** ; et de savoir reconfigurer des catégories nouvelles à haute vitesse, puisqu'il n'est pas d'action organisée sans cartographie du monde.

Cela suppose au moins, lorsque l'on annonce un choc de cette ampleur (« catégorie 5 » pour Katrina avant son impact), que l'on sache sortir de ses lectures et fiches habituelles. Que l'on sache poser : « **Un cyclone de catégorie 5, ce n'est pas un cyclone, on ne sait pas ce que c'est** ». « Cela peut toucher à tout, déclencher des effets dominos généralisés ». Des systèmes et des responsables non préparés sont incapables d'une telle ouverture. La frayeur produite par l'annonce conduira bien plus sûrement à s'enfermer à triple tour dans les modèles habituels, et plus encore dans une petite partie de ces modèles.

### *L'inimaginable*

It is hard for those who have not witnessed first hand the hurricane's destruction and its human toll to fully comprehend [their scale]. [Cover Letter, p. i]

Hurricane Katrina (...) caused **unimaginable** devastation and heartbreak throughout the Gulf Coast Region. **A vast coastline of towns and communities [was] decimated.** [I, p. 5]

[Some] likened the scene to that of a **nuclear detonation.** [IV, pp. 33-34]

Hurricane Katrina, its 115-130 mph [185 à 209 km/h] winds, and the accompanying **storm surge it created as high as 27 feet [8m22]** along a stretch of the Northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama, to New Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 square miles [**241 000 km<sup>2</sup>**] of our Nation – roughly an area **the size of Great Britain.** [Foreword, p. 1]

In less than twenty-four hours, Hurricane Katrina (...) [changed] the [Gulf Coast] region, its people, and the Nation. [III, p. 31]

### *L'une des pires catastrophes du pays*

Katrina (...) became the most destructive natural disaster in American history. [Foreword, p. 1]

The overall destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina (...) vastly exceeded that of any other major disaster, such as the Chicago Fire of 1871, the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906, and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. [I, p. 5] Hurricane Katrina (...) was (...) the deadliest natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane San Felipe in 1928. [I, p. 6]

### *Les limites des échelles de gravité*

Seventy-five hurricanes of Katrina's strength at landfall – a Category 3 – have hit the mainland United States since 1851, roughly one every two years. Yet Katrina was anything but a "normal" hurricane.

First, Katrina was larger than most. [Although] Hurricane Camille [(1969) was] a Category 5 storm, (...) Camille's hurricane force winds only extended seventy-five miles from its center, whereas Katrina's extended 103 miles [106 km] from its center. As a result, Hurricane Katrina's storm surge affected a larger area than did Hurricane Camille's.

(...) The extreme intensity that Hurricane Katrina reached before landfall on the Gulf Coast, as well as its size, meant that its storm surge was consistent with a more powerful storm. (...) The National Hurricane Center concluded that the height of Hurricane Katrina and Camille's respective storm surges were comparable to each other. [I, p. 5]

Hurricane Katrina was not average, as would soon become vividly clear – it was a fierce hurricane and a near-record storm surge that was heading directly toward a densely-populated urban area, much of which lay below sea level. [III, p. 31]

In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck (...) Florida as a Category 5 storm, (...) but Katrina affected an area three times as large, caused two to six times the economic damage, and killed up to twenty times as many people – this was partially due to Katrina's large wind field and the high storm surge, which proved far more damaging than the more compact Andrew. [Appendix B, p. 125]

### *Événement «aberrant» contre tendances supposées établies*

Hurricane Katrina contradicts one side of an important two-part trend. For at least a century, America's most severe natural disasters [had] become steadily *less* deadly and *more* destructive of property. (...) Yet, Hurricane Katrina not only damaged far more property than any previous natural disaster, it was also the deadliest natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane San Felipe in 1928. [I, p. 6]

### *La Nouvelle-Orléans, catastrophe dans la catastrophe*

The flooding destroyed New Orleans, [i.e.] the Nation's thirty-fifth largest city [and] (...) the heart of the Gulf Coast. [I, p. 6] Approximately 80 percent of the city [of New Orleans] flooded with six [1,82 m] to twenty feet [6,09 m] of water, necessitating one of the largest search and rescue operations in our Nation's history. [Foreword, p. 2]

[The] unprecedented flooding [in New Orleans] transformed Hurricane Katrina into a "catastrophe within a catastrophe". [IV, p. 36]

### *L'inclassable*

Hurricane Katrina (...) was both a large and powerful hurricane as well as a catastrophic flood. [I, p. 5]

Much more than any other hurricane, Katrina's wrath went far beyond wind and water damage. In fact, Hurricane Katrina caused at least ten oil spills, releasing the same quantity of oil as some of the worst oil spills in U.S. history. (...) [Oil spills caused by Katrina amount to the equivalent of] two thirds of the amount that spilled out during America's worst oil disaster, the rupturing of the Exxon Valdez tanker off the Alaskan coast in 1989. [I, p. 8]

### *Événement non circonscrit à un « Ground Zero »*

The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or even one State. (...) [Our] plans (...) failed to adequately account for widespread or simultaneous catastrophes. [Foreword, p. 1] One of the gravest challenges (...) was the vast geographic distribution of the damage. [I, p. 6]

The [Joint Field Office] (JFO) was located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, (...) [rather than] New Orleans. The NRP [National Response Plan] does not contemplate [setting up local] structures [subordinate] to the [main] JFO (...) in the event of multiple or geographically widespread catastrophes (i.e. multiple "ground zeros"). [IV, p. 42]

Hurricane Katrina's (...) storm surge (...) dealt a ferocious blow to (...) the coast and for many miles inland. [I, p. 6] Surge waters flooded over six miles inland in many parts of coastal Mississippi and up to twelve miles inland along rivers and bays. [IV, p. 33]

The storm devastated Waveland, Mississippi, wiping out all the local resources, including those that municipal officials had staged ten miles north of town. [IV, p. 34]

## 2. Sauts quantitatifs

On trouve avec Katrina un trait commun des grandes catastrophes contemporaines : sur chaque dimension, les chiffres à prendre en compte sont de l'ordre de l'inédit, tout au moins pour les intervenants qui ont en charge le problème. N fois le niveau du précédent drame, N fois la somme de toutes les destructions enregistrées jusqu'alors... Et, sur certaines dimensions vitales, on passe à des niveaux de destruction frisant les 100%, comme ce fut le cas des communications. Le basculement est donc à opérer : non plus "qu'est-ce qui est détruit et à réparer ?", mais "qu'est-ce qui marche encore par miracle ?". Ces niveaux de destruction en viennent à emporter les structures de commandement, les infrastructures de pilotage, et les repérages statistiques habituels – qui portent les logiques de lecture et d'action. Le maire de la Nouvelle-Orléans, avec ce qui reste de son équipe, doit trouver refuge dans un hôtel pour tenter d'opérer encore, alors même qu'il n'a quasiment plus de possibilité de communiquer. Les actions de secours et d'assistance sont à penser et déployer dans ce même registre de l'extrême, de systèmes très dégradés.

### 2.1. L'ampleur des destructions

An estimated 1,330 people [died] (...) as a result of the storm. (...) [Moreover], as of February 17, 2006, there were still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area reported missing. [I, p. 8]

Katrina affected an area three times as large [as Hurricane Andrew (1992)], caused two to six times the economic damage, and killed up to twenty times as many people. [Appendix B, p. 125]

Hurricane Katrina is America's first disaster – natural or man-made – to approach the \$100 billion mark. (...) [It] devastated far more residential property than had any other recent hurricane, completely destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes. This far surpasses the residential damage of Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed or damaged approximately 80,000 homes in 1992. It even exceeds the combined damage of the four major 2004 hurricanes, Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, which together destroyed or damaged approximately 85,000 homes. [I, p. 7]

Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest national housing crisis since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. The impact of this massive displacement was felt throughout the country, with Gulf residents relocating to all fifty States and the District of Columbia. [V, pp. 59-60] Around 770,000 people were displaced – the largest since the Dust Bowl migration from the southern Great Plains region in the 1930s. [I, p. 8]

The Department of Energy (DOE) reported "unprecedented damage" to the U.S. energy sector. [IV, p. 34]

Hurricane Katrina destroyed an unprecedented portion of the core communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region. [V, p. 55] The State of Louisiana's 800 MHz radio system, designed to be the backbone of mutual aid communications, ceased functioning, and repairs were delayed for several days. (...) Local emergency response officials found it difficult or impossible to establish functioning incident command structures in these conditions. (...) [A] Louisiana firefighter stated, "the command structure broke down – we were literally left to our own devices". [IV, p. 37]

The New Orleans Mayor's Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina's landfall. [IV, p. 37]



## 2. 2. L'ampleur de l'opération de secours et d'assistance

### *Avant l'impact, le plus grand pré-positionnement jamais réalisé*

(...) the largest pre-positioning of Federal assets in history. [III, p. 23]

### *Des opérations de sauvetage et d'évacuation uniques dans l'histoire du pays*

(...) the largest search and rescue operations in the Nation's history. (...) Coast Guard teams alone ultimately rescued and evacuated over 33,000 people – over six times the number in an average year. [IV, p. 38] Almost one-third of the Coast Guard's entire fleet was dedicated to rescue efforts. [Appendix B, p. 129]

[To evacuate the Superdome], the Department of Transportation (...) [assembled] a bus fleet of over 1,100 vehicles, equal in size to some of the largest transit agencies in the Nation. [IV, p. 39]

In addition to ground operations, [an] (...) airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people [from New Orleans], constituting the largest domestic civilian airlift on U.S. soil in history. [IV, p. 40]

### *Une catégorie nouvelle : les évacuations massives post-impact*

Neither the Louisiana nor the New Orleans evacuation plans addressed evacuation protocols for post-landfall. [IV, p. 38]

### *Des opérations de sécurité publique inédites*

By September 2, 22,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen had deployed to the region – breaking the National Guard's previous record for the largest response to a domestic emergency. Eventually, over 50,000 National Guard members (...) deployed to the Gulf Coast. [IV, p. 43]

### *Des opérations de secours médicaux inédites*

Hurricane Katrina (...) forced an unprecedented mobilization of Federal health and medical assets. [V, p. 58] The [Louisiana State University] (LSU) campus hosted one of the largest peacetime triage operations in the history of the United States. [Appendix B, p. 128]

### *Une échelle d'assistance inédite : 250 000 personnes à prendre en charge*

Le saut quantitatif pose rapidement un problème qualitatif. S'il s'agit de venir en aide à 250 000 personnes, il faudra une masse considérable d'intervenants. Eux-mêmes poseront de lourds problèmes de logistique – énergie, nourriture, hébergement, communication, etc. – qui viendront faire masse avec les problèmes déjà existants.

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left the Gulf Coast in desperate need of resources. (...) Nearly a quarter of a million people in shelters relied on shipments of ice, food, and water to meet their basic needs. Hospitals, shelters, and other critical facilities required diesel fuel to run their back-up generators. Many evacuees lacked access to medical providers and supplies. Emergency responders (...) demanded additional supplies and fuel. (...) As a result, shortages plagued the affected area. [IV, p. 44-45]

The Federal government sent more resources to Louisiana in the first two weeks after Katrina than it had sent to Florida for all of the previous year's hurricanes combined. (...) [FEMA's] contract with private companies, though sufficient for smaller disasters, were incapable of supplying the enormous quantities of resources needed. [IV, p. 44-45]



FEMA delivered over \$1 billion in assistance to evacuees (...) by September 17 – less than three weeks after landfall. (...) This [was an] extraordinary and unprecedented effort. [IV, p. 49]

Volunteers allowed for the creation of an actual city (with its own zip code) for nearly 25,000 Louisiana evacuees sheltering in the Houston Reliant Astrodome. [Appendix B, p. 126]

The Salvation Army (...) served over one million meals, sheltered more than 31,000 people in seven states, and provided aid to displaced citizens in thirty states. [Appendix B, p. 126]

In the hours and days after the catastrophic storm, (...) resources from Florida were mobilized through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. These efforts represent Florida's largest state-to-state assistance in history. [Appendix B, p. 127]

FEMA staff distributed more than \$5 billion in federal aid to more than 1.7 million households in the affected region by February 1, 2006. [Appendix B, p. 130]

### 3. Sauts qualitatifs : déstabilisations de l'environnement de réponse

#### 3.1. Environnement physique

##### *Débris : 14 millions de m<sup>3</sup>*

Comme dans le cas du World Trade Center (1,8 millions de tonnes de débris), on retrouve ce problème, sans doute peu identifié dans les plans. Et pourtant critique.

An extraordinary amount of debris was left behind – 118 million cubic yards [14 Mns de m<sup>3</sup>] all told. [I, p. 8]

Destroyed homes, beached vessels, collapsed bridges, uprooted trees, and other debris littered the ground and blocked waterways [and highways]. [IV, pp. 33-34]

##### *Conditions atmosphériques : chaleur et humidité*

Emergency responders operated in an environment involving extreme heat. [IV, p. 37]

People brought [by rescuers] to (...) raised surfaces [such as highways] as they transitioned to safety had little shelter from the sun and were in ninety-eight degree [36,6° C] heat. [IV, p. 39]

##### *Pollution : 28Mns de litres d'hydrocarbures déversés, décharges toxiques inondées*

More than 7.4 million gallons [28 Mns de litres] [of oil] poured into the Gulf Coast region's waterways. (...) The wave of destruction created environmental and health hazards across the affected region, including standing water, oil pollution, sewage, household and industrial chemicals, and both human and animal remains. The storm surge struck 466 facilities that handle large amounts of dangerous chemicals, thirty-one hazardous waste sites, and sixteen Superfund toxic waste sites, three of which flooded. The surge also destroyed or compromised (...) [at least forty-seven] wastewater treatment facilities [along the Gulf Coast]. [I, p. 8]<sup>18</sup>

##### *Intervenants d'urgence en environnement toxique*

Emergency responders operated in an environment involving (...) chemicals, contaminated mud, downed power lines, and standing water. (...) [They] repeatedly exposed themselves to floodwater, chemicals, [and] bacteria. [IV, p. 37]

<sup>18</sup> Cf. sur les sites Superfund : <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm>

The storm's (...) environmental damage (...) [created] a potentially hazardous environment for emergency responders and the general public [V, p. 61]

[Helicopter crews had to conduct search and rescue] operations in an urban setting with hazards including unlit towers, downed power lines, and contaminated floodwaters. [Appendix B, p. 129]

[Environmental hazards included] asbestos, (...) septic systems, (...) batteries, (...) paint, solvents, lawn and garden products. [Appendix B, p. 142]

### 3.2. Environnement humain

#### *Pillages, violences, liquéfaction des « contrats sociaux »*

Le rapport souligne le débordement des instances en charge de la sécurité publique, les graves problèmes de pillages, de violence et autres comportements anti-sociaux – qui se sont manifestés dès le passage du cyclone. Mais le rapport souligne aussi que le problème de l'insécurité a été exagéré, les rumeurs prenant vite leur autonomie en raison de l'absence d'information. Il indique toutefois très clairement que la mission de sécurité publique n'a pu être remplie comme elle doit l'être dans une société organisée.

On rappellera ici le débat constant sur cette question entre les médias, les officiels et les sociologues spécialisés, en tout premier lieu ceux du Disaster Research Center, forts de près de 600 études post-catastrophes. Ces derniers soulignent : 1° le caractère exceptionnel des pillages et des comportements anti-sociaux (il faut pour cela : des phénomènes d'une exceptionnelle gravité, la disparition de toutes les institutions publiques en charge de la sécurité ; un niveau de violence préexistant déjà très élevé) ; 2° le fait que bien des actes labellisés comme « pillages » par les médias ne sont en réalité que des actes de survie tout à fait rationnels (pour survivre, on se sert de denrées alimentaires dans un magasin, ces denrées étant promises à être perdues de toutes les façons), etc.

Il est nécessaire de bien prendre en compte ces savoirs, importants et convergents, afin de ne pas succomber au mythe constant des pillages et autres débordements de violence. Surtout si un regard sur les pauvres et les Noirs alimente fortement les mises en cause, et sans aller plus loin que la condamnation<sup>19</sup>. Et l'on a vu à la Nouvelle-Orléans les conséquences graves de représentations fausses de la réalité (retard ou retrait des sauveteurs). Ces constats et analyses sont maintenus sur Katrina.<sup>20</sup>

Joseph Scanlon, comme bien d'autres spécialistes, nous met en garde. Une erreur d'interprétation est vite enclenchée, qui conduit à de sinistres erreurs stratégiques. "Sadly, the authorities chose to view the situation in New Orleans after Katrina not as one involving desperate people urgently in need of assistance but as a situation requiring law and order. So the police –though reluctant at first–began to crack down on what they were being told was "looting". And the military arrived with a show of force"<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Sarah Kaufman, "The Criminalization of New Orleanians in Katrina's Wake", Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Kaufman/>

"When basic needs were met, people began to look out for each other, working together and constructing a community. If the relief organizations had saturated the city with food and water the first two or three days, the desperation, frustration and ugliness would not have set in (Brashaw and Slonsky, 2005)."

<sup>20</sup> Lauren E. Barsky, "Disaster Realities Following Katrina: Revisiting the Looting Myth." Pp. 215–234 in Learning from Catastrophe: Quick Response Research in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina. Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph Scanlon, "Two Cities, Two Evacuations: Some Thoughts on Moving People Out", Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Scanlon>

Cependant, les analyses à ce jour publiées semblent à approfondir. Lorsque les Coast Guard reviennent dans leur bâtiment et constatent qu'il a été pillé, on ne peut prétendre que le matériel informatique subtilisé constituait des denrées alimentaires de première nécessité.<sup>22</sup>

On soulignera aussi l'importance, pour la compréhension de la situation, d'une approche complémentaire consistant à tourner l'objectif sur les **comportements positifs**.<sup>23</sup>

People began looting in some areas as soon as the storm relented. [...] The storm's damage to equipment, facilities, communications, and jails limited the ability of authorities to respond to calls for help and to combat lawlessness. It is clear that violent crime was less prevalent than initially reported, although reliable crime statistics are unavailable. Exaggerated, unconfirmed claims of violent crimes and lawlessness took on a life of their own in the absence of effective public information to counter them. [IV, p. 40]

State and local governments have a fundamental responsibility to provide for the public safety and security of their residents. (...) [However], almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina's landfall, (...) [New Orleans'] overwhelmed police force (...) did not have the capacity to arrest every person (...) committing a crime. [V, p. 57]

### *Intervenants d'urgence en environnement non sécurisé*

Non seulement les sauveteurs ont à opérer en zone insalubre, mais ils opèrent en zone à risque social – élevé, ou non évalué, et sur fond d'informations médiatiques et de rumeurs conduisant à des visions extrêmes de type "urban warfare". Ce qui n'est pas dans la culture habituelle des sauveteurs : quelqu'un qui vient apporter un secours vital ne s'attend pas, en général (le cas des "banlieues" est le contrepoint qui confirme la règle), à devenir une cible. Et l'attaque des sauveteurs, ou la rumeur d'attaque, risque de précipiter des représentations extrêmement fortes, très destructrices en termes de solidarité, et incapacitantes en termes d'intervention.

On notera que ce rapport Maison-Blanche fait mention des rapports qui ont circulé sur des tirs à l'encontre des hélicoptères de secours. Il ne dit rien sur le fait qu'ils aient reflété ou non une réalité. Le rapport de la Chambre des Représentants soulignait, de son côté, que les hélicoptères n'avaient pas été pris pour cible. On mesure la difficulté d'établir les « faits ». Si, 6 mois après l'événement, les analystes sont toujours incapables de se déterminer sur un point aussi sensible, on imagine **la difficulté de l'analyse en temps réel**. Et les problèmes pour les **médias**, pris entre folles rumeurs et réassurances officielles tout aussi infondées... ou (voir tome 1) des rumeurs corroborée et encore dramatisées par des figures d'autorité.

Violent crimes were committed against law enforcement officers and other emergency response personnel. Security problems in the Gulf Coast, both actual and perceived, obstructed the speed and efficiency of the Federal response and in some cases temporarily halted relief efforts. Security concerns **suspended** search and rescue missions, **delayed** the restoration of communications infrastructure, and **impeded** medical support missions. [IV, p. 40]

[During the] search and rescue operation, (...) emergency responders [had to intervene] (...) while avoiding urban hazards not normally encountered during waterborne rescue. [V, p. 57]

<sup>22</sup> Entretiens avec le Captain Paskevitch, La Nouvelle-Orléans, missions EDF (mars 2006 ; mars 2007).

<sup>23</sup> Rodríguez, Havidàn, Joseph Trainor, and Enrico L. Quarantelli, "Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial Behavior following Hurricane Katrina." Shelter from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Hurricane Katrina, special issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 604, pp. 82–101.

Almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina's landfall, law and order began to deteriorate in New Orleans. (...) The (...) lawlessness in New Orleans significantly impeded – and in some case, temporarily halted – relief efforts. [V, p. 57]

[They were reports of] individuals shooting at (...) helicopter[s] as [they] flew overhead. (...) On September 3, ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] New Orleans Field Division agents provided security at a Mandeville, Louisiana hospital to which a large number of evacuees were airlifted. Due to aircraft coming under fire, the hospital requested that ATF provide armed support for a rescue mission into the city to evacuate patients and personnel from Tulane University Hospital. (...) Agents also provided an armed escort for a transport shipment of emergency medical supplies from the New Orleans Airport to the Mandeville hospital. (...) ATF (...) responded on several occasions with NOPD (...) after receiving reports of sniper fire. (...) On September 10, ATF (...), acting on a tip, (...) found an AK-47 assault weapon with a 100 round magazine. It is believed that (...) the weapon [was] used during (...) sniper shootings. (...) [ATF] agents provided personal security for Assistant United States Attorneys for the Eastern District of Louisiana returning to their offices (...) to retrieve important case information. [Appendix B, p. 133]

As Colonial [compagnie gérant un pipe-line majeur] attempted to restore power and deliver generators to [its pumping] sites, their crews reported criminal activity and gunshots. Colonial stated they needed protection or would have to cease work and depart. [The Department of Energy] (DOE) arranged with the Mississippi Highway Patrol to provide police protection to three of the Colonial pumping stations. [Appendix B, p. 135]

### ***Les sauveteurs locaux sont aussi des victimes***

Nous sommes là encore bien loin du modèle de base : des victimes, des sauveteurs en pleine possession de leurs moyens qui viennent porter assistance. Ici, la majorité des intervenants locaux (70% des policiers) ont aussi perdu tous leurs biens, ou sont sans nouvelles de leur maison, leur famille... Il y a là une dimension à prendre en compte dans les nouvelles situations de d'urgence de grande échelle, et notamment en cas de pandémie. Les lectures expéditives en termes de « désertion » sont à revoir. Des logiques nouvelles de mobilisation sont à inventer.

For the survivors, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina has been characterized by a mixture of grief, anxiety, and frustration. [I, p. 8]

[After Katrina], many of those called upon to do the toughest work were those that had lost the most. Members of local fire departments, police departments, and emergency service units worked tirelessly despite being victims themselves. Many lost their homes, cars, and possessions. Others lost their families and loved ones. (...) They often worked their shifts without knowledge of where their family was, or where they would sleep that night. [Appendix B, p. 127]

### ***Hétérogénéité : la dimension internationale***

Il faut s'attacher à sortir du modèle de la population habituelle, connue, homogène. Dans la zone de la Nouvelle-Orléans, il y a aussi bien des populations qui n'ont jamais quitté leur quartier et qui ne peuvent imaginer en sortir sans perdre tout lien social, toute sécurité ; et des flux extérieurs faits d'étrangers présents pour un séjour de longue durée, un séjour touristique rapide, ou une simple halte ou traversée de circonstance. Ces derniers ne demandent qu'à s'enfuir avec leur carte American Express ; les premiers n'ont aucun lien social exploitable en dehors de leur quartier, et n'iront pas s'exposer à la jungle sociétale qui les attend si d'aventure ils évacuent.

Dans les cas de « hubs », cette dimension serait poussée à l'extrême : les présents ne font que « passer », les « résidents » ne sont qu'exception. On imagine une gestion de crise dans un territoire touristique d'importance internationale.

Our experience with the tragedies of September 11<sup>th</sup> and Hurricane Katrina underscored that our domestic crises have international implications. (...) Among the victims were foreign nationals who were in the country on business, vacation, or as residents. [V, p. 62]

### 3.3. Environnement perçu, informations et rumeurs

#### *Implosion de l'information, explosion des rumeurs*

Ce doit être une préoccupation immédiate en matière de pilotage de crise : dès l'instant où l'information se fait insaisissable, il faut se brancher non plus seulement sur la recherche d'informations validées, mais aussi sur les rumeurs générées ou possibles à anticiper. Ces rumeurs et « informations-ovni » conduiront à des perceptions fortes, des représentations elles-mêmes génératrices de comportements sur le terrain – par exemple l'arrivée de milliers de personnes au Convention Center, la généralisation de l'image d'un niveau d'insécurité extrême (avec des dires du type : « Les soldats de la National Guard rappatriés d'urgence de Bagdad déclarent qu'ils étaient plus en sécurité en Irak »).<sup>24</sup> Ce monde flottant possède désormais, avec Internet, la plus formidable des chambres d'écho. Blogs et Vlogs pourraient même renvoyer les médias traditionnels dans un rôle marginal, pour population également marginale – celle qui reste culturellement branchée sur les dispositifs de gouvernement. Et le caractère extrême des événements pourrait bien donner un bon d'entrée à toutes les « informations » extrêmes, sous la forme d'une prime au « pire disant ».

Without strong public messaging to inform them otherwise, many (...) people [in New Orleans] had simply assumed that the Convention Center – as a large public building on high ground – would be a safe gathering place. [IV, p. 39]

Exaggerated, unconfirmed claims of violent crimes and lawlessness took on a life of their own in the absence of effective public information to counter them. [IV, p. 40]

Identifying the dead (...) [was] made even more challenging by (...) the inability of many people to accurately determine whether those people they sought were dead or missing. [Appendix B, p. 130]

#### *État de choc devant l'impensable, désarroi devant le vide et l'impuissance d'État*

Chacun dans le pays se fixe devant CNN, découvre le spectacle sous bannière claironnante – « Breaking News » – et récit en déroulement inexorable – « Hurricane Katrina, The Aftermath ». Avant de passer à une perte totale de confiance vis-à-vis des responsables, et à un état de choc devant des scènes particulièrement traumatisantes dès lors que l'on perçoit que ce n'est pas un « reality show », mais de la réalité « réelle ». Des banderolles sont tenues à bout de bras par des « naufragés », notamment depuis les toits des hôpitaux, pour prendre chaque téléspectateur à témoin, et en faire le déclencheur d'un « réveil » des autorités : “Stop the Lying and get us the hell out of here” (rapport des Représentants, p. 284).

American citizens watched events unfold with an initial curiosity that soon turned to concern and sorrow. The awe that viewers held for the sheer ferocity of nature was soon matched with **disappointment and frustration at the seeming inability of the “government”** – local, State, and Federal – to respond effectively to the crisis. [Foreword, p.1].

<sup>24</sup> Un point auquel devront être attentives les Forces de Réflexion Rapide.



Similar to the images of grief and destruction on **September 11, 2001**, the images of suffering and despair from Hurricane Katrina are forever seared into the hearts and memories of all Americans. [I, p. 9]

The Nation empathized with the harrowing stories [reportages] of **survival, loss, and family separation**. [IV, p. 33]

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina will forever be seared into our country's memory. Visions of our citizens stranded on highway overpasses, of debris-filled plots where grand houses once stood, and of babies being hoisted onto roofs to avoid the surging water, continue to haunt us to this day. But there are other, [successful] stories from Katrina, stories that may only be known by a few, but are appreciated deeply by those involved. [Appendix B, p. 125]

### ***Confusion, notamment sur les digues – “submergées” ou “détruites” ?***

L'analyste doit, dès les premiers instants, avoir la vigilance et le courage nécessaires pour traquer les approximations dans les données reçues. Il faut se battre pied à pied sur chaque fragment de donnée et de sens rapporté. Et toute personne formée sait qu'il faut s'attendre à des distorsions importantes dans les messages : il peut y avoir erreur, sous-estimation ou sur-estimation. Il faut surtout détecter au plus vite si le système officiel, déstabilisé par la crise, est incapable de convoier des données autres que « lissées », « rassurantes ». Si le problème majeur est la « destruction » des digues, et que tout est fait pour ne parler que de « dépassement des digues », il faut immédiatement poser le diagnostic d'un système de gestion déjà très dégradé, en quelque sorte sous la coupe de la crise.

Et il faut aussi compter avec les systèmes non-officiels. Le rapport souligne que la confusion entre dépassement et brèche est commise par les reporters. Il serait juste de dire que les autorités aussi commettent la même erreur : le rapport montant du responsable de la FEMA vers Washington est ainsi immédiatement reformulé pour que l'on reste bien dans la catégorie « overtopping », bien moins inquiétante que celle de la « brèche » et des destructions (voir le tome 1).

On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting [on the exact situation in New Orleans] was extremely difficult to obtain because of the widespread destruction of communication infrastructure, the incapacitation of many State and local responders, and the lack of Federal representatives in the city. As a result, local, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of **conflicting reports** [especially] from (...) media (...) sources, many of which continued to provide **inaccurate or incomplete information** throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New Orleans. (...) In addition to the dearth of reliable reporting regarding the situation in New Orleans, there was **widespread confusion and misuse of the terms “break” and “overtopping”** by (...) reporters who did not fully understand the distinction between the two terms, or whose observations were not sufficient to enable differentiation of one from the other. [IV, p. 35]

### ***Information : entre messages officiels non crédibles, et exagérations médiatiques***

It is clear that violent crime [after landfall] was less prevalent than initially reported. (...) **Exaggerated, unconfirmed claims of violent crimes and lawlessness took on a life of their own in the absence of effective public information to counter them.** Security problems in the Gulf Coast, **both actual and perceived**, obstructed the speed and efficiency of the Federal response and in some cases halted relief efforts. [IV, p. 40]

[The formation of] Joint Information Centers (JICs) [by DHS] in Baton Rouge on (...) September 6 [and] (...) New Orleans three days later (...) helped to stem the spread of (...)

unsubstantiated reports that had plagued public information efforts during the first week after landfall. [IV, p. 47]

[A] perception that government sources lacked credibility [arose for instance from the fact that] on September 1, conflicting views of [the situation in] New Orleans emerged with positive statements by some Federal officials that contradicted a more desperate picture painted by reporters in the streets. The media, operating 24/7, gathered and aired uncorroborated information which interfered with ongoing emergency response efforts. [V, p. 60]

The storm's environmental damage (...) [did] not [create] the "toxic soup" portrayed in the media, [although it] (...) did create a potentially hazardous environment. [V, p. 61]

### *Les images à la télévision : le vrai «réel» ?*

Retenons un élément de réflexion peu courant : des sauveteurs qui baignent dans l'horreur sont soudain déstabilisés, non par leur environnement immédiat, mais par ce qu'ils voient à la télévision. L'image « à la télévision » semble tout à coup plus prégnante que la réalité immédiate, vécue sur le terrain.

After several days piloting a boat into devastated neighborhoods, ferrying thousands of people to safety, and seeing destruction on a scale so vast that it seemed surreal, [Coast Guard Officer] Guidroz was moved when she saw an image on television. She had been haunted by the memory of a young mother who had almost been trampled during the evacuation, [and her baby]. (...) [One] night, a news channel showed images from the Houston Astrodome, and there she was – the lady with the baby. "She was in Houston now, and she looked like she'd showered and her kid had on clean clothes. That moment is when it clicked," Guidroz said. "Here was someone we had actually helped, and it fell into place that we were doing something that really mattered, something really good." [Appendix B, p. 129]

## 4. Un système débordé

### 4.1. Une guerre de retard

#### *Rupture conceptuelle : un système de réplique inadapté aux crises du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle*

Les remarques sur le décalage entre les risques en émergence et nos systèmes sont fondamentales et rarement exprimées avec une telle netteté.

While we have constructed a system that effectively handles the demands of routine, limited natural and man-made disasters, our system clearly has structural flaws for addressing catastrophic incidents. [VI, p. 66]

The methods that had been employed successfully for the 243 previous major disaster declarations since January 2001 proved inadequate for Hurricane Katrina's magnitude. [IV, p. 50]

Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21<sup>st</sup> Century catastrophic threats. [V, p. 52]

#### *Rupture systémique : le système est débordé de toutes parts*

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left the Gulf Coast in desperate need of resources and assistance. (...) FEMA's pre-positioned supplies proved inadequate to meet (...) demands throughout the region after landfall. (...) FEMA personnel soon discovered (...) that the quantity of material requested post-landfall outstripped their logistical capabilities. FEMA simply could not procure enough resources to match the rate at which commodities

were being consumed. The agency's contracts with private companies, though sufficient for smaller disasters, were incapable of supplying the enormous quantities of resources needed. [IV, pp. 44-45]

The Federal government's problems responding to Hurricane Katrina illustrate (...) systemic weaknesses inherent in our current national preparedness system: the lack of expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and reconstruction, insufficient planning [and] training. [IV, p. 50]

### ***Rupture sur les hypothèses : le découpage administratif habituel est débordé***

Une Force de Réflexion Rapide<sup>25</sup> aura grandement intérêt à s'interroger sur les nouvelles dimensions à prendre en compte : un territoire qui ne correspond plus au territoire implicitement pris en compte dans les plans ; des modalités de gestion, comme les accords d'aide mutuelle, qui sont pulvérisées du fait que tous les partenaires sont situés dans la zone affectée.

[Prior to Katrina], the Department of Homeland Security [had] produced a set of fifteen *National Planning Scenarios*. (...) Scenario 10 (...) depicts the effects of a Category 5 hurricane hitting a major metropolitan area in the United States. However, in the Scenario, the Category 5 hurricane actually causes fewer deaths and less destruction than did Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3, because the Scenario only characterizes the destruction caused to a metropolitan area, while (...) Hurricane Katrina [spanned] (...) **three or more States**. Further, although the Scenario acknowledges potential delays and difficulties in evacuation, (...) [actual] circumstances during Hurricane Katrina were] worse, [as] (...) **more than 100,000 residents did not evacuate**. [VI, pp. 75-76]

Hurricane Katrina's impact across the Gulf Coast region limited the use of normal mutual aid agreements, (...) [as] **neighboring jurisdictions were overwhelmed themselves and unable to provide assistance elsewhere**. [IV, p. 41]

## **4.2. Des cadres de références décalés, et encore non stabilisés**

### ***Paradigmes culturels : les États en première ligne, non le Fédéral***

Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role. **Limits on the Federal government's role in disaster response are deeply rooted in American tradition**. [II, p. 11]

The Constitution (...) [delineates] Federal and State roles. It tells us which branches and offices will be part of the Federal government, what powers they may exercise, and what limitations constrain them. [II, p. 11]

Today, the centerpiece legislation for providing Federal aid in disaster relief, the (...) Stafford Act, reinforces the principle that response efforts should **first utilize State and local resources**. [II, p. 12]

Recognizing that most incidents are managed locally, the command function under [the Incident Command System] (ICS) [(i.e. the command structure that the National Incident Management System recommends)] is [traditionally] set up at the lowest level of the response, and grows to encompass other agencies and jurisdictions as they arrive. [II, p. 13]

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<sup>25</sup> Vidéo : "Les Forces de Réflexion Rapide - Aide au pilotage des crises hors-cadres", une initiative d'Electricité de France : à l'écoute de Pierre Béroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques Groupe ; et avec le témoignage de Yann Laroche, Directeur Général Délégué, Ressources Humaines et Communication, Décembre 2006.



Consistent with the traditions and customs that have developed under American federalism, the NRP is built on the premise that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. (...) [While] the NRP (...) does recognize that some events will be so catastrophic that they will require a (...) proactive Federal government response [without waiting for requests “from below”] (...), no final plan has been put in place to make this operational. [II, p. 14]

The system for providing Stafford Act [(i.e. Federal)] assistance, set forth in the NRP and FEMA regulations, reflects the American system of federalism, allocating roles and responsibilities between levels of government by utilizing a layered system that requires local governments to first request assistance from their State. (...) When local and State governments require additional resources, they generally call upon neighboring jurisdictions and other States through mutual assistance agreements and through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). (...) Traditionally, it is only after local, State, and mutual assistance resources are depleted, or prove insufficient, that the Federal government is requested to help. (...) Should State and affected local governments become overwhelmed, the President may declare (...) a major disaster (...) through his authorities under the Stafford Act. (...) This is often referred to as a “pull” system for Federal assistance because local and State governments must identify needs and make specific requests for assistance before the Federal government can deliver. (...) Equally important to understanding the current “pull” system is [that the delivery of requested] (...) Federal assistance [relies] (...) on the State as an intermediary: (...) the Federal government does not always directly deliver its assistance to local governments or others in need. [II, pp. 17-18]

Under the current response framework, the Federal government merely “coordinates” resources to meet the needs of local and State governments based upon their requests for assistance. Pursuant to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP), Federal and State agencies build their command and coordination structures to support the local command and coordination structures during an emergency. [V, p. 52]

### *Principes encore incertains en matière “d’ingérence” du fédéral*

Comme longuement discuté dans le rapport de la Chambre des Représentants, le principe du « push » system était admis pour les situations où les États seraient incapables de lancer les appels nécessaires au fédéral. Mais il est souligné ici que cette ligne d’action n’était pas encore bien inscrite dans les esprits, les textes et les systèmes. Certes, le Fédéral peut prendre l’initiative de pré-positionner des moyens, mais leur utilisation effective reste du ressort de l’État concerné. Si l’État en question n’est pas en mesure de prendre cette initiative, le “push system” tel qu’inscrit dans les textes reste insuffisant. D’après le rapport, on était sur le point de remédier à cette insuffisance quand Katrina est arrivé.

During the development of the NRP, (...) [the Federal government began planning for] a catastrophic scenario [that would incapacitate local and State governments, and therefore require that the Federal government move] (...) assets to the affected areas without waiting for State requests. Under [the resulting] (...) Catastrophic Incident Annex, however, the **general operating presumption** is that [while] Federal (...) resources [are] pre-deployed, [they] remain at staging areas until [actually] requested [and distributed] by the State and local incident command authorities. (...) [Therefore], the actual employment of the resources [still] depends to a good degree on (...) State and local authorities. (...) Because [the limits of this Annex were] recognized, (...) [the Annex itself] required that a “more detailed (...) NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement [(CIS)]... be approved and

published” (...). [But] on August 29, at the time Hurricane Katrina hammered into the Gulf Coast, [this] draft CIS had not been finalized and promulgated. [II, pp. 18-19]

### ***Confusion entre nouveau et ancien système***

Au-delà de ce qui vient d’être indiqué – des textes pas encore publiés –, il faut considérer un facteur de résistance plus fondamental : le nouveau système prévoyant une responsabilité « d’ingérence » pour le fédéral reste difficile à tolérer, ce qui se traduit dans la mise en œuvre. D’un côté, des principes nouveaux d’intervention du Fédéral à la place de l’État local, en cas de grave crise ; de l’autre, les composantes de l’action qui restent inscrites, en partie, dans les cadres de référence anciens. En situation de grave crise, l’hésitation, la résistance, conduisent rapidement à la confusion, la contradiction, les heurts.

The Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) [unités inter-agences spécialistes d’une mission précise et mobilisées par DHS en cas de crise] did not function as envisioned in the NRP. First, since the ESFs do not easily integrate into the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS) structure, **competing systems were implemented in the field** – one based on ESF structure and a second based on the ICS. (...) [Second], the agencies assigned ESF responsibilities did not respect the role of the [Principal Federal Officer] (PFO). (...) This is convoluted, inefficient, and inappropriate during emergency conditions. [V, p. 53]

The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides strategic-level guidance for all Federal, State, and local entities to use in prioritizing infrastructure for protection. However, there is no supporting implementation plan to execute these actions during a natural disaster. [V, p. 61]

[At present], the United States (...) has guidelines and individual plans across multiple agencies and levels of government that do not yet constitute an *integrated* national system that ensures unity of effort. [VI, p. 66]

### ***Mise en échec des accords de coopération mutuelle entre États***

Le désastre est d’une telle ampleur géographique que tout ce qui était accord d’aide mutuelle est caduc.

[As a matter of fact, Katrina] overwhelmed and, in some cases, incapacitated State and local emergency capabilities across the Gulf Coast, requiring an unprecedented Federal response. [IV, p. 33]

Hurricane Katrina’s impact across the Gulf Coast limited the use of normal mutual aid agreements, (...) [as] **neighboring jurisdictions were overwhelmed themselves** and unable to provide assistance elsewhere. Assistance had to come from States outside the region and from the Federal government. [IV, p. 41]

State and local governments have a fundamental responsibility to provide for the public safety and security of their residents. (...) [However], almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, (...) [State and local law enforcement personnel were] overwhelmed. (...) [Among New Orleans’] police force, 70 percent (...) were themselves victims of the disaster. [Therefore they lost] (...) the capacity [to maintain order, and] (...) the Federal law enforcement response (...) was (...) crucial. [V, p. 57]

### ***Cloisonnements : Public-Privé ; Public-ONG ; Fédéral-Local***

Les systèmes restent sévèrement cloisonnés, et toute absence de lisibilité dans la planification publique se traduit par des vides chez les partenaires. En conséquence, les apports positifs qui peuvent tout de même se manifester se font bien plutôt « en dépit des obstacles » posés par le système gouvernemental qu’en lien avec lui.

The National Response plan urges businesses to develop disaster contingency plans. [However], **businesses have been unable to develop completely effective contingency**

plans without understanding the actions Federal, State, and local governments will take in response to a disaster. [Appendix A, p. 112]

There is no single office within DHS that is responsible for integrating non-governmental and faith-based assistance into emergency response planning. [Appendix A, p. 115]

Legal and liability impediments to the use and coordination of non-governmental and private sector resources during a catastrophic event should be removed. [Appendix A, p. 116]

Security problems in the Gulf Coast [after landfall] (...) obstructed the speed and efficiency of the Federal response, and in some cases temporarily halted relief efforts. (...) Federal officials attempted to have law enforcement officers protect emergency responders. (...) However, due to a lack of planning, arranging this support took several days, during which the situation grew worse. [IV, p. 40]

[Following requests from local officials, a number of Federal agencies] deployed (...) Federal law enforcement officers [to the Gulf Coast in order to assist] (...) local law enforcement, particularly in New Orleans. However, [Federal] department and agencies (...) were impeded in their ability to provide immediate assistance due to the need for deputization to enforce State or Federal laws. Federal planning should have anticipated the need for such deputization procedures. [IV, p. 41]

Hurricane Katrina (...) crippled the region's criminal justice system. (...) The strain [caused by Katrina] on the criminal justice system is largely attributable to the absence of contingency plans [in the matter] (...) at all levels of government. [IV, p. 41]

Federal, State and local governments have not yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve operability and interoperability to meet the needs of emergency responders. [V, pp. 55-56]

Local, State, and Federal law enforcement were ill-prepared and ill-positioned to respond efficiently and effectively to the crisis. (...) Federal law enforcement support to State and local officials [requires] greater (...) collaborative planning and training with State and local law enforcement, as well as detailed implementation guidance. [V, pp. 57-58]

More often than not, NGOs successfully contributed to the relief effort in spite of government obstacles. [V, p. 64]

### ***Impréparation : l'exercice Pam mal exploité, l'apprentissage peu développé***

Un problème majeur est souligné : même si on fait des exercices (ce qui est déjà une avancée considérable), il n'y a pas de programme déterminé pour appliquer les enseignements de ces exercices.

The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed a lack of familiarity [from officials at all levels] with incident management (...) and field-level crisis leadership. [VI, p. 73]

The results of [the "Hurricane Pam"] exercise revealed to the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) and FEMA the shortfalls in existing plans, and were to be used to inform future development of State and Federal plans to address (...) [a] potential catastrophe [of this type]. At the first session [in July 2004], LOHSEP and Federal representatives identified a list of planning topics as the most urgent or complex topics needing discussion, including pre-landfall issues, search and rescue, and medical care, as well as mass sheltering and housing. (...) [But the last of the] after-action review workshops did not [convene] until [August] 2005, mere [days] before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. (...) [Therefore, the Pam workshops] failed to generate a comprehensive, integrated, and actionable plan in time for Katrina, (...) [although they] did have some positive impact. [III, p. 25]

The most recent Top Officials (“TOPOFF”) exercise in April 2005 revealed the Federal government’s lack of progress in addressing a number of preparedness deficiencies, many of which had been identified in previous exercises. This lack of progress reflects, in part, the **absence of a remedial action program to systematically address lessons learned** from exercises. [Appendix A, p. 117]

While the deployment of Federal law enforcement capability to New Orleans (...) significantly contributed to the restoration of law and order, **pre-event collaborative planning between Federal, State and local officials would have improved the response.** (...)

*Un système encore théorique, et mal connu des décideurs-clés*

Quand les dirigeants sont les derniers formés, le système est gravement handicapé. Et il ne sert à rien que les dirigeants signent une nouvelle note de service enjoignant chacun à bien noter sur quelle étagère se trouve le plan de crise.

The NRP itself provides only the ‘base plan’ outlining the overall elements of a response: Federal departments and agencies were required to develop supporting operational plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to integrate their activities into the national response. [But] in almost all cases, the integrating SOPs were either non-existent or still under development when Hurricane Katrina hit. Consequently, (...) Federal partners [often] had to operate without any prescribed guidelines or chains of command. [V, p. 53]

[Because] Federal personnel [often] lacked a working knowledge of [plans and procedures], (...) valuable time and resources were diverted to provide on-the-job (...) training to Federal personnel assigned to the JFO. [V, p. 53]

At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the response to Katrina did not go as planned is that **key decision-makers at all levels simply were not familiar with the plans.** The NRP was relatively new to many at the Federal, State, and local levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina. (...) Consequently, some of the specific procedures and processes of the NRP were not properly implemented. (...) Furthermore, the JFO staff and other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working knowledge of [the National Incident Management System] (NIMS) or even a basic understand of [Incident Command System] (ICS) principles. As a result, valuable time and resources were diverted to provide on-the-job ICS training to Federal personnel assigned to the [Joint Field Office] (JFO). (...) There were not enough qualified persons to staff all the required positions. [V, p. 53]

[During] the response to Katrina, (...) the Federal government [showed that it often had poor] (...) operational capabilities. (...) These shortfalls were not due to the absence of top level plans such as the *National Response Plan* and the *National Incident Management System*. Rather, the problem is that these plans lack clarity on key aspects, have operational gaps (...), and have not been effectively integrated and translated into action. Prior training, exercising and equipping proved inadequate to the task of effectively responding to Hurricane Katrina. There is a difference between a plan (saying “this is what we need to do”) and a trained, resourced set of defined missions (saying “this is what we are going to do, and this is how we are going to organize, train, exercise, and equip to do it”). [VI, pp. 68-69]

During Hurricane Katrina, it became clear that most Federal department and agencies had not developed – much less exercised – standard operating procedures for their response [to large-scale disasters on the basis of the NRP]. [VI, p. 72]

The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed a lack of familiarity with (...) planning, (...) legal authorities, [and response] capabilities. (...) Many Federal, State, and local officials **lacked a fundamental understanding** of the *National Response Plan*, the *NIMS*, and State and local response plans. [VI, p. 73]

### **4.3. Complexité, Confusion, “usines à gaz”**

Le rapport n'en finit pas de mentionner les sous-systèmes qui ne fonctionnent pas correctement. Les pages correspondantes deviennent rapidement illisibles tant les principes, les composantes, les acronymes, les hypothèses, les pratiques, concourent à construire un système à la fois incompréhensible et inopérant. On se contentera ici de pointer quelques exemples, sous la forme d'un court résumé. Nous tentons de clarifier le propos, par égard pour le lecteur, mais nous sommes bien conscient du biais introduit car le tout risque d'apparaître bien plus clair que dans la réalité.

#### ***La FEMA et ses organigrammes introuvables, PFO/FCO/JFO***

Le système mis en place est la traduction d'une culture-papier ignorante des réalités opérationnelles et stratégiques. On arrive en à un modèle achevé de confusion et d'impuissance, l'effort majeur semblant consacré à tenter d'appliquer un schéma théorique introuvable.

On August 30, Secretary Chertoff (...) appointed FEMA Director Michael Brown as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for the Hurricane Katrina response. A PFO is designated to facilitate Federal support to the unified command structure and coordinate overall Federal incident management. (...) **However**, according to the NRP, “*The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, FCO [(i.e. Federal Coordinating Officer, a position created by the Stafford Act; its incumbent is in charge of managing and coordinating Federal resource support activities)], or other Federal and State officials.*” The FCO retains his authorities to coordinate response activities under the Stafford act. As PFO, Brown had no authority over the FCOs. **However**, as the Director of FEMA, Brown was vested with the authority to directly oversee the FCOs, thereby mitigating the PFO limitations. His subsequent PFO replacement [Thad Allen] had no such authority to work around this impediment, and as a result, was eventually made FCO as well. **The multiple Federal coordinators** with varying authority frustrated State and local officials in the region. [IV, pp. 41-42]

The Joint Field Office (JFO) [as described in the NRP] (...) provides [in theory] a single location for all Federal departments and agencies to acquire situational awareness, direction, mission assignments, and a forum to interface with other agencies. It is essential for ensuring that all Federal response elements possess a common operating picture and synchronize their response operations and resources. **However**, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the JFO was not established at the outset, and **did not function as envisioned** when it was established. Key PFO staff positions had not been identified prior to landfall, which forced Director Brown to assemble his staff in the midst of the disaster. **Brown was still working on a PFO organizational chart on the evening of August 31, almost sixty hours after landfall. Key components of the Baton Rouge JFO were still being assembled in the two weeks that followed.** [IV, p. 42]

#### ***La FEMA, incapable de « faire réseau » avec les autres ministères***

Les rapports soulignent régulièrement que tel organisme ne connaissait pas tel autre organisme, ce qui n'a pas permis une collaboration efficace. Cela complète l'argument leitmotiv selon lequel « les gens doivent se connaître avant les crises », idée toujours exprimée aux Etats-Unis par la petite phrase « ce n'est pas au moment de la crise qu'il faut se mettre à échanger les cartes de visite ». Certes, les connaissances préalables sont essentielles. Mais il faut aller plus loin, en prenant en considération la complexité du monde actuel et le fait que les crises seront de plus en plus des moments de foisonnements illisibles, de surgissements d'acteurs en surnombre. **L'objectif est moins de « connaître tout et tout le monde » que d'être en mesure de nouer de liens solides, efficaces et inventifs, tant pour**



l'analyse que pour la décision et la mise en œuvre, avec des acteurs jusqu'alors non connus, non répertoriés, et cela en situation chaotique. Ce niveau d'exigence va devenir de plus en plus essentiel à l'heure des épisodes d'échelle continentale ou mondiale.

Ces difficultés se traduisent sur toutes les lignes de front : le sauvetage, l'apport de biens de première nécessité, le logement. Et l'on se heurte parfois aussi à des situations kafkaïenne, comme sur le problèmes des débris, marqués par des règles juridiques de propriété incompatibles avec toute action un tout petit peu efficace.

[During] the (...) search and rescue effort, (...) [FEMA's] Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams had a particularly challenging situation since they are neither trained nor equipped to perform water rescue. [V, p. 57]

[Following landfall], the Department of Interior (...) offered valuable assistance [to FEMA]. In the aftermath of the hurricane, DOI delivered a comprehensive list of its deployable assets that were immediately available for humanitarian and emergency assistance. (...) Although DOI repeatedly attempted to provide these assets through the process established by the NRP, there was **no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating and deploying these resources**. [IV, p. 45]

[Following landfall], the [Department of Agriculture] (USDA) observed that its personnel "had difficulty in getting FEMA to take advantage of the resources available to them because of the unfamiliarity of some FEMA employees with USDA programs. Likewise, many USDA employees were unfamiliar with FEMA programs and procedures." [IV, p. 45]

The Federal government's capability to provide housing solutions to the displaced Gulf Coast population has proved to be far too slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient. FEMA's temporary and long-term housing efforts [for evacuees] (...) suffered [in part] from the failure to pre-identify workable sites and available land and the inability to take advantage of housing units available with other Federal agencies. [V, p. 60]

[...] The unnecessarily complicated rules for removing debris from private property hampered the response. In addition, greater collaboration among Federal, State, and local officials as well as an enhanced public communication program could have improved the effectiveness of the Federal response. [V, p. 62]

### ***La FEMA, incapable d'intégrer les ressources des ONG, du secteur privé, de l'international***<sup>26,27</sup>

Au nombre des fonctions essentielles à mettre en place, il y a la capacité à intégrer des ressources extérieures inattendues, massives, étrangères au système local. Sinon, on passe à côté de fortes opportunités, et on crée beaucoup de frustrations.

FEMA could neither efficiently accept nor manage the deluge of charitable [or private sector] donations. (...) Other countries made generous offers of assistance that the Federal government had difficulty integrating into the ongoing response operation. Absent an implementation plan for the management of foreign material assistance, valuable resources often went unused, which frustrated many donor countries. [IV, p. 45]

[The Federal government] did not always make effective use of [non-governmental or private sector] contributions [to the response] because we had not effectively planned for integrating them into the overall response effort. (...) The government relief effort was

<sup>26</sup> Sara Ulrich: "The Impact of Hurricane Katrina's Crisis Management on Transatlantic Relations", Occasional Paper, Network of European Union, Texas A&M University, Centers of Excellence, February 2007. [http://eucenter.tamu.edu/Publications/OccasionalPapers/Hurricane\\_Katrina\\_Crisis\\_Management.pdf](http://eucenter.tamu.edu/Publications/OccasionalPapers/Hurricane_Katrina_Crisis_Management.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> De même : Anne C. Richard: *Role Reversal: Offers of Help From Other Countries in Response to Hurricane Katrina*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University 2006.

unprepared to meet the fundamental food, housing, and operational needs of the surge of volunteer force. [V, p. 63]

Inadequate planning delayed the overall process of accepting and receiving disaster aid from abroad. (...) The same was true of foreign financial assistance. There was no means of accepting, allocating and disbursing funds that would also ensure transparency and acknowledgement of donors. The Federal government eventually developed a process to accept financial gifts from foreign countries, but because there was no pre-established plan, implementation was a slow and often frustrating process. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sent liaisons to FEMA field locations on September 2 to coordinate the delivery of foreign disaster relief. However, it took several days for the international staging area at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, to become operational. Before this staging area was established, foreign aid could not be efficiently unloaded and distributed. [IV, pp. 45-46]

### ***Risques environnementaux : le vide***

Le cloisonnement des fonctionnements, des approches des crises, conduit à voir toute catastrophe « naturelle » comme sagement limitée à ce terrain. Bien sûr, les entités en charge des questions d'environnement se mobiliseront en cas de besoin, après appel spécifique. Mais il serait essentiel que, dès l'instant où un phénomène perturbateur d'importance non négligeable est annoncé, les organes en charge des risques environnementaux se mobilisent d'eux-mêmes.

The relatively small number of personnel available during the critical week after landfall were unable to conduct a rapid and comprehensive environmental assessment of the approximately 80 square miles flooded in New Orleans, let alone the nearly 93,000 square miles affected by the hurricane. [V, p. 62]

There [was no] comprehensive plan to accurately and quickly communicate (...) critical information [on environmental hazards] to the emergency responders and area residents. (...) Had such a plan existed, the mixed messages from Federal, State, and local officials on the reentry into New Orleans could have been avoided. [V, p. 62]

### ***Prise en considération des étrangers sur place : le vide***

We [did not] have the mechanisms in place to provide foreign governments with whatever knowledge we had regarding the status of their nationals. Despite the fact that many victims of the September 11, 2001, tragedy [already] were foreign nationals, the NRP does not take into account foreign populations (e.g. long-term residents, students, businessmen, tourists, and foreign government officials) affected by a domestic catastrophe. In addition, (...) emergency response officials have not included assistance to foreign nationals in their response planning. (...) The absence of a central system to manage and promptly respond to inquiries about affected foreign nationals led to confusion. [V, p. 63]

### ***FEMA / DHS : deux cultures***

La FEMA avait plutôt une culture de mise en réseau, le DHS a une culture de commandement hiérarchique. La juxtaposition des deux ne peut être que problématique, d'autant que les grandes crises contemporaines ne peuvent être maîtrisées autrement que sur un mode « biologique ». Les logiques d'alignement et de régulation hiérarchiques ne sont pas en mesure de traiter l'hyper-complexité, la vitesse, les rétroactions constantes, les maillages les plus divers et les plus mouvants. Comme la logique dominante a été de mettre la FEMA sous la coupe du DHS, on se trouve rapidement face à des problèmes stratégiques plus que difficiles. Certes, les auteurs du rapport prennent bien soin de souligner qu'ils prônent un

commandement « unifié » et non un commandement « unique » (p. 13). Mais il faudrait voir si les logiques appelées respectent bien ces précisions sémantiques.

The current arrangements [for Federal crisis response] are an awkward mix of the traditional, FEMA-led, approach to interagency coordination and the Homeland Security Act's creation of a powerful Department of Homeland Security. [VI, p. 71]

### *Aide au logement, des règles pénalisantes*

Illustration immédiate : à vouloir tout réguler d'en haut, par des règles fermes, on aboutit à des effets de confusion et d'inefficacité, de perte de crédit et de confiance.

Current regulations allow payment of rental subsidies to disaster victims, but not the routine payment of security deposits or utility fees. Reimbursement for repairs to existing available housing units [is] also not authorized, effectively precluding the use of a large supply of federally controlled units that may only need minor repairs in order to be occupied. These restrictions effectively push many people to trailers and other manufactures housing units, while leaving other available housing vacant. Revising these housing regulations would allow greater flexibility in meeting urgent housing needs in the aftermath of a disaster. [Appendix A, pp. 108-109]

## **5. Un “Inconcevable” moins “inconcevable” qu'on l'a proclamé**

### **5.1. Un cyclone qui n'était pas une surprise**

#### *Un scénario répertorié*

A catastrophic hurricane striking Southeast Louisiana has been considered a worst-case scenario that the region and many experts had known and feared for years. Much of Southeast Louisiana is at or below sea level, and experience had shown Gulf Coast hurricanes to be deadly. (...) An unnamed Category 4 hurricane made landfall on September 8, 1900, in Galveston, Texas. With storm surges higher than fifteen feet and winds stronger than 130 mph, over 8,000 perished. (...) On September 9, 1965, Hurricane Betsy made (...) landfall (...) [in] Louisiana as a strong Category 3 storm. As an omen of things to come, Hurricane Betsy's storm surge and high winds hit Lake Pontchartrain (...), overtopping levees and flooding the city. Breaching the Florida Avenue levee, flood waters [poured into] the Lower 9<sup>th</sup> Ward (...), drowning many in their attics as they tried to escape. In total, seventy-five people were killed and over 160,000 homes were flooded. (...) Hurricane Camille, a Category 5 hurricane, struck the mouth of the Mississippi River on the night of August 17, 1969. Storm surges measuring over twenty-five feet, combined with winds estimated close to 200 mph, caused an estimated 335 deaths, destroyed or damaged 22,008 homes, and injured thousands in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia.

In the decades that followed, experts attempted to model the likely impact of future hurricanes to improve protection in the Gulf Coast region. In 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) modeled the effect of a slow moving Category 4 or any Category 5 hurricane on the region. According to the Corps, New Orleans would be inundated by over twenty feet of water if such a hurricane took a “critical path” towards the city. (...) Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., Undersecretary of Commerce for Ocean and Atmosphere, stated in 2002 that the overtopping of the levees and subsequent flooding of the city could occur during slow moving Category 3, 4 or 5 storms. [III, p. 24]



### ***Un scénario travaillé***

Recognizing that (...) response capabilities overall needed to be enhanced, (...) FEMA provided funding for (...) “Hurricane Pam” (...) [in] 2004. (...) The results of this exercise revealed to the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) and FEMA the shortfalls in existing plans. [III, pp. 24-25]

State and local officials knew that tens of thousands of Gulf Coast residents either could not or would not evacuate. A large number of residents who did not own a vehicle depended on relatives, neighbors, charitable organizations, or public transportation to evacuate; New Orleans hurricane plans estimated that over 100,000 residents did not own an automobile. [III, p. 26]

### ***Un scénario souligné pour la saison 2005***

On May 16, 2005, (...) the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service (NWS), released the 2005 Atlantic hurricane outlook. (...) In its report, NOAA assessed a 70 percent chance of an above-average season, predicting (...) three to five (...) major hurricanes (equivalent to Categories 3 [and above]). (...) NOAA also noted that the previous year had been “extremely active” (...). That same day, (...) the National Hurricane Center (NHC) cautioned, “last year’s hurricane season provided a reminder that planning and preparation for a hurricane do make a difference.” (...)

### ***Un risque à nouveau fortement souligné début août 2005***

On August 2, 2005, NOAA released an updated 2005 Atlantic hurricane season outlook: (...) based on the [high level of hurricane activity] in June and July, NOAA revised its assessment to a “95 to 100 percent” chance of an above-normal 2005 Atlantic Hurricane season. It reported that “(...) the [current] atmospheric and oceanic conditions [favor] hurricane formation (...) [and] make an above-normal season nearly certain”. (...) NOAA emphasized that the next three months constituted the peak of hurricane season. (...) [It] urged that “residents and government agencies of coastal and near-coastal regions should embrace hurricane preparedness efforts.” (...) The NOAA outlook proved an ominous forecast. [III, pp. 21-22]

### ***Katrina, remarquablement bien suivi***

In the afternoon of August 26, the [National Hurricane Center] (NHC) released a track forecasting the eye of Hurricane Katrina would pass just east of New Orleans on Monday, August 29. This forecast and all subsequent NHC forecasts projected Hurricane Katrina would make its second landfall as a Category 4 or 5 storm (...). The Center also forecasted that the accompanying coastal storm surge would cause flooding fifteen to twenty feet above normal tide levels where the eye of the hurricane would make landfall. [III, pp. 23-24]

### ***Une annonce présidentielle, fait exceptionnel***

[On Saturday, August 27] President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana, (...) [and he] issued additional emergency declarations for Mississippi and Alabama the following day. (...) The issuance of a Presidential emergency declaration before landfall is extremely rare, and indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly devastating. [III, p. 27]

### ***Une intervention – rarissime – du directeur du centre national des cyclones***

Hurricane Katrina’s growing intensity on Saturday, [August 27], led [National Hurricane Center] (NHC) Director Mayfield to make personal calls to State and local

officials in the region that evening [in order to warn them] (...) that this could be the “big one”. That evening, Director Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour [(Mississippi)], Mayor Nagin, and [the] Alabama Emergency Management Agency Chief of Operations (...) about Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude and the potential storm impacts. [III, pp. 27-28]

On Sunday, August 28, (...) the National Weather Service (...) issued a detailed (...) warning of Hurricane Katrina’s impending devastating impact on the Gulf Coast. The warning stated, “The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional... High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously – a few to the point of total collapse. All windows will blow out. Airborne debris will be widespread – and may include heavy items such as (...) light vehicles..., [and people] (...) will face certain death if struck”. The [National Hurricane Center] (NHC) issued advisories that warned the levees in New Orleans could be overtopped by Lake Pontchartrain and that significant destruction would likely be experienced far away from the hurricane center. The warning continued, “most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks... Perhaps longer... Power outages will last for weeks... Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.” [III, p. 28]

### *Une perception très vive de la gravité des événements annoncés*

[At the teleconference held on Sunday, August 28], the FEMA Director [Michael Brown] (...) expressed concern about (...) the Superdome as a shelter of last resort. [III, p. 29]

[On] Sunday, [August 28], (...) Mayor Nagin said, “the storm surge most likely will topple our levee system.” [III, p. 30]

The nightmare scenario that some had predicted prior to Katrina’s landfall became a reality [when the hurricane hit]. [IV, p. 33]

[Before Katrina], the Department of Homeland Security (...) [had] produced a set of fifteen *National Planning Scenarios*, [which] (...) include a Category 5 hurricane hitting a major metropolitan area. [VI, p. 75]

## **5.2. Une « surprise » qui cache de profondes défaillances**

### *Katrina, un petit événement relativement aux grands désastres possibles*

Hurricane Katrina severely stressed out current national response capabilities. However, (...) three other [scenarios among the fifteen] National Planning Scenarios [prepared by DHS prior to the Hurricane] – an act of nuclear terrorism (...), an outbreak of pandemic influenza (...), and a 7.5 magnitude earthquake striking a major city (...) – are more daunting still. Compared with the deaths and economic chaos a nuclear detonation or influenza outbreak could unleash, Hurricane Katrina was small. [VI, p. 76]

### *L’« inconcevable », paravent des réelles défaillances*

The magnitude of Hurricane Katrina does not excuse our inadequate preparedness and response. [I, p. 5]

[Even though] Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history, (...) there is no question that improved operational plans could have better mitigated the Hurricane’s tragic effects. [II, p. 19]

### ***Blocages et problèmes de perception***

Comme souvent, l'analyse des comportements des populations mériterait d'être fortement éclairée par les connaissances sociologiques désormais à disposition, et par les études engagées lorsque l'on dispose d'équipes aussi performantes que les équipes de recherche rapide comme en disposent le Disaster Research Center, ou l'Université du Colorado. Sinon, on en reste à des remarques bien légères.<sup>28</sup>

Et il faudrait sans doute « revisiter » ces études pour être certain qu'elles conservent toute leur valeur alors qu'émergent des risques et des ensembles sociaux qui ne sont plus ceux des années 1960-90.

Despite hurricane watches and warning through [Saturday, August 27], it appeared that many people along the Gulf Coast (...) remained (...) **unconcerned about the storm**. [III, p. 25]

Many Gulf Coast residents had become **so accustomed** to hurricanes and tropical storms that they **refused to evacuate despite the warnings**. [III, p. 26]

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<sup>28</sup> Pour approfondir, voir : Joseph E. Trainor, William Donner and Manuel R. Torres, "There for the Storm: Warning, Response, and Rescue Among Nonevacuees." Pp. 307–326, in Learning from Catastrophe: Quick Response Research in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina. Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006.

## MUTATIONS CULTURELLES

Les grandes ruptures que nous connaissons dans le domaine des risques et des crises appellent, en réponse, des mutations tout aussi déterminantes dans l'ordre du pilotage et de la conduite de nos systèmes. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de renforcer les règles hiérarchiques, de rappeler les dispositifs en vigueur, d'en appeler à la bonne volonté managériale au long des chaînes de commandement... Les grandes batailles perdues – comme le 11-Septembre, Katrina – signent clairement des ruptures intellectuelles et stratégiques que les systèmes en charge n'ont pas eu l'intelligence d'anticiper et de réaliser. Mais l'enjeu n'est pas de l'ordre de l'ajustement tactique. Il nous faut aujourd'hui des mutations culturelles en profondeur.

Le rapport Maison-Blanche est intéressant à double titre. D'une part, il montre des décideurs convaincus qu'il ne saurait y avoir de véritables progrès sur ces questions vitales sans mutations culturelles fortes. À plusieurs titres, le rapport démontre des avancées très nettes, qu'il est précieux de repérer. D'autre part, il montre aussi la lourdeur des changements à opérer, quand les références les plus ancrées restent parfois bien en retard. C'est à travers ces avancées et ces lourdeurs que se décline aujourd'hui le pilotage du sujet.

### 1. L'affirmation de mutations nécessaires

#### 1.1. Mutations en termes de visions et de responsabilité

Les auteurs introduisent dès l'avant-propos la notion de mutation nécessaire dans les visions, les dispositions d'esprit. C'est là une avancée déterminante. Même si elle reste à traduire et dans les perspectives ici prônées, et dans les initiatives effectivement prises.

The objective of this Report is to (...) lay the groundwork for transforming how this Nation (...) pursues a real and lasting vision of preparedness. To get there will require significant changes to the status quo, to include adjustments to policy, structure, and mindset. [Foreword, p. 2] (mes italiques)

We must (...) foster a new, robust Culture of Preparedness. [Foreword, p. 2]

We as a Nation (...) have not [yet] developed a shared vision of commitment to preparedness. (...) Without [such] a shared vision (...) we will not achieve a truly transformational national state of preparedness. (...) [One of the] priorities for this transformation [is to] (...) foster a new, robust Culture of Preparedness. [VI, p. 66] [mes italiques]

Shortfalls in the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlight that our current homeland security (...) doctrine (...) must be strengthened and transformed. [VI, p. 66]

Our continuing transformation is not a choice but an absolute necessity. [VI, p. 82]

We understand that for many aspects of homeland security there is *no single, best way of doing business*. Our National Preparedness organization should systematically investigate and seek out innovative approaches [to preparedness and crisis management] being applied in the various localities, States, departments, agencies, and the private sector. [IV, p. 74] [Mes italiques]

HHS working with DHS should work to include faith-based, community, and non-profit organizations in the emergency planning, preparedness, and delivery of human services. These private sector organizations contributed greatly to the Hurricane Katrina response. They should actively participate in all phases of a Federal disaster response. [Appendix A, p. 107]

[The American Red Cross] (ARC) (...) must be a primary agency, along with DHS, (...) with [respect to] mass care and sheltering during disasters. However, [ARC's] status as a non-government organization limits their access to Federal planning meetings. DHS and ARC should [therefore] strengthen their planning and operational relationships. [Appendix A, p. 108]

A new preparedness culture must emphasize that the entire Nation – Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; communities; and individual citizens – **shares common goals and responsibilities for homeland security**. [VI, p. 79]

Public awareness messaging must shift to include **more substantive information, as opposed to just telling our citizens that they need to “do something”**. (...) [Information campaigns should provide] citizens with specific steps to take. [VI, p. 80]

The new culture of preparedness must stress *partnership* among all levels of government, (...) citizens, [the] private sector, and community groups, (...) [and among] neighboring jurisdictions. [VI, pp. 81-82]

We must begin a national dialogue on (...) preparedness, (...) [in order to identify] the circumstances under which the Federal government will push capabilities independent of request. [VI, p. 82]

**Commercial logistics best practices in supply chain management should be used [by FEMA]** to minimize the need for the Federal government to stockpile materials. (...) Federal, State, and local logistical planners should use the best practices from successful large private sector companies as well as from DOD as the standard to develop improved operational capabilities and coordination procedures in the [public sector's] logistics system. [Appendix A, p. 99]

**DHS should establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU) for senior officials**. (...) An NHSU should be established to provide a strategic perspective of homeland security and counterterrorism that transcends organizations, levels of government, response disciplines, and the private sector. [Appendix A, p. 120]

## 1.2. Mutation des approches, jusqu'à "casser" nos modèles habituels

### *La fin du « tout est sous contrôle »*

**Dans un monde chaotique, l'idée même de pouvoir « tout contrôler » est dangereuse** et ne peut conduire qu'à des déboires très graves. Il est vrai que passer du chêne au roseau est le plus souvent tenu pour impossible, trop « risqué ». Il est donc intéressant de voir le comité introduire le principe selon lequel la sécurité n'est pas dans le caractère massif et rigide des dispositifs. Mais **il ne fait pas encore le pas** entre l'impossibilité de l'exhaustivité, et la nécessité d'une capacité stratégique extrêmement inventive et rapide.

To be clear, it is unrealistic to think that even the strongest framework can perfectly anticipate and overcome all challenges in a crisis. [V, p. 52]

### *Contre les « failures of imagination and initiative » : la focalisation sur les surprises, non sur les plans à disposition*

Le centre de gravité de la réflexion n'est plus la traditionnelle focalisation sur les plans, avec l'espoir que les événements voudront bien venir s'y loger, et frapper aux bonnes portes. On n'affiche plus la condamnation instinctive de tout questionnement. Les auteurs plaident pour une sortie du cadre, une lucidité sans relâche, afin qu'on ne puisse pas être piégé par une défaillance d'imagination. Ils demandent que l'on s'interroge d'abord sur les crises qui, précisément, mettraient en péril nos plans, nos aptitudes. C'est le principe supérieur prôné par Sun Tsu (*L'Art de la guerre*) : « S'attaquer à la stratégie de l'ennemi ». Ou, inversement, si

l'on est du côté de la défense : « Ne jamais être en retard d'une guerre ». Car alors, comme le dit aussi Sun Tsu, « on sera défait à chaque bataille ». Ce qu'il faut éviter à tout prix, c'est – sous couvert « d'optimisme » – de se retrouver dans cette situation où le système de défense se brise net, car trop décalé par rapport aux épreuves.

Le Comité, en évoquant le risque d'être paralysé et « cloué au sol » (« grounds us »), s'approche aussi de la notion de sidération (« stun effect ») qui affecte organismes et individus soudain confrontés à l'impensable (ou plus exactement bien sûr : « ce qu'ils avaient considéré et tenu pour impensable »).

La sécurité, ce n'est pas d'avoir réponse à tout, mais de pouvoir à s'adapter à tout. Cela exige des capacités d'anticipation, de décalage du regard, de créativité à tout niveau – aux antipodes de nos cultures d'urgence qui prônent surtout une capacité de « réaction » réflexe. Le vital, c'est la capacité d'anticipation et de réaction créatrice.

We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina – and possibly even worse. [VI, p. 65]

[When training, Federal officials] should not shy away from exercising worst-case scenarios that “break” our homeland security system. Arguably, those scenarios will provide us the most meaningful, if sobering, lessons. [VI, p. 73]

[Prior to Katrina], the Department of Homeland Security [had] produced a set of fifteen *National Planning Scenarios*. (...) They identify the potential scale, scope, and complexity of fifteen [potential major] incidents. (...) [However], they do not [in fact] fully anticipate some of the worst [possible] disaster scenarios. (...) [For instance], Scenario 1, the detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device in an American city by a terrorist group, (...) fails to fully challenge our plans and preparation skills. (...) A ten-kiloton bomb is a relatively small nuclear device: moreover, the Scenario does not anticipate one of the most demanding characteristics of past al-Qaida operations: multiple, simultaneous attacks. (...) [It would be] much more taxing (...) to respond to multiple and simultaneous nuclear, chemical, or biological incidents. (...) [Therefore], the Scenarios must press us to confront the most destructive challenges. (...) Until we can meet the standard set by the most demanding scenarios, we should not consider ourselves adequately prepared. (...) We must not shy away from creating planning scenarios that stress the current system of response to the breaking point and challenge our Nation in ways that we wish we did not have to imagine. To that end, we must revise the planning scenarios to make them more challenging. Among other characteristics, they must reflect both what we know and what we can imagine about the ways our enemies think – [for instance], that they will not hit us hard just once, but that they will seek to cause us damage on significant scale in multiple locations simultaneously. We must not again find ourselves vulnerable to the charge that we suffered a “failure of imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities. [VI, p. 76] [Mes italiques].

Optimism is fundamental to the American character. While it always energizes us, it also grounds us in times of tragedy and loss. We must guard against our optimism leading us to a dangerous sense of complacency. (...) We must temper our optimism with sober recognition of the certainty of future catastrophes. (...) Our Culture of Preparedness, therefore, must emphasize the importance of flexibility and readiness to cope with an uncertain future. While we cannot predict the future to our satisfaction, we can build capabilities that prepare us for a broad range of challenges. We can [also] ensure that our preparedness plans, thinking, and “imagination”, do not become so rigid that we cannot rapidly adapt to unforeseen challenges. [VI, p. 79] [Mes italiques].

Despite reforms that encourage a proactive, anticipatory approach to the management of incidents, the culture of our response community has a fundamental bias towards reaction rather than initiative. As a result, our national efforts too often emphasize response and



clean-up efforts at the expense of potentially more cost-effective anticipatory actions that might prevent or mitigate damage. (...) **Our Culture of Preparedness must stress initiative at all levels. Fundamentally, our Preparedness System and Culture must encourage and reward innovation.** [VI, p. 79]

***Contre les taxonomies par type de sinistre, une approche par « fonctions vitales »***

Ce qui est déterminant, ce n'est pas la perte d'un élément particulier, que l'on s'efforcerait de protéger en tant que tel, mais l'atteinte au fonctionnement du système, à la résilience du tout.

DHS should (...) finalize the Interim [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] to (...) require the use of a *systems and resiliency approach* to determine the global consequence of the loss of each asset. Using a systems approach will clearly identify the assets in each region whose loss has the greatest potential to cause a national impact. [Appendix A, p. 111] [Mes italiques]

***Associer prévention et anticipation de la reconstruction***

Les auteurs se libèrent du traditionnel découpage (prévention//secours//reconstruction) et intègrent l'action en remontant vers l'amont ce qui est supposé "aval". C'est dès l'amont qu'il faut prendre en considération les problèmes de reconstruction. Ce qui suppose, entre autres, que l'on inscrive la possibilité de défaillance, de catastrophe, dans la conception du système. Nous avons pu voir les nouveaux principes prônés ici appliqués par la Banque Whitney à La Nouvelle-Orléans : l'objectif de sécurité est que, quelle que soit l'épreuve, le système puisse redémarrer en un temps très limité.<sup>29</sup> **Cette dimension « reconstruction rapide » fait partie du travail de prévention.**

DHS should (...) link the prioritization of **both protection and restoration.** (...) Policy considerations that are learned in the prioritization for protection will be used to develop restoration priorities. The Federal government can develop priorities for restoring critical infrastructure using much of the same information used to prioritize protecting it. [Appendix A, p. 111]

***Mettre fin à la focalisation exclusive sur le terrorisme***

The National Preparedness System must emphasize preparedness for *all hazards*. Most of the capabilities necessary for responding to natural disasters are also vital for responding to terrorist incidents. Yet for a variety of reasons, much of the Federal government, Congress and the Nation at large have continued to think about terrorism and natural disasters as if they are competing priorities rather than two elements of the larger homeland security challenge. The lessons of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina are that we cannot choose [to restrict our efforts to] one or the other type of disaster. **We must be prepared for all hazards.** [VI, p. 68]

***Contre le « blame game »***

Performance assessment and accountability (...) must not be *blame*. Our current culture of blame threatens both individual and institutional initiative, resourcefulness, and enterprise across the homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence fields. (...) [If

<sup>29</sup> Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, Erwan Lagadec : "Les Grands Réseaux Vitaux et Katrina, enseignements sur les crises hors-cadre et leur pilotage". Dans le cadre d'une mission Electricité de France, à la demande de Pierre Béroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques.

[http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF\\_Katrina\\_Rex\\_Faits\\_marquants.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Katrina_Rex_Faits_marquants.pdf)

we do not act against it], the culture of blame and its related acrimony will debilitate us. [VI, p. 80]

### ***Savoir mettre en question les solutions habituelles en situation de crise***

While there will always be a need for some victims to remain on their property while rebuilding their homes, the provision of trailers should not be the default means of temporary housing offered to all evacuees leaving shelters. [Appendix A, p. 108]

### ***Prendre en compte la dimension internationale***

In improving their strategies for providing faster information and assistance to American citizens, Federal, State, and local emergency management officials should include provisions covering the needs of affected foreign nationals. (...) DHS should include [the Department of State] (DOS) and foreign assistance management in domestic interagency training and exercise events, [through their] inclusion in the new National Exercise Program (NEP). [Appendix A, p. 114]

## **1. 3. Mutations culturelles vis-à-vis du régalién**

Les auteurs prônent un basculement particulièrement « décoiffant » si l'on se souvient des références culturelles d'il y a une ou deux décennies – centralisation extrême, information minimale ou nulle du citoyen, ignorance totale des acteurs économiques, assurance orgueilleuse et conviction des grands bunkers régaliens qu'ils savent tout des crises etc. Des notions telles que les suivantes sont mises en avant :

- le **partage des visions**, des responsabilités, pour une cause commune globale : la **sécurité nationale** ;
- **l'information concrète, précise, opérationnelle des citoyens** ;
- la reprise par le secteur public des meilleures compétences en matière de logistiques – **compétences qui sont dans le privé**, on le reconnaît ;
- le **partenariat élargi, jusqu'aux ONG et groupes locaux**.

On y ajoute une exigence forte de formation de haut niveau :

- **une université « Homeland Security » pour une formation transverse de ceux qui ont en charge la sécurité nationale**.

Dès l'instant où on ne pose plus par principe que les systèmes sont totalement sûrs, que les dispositifs sont sacrés et non critiquables, que les risques sont immuables, bien classés, mesurés, et définis une fois pour toutes, il devient possible de penser des systèmes de réplique plus intelligents. C'est-à-dire capables de s'interroger sur leurs faiblesses, et de se doter d'une réelle stratégie de mise à niveau permanente. Il ne suffit pas de pointer des insuffisances. **Il faut mettre sur pied des programmes forts de correction, de suivi des corrections**. Nous ne sommes plus dans le monde de la perfection, avec crime de lèse-majesté définitivement disqualifiant à la moindre critique ou au moindre questionnement.

Nous sommes à l'ère de la sécurité dynamique, dans des mondes en mutation permanente et ultra-rapide. Le principe n'est pas d'affirmer son poids, mais de gagner en vitesse de **repérage et de correction**. Cela suppose une formation des acteurs assez radicalement redéfinie.

### ***Au-delà de la capacité d'administration, une capacité de leadership***

Dès l'instant où il ne suffit plus d'appliquer des scripts préalablement établis, spécifiques, ayant réponse à tout et non criticables, il faut s'obliger à former des dirigeants.



[We stress] the essential roles [of] training, education, and exercises as well as the importance of feedback – through readiness assessment and lessons learned. [VI, p. 67]

At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps that is fully educated, trained, and exercised in our plans and doctrines. Training is not nearly as costly as the mistakes made in a crisis. [VI, p. 72]

[The new] National Preparedness System must be dynamic. (...) We must routinely revisit our plans and reassess our capabilities in order to account for evolving risks, improvements in technological capabilities, and preparedness innovations. [IV, p. 74]

Too often, after-action reports for exercises and real-world incidents highlight the same problems that do not get fixed – the need for interoperable communications, for example. (...) [Therefore], the National Preparedness System must [include] (...) a Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) (...) [so that we can at last] translate findings of homeland security gaps and vulnerabilities into concrete programs for corrective action. [VI, p. 74]

DHS should require all Federal and State entities with operational Homeland Security responsibilities to have a lessons learned capability. [Appendix A, p. 117]

[The] Homeland Security Council (HSC) should (...) ensure the establishment of a Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) to ensure agencies are enacting lessons learned to improve response capabilities. (...) The RAMP would conduct remedial action tracking and long-term trend analysis, ensuring that remedial actions are completed. (...) This program will provide (...) the means of overcoming the perennial problem of observing the same issues repeatedly characterized as “lessons learned” in reports compiled following major events. [Appendix A, p. 117]

DHS should restructure the TOPOFF Exercise Series. (...) Rather than simply conducting full-scale exercises every two years, the TOPOFF structure should execute a series of exercises every year, identify lessons learned from those exercises in a timelier manner and issue an [After Action Review] (AAR) that identifies the remedial actions to be taken with a deadline for implementation. [Appendix A, p. 118]

### *De la culture de dossier à la culture opérationnelle*

Les administrations doivent dorénavant être capables de dépasser la simple culture de dossier pour être en mesure d'intervenir sur le terrain, loin des logiques papier. Ce qui peut exiger l'acquisition de savoirs faire tout à fait spécifiques, comme en matière de logistique. Une dimension de plus en plus essentielle.

The creation of an effective National Preparedness System will require the Federal government to transform the way it does business. The most important objective of this Federal transformation must be to build and integrate operational capability. (...) The response to Hurricane Katrina [shows] that the Federal government (...) [must be able to conduct] response operations in the field, in addition to making policy or implementing programs. [VI, p. 68]

Many departments and agencies that traditionally do not have emergency response missions or roles assisted in the Hurricane Katrina response. To perform more effectively in future disasters, all Federal departments and agencies should develop emergency plans and possess the ability to operate in an emergency situation. Departments and agencies should coordinate and integrate their response planning efforts with those of other Federal agencies. [Appendix A, p. 91]

The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) (...) have significant technical capabilities that should be integrated into the Nation's preparation and response efforts. (...) In order to meet these new mission requirements these agencies need to expand from a legacy focus of being a producer [of information] to a broader role as a service provider. [Appendix A, p. 94]

The Federal government must develop the capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations. [Appendix A, p. 98]

### *Un monde administratif ouvert en interne et vers l'extérieur*

Over the long term, our (...) education programs must break down interagency barriers to build a unified team across the Federal government. (...) The Federal government must make familiarity with other departments and agencies a requirement for career advancement. Where practicable, interagency and intergovernmental assignments for Federal personnel must build trust and familiarity among diverse homeland security professionals. These assignments will **break down organizational stovepipes, advancing the exchange of ideas and practices**. (...) These (...) education programs must integrate participants from other homeland security partners – namely, State and local governments as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based organizations. [VI, p. 73]

[DHS] should sponsor an **aggressive program of joint exercises** that involve all levels of government. [VI, p. 73]

The National Preparedness System (...) must **systemically identify best practices and lessons learned in order to share them with our homeland security partners throughout the Nation**. [VI, pp. 73-74]

Our National Preparedness organization should (...) **circulate the most promising** (...) practices [in crisis management], as well as (...) lessons – positive and negative – on a continuous basis, so that we never stop improving our security. [IV, p. 74] [Mes italiques]

The new culture of preparedness must stress *partnership* among all levels of government, (...) [and among] neighboring jurisdictions. [VI, pp. 81-82]

In our new Culture of Preparedness, (...) [we must step] away from the bureaucratic view of a particular department or agency's institutional interests. Instead, we must continually build preparedness partnerships across the Federal government. [VI, p. 82]

All departments and agencies assigned specific homeland security roles should establish professional development programs to insure [among others that their] (...) personnel (...) have the requisite (...) understanding of other organizations' (...) emergency responsibilities. Homeland security professional development programs should include *interagency* and *intergovernmental* (i.e., Federal, State, and local governments) perspectives. (...) [In addition], Federal Departments and agencies should implement a career development process that mandates interagency and intergovernmental assignments. (...) These career development processes must require and reward interagency and intergovernmental homeland security assignments. (...) These assignments will (...) break down barriers between organizations. [Appendix A, p. 119]

### *Vers l'empowerment des acteurs locaux*

En matière de crise, et cela est exacerbé désormais avec les environnements instables et chaotiques, il est faut **développer les capacités d'intervention au plus près du terrain, la faculté de se brancher sur les dynamiques dès leur émergence, l'aptitude à travailler en réseau, avec des acteurs jusque là peu ou non repérés**.

La réorganisation de la FEMA depuis 2003 a fait très exactement l'inverse. Ce qui était lien, mise en réseau, maillage a été systématiquement délaissé au profit du QG de Washington. Si l'on vide le local de ses compétences, si on donne les prérogatives à l'échelon central, et si, pour couronner le tout, le central n'a pas la compétence, le fiasco est assuré. C'est là un des traits de nos logiques organisationnelles de simplification rationalisée. On le voit notamment avec les services administratifs dans les grandes organisations qui finissent parfois par imposer des règles à ce point délirantes que la survie des systèmes ne tient qu'à

l'inventivité des acteurs individuels pour contourner ces règles. Ce fut la remarque (citée dans le tome 1 de ces analyses des rapports sur Katrina) d'un responsable des CDC : « C'est la même procédure pour acheter un tube d'aspirine que pour réaliser un hôpital de 500 lits ».

À l'inverse, le rapport préconise fort justement de redonner de la vie aux bureaux régionaux.

[A major] structural flaw in our current system for national preparedness is the weakness of our regional planning and coordination structures. Guidance to governments at all levels is essential to ensure adequate [regional] preparedness: (...) [but] since incorporating FEMA in March 2003, DHS (...) [hasn't maintained] the personnel and resources of FEMA's regional offices, [although they] (...) are responsible for assisting multiple States [in] planning for disasters. (...) Additionally, many FEMA programs that were operated out of the FEMA regions, such as the State and local liaison programs (...), have moved to DHS headquarters in Washington. [But] when programs operate out of regional offices, closer relationships are developed among all levels of governments. (...) These relationships are critical when a crisis situation develops, because individuals who have (...) trained together daily will work together more effectively during a crisis. [V, pp. 53-54]

The [Principal Federal Officer] (PFO) should have the authority to make any operational decisions necessary, within the law, without having to obtain approval from headquarters. [Appendix A, p. 90]

### *Le citoyen, une nouvelle place*

DHS should make citizen and community preparedness a National priority. To facilitate this initiative, Cabinet Secretaries and other prominent National figures (e.g. the Surgeon General) should serve as spokesperson to promote citizen and community preparedness. (...) The goal of this effort should be to have citizens better understand the role and limitations of government and to encourage individual preparedness. In addition, DHS should (...) [improve] outreach and instructional materials. (...) Public awareness messaging should shift to include more substantive information within the message, as opposed to telling citizens they need to "do" something.

DHS should leverage the success of public education conducted by fire departments nationwide. (...) The Citizen Corps public education effort should be integrated with (...) DHS. [Appendix A, pp. 121-122]

State and local governments generally do not have full time staff assigned to support [the Citizen Corps Council, although it is a] (...) critical component of community preparedness. The availability of full-time positions at the State and local level for the Citizen Corps to coordinate the government and community planning is critical. [Appendix A, p. 122]

DHS and other organizations already have established websites to assist with community preparedness (e.g., [www.ready.gov](http://www.ready.gov), [www.prepare.org](http://www.prepare.org)). [Appendix A, p. 122]

The Department of Education (DOEd), working with DHS, should include individual and community preparedness into current elementary and secondary educational programs. (...) School programs on littering, recycling, anti-smoking and seat belt safety have demonstrated their effectiveness at helping to achieve National community goals beyond just students. We should build on these successful initiatives to educate and prepare our children and their families for the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. [Appendix A, pp. 122-123]

## 2. Limites des changements culturels recommandés

### 2. 1. La prégnance encore marquée de la centralisation hiérarchique

Certes, le rapport fait un effort louable pour ouvrir les raisonnements, prôner des processus de feedback, distinguer « unité de commandement » et « système unifié de décision » – avec une insistance sur les dynamiques de coopération et de mise en cohérence, et non plus sur la seule observation de règles et instructions venant d'en haut et par canal unique.

Il semble cependant que l'on ait de la difficulté à lâcher l'idée d'un pilotage central plus hiérarchique que dynamique. C'est là un des points majeurs d'opposition entre les approches des officiels et les recommandations des académiques. Un leitmotif dans les écrits du Disaster Research Center depuis les années 1950.

“Command-and-control (top-down) approaches to disaster response initiatives are not the most appropriate and effective”.<sup>30</sup>

Certes, les cercles de décision peuvent mettre en doute des acquis de recherche qu'ils peuvent juger insuffisamment ouverts aux nouvelles conditions des risques en émergence. Mais, à l'inverse, les orientations prônées ici appellent interrogation. On peut notamment hésiter sur certaines formulations qui peuvent conduire à des perspectives assez régressives : une autorité de bout en bout du Président des Etats-Unis, un Secrétaire du DHS très renforcé, un centre de crise fédéral singulièrement étoffé et consacré comme point essentiel de commandement, un programme d'exercice et d'évaluation qui s'impose à tous, une méthodologie commune. S'il y a de solides ouvertures par ailleurs, la perspective peut aider à mettre un peu de cohérence interne. S'il y a seulement repli sur un tel squelette, les mises en garde du Disaster Research Center ont toute chance de se révéler très justes.

Le complément inquiète aussi : est prôné en effet, tout un système d'évaluation exhaustive, pensé, engagé, traité en central, pour s'assurer que tout est bien dans les registres et les niveaux prévus... On imagine le risque d'une dérive bureaucratique kafakaïenne pour faire remplir, et traiter, des montagnes de formulaires d'audit. On imagine les pauvres intervenants de base, et les responsables à chaque échelon, condamnés à passer plus de temps à renseigner les formulaires fédéraux qu'à s'entraîner effectivement. On imagine les biais, maints sous-systèmes trouvant finalement l'art et la manière d'envoyer à Washington les bons chiffres, de manière à ce que les ordinateurs centraux ne trouvent rien à redire à la marche virtuelle ainsi livrée à la folie du système mis en place.

Cette réaffirmation – certes contrebalancée par ailleurs par des ouvertures dont il faudra voir si elles se concrétisent – des logiques centralisatrices, doublée d'une intense activité de quantification évaluatrice, est à attendre à la suite de tout fiasco type Katrina. Mais il faut prendre garde aux dérives délirantes.

L'invention de logiques de pilotage à l'ère de l'hypercomplexe et du chaotique n'est pas chose facile. Il faut au moins rester vigilant sur le risque de résurgence fulgurante, pour contrecarrer le désarroi, de principes archaïques.

Imaginons un système qui suivrait la logique formelle ici prônée, en reprenant quelques faits majeurs de l'épisode Katrina : un système qui, au plus haut niveau, ne peut se représenter une destruction des digues ; qui affirme que tout est prêt ; qui ne se mobilise pas ; qui refuse les premiers rapports de terrain venant d'un responsable de la FEMA, au prétexte qu'il vaut mieux attendre confirmation (de l'armée) ; qui ne connaît pas lui-même ses propres plans et prérogatives... Et qui interdit à quiconque d'agir en dehors des lignes édictées au

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<sup>30</sup> Rodríguez, Havidàn and Daniel Marks : “Disasters, Vulnerability, and Governmental Response: Where (How) Have We Gone So Wrong?” *Corporate Finance Review*, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 5–14.

sommet... Imaginons un système qui, comme lors de l'attaque du World Trade Center, interdit à l'Agence pour l'Environnement de faire état de la toxicité de l'air...

Mais l'on sent bien que ces questions sont loin d'être stabilisées. Le plus clair à cet égard est l'inconfort autour du principe du « droit d'ingérence » de l'échelon fédéral. Alors que l'on fait tout pour affirmer l'importance du « push » system, il est préconisé que, pour l'intervention de forces de sécurité fédérales, la demande soit bien faite par le Gouverneur.

***Réaffirmation forte des logiques centralisatrices et « top-down »***

The Federal government (...) must create the infrastructure – through the definition of common strategies and interoperable capabilities – for ensuring unity of effort [among all emergency responders]. (...) The Federal government must develop common doctrine and ensure alignment of preparedness plans, budgets, grants, training, exercise, and equipment. [VI, p. 68]

[DHS should set up] a ***new National Operations Center (NOC)*** (...) [that would] ensure National-level coordination of Federal, State, and local response to major domestic incidents. [VI, p. 69]

[Too often during the Hurricane Katrina response], red tape (...) [prevented] the Federal government [from] effectively [using] assets at the ready. (...) ***The solution is to [strengthen] (...) Unified Command.*** We must transform our approach for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic coordination to proactive unified command that creates true unity of effort. (...) The most urgent step in creating unity of effort will be to ***reinforce the Secretary of Homeland Security*** as the Federal government's preparedness and incident manager. [VI, p. 70] [Mes italiques]

One model for the command and control structure [that we suggest] for (...) the next National Preparedness System is our successful defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework, there is a clear line of authority that stretches from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commander in the field. (...) During a military operation [the Combatant Commander] controls all military forces in his theater. [VI, p. 71]

Without infringing upon the statutory responsibilities of the Cabinet departments and agencies, we must [nevertheless] ensure that the President's incident manager [i.e.: the Secretary of Homeland Security] is able to call upon the full range of the Federal government's response assets, and to aggressively orchestrate, lead, and coordinate their use in response operations. [VI, p. 73]

The Department of Homeland Security should serve as the President's executive agent in developing and managing a ***National Exercise and Evaluation Program*** (NEEP). The NEEP should consolidate all existing interagency homeland security-related exercise programs at the Federal level with existing DHS (...) exercise [programs] (...) through common doctrine, objectives, and management. [VI, p. 73]

DHS should establish a National Exercise and Evaluation Program (NEEP). Building on the existing [National Exercise Program] (NEP), DHS should coordinate the establishment of a NEEP for homeland security related exercises. (...) As currently constructed the NEP does not include and coordinate the full range of National homeland security exercise programs. (...) The NEEP should designate [the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program] (HSEEP<sup>31</sup>) as ***a common methodology across all levels of government, so all exercises are using the same doctrine.*** [Appendix A, pp. 118-119] [Mes italiques]

<sup>31</sup> Sur HSEEP, cf. <http://www.hseep.dhs.gov/>

The strengths of [the proposed] System [of National Preparedness] include *first and foremost integration of strategy, doctrine, capabilities, response activities, and exercises, as well as assessment and evaluation.* (...) [We also emphasize] the importance of unity of effort in (...) the conduct of response activities. [VI, pp. 76-77] [Mes italiques pour « first and foremost »]

In our new culture of preparedness, all required response assets and resources of the Federal government must integrate and synchronize to ensure an effective national response to a crisis. [VI, p. 82]

The entire Federal response structure should be (...) based [on the National Incident Management System], reporting through one unified command using the same terminology and basic organizational structure. [Appendix A, p. 89]

[We should] establish a National Operations Center (...) [that] will allow for National-level coordination of Federal/State/local response to major domestic incidents. This center will combine, co-locate, and replace the situational awareness mission of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the operational mission of [FEMA's] National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and the role of the [Interagency Incident Management Group] (IIMG). [Appendix A, p. 92]

### ***Uniformisation, intégration, commandement unifié***

Our response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the imperative to integrate (...) our policies, strategies, and plans (...) across all partners (...) into a **unified system** for homeland security. This unifying system *will ensure* National Preparedness. [VI, pp. 65-66]

[One of the] immediate priorities (...) [is to] define and implement a comprehensive National Preparedness System. [VI, p. 66]

**A useful model for our approach to homeland security is the Nation's approach to national security.** Over the past six decades, we have created a highly successful national security system. This system is built on deliberate planning that assesses threats and risks, develops policies and strategies to manage them, identifies specific missions and supporting tasks, and matches the forces or capabilities to execute them. Operationally organized, it stresses the *importance of unity of command* from the President down to the commander in the field. [VI, pp. 66-67]

We must [create] (...) a robust preparedness system that includes *integrated plans*, procedures, policies, training, and capabilities at all levels. [VI, p. 68]

Secretaries and directors throughout the government must [use] (...) the same systems, doctrine, and terminology. [VI, p. 72]

The *first priority* for training is to ensure that our emergency managers fully understand our preparedness and response *plans and doctrine*. To that end, we must train all emergency managers (...) in the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. [VI, p. 73] [Mes italiques]

[Federal] Departments and agencies (...) should establish a single reporting system to establish a **uniform information flow to senior decision makers.** **A single reporting system** should be used to provision relevant information for the right decision maker, at the right time, and in a usable format. [Appendix A, p. 92]

Federal grant assistance should require each State (...) and urban area (...) develop a search and rescue annex within its specific disaster response plan. (...) This search and rescue annex (...) should **specify in what order** Federal assistance assets or State-to-State mutual aid assets (...) will be requested. [Appendix A, p. 101]

As outlined by the NRP, law enforcement personnel should be drawn from the following sources, *in this order*: 1) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from



affected State[s] 2) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from other States; and 3) Civilian law enforcement from Federal agencies. [Appendix A, p. 103] [Mes italiques]

Revised plans should include (...) *pre-determined* roles and responsibilities for volunteer organizations, which identify their mission, capabilities, training, and certification. [Appendix A, p. 115] [Mes italiques]

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should establish specific requirements for training, exercise, and lessons learned programs linked through a *comprehensive system and common supporting methodology throughout* the Federal, State and local governments. [Appendix A, p. 117] [Mes italiques]

DHS should consolidate homeland security related training and exercise assets in a new **Office of Training, Exercises and Lessons Learned** (TELL). (...) This office should reside under the Preparedness Directorate and reflect the continuing transformation within DHS. DHS should separate training and exercise components currently within [other directorates] (...) and place those assets with the new TELL. [Appendix A, p. 118]

The Department of Homeland Security should establish an interagency working group to (...) ensure consistency and **uniformity** among Federal homeland security professional development programs. [Appendix A, p. 120]

The newly created Office of Public and Community Preparedness (...) should be removed from the Office of Grants and Training, so as to focus solely on homeland security policies, plans, strategies, and guidance at the Federal, State, and local levels which highlight citizen (...) preparedness. [Appendix A, p. 122]

### ***L'obsession de la mesurabilité et de l'inventaire exhaustif***

The success of the National Preparedness System over time will depend upon the quality of its **metrics-based assessment** (...). In particular, the System must possess the means to measure progress toward strategic goals and capability objectives. (...) Performance metrics (...) must (...) provide us with the capacity to create a national preparedness baseline. (...) The baseline *will tell us how prepared we are* today. [VI, pp. 73-74]

The National Preparedness System [should] include (...) metrics for State, local, community, and individual preparedness. [VI, p. 82]

DHS should establish performance measures and metrics to allow an objective assessment of NRP and NIMS implementation status for all departments and agencies, and state and local governments. [Appendix A, p. 89]

Pursuant to HSPD-8, DHS should develop a system to assess the level of national preparedness by assessing the levels of capability identified in the [National Preparedness Goal] (NPG) through performance metrics outlined in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). [Appendix A, p. 93]

[We should] establish a program to measure and assess the effectiveness of preparedness capabilities across the Nation using the President's Management Agenda Score Card tool. [Appendix A, p. 93]

Measurement of progress [in] (...) overall crisis communications capability [should] be graded against the President's Management Agenda criteria. [Appendix A, p. 97]

Each State (...) should receive [from DHS] an annual evacuation readiness status report. This report will be in the form of an evacuation readiness "report card" that will grade the ability of the State to conduct evacuation operations. [Appendix A, p. 100]

[The Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) should inventory the range of human services programs of the Federal government. There are thousands of human service programs. (...) **A catalogue** of available programs will facilitate the prioritization and delivery of services, especially during emergency situations. [Appendix A, p. 106]



DHS should lead an interagency effort to create and routinely update a prioritized **list** of anticipated disaster needs for foreign assistance and a **list** of items that cannot be accepted. (...) **Once complete, DHS should distribute these lists to all appropriate agencies.** [Appendix A, p. 113]

Assessments [by DHS] of training and exercises should be based on clear and consistent performance **measures.** [Appendix A, p. 117]

**Each State (...) should get [from DHS] an annual level of preparedness status report.** This report will be in the form of a comprehensive preparedness “report card” that will grade capabilities, exercises, training, effective use of federal grant monies, and other relevant criteria as a condition of further grant funding. (...) **This “report card” would (...) classify each State on their level of preparedness.** [Appendix A, p. 118]

The Department of Homeland Security should establish an interagency working group to establish specific goals with **objective standards** against which Department and Agency progress toward full implementation of effective professional development programs can be measured. [Appendix A, p. 120]

DHS should leverage the success of the USAonwatch program to form a National Network of Community Watches (...) to develop (...) common (...) **metrics** for all-hazards community preparedness. [Appendix A, p. 122]

DHS needs to establish a comprehensive list of skills and capabilities to assess how well citizens are prepared. (...) DHS should develop a process to evaluate national progress toward improved citizen preparedness capabilities through the use of the Target Capabilities List and established metrics. [Appendix A, p. 122]

***Un « push system » déterminé... à condition que le Gouverneur donne son accord***

[We should create a rapidly deployable] contingent of Federal law enforcement officers to prevent and respond to civil disorder. *Consistent with the principle* that law enforcement is the responsibility of local and State governments, this force should deploy only in the event that State authorities request Federal assistance pursuant to the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act, or as otherwise directed by the President. However, the NRP should make clear that where, as in [the] case [of Katrina], the need for additional law enforcement resources is manifest and obvious, it should be the Attorney General’s responsibility, after notifying the Secretary of Homeland Security, to **make an offer of Federal law enforcement support to the affected Governor.** [Appendix A, p. 103] [Mes italiques].

## **2. 2. Préparation encore fondée sur une typologie des sinistres**

Le rapport prône une approche des sinistres fondée sur la notion de « fonctions vulnérables », et non plus sur les catégories habituelles, par type de sinistre. Mais il ne parvient pas à s’extraire véritablement des logiques antérieures. Il est vrai que le problème est difficile : nous avons une telle habitude de catégoriser en fonction des événements déclencheurs, de préparer des plans spécifiques, qu’il n’est aisé de passer à une approche transverse et fonctionnelle.

Certes, on tente de s’extraire des habitudes, en affirmant notamment une approche *all hazards*, mais très vite le glissement s’opère. Le *all hazards* risque au fil des pages d’être vidé de son contenu et de finir par signifier une sorte d’exigence d’exhaustivité – être certain que l’on n’a oublié aucun risque. C’est là un problème dans tous les temps de mutation : on tente d’inventer et d’affirmer de nouveaux concepts, mais le poids des habitudes vient neutraliser les tentatives de changement. Et comme le système a été en quelque sorte inquieté, il réagit vivement, et l’on peut aboutir au résultat inverse à celui recherché : une compartementalisation de fait encore plus affirmée.

En l'espèce, les mentions soi-disant « non spécifiques » sont en fait transparentes : tout le monde sait que le « tremblement de terre » désigne la Californie, que l'hypothèse d'un ouragan concernait la Nouvelle-Orléans, et celle d'une bombe atomique, New York... Comme si l'on se ramenait rapidement, en réalité, à une étroite typologie de sinistres – il est vrai masquée par un pilonnage de vocabulaire qui a les apparences de la nouveauté.

The Department of Homeland Security has produced a set of fifteen National Planning Scenarios. (...) The Scenarios were designed to illustrate a myriad of tasks and capabilities that are required to prepare for and respond to a *range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters that our Nation may confront*. They identify the potential scale, scope, and complexity of fifteen [major potential] incidents. (...) Examples include an outbreak of pandemic influenza on U.S. soil, a major earthquake in a U.S. city, and the detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device in a large U.S. metropolitan area. The Scenarios also include a Category 5 hurricane hitting a major metropolitan area. (...) The Scenarios, which were meant to be illustrative of a wide variety of hazards, generally *do not specify* a geographic location, and the impacts are meant to be scalable for a variety of population considerations. Ultimately, they give homeland security planners a tool that allows for the *flexible and adaptive development of capabilities as well as the identification of needed capability levels*. (...) [They] have been effective tools for generating dialogue on response capabilities. (...) The purpose of the National Planning Scenarios is to provide a foundation for identifying the capabilities required to *meet all hazards*. [VI, pp. 75-76] [Mes italiques]. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism [(i.e. Frances Townsend, l'auteur du rapport)] now annually conducts four Cabinet-level exercises with catastrophic scenarios. To date, a catastrophic exercise *with a pandemic scenario* was conducted in December 2005. [VI, p. 76]

An (...) important input [to ensure the adaptability and continued relevance of our proposed National Preparedness System] is the current assessment of risks – *what threats does the Nation currently confront*, what are our *current vulnerabilities*, and what are the consequences? Against the current assessment of risks, we must continually evaluate our capability to respond effectively. [VI, p. 77] [Mes italiques]

[The] Homeland Security Council (HSC) (...) should (...) review Senior Official exercise priorities to ensure more challenging scenarios based on the most catastrophic threats (natural and man-made). [Appendix A, p. 117]

Each Federal department and agency assigned specific homeland security roles should establish a homeland security professional development program. (...) The scope of homeland security requires that these programs focus on all hazards: terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other disasters. [Appendix A, p. 119]

### **2.3. Le culte du courage et de l'exploit individuel, paravent facile des difficultés systémiques**

Le casse-tête conceptuel et organisationnel est extrêmement difficile à traiter, les émotions et les risques politiques sont majeurs. Des exploits individuels sont marquants. Le danger est de masquer le premier problème par une fixation sur les exemples de bravoure.

En l'espèce, la grandeur des Coast Guards est indéniable, et il faut leur rendre hommage. Mais elle ne peut tout de même servir à louer les 180 000 employés du DHS – ce qui est fait dans le rapport. Monsieur John Calvin a certainement eu une action de haute tenue, mais il ne peut refermer à lui seul le dossier de l'évacuation de la Nouvelle-Orléans.

Le piège serait d'utiliser les exploits individuels pour se dispenser d'une réflexion suffisante sur le fonctionnement des systèmes.

Et d'ailleurs, une écoute attentive des responsables des Coast Guards locaux conduit à un constat. Si, globalement, ils n'ont pas été anéantis par l'événement, cela tient à un facteur de fond : leur culture de liens avec de très nombreux acteurs, leur aptitude à travailler en urgence sur des tissus organisationnels complexes. Donc bien au-delà de leurs plans, certes très rôdés, mais loin d'être le seul levier de leur réussite.<sup>32</sup>

“There are lessons learned that we don't need to change: the lesson of courage... the determination of our citizens... the compassion of our fellow citizens... the decency of men and women.” – President George W. Bush. [Appendix B, p. 125]

[Beyond the failures], there are other, [successful] stories from Katrina. (...) These are the stories of the human side of Katrina. It is important that we do not let the horror of the storm overshadow the true courage, determination, compassion and decency of the American people. [Appendix B, p. 125]

Responsible for more than 180,000 employees, the Department of Homeland Security was duly praised for the [heroic] efforts of the United States Coast Guard. [Appendix B, p. 130]

[John Calvin], a member of the [Department of Transportation] Region Ten Emergency ESF-1 response cadre, (...) [undertook] dangerous but urgent [evacuation] mission (...) voluntarily (...) and at considerable risk. (...) His personal efforts were instrumental in moving 210,000 people from New Orleans to shelters. [Appendix B, p. 136]

### 3. Un examen à peine ébauché : comment penser et traiter les désastres de niveau cataclysmique ?<sup>33</sup>

Le principe est posé : il faut ouvrir la question des cataclysmes, au-delà des catastrophes « normales ».<sup>34</sup> Les analystes ont à l'esprit, bien évidemment, des événements telle l'attaque nucléaire (engin de 10 kt, provoquant la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes) [p. 212].

Il faut alors prendre en compte, indiquent le rapport, la possibilité que le niveau local soit totalement dépassé, incapable de réagir, et même de demander de l'aide. Le niveau supérieur, l'échelon fédéral, doit être en mesure d'intervenir de lui-même, sans attendre une sollicitation ; il doit prévoir la logistique nécessaire, des moyens de transport pour des évacuations de masse, etc. Et les armées doivent aussi avoir pris pareille hypothèse en compte.

L'exercice de réflexion est important, mais difficile. D'une part, nous ne sommes pas habitués à réfléchir sur des situations de ce niveau de gravité : il faut tolérer une grande marge d'inconnu, et ne pas se réfugier à tout moment dans les modèles habituels. D'autre part, il y a le risque de simplifications tant dans les représentations des problèmes que dans la vision des solutions : par exemple, partir de l'idée que tout serait anéanti, et que seule une force extérieure, militaire, pourrait encore intervenir – comme pour faire triompher enfin une logique aujourd'hui en difficulté.

Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role. (...) [However], while we remain faithful to basic constitutional doctrine and time tested principles, we

<sup>32</sup> Nos entretiens sur place, à La Nouvelle-Orléans.

<sup>33</sup> C'est là une discussion extrêmement complexe et je remercie Michel Nesterenko pour les échanges continus que nous avons à ce sujet depuis Katrina. Nous sommes bien conscients du fait que nous ne sommes encore qu'au début de la réflexion.

<sup>34</sup> E. L. Quarantelli, “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina”, *Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences*, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli>

must likewise accept that events such as Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, require us to tailor the application of these principles to the threats we confront in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. [II, p. 11]

[The Stafford Act principle of gradual response (from local to federal)] generally works well and should continue in the majority of instances. *However*, in some instances the State and local governments *will be overwhelmed* beyond their ability to satisfy their traditional roles in this system. Indeed, in some instances, State and local governments and responders *may become victims themselves*, prohibiting their ability to identify, request, receive, or deliver assistance. This is the moment of catastrophic crisis. [II, pp. 17-18] [Mes italiques]

Ultimately, when a *catastrophic incident* occurs (...) the Federal government should not rely on the traditional layered approach [(between local, State, and Federal responsibilities)] and instead should proactively provide, or “push”, its capabilities and assistance directly to those in need. [II, p. 19]

The current response framework [adopted by] (...) the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the (...) NRP (...) does not address the conditions of a catastrophic event with large scale competing needs, insufficient resources, and the absence of functioning local governments. [V, p. 52]

When local and State government are overwhelmed or incapacitated by an event that has reached catastrophic proportions, only the Federal government has the resources and capabilities to respond. The Federal government must therefore plan, train, and equip to meet the requirements for responding to a catastrophic event. [V, p. 52]

For Federal domestic disaster relief operations, DOD currently uses a “pull” system that provides support to civil authorities based upon specific requests from local, State, or Federal authorities. (...) The delays inherent in this “pull” system [are not satisfactory. Therefore], (...) we should (...) define the circumstances under which [DOD] will push resources to State and local governments [even in the absence of] a request. [V, p. 54]

The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that our current [National Preparedness] system is too reactive in orientation. Our decades-old system, built on the precepts of federalism, has been based on a model whereby local and State governments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources before requesting Federal assistance. (...) While this approach has worked well in the majority of disasters and emergencies, catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina are a different matter. [VI, p. 66]

Today, we operate under two guiding principles: a) that incident management should begin at the lowest jurisdictional level possible, and b) that, for most incidents, the Federal government will generally play a supporting role to State and local efforts. While these principles suffice for the vast majority of incidents, they impede the Federal response to severe catastrophes. In a catastrophic scenario that overwhelms or incapacitates local and State incident command structures, the Federal government must be prepared to assume incident command and get assistance directly to those in need until State and local authorities are reconstituted. (...) Federal, State, local, and private sector partners must agree on a system in which the Federal government responds more actively and effectively while respecting the role of the State and local governments. [VI, p. 81]

DOD should revise its Immediate Response Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even without a request from local authorities. [Appendix A, p. 94]

The Federal government must develop the capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical systems. (...) The Department of Transportation, in coordination with other appropriate departments of the Executive Branch, must also be prepared to conduct mass evacuation operations when disasters overwhelm or incapacitate State and local governments. [App. A, p. 98]

Federal agencies with an ongoing role in delivering human services should be prepared to do so in a disaster environment. (...) Federal agencies that routinely deliver human services should build on established relationships with State and local agencies and private sector organizations, but also create contingency plans to assure the independent delivery of Federal assistance when necessary. [Appendix A, p. 106]

### Réflexion 1 : le piège du retour au “Command and Control”

Kathleen J. Tierney (Directrice du Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado), dans le dernier manuel paru sur les recherches dans le domaine des catastrophes, met en garde : le danger est de prendre appui sur les nouveaux risques pour imposer des logiques centralisatrices inadaptées. Nous avons besoin d’une nouvelle réflexion, et non d’une réaffirmation des principes habituels à l’occasion de l’émergence de nouveaux défis.

*“Some critics fault ICS [Incident Command System, traduction du nouveau plan global sur le pilotage de terrain] for overly emphasizing command-and-control principles; they also question the wisdom of mandating one particular management framework for the many and diverse organizations that respond to disasters. Emergency management policy expert William Waugh observes that ICS “was created utilizing management concepts and theories that are now more than 30 years old” (Waugh, 1999) and that current management theory places much less emphasis on command-and-control philosophy on which ICS is based. Waugh also notes that ICS is far more compatible, both structurally and culturally, with command-oriented organizations like police and fire departments than with the structures and cultures of the many other types of agencies and groups that play key roles in responding to disasters, but that do not operate according to hierarchical principles. In his view and other critics, top-down management models like ICS (and now NIMS) are particularly ill suited to the distinctive challenges disasters present, which call for flexibility, improvisation, collaborative decision-making, and organizational adaptability. The danger is that in mandating a single, standardized management approach that is familiar mainly to command-and-control agencies, the NRP will stifle the capacity to improvise and will exclude many entities and groups that can make critical contributions during extreme events” (p. 409).*

*“These programs and forms of funding were initiated in order to address serious gaps in response capability, notably challenges associated with intergovernmental collaboration on law enforcement issues and with inadequate public health emergency response resources. However, such initiatives also have unintended consequences. They encourage collaboration and integration within sectors (e.g., law enforcement and public health), rather than across the diverse sectors that must be involved in responding to crises. They also promote specialized planning for particular types of emergencies. In other words, both in structure and in function, these increasingly influential entities contravene widely accepted principles of emergency management, which emphasize the importance of developing comprehensive, integrated preparedness and response networks and all-hazards preparedness activities, rather than hazard-specific ones” (p. 411).<sup>35</sup>*

<sup>35</sup> Kathleen J. Tierney: “Recent Developments in US Homeland Security Politics”, in Havidan Rodriguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russel R. Dynes: *Handbook of Disaster Research*, Springer, 2006 (p. 407-412)



## Réflexion 2 : la fiction du local

William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May : <sup>36</sup>

“First and foremost, the scale of disaster would quickly overwhelm even the most prepared city and state governments. To avoid repeating the Hurricane Katrina fiasco on a much larger scale, Washington must stop pretending that its role would be to support local responders. State and local governments — though their actions to save lives and avoid panic in the first hours would be essential — must abandon the pretense that they could remain in charge. The federal government, led by the **Department of Homeland Security**, should plan to quickly step in and **take full responsibility** and devote all its resources, including those of the Department of Defense, to the crisis. **Only the federal government** could help the country deal rationally with the problem of radiation, which is unique to nuclear terrorism and uniquely frightening to most people. For those within a two-mile-wide circle around a Hiroshima-sized detonation (in Washington, that diameter is the length of the Mall; in New York, three-fourths the length of Central Park; in most cities, the downtown area) or just downwind, little could be done. People in this zone who were not killed by the blast itself, perhaps hundreds of thousands of them, would get radiation sickness, and many would die.”

### Questions :

1. Et si le fédéral était lui aussi « liquéfié » par le cataclysme ? Après tout, dans les grandes crises récentes, l'échelon central a souvent donné des signes d'une singulière fragilité.
2. Et si le local était finalement, sur maintes dimensions, le plus à même d'agir ?
3. Et s'il fallait songer à des combinaisons de ressources, tissant des compétences venant de tous les cercles d'acteurs, chacun avec ses points forts et ses points faibles ?

Spécialistes des sciences sociales et responsables aux commandes devraient pouvoir travailler ces questions sans que chacun soit enfermé dans son monde.

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<sup>36</sup> William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter and Michael M. May, “After the Bomb”, Op-Ed Contributor, *The New York Times*, June 12, 2007.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/opinion/12carter.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=59e9c8b47d4896f2&ex=1182312000&emc=eta1>

William J. Perry, a professor at Stanford, and Ashton B. Carter, a professor at Harvard, were, respectively, the secretary and an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. Michael M. May, also a professor at Stanford, is a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

## LEADERSHIP

At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps that (...) must be populated by *leaders* who are prepared to exhibit innovation and take the initiative during extremely trying circumstances. [VI, p. 72]

Les auteurs du rapport soulignent l'essentiel : il faut disposer de dirigeants capables d'injecter à tout niveau une capacité de décision, d'initiative, de prise de responsabilité, dans les circonstances les plus extrêmes. Le processus doit se nourrir d'ingrédients essentiels : des éléments de base de grande force (granularité), des principes d'intégration extrêmement adaptables, une capacité de pilotage apte à l'inventivité, la vitesse, la lucidité, l'aptitude à s'accrocher à toutes les ressources du terrain telles qu'elles se présentent.

Précisons : des leaders portés à se saisir de signaux encore peu clairs, capables de ne pas se laisser aller à l'évitement en cas de signaux clairs. Des leaders en mesure de se saisir des situations difficiles, pour tenir des points forts, donner une direction, travailler à la cohérence et la mise en lien, ouvrir les champs du possible tant en matière d'initiatives hors cadres que de cartes d'acteurs. Il ne s'agit plus seulement de surveiller la bonne marche des rouages, à travers des dossiers et rapports statistiques mettant à comfortable distance de la brutalité des enjeux.

Cela suppose que l'idée-même de situation extrême soit intellectuellement considérée, organisationnellement préparée, psychologiquement tolérée. Cela suppose que l'on dispose de « dirigeants », et pas seulement de « managers » formatés pour agir dans le cadre de règles prescrites. Cela suppose des systèmes bureaucratiques qui n'éjectent pas biologiquement toute personne questionnant le *business as usual*. Cela suppose une culture de l'action et de la décision appropriée à ces nouvelles frontières, ancrée dans les acquis de la formation initiale.<sup>37</sup>

Si l'on ne dispose pas de ces dirigeants, et de relais également portés à prendre des responsabilités en terrain non totalement balisé, tout le reste – plans, organisation, outils, fiches, etc. – ne sera que décor illusoire. Certes, il ne faut pas négliger les ressources du terrain, les dynamiques émergentes. Mais un leadership effectif est tout de même une dimension critique à faire vivre. Le cas Katrina permet d'enrichir les réflexions autour de ces exigences.

### 1. Les interventions remarquables du directeur du National Hurricane Center

Le rapport mentionne les prises de position du Directeur du National Hurricane Center, qui n'hésite pas à aller au-delà du rapport technique, à appeler personnellement les responsables –

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<sup>37</sup> Et pas seulement quelques stages de visant des éclaircissements de vocabulaires, d'organigrammes, et un peu de « media training ». Il ne suffit pas, pour amadouer les médias, de jeter en pâture quelques « éléments de langage » visant à laisser entendre que l'on est prêt à exercer ses responsabilités. Il faut être capable d'inscrire les mots dans les actes, les décisions, les préparations. Il faut être en mesure de ne pas fuir toute préparation et formation sur ces enjeux vitaux.



la seconde fois seulement en 36 ans de carrière qu'il appelait un gouverneur de cette façon-, à clarifier que l'on va sortir totalement des habitudes.

Mais, hélas, ces cris d'alarmes ne trouveront pas de terrain suffisamment préparé pour donner tout leur effet. Peut-être aurait-il fallu que le Directeur du National Hurricane Center saisisse directement le Président des Etats-Unis ?

Hurricane Katrina's growing intensity on Saturday led NHC Director Mayfield to make personal calls to State and local officials in the region that evening to emphasize the threat posed by the storm. He warned Jefferson Parish officials that this could be the "big one." That evening, Director Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, Mayor Nagin, and Alabama Emergency Management Agency Chief of Operations Bill Filter about Hurricane Katrina's magnitude and the potential storm impacts. **Director Mayfield testified before Congress that he had only made such a call to warn a governor once before in his thirty-six year career.** Mayfield stated that "I just wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing that I did all I could do."

The National Weather Service office in Slidell, Louisiana, issued a detailed, urgent warning of Hurricane Katrina's impending devastating impact on the Gulf Coast. The warning stated, "The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional... High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously - a few to the point of total collapse. All windows will blow out. Airborne debris will be widespread - and may include heavy items such as household appliances and even light vehicles... Persons - pets - and livestock exposed to the winds will face certain death if struck." The NHC issued advisories that warned the levees in New Orleans could be overtopped by Lake Pontchartrain and that significant destruction would likely be experienced far away from the hurricane's center. The warning continued, "**[m]ost of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks... Perhaps longer... Power outages will last for weeks... Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.**" [III, p. 27-28]

Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane Center, **personally** made phone calls to local, State and Federal leaders to apprise them of the situation, **aggressively contacting officials (...) to warn them.** [Appendix B, p. 138]

## 2. Une défaillance générale de leadership

**Le système de pilotage, en cette fin août-début septembre 2005, va comme il peut,** entre briefings, communications, et tentatives pour faire quelque chose. Au sommet, la présence semble flottante ; le fédéral est hésitant dans ses actions, ne sachant pas bien où les ancrer ; le local est dans la tourmente, le maire réfugié dans un hôtel. Seul point d'appui solide, mais très tardif : la nomination du Vice-Amiral Thad Allen, dans un poste de commandement avancé, à bord du croiseur Iwo Jima qui vient s'ancrer à la Nouvelle-Orléans. Mais cela se fait en deux temps, avec un premier pas le 7 septembre, un second le 21 septembre, quand on donne à Thad Allen une position moins confuse que dans le premier temps. La clarification institutionnelle intervient donc avec trois semaines de retard. Trois semaines de soupe organisationnelle. C'est là une dynamique normale. C'est le temps nécessaire pour découvrir que l'événement ne rentre pas dans les plans, les architectures prévues ; pour accepter ce fait, et le faire tolérer ; et pour tenter de proposer autre chose, en s'arrachant aux dispositifs prévus, qui ne machent pas.

Bien évidemment, le leadership défaillant entre en écho avec un système organisationnel lui aussi dépassé. Les indications données par le rapport laissent l'impression d'une FEMA impuissante, débordée, dès qu'elle est confrontée à autre chose qu'à de la petite logistique de secours routinière. Elle n'est pas préparée à devoir piloter des problèmes d'importance

stratégique nationale. Elle n'est pas en mesure de traiter avec les grands opérateurs de réseaux vitaux. Elle n'est pas préparée à traiter avec les ONG. En d'autres termes, aussi longtemps que les catastrophes restent des accidents d'une certaine échelle gérée par le local, avec appui du Fédéral sur quelques points logistiques, une FEMA fait l'affaire. **Si les catastrophes deviennent des enjeux de sécurité nationale**, touchant le cœur de la stabilité du pays, **appelant des interventions de grande complexité**, une FEMA n'est plus du tout configurée au niveau voulu. Dans le contexte actuel, si l'on veut aboutir à quelque action pertinente il faut le plus souvent le faire *sans, en dépit de, ou contre* les organisations supposées en charge.

A chaque niveau, les officiels font probablement ce qu'ils peuvent. Mais ils ne sont pas préparés, ni personnellement, ni collectivement, à tenir la barre en pleine tempête. La crise va donc marquer ses points, un à un, écrasant peu à peu toute capacité de résistance.

- **Il n'y a pas de mobilisation forte**, autrement qu'au fil de l'eau, selon le principe : « Les autorités suivent le problème heure par heure, et toujours avec une heure de retard ».
- **On ne se saisit pas de l'ultime point critique**, sur lequel il faut porter toute son attention stratégique : la tenue des digues, avec le risque de brèche. Or, ne pas se saisir des points clés, c'est laisser un atout décisif à la crise.
- **Les leaders ne font rien pour s'assurer que leur système de pilotage est effectivement totalement mobilisé et opérationnel** : il est plutôt en hibernation, dans l'attente que la crise ait bien imposé sa loi.
- **Les lourdeurs bureaucratiques prennent le pas sur les dynamiques de pilotage** : et cette dynamique sera d'autant plus marquée que le système aura été ébranlé.

Rien de cela n'est surprenant. Mais Katrina l'illustre à un niveau hélas remarquable. Un système non préparé ne peut pas faire preuve de grande inventivité. Il reste tétanisé, et ne trouve de protection que dans le rappel des règles habituelles, la centralisation aveugle, le combat contre toute initiative locale qui risquerait de souligner plus encore le décalage avec l'impérialité centrale, et d'inquiéter l'échelon supérieur. **Pour un système non préparé, l'évitement devient instantanément vital** : il ne peut tolérer l'idée d'une question à laquelle il n'aurait pas les réponses ; il est terrorisé à l'idée de perdre la main – alors qu'il l'a déjà perdue d'ailleurs ; et plus encore par l'idée de prendre la main, alors qu'il n'a plus ses assurances habituelles. La survie du milieu de vie qu'il a le devoir, en principe, de protéger, risque de devenir à ses yeux une question tout à fait annexe, perdue de vue. **Comme ce mode de fonctionnement ne peut bien sûr être clarifié, il faudra injecter des montagnes de règles papiers, de complications de toutes natures, juridiques de préférence, pour assurer le paravent nécessaire.**

La solution n'est pas dans un plan supplémentaire. Mais bien dans la préparation en profondeur – psychologique au premier chef – des instances en charge. Elles doivent pouvoir tolérer les défis hors-cadres, pour qu'ils ne deviennent plus des menaces à ce point terrifiantes qu'elles conduisent aux comportements les plus bloquants.

Le véritable enjeu est alors de savoir si les bureaucraties peuvent tolérer l'idée de s'ouvrir à ces questions. Ou bien, effectivement, le hors-cadres est pris comme la nouvelle frontière sur laquelle on est attendu. Ou bien, tout ce qui est hors-cadres est assimilé à du « pessimisme », à de la « lubie », et alors le fiasco sera au rendez-vous. Si le blocage est vraiment très fort, le système s'arrangera même pour qu'aucun retour d'expérience, aucune enquête, ne viennent troubler son « business as usual ».

### ***Prise en charge bien molle***

Early [on Sunday] morning, [August 28], **President Bush called Governor Blanco to urge that mandatory evacuation orders be issued for New Orleans**, [which they did following this] call. [III, p. 28] [NB donc flottement et retard des leaders locaux]

Although the Federal government pushed assets into the Gulf Coast region to fill the communication gaps created by Hurricane Katrina, we could have and should have done

more. FEMA had [only] pre-positioned two of their five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments in the Gulf. (...) [Of course], the Federal government must keep some MERS detachments at locations outside the incident area in case there is another catastrophe or event: but **additional MERS support should have been deployed** to the Gulf when it became apparent that those pre-positioned were insufficient for an incident of Katrina's magnitude. [IV, pp. 43-44]

The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that our current [National Preparedness] system is too reactive in orientation. (...) Federal agencies (...) tended to provide little [to State and local governments] without a prior and specific request. In other words, the system was biased toward requests and the concept of "pull" rather than toward anticipatory actions and the proactive "push" of Federal resources. [VI, p. 66] **At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps that (...) must be populated by leaders who are prepared to exhibit innovation and take the initiative during extremely trying circumstances.** [VI, p. 72]

### *Paralysie décisionnelle sur la question critique – la destruction des digues*

Le rapport donne des indications (ambiguës sur le tout début : 8h14 ou 9h12 ?) sur le moment où des informations ont commencé à circuler dans les canaux officiels au sujet d'une rupture des digues, et sur le traitement de ces informations. En résumé :

- on perd près de 24 heures dans la reconnaissance de l'événement ;
- alors que c'est le point majeur, on n'y prête pas grande attention ;
- **dans l'ignorance, on certifie d'abord qu'il n'y a pas de brèche ;**
- le rapport de Bahamonde met 2h30 à parvenir au centre de crise du DHS ;
- le rapport du DHS met 1h30 à parvenir ensuite à la Maison-Blanche ;
- la Maison-Blanche attend le lendemain matin [pour avoir confirmation, a indiqué le rapport de la Chambre des Représentants].

Perception : la crise peut avancer sans problème. Tout rapport faisant état de rupture de digue est mis de côté. En fin de parcours, on décide même, clairement, qu'on ne fera rien d'une telle information — qui arrive pourtant par les canaux officiels, et a pour source un officiel de la FEMA, après reconnaissance de visu — si elle n'est pas confirmée. Prime est ainsi donnée au « business as usual ». La crise a de solides alliés tout au long des chaînes de commandement, et un point d'appui majeur à la Maison-Blanche.

On le voit ici de façon lumineuse. Avoir une chaîne de commandement, un pouvoir central clair et fort, de bonnes informations, est loin de suffire. Il y avait un seul point stratégique à surveiller : est-ce que les digues tiennent ou non ? Et ce point vital est viscéralement écarté des écrans radars. S'il s'impose de force, il est éjecté. Aussi longtemps que les officiels en charge restent ignorants de ces pathologies de crise, il est illusoire de se contenter de prôner d'autres plans, d'autres cellules de crise, etc.

- **8h14, lundi 29 mai** : le National Weather Service émet une alerte indiquant : **"Une brèche s'est produite sur la levee au long de l'industrial canal à la hauteur de Tennessee Street. Un mètre à deux mètres cinquante d'eau à prévoir en raison de la brèche"** (Annexe, p. 138)
- **9h12, le lundi 29** au matin, le National Weather Service reçut un rapport faisant état d'une rupture de digue ; il émet une alerte peu après sur la question. (p. 36)
- À midi, lors d'une téléconférence de la FEMA, des responsables locaux apportent des précisions. Le DHS résume en faisant état de **« Quelques fuites au niveau des digues, mais il n'y a pas de destruction de digue en ce moment »**.
- Dans l'après-midi du 29, le DHS est averti par le Corps of Engineer de destructions de digues rapportées par les sapeurs-pompier.

- A 18 heures ce même jour, le centre de crise du DHS rapporte aux dirigeants du DHS et à la Maison-Blanche que les « premiers rapports indiquent qu'il n'y a pas eu de destruction de digues à la Nouvelle-Orléans, mais que, cependant, l'analyse est en cours ».
- A 18 heures toujours, Marty Bahamonde, un responsable Affaires Publiques de la FEMA, à bord d'un hélicoptère de la FEMA est frappé de voir à quel point les rapports antérieurs sur les destructions de digues étaient exacts.
- À 20 heures, Bahamonde appelle le Directeur de la FEMA, Michael Brown et d'autres responsables de la FEMA, pour rapporter ce qu'il a vu en tant que témoin privilégié.
- Michael Brown a témoigné devant la Commission qu'il avait appelé et transmis l'information à la Maison-Blanche.
- En outre, Bahamonde a organisé une téléconférence avec des responsables de l'état de la FEMA pour leur rendre compte de ce qu'il avait vu.
- À 22h30, le centre de crise du DHS [HSCO] résume la situation et rapporte les observations de Bahamonde dans un rapport.
- À Minuit 02, la Maison-Blanche reçoit ce rapport.
- **À 6 heures du matin le mardi 30**, le centre de crise du DHS sort diffuse un rapport qui décrit les brèches sur les digues au niveau de l'Industrial Canal, de la 17<sup>ème</sup> rue, et du Lac Pontchartrin.

In addition to the dearth of reliable reporting regarding the situation in New Orleans, there was widespread confusion and misuse of the terms “break” and “overtopping” by observers and reporters who did not fully understand the distinction between the two terms, or whose observations were not sufficient to enable differentiation of one from the other. [IV, p. 35]

The National Weather Service (...) correctly realized that the levees were breaching and issued a flash flood warning at 8:14 am Monday, August 29, saying “A levee breach occurred along the industrial canal at Tennessee Street. Three to eight feet of water is expected due to the breach.” (...) [It] correctly characterized the situation, identified the danger, and got the word out clearly and promptly. [Appendix B, p. 138]

As early as 9:12 am EDT on August 29, the National Weather Service (NWS) received a report of a levee breach and shortly thereafter issued a (...) warning [mentioning it]. (...) [However], at a noon FEMA teleconference, local officials gave spotty reporting [on the matter] to participating State and Federal officials. As DHS summarized the report, (...) “Some levee leakage, but no reported failure to date... levee in New Orleans is overflowing.”

Mid-afternoon on August 29, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) notified DHS of (...) levee breaches (...) reported by local firefighters.

[However, as late as 6:00 pm EDT that day, the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) reported to senior DHS and White House officials that “Preliminary reports indicate the levees in New Orleans have not been breached, however an assessment is still pending.”]

At 6pm EDT aboard a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA Public Affairs Official, (...) was “struck by how accurate” the earlier local reporting was of the levee breaches.

He then called FEMA Director Michael Brown and other FEMA officials with his eyewitness account at approximately 8 pm EDT that day. Director Brown has testified that he subsequently called the White House to report the (...) information he received from

Bahamonde. Following the calls, Mr. Bahamonde arranged a conference call with State, regional, and FEMA officials to recount what he had seen.

An HSOC report marked 10:30 pm EDT, but not received at the White House until 12:02 am EDT the next day [i.e. minuit], summarized the conference call and reported Mr. Bahamonde's observations (...). By morning light and with the passage of the storm, the extent of the flooding was apparent.

[Finally], at 6 am EDT on [Monday], August 30, the HSOC issued a report describing levee breaches at the Industrial Canal, 17<sup>th</sup> Street, and at Lake Pontchartrain. [IV, p. 36] [Mes italiques. Il n'y a pas eu de brèche au Lac Pontchartrain]

### *Viscosités bureaucratiques*

The Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture (USDA) (...) offered thousands of housing units nationwide to FEMA for temporary assignment to evacuees. [But] FEMA officials said that the need to negotiate conditional requirements in some cases prevented them from accepting [the majority of these] (...) offers. (...) Most of the thousands of housing units made available by (...) Federal agencies (...) were never used. [IV, p. 45]

Federal departments and agencies [consistently had] (...) difficulty adapting their standard procedures to [the] catastrophic incident [that was Hurricane Katrina]. [IV, p. 50]

[In many cases], requirements for paper work and form completions hindered immediate action and deployment of people and materials to assist in rescue and recovery efforts. Far too often, the process required numerous time consuming approval signatures and data processing steps prior to any action, delaying the response. As a result, many agencies took action under their own independent authorities. [V, p. 52]

For Federal domestic disaster relief operations, DOD currently uses a "pull" system that provides support to civil authorities based upon specific requests from local, State, or Federal authorities. This process can be slow and bureaucratic. Assigning active duty military forces or capabilities to support disaster relief efforts usually requires a request from FEMA, an assessment by DOD on whether the request can be supported, approval by the Secretary of Defense or his designated representative, and a mission assignment for the military forces or capabilities to provide the requested support. From the time a request is initiated until the military force or capability is delivered to the disaster site, (...) a 21-step process [intervenes]. While this overly bureaucratic approach has been adequate for most disasters, in a catastrophic event like Hurricane Katrina the delays inherent in this "pull" system of responding to requests resulted in critical needs not being met. [V, p. 54]

Hurricane Katrina [created] (...) a massive requirement for Federal resources. (...) [But] the highly bureaucratic supply processes of the Federal government were not sufficiently flexible and efficient [to meet the challenge]. [V, p. 56]

[Federal law enforcement support to State and local officials [following Hurricane Katrina suffered from the fact that] (...) the procedures [by which Federal law enforcement agents had to be] deputized to enforce State law were cumbersome and inefficient. In Louisiana, a State Police attorney had to physically be present to swear in Federal agents. Many Federal law enforcement agencies also had to complete a cumbersome Federal deputization process. [V, p. 58]

The cumbersome process for the authorization of reimbursement for medical and public health services provided by Federal agencies created substantial delays and frustration among health care providers, patients and the general public. [V, p. 58]

Disaster victims [who required Federal assistance] confronted an enormously bureaucratic, inefficient, and frustrating process that failed to effectively meet their needs.



The Federal government's system for distribution of human services was not sufficiently responsive. [V, p. 59]

The Federal government's capability to provide housing solutions to the displaced Gulf Coast population has proved to be far too slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient. [V, p. 60]

### *Non décision, complication*

FEMA (...) deployed (...) Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) [to recover bodies on the ground]. (...) [But] Federal and State officials [argued] over body recovery responsibilities (...) for weeks after landfall. Federal officials maintained that body recovery was ultimately a State responsibility with the Federal government providing support only. (...) The deployed DMORTs performed well in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, though they found themselves (...) caught in a public political dispute. [IV, p. 48]

Competing priorities hampered efforts to assess the [environmental impact of Hurricane Katrina on the ground]. [V, p. 62]

The current system [of National preparedness] fails to (...) establish clear, comprehensive goals along with an integrated means to measure their progress and achievement. [VI, p. 66]

### *Irruptions intempestives*

[When] an energy company arranged to have generators shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the entire mid-Atlantic United States, (...) FEMA regional representatives diverted [them] (...) to hospitals. (...) There was no overall awareness of the competing important needs of the two requests. [V, p. 61]

The Department of Energy (DOE) persuaded Entergy and Mississippi Power to elevate the electrical restoration of [major pipe-line] pumping stations to near the top of the priority list. (...) As a result of the lengthy restoration time, Colonial [(i.e. une des compagnies gérant les pipe-lines)] contracted for some generators, [but] (...) these initial contacts were superseded by FEMA for use on lifesaving activities. [Appendix B, p. 135]

### *Incapacité d'apporter un appui*

More often than not, NGOs successfully contributed to the relief effort (...) with almost no government support or direction. [V, p. 64]

### *On fait juste ce qu'on peut...*

The President "received regular briefings, had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local officials, and took extraordinary steps prior to landfall." [III, pp. 28-29]

After the video teleconference [on Sunday, August 28], the President (...) issued a public statement, [urging] (...) citizens [of the Gulf Coast to evacuate. [III, p. 29]

Following the video teleconference [among high-ranking Federal officials] on Sunday, [August 28], FEMA Director Michael Brown deployed from Washington to Baton Rouge. [III, p. 29]

On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting from the field was extremely difficult to obtain [in part] because of (...) the lack of Federal representatives in [New Orleans]. [IV, p. 35]

The New Orleans Mayor's Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina's landfall. This meant that the Mayor was neither able to effectively command the local efforts, nor was he able to guide the State and Federal support for two days following the storm. [IV, p. 37]

The [Joint Field Office] (JFO) was [initially] located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (...) A Federal coordination center was not immediately established in New Orleans. [IV, p. 42]

The establishment of JFOs in several States across the Gulf Coast [after the first week following landfall] enhanced the Federal response by providing the coordination and management that had been largely absent [until then]. (...) To gain greater visibility of the disaster area, [Vice Admiral] (VADM) [Thad] Allen, [newly appointed as Deputy Principal Federal Officer], stood up a “PFO-Forward Headquarters” in New Orleans on the *USS Iwo Jima* on September 7. The PFO-Forward rapidly increased the effectiveness of the Federal response by providing a Federal unified command close to the disaster scene. [IV, p. 47]

On September 9, Secretary Chertoff appointed [Vice Admiral] (VADM) [Thad] Allen to replace Michael Brown as [Principal Federal Officer] (PFO) for Hurricane Katrina. (...) On September 21, VADM Allen was given additional authorities when he was appointed [Federal Coordinating Officer] (FCO), in addition to PFO. VADM Allen’s appointments ultimately proved critical for energizing the JFO and the entire Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. [IV, p. 47]

On September 6, (...) a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) [was established] in New Orleans. [IV, p. 47]

[DHS was late in setting up] subordinate JFO structures to coordinate Federal response actions near the major incident sites. [V, p. 53]

### *La nécessité d’une autre culture de décision*

DHS must (...) have available operational funds so that it can “lean forward” in future crises, to take anticipatory actions without budgetary concern or risk of subsequent criticism for a false alarm. In the event of a surprise contingency, (...) field commanders should not have to wait for the release of funds to execute their pre-assigned missions. [VI, p. 70]

We must eliminate the extraordinary red tape and resulting delays in the process of requests for assistance in response efforts. Too often during the Hurricane Katrina response we found that the Federal government did not effectively use assets at the ready because the necessary requests were being “coordinated” somewhere in the bureaucracy. [VI, p. 70]

Despite reforms that encourage a proactive, anticipatory approach to the management of incidents, the culture of our response community has a fundamental bias towards reaction rather than initiative. [VI, p. 79]

[Federal agencies] should (...) identify current statutory authorities that permit the waiver of impediments to the delivery of services during an emergency. Knowing which regulations can be waived will help responding agencies to more efficiently deliver services in emergency settings when speed is a high priority. [Appendix A, p. 106]

### **3. Des exemples positifs, mais qui seraient plus déterminants dans un environnement décisionnel plus favorable**

Le rapport fait mention d’une multitude d’initiatives concourant à donner des marges de liberté aux systèmes concernés. À chaque fois, cela suppose de changer de vision, de reconsidérer les priorités, de faire preuve de créativité, d’initiative.

Le point important est de savoir si cette inventivité doit se tailler une place envers et contre tout, ou bien est d’emblée valorisée et encouragée par l’environnement mis en place. Plus un système est tétanisé, moins il sera perméable à ce type de dynamique. Le schéma le plus pénalisant est celui qui conduit les autorités à prôner un strict contrôle hiérarchique, des



dynamiques uniquement « top-down », qui tuent rapidement les initiatives au prétexte de les rationaliser totalement. Mais il est souvent difficile à des organismes centraux de se percevoir comme fonctionnant en appui à ces dynamiques au ras du sol ; il est plus courant de considérer que le local ne peut plus rien, et qu'il faut le remplacer en tout, en lui imposant tout de l'extérieur. C'est alors que l'on constate que l'échelon central conduit à construire une catastrophe dans la catastrophe. En d'autres termes, il faut penser, structurer et conduire l'impulsion centrale de telle sorte qu'elle puisse venir valoriser, soutenir, enrichir les initiatives du terrain. Car il s'agit bien de redonner vie à un système biologique, à un tissu de vie, qui obéit à des lois plus complexe que le mécano basique souvent pensé au sommet.

C'est le génie de la remarque du Président d'EDF, François Roussely, lors de la tempête de 1999, dans une téléconférence avec un de ses directeurs sur le terrain. Ce dernier venait de lui dire qu'il lui faudrait 48 heures pour remettre tel système en fonctionnement. Le Président lui posa la question : « Quel appui pouvons-nous vous donner pour que vous puissiez y parvenir en 24 heures ? ».

Un des enjeux est de savoir si les chefs d'orchestre sont en mesure de faire des gerbes un peu cohérentes à partir des myriades d'initiatives, et de leur apporter des appuis appropriés. Ou s'ils sont englués dans leurs pathologies décisionnelles, qui les portera surtout à neutraliser toutes les autres initiatives.

### *Initiatives*

In addition to the mandatory evacuation order, Mayor Nagin announced Sunday that he had authorized New Orleans Police Department members and other City officials to **commandeer private property** for evacuation and shelter purposes, if necessary. [III, p. 30]

Faced with [the] increasingly dire situation [of the people trapped in New Orleans e.g. at the Convention Center or on raised surfaces such as highways], Governor Blanco used her executive authority to **commandeer private school buses** as evacuation assets, since many of the city's buses had been parked in lots that had flooded. [IV, p. 39]

The standard National Guard deployment coordination between State Adjutants General (...) [soon proved to be] insufficient for such a large-scale and sustained operation. To address this shortfall, LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, held a conference call on [Wednesday], August 31 with all fifty-four [Adjutants Generals (from States, DC, and the territories of Porto-Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands)] to distribute requests for forces and equipment to all [Adjutants General]. [IV, p. 43]

[In] the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Commerce (...) granted certain [private] companies **prioritized access to the raw materials** needed to restore the region's crippled infrastructure, even when the resources had previously been contracted to other parties. [IV, p. 45]

DOE (...) worked with the local utilities to prioritize their restoration of commercial power [to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port]. [Appendix B, p. 135]

[When] DOT coordinated with private air carriers (...) to begin [a] massive airlift [from Louis Armstrong Airport, it] (...) invited the Air Transport Association, the trade organization of principal U.S. airlines, to come to (...) [FEMA's National Response Coordination Center] (NRCC) to help coordinate with air carriers volunteering their services. [IV, p. 40]

[Department of Health and Human Services] and DOD health officials collaborated with State and local health officials [to address public health issues]. [IV, p. 46]

### *Innovations*

[After landfall], medical and public health professionals (...) often had to improvise and use their own initiative because the system (...) failed to adequately supply them. (...)

Health care providers across the Gulf Coast took the initiative to overcome the inefficiencies of the medical support system and meet their patients' needs. [IV, pp. 46-47]

In order to respond swiftly, [the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) took] (...) emergency response actions **without mission assignments, bypassing FEMA.** [IV, p. 47]

In the weeks after landfall, government, private sector, faith-based, non-profit, and other volunteer personnel collaborated in **innovative ways** to [assist victims of Hurricane Katrina]. [IV, p. 48]

[During the] search and rescue operation, (...) [emergency responders acted] with **extraordinary ingenuity.** [V, p. 57]

DHS Customs and Border Protection and DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement leaders (...) took **clothing, toys, linens and other useful items seized and forfeited at U.S. ports of entry for violations of federal law (...) and delivered them directly to the victims** of the hurricane and flood. (...) Their practical and innovative thinking and actions helped these victims directly, returning to them some possessions, as well as the sense of security such possessions convey. [Appendix B, p. 130]

As a member of the [Department of Transportation] (DOT) Region Ten Emergency ESF-1 response cadre, John Calvin was deployed (...) to the Louisiana State [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC) and to the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) in Baton Rouge. (...) He played a crucial role in post-landfall evacuations using ESF-1-controlled helicopters. (...) This (...) mission was undertaken voluntarily on John Calvin's part (...) despite the fact that **helicopters evacuations are not part of the traditional ESF-1 function.** [Appendix B, p. 136]

Many organizations and agencies that responded to Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing flood arrived in the region without much experience with or knowledge of the affected States and their geography. [But] a National Guard member (...) – also of the USDA [(Department of Agriculture)] National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) utilized **the organization's digital [topographic] data (ordinarily used to produce conservation plans) (...) to create (...) much needed maps of the affected regions.** (...) In addition to hand-delivering these maps to National Guard units, [he and his] team also delivered maps to local police, law enforcement officers arriving from other States, and FEMA. [Appendix B, p. 137]

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) took a hard look at their resources, missions, assets and personnel, and redirected them to fill the needs of the victims of the hurricane and flood, while maintaining service to America's veterans. The VA (...) removed VA properties for sale from the market in eleven states to use them instead to fill housing needs for those displaced. [Appendix B, p. 141]

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (...) [its] partners in the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and other local officials (...) created a "curbside pickup" program to **collect [hazardous] materials from the houses, instead of making already overwhelmed victims deliver [them] (...) to another location.** (...) Additionally, the **EPA also waived national sulfur emissions standards** for diesel fuel for a short period so that fuel produced for non-road uses could be legally used in highway vehicles. [Appendix B, p. 142]

The Farm Service Agency (FSA) (...) decided to **change its policy** for [farmers] affected by the disaster, allowing eligible producers to receive 100% cost-share assistance in implementing an approved practice [for farmland rehabilitation] (instead of the usual 75%). (...) The USDA program for Rural Development **did not wait to be asked** and instead reached out to those displaced by the hurricane and flood. It offered direct loan borrowers a "no-questions-asked" moratorium on their mortgage payments, while

simultaneously working with guaranteed lenders to prevent any liquidation actions and offer payment forbearance. The program also actively looked to fill the housing gaps that could not be addressed by FEMA (...). For example, the program arranged to let tenants use vacant seasonal labor housing units while repairs were being made to their own homes. Rural Development looked for ways to make its own activities bend to meet the housing needs generated by this catastrophe. [Appendix B, p. 137]

### *Allègement de contraintes bureaucratiques*

The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) (...) expanded the range of foods that could be purchased with food stamps in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, and Texas, and approved alternate procedures for use and replacement of food stamp benefit cards to improve a household's ability to purchase food. [Appendix B, p. 136]

The Bureau of Public Debt [at the Department of the Treasury] immediately realized that there would be a great need for money in the devastated region, but that ordinary access to cash would be limited at the banks. The Bureau expedited both the replacement of saving bonds that had been destroyed, as well as the redemption of (...) saving bonds that were less than one year old. (...) Although Treasury checks, saving bonds, and (...) retirement plans are often considered long-term investments, the Department of the Treasury allowed investors to turn them into sources of cash in this emergency, understanding that without the cash to address immediate needs, there would be no long-term future for these victims. [Appendix B, p. 140]

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (...) approved temporary waivers and expanded eligibility standards, [which helped] (...) natural gas companies restore service and deliver additional gas to the market. [Appendix B, p. 142]

The [Federal Communications] Commission acted quickly (...) to authorize the use of temporary communications services for use by emergency personnel and evacuees in shelters. (...) The Commission streamlined procedures to approve requests for special temporary authority (STA), which would in turn expedite industry recovery efforts. [Appendix B, pp. 142-143]

Recognizing that recipients of federal grants in those areas affected by Hurricane Katrina and its ensuing flood either would have to stop grant-related activities or be unable to perform as well as usual, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (...) relieved short-term administrative and financial management requirements [on its grantees]. [Appendix B, p. 143]

## GESTION ET COMMUNICATION

En plus du socle culturel adapté, du leadership nécessaire, les systèmes doivent encore posséder une capacité de conduite opérationnelle à la hauteur des chocs désormais à l'ordre du jour. Cela signifie tout un ensemble de compétences en mesure d'assurer une cohérence et une convergence de l'action, des liens entre entités et sous-entités, des dynamiques globalement positives (cercles vertueux). Cela suppose une force interne des systèmes en charge, afin qu'ils puissent se lier positivement les uns avec les autres ; une capacité à tisser des liens porteurs de confiance et de résultats positifs avec le public, et les victimes. La crise – processus de déstructuration massive – peut alors être contenue ; le système fait montre d'une vitalité particulière et globale qui aura raison du travail de sape de la crise.

Katrina a montré à quel point le système était loin du compte.

### 1. Dynamiques au sein des grandes organisations et systèmes en charge

#### 1.1. Avant l'impact : “*no unmet needs*” ; inquiétude ; ou initiatives remarquables

Des initiatives remarquables ont été prises par le centre national des cyclones. D'autres initiatives sont notées, en termes de cartographie point zéro des systèmes d'information et autres infrastructures critiques.

Mais le point faible semble bien être le centre de crise de Louisiane : il certifie que tout est bien prêt. Pareille assurance doit sans doute être interprétée comme la traduction d'une régularité très fréquente : les plus concernés sont souvent les premiers à assurer qu'il n'y a aucun problème. Sur une situation aussi grave qu'annoncée, si des personnes au front s'empressent ainsi de « rassurer », c'est généralement qu'elles sont déjà frappées, happées, par la crise. Cela doit conduire à une mobilisation totale instantanée : le message « rassurant » est le signe que la crise a déjà de sérieuses têtes de pont. La difficulté est qu'un système non préparé ne peut ni percevoir la faille, ni opérer la clarification nécessaire, ni passer à la mobilisation urgente.

Il semble bien que le Secrétaire Chertoff, comme Michael Brown le perçoive. Tout le problème est alors d'opérer le basculement, d'énoncer à tous qu'il y a situation de crise hors-cadres appelant une tout autre mobilisation. Ils n'iront pas jusque là, même si le Secrétaire du DHS prend l'initiative de parler personnellement aux gouverneurs. On note aussi des briefings nombreux du Président des Etats-Unis. Il aurait fallu pouvoir qualifier plus précisément le contenu de ces briefings et ce qu'il en sort. Car une autre pathologie des systèmes de décision est de contrebalancer l'inquiétude par des flots de paroles, d'innombrables réunions, une mobilisation effrénée de moyens high-tech – mais sans jamais rechercher de clarification décisionnelle effective.

On August 19<sup>th</sup> the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order to prepare and organize for severe weather disaster operations. This order expedited the pre-positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense Coordinating Officers, to act as liaisons with other governmental organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. [Appendix B, p. 130]

On Thursday, August 25, (...) FEMA (...) conducted their first video teleconference, a call held each day at noon from [that day] until well after landfall. These video teleconferences helped synchronize Federal, State, and local responders and were a means of defining and coordinating assistance and support needs. [III, p. 23]

On Sunday, August 28, (...) the President (...) participated in FEMA's daily video teleconference. (...) The President "received regular briefings, [and] had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local officials (...) prior to landfall". [III, pp. 28-29]

[During the teleconference held on Sunday, August 28], the Louisiana [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC) reported that (...) it had no unmet needs. (...) Despite State assurances, the FEMA Director [Michael Brown] (...) expressed concern. [III, p. 29]

After the video teleconference [held on Sunday, August 28], Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff spoke with the participating State governors to ensure that their needs were being met. He later explained, "my concern then was to talk off-line to the governors, to [check whether they wanted] (...) to tell me something privately that maybe they didn't want to share publicly." [III, p. 29]

[On Sunday, August 28], officials at all levels were unsure of who and how many people would come to the [Superdome] and were modifying their special needs and commodities requests throughout the day. [III, p. 29]

[On Sunday, August 28], The Louisiana State Police reported that one of its 800 MHz communications towers had been rendered inoperable. [III, p. 30]

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) started collecting key infrastructure-related information (i.e. on airports, hospitals, police stations, emergency operations centers, highways, schools, etc.) well in advance of landfall and got this information into the hands of Federal, State, and local first responders in the affected region. As the storm was tracked, NGA pre-deployed analysts and mobile systems to the affected areas that provided expertise and information on the ground and facilitated the delivery of (...) information from NGA. [Appendix B, p. 131]

## 1.2. Après l'impact : coups de boutoir tous azimuts

### *Destruction de l'infrastructure de communication : déstructuration globale*

Alors que l'on met toujours en avant les problèmes d'*interopérabilité*, Katrina a posé un problème plus brut – celui de l'*opérabilité* pure et simple. Tous les moyens ou presque étaient anéantis. La FEMA n'avait pas effectué des pré-positionnements à la hauteur des enjeux. D'autres organismes, heureusement, ont apporté des moyens, et ont tissé les contacts nécessaires avec des opérateurs privés pour déclencher de meilleurs appuis. Pour le jeudi, on commençait à avoir quelques moyens de communication qui fonctionnaient. Soit une demi-semaine de black-out quasi total.

### *Bien au-delà des problèmes classiques d'inter-opérabilité : l'anéantissement*

On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting [on the exact situation in New Orleans] was extremely difficult to obtain because of the widespread destruction of communication infrastructure, the incapacitation of many State and local responders, and the lack of Federal representatives in the city. As a result, local, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of conflicting reports from a combination of media, government, and private sources, many of which continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New Orleans. (...) [IV, p. 35]

The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left responders without a reliable network to use for coordinating emergency response operations. Flooding blocked access to the police and fire dispatch centers in New Orleans; neither 911 service nor public safety radio communications functioned sufficiently. In addition, the State of Louisiana's 800 MHz radio system, designed to be the backbone of mutual aid communications, ceased functioning, and repairs were delayed for several days. (...)

People could not communicate. It got to the point that people were literally writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and dropping them from helicopters to other people on the ground. [IV, p. 37]

The communications challenges across the Gulf Coast region in Hurricane Katrina's wake were more a problem of basic *operability*, than one of equipment or system *interoperability*. The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left emergency responders (...) without a reliable network across which they could coordinate. [V, p. 55]

*Renforcement des moyens de communication : la FEMA défailante*

FEMA had pre-positioned two of their five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments in the Gulf and quickly moved them to the affected areas in Louisiana and Mississippi soon after landfall. MERS detachments consist of an array of vehicles and trained personnel and provide mobile communications (...) assets – including satellite communications, dozens of phone and data lines, (...) and office functionality (...). Because MERS is a system of divisible assets and not a rigid unit, a single MERS detachment can provide limited support to multiple field operating sites within the disaster area simultaneously. (...)

Additional MERS support should have been deployed to the Gulf when it became apparent that those pre-positioned were insufficient for an incident of Katrina's magnitude. [But] at the time, some key Federal officials both on the ground and back in Washington did not know that there were additional MERS available.

*Points positifs : l'appui des systèmes de communication d'autres acteurs (Armées, AT&T)*

To augment FEMA's effort, DOD deployed available communications assets to the affected areas, such as its Deployable Joint Command and Control System. On August 31, National Guard Bureau Chief LTG Blum reported that DOD was "pushing every communication asset that we have". Further, the National Interagency Fire Center provided 3,200 radios, thirty-eight satellite systems, and several other communications modules in order to supplement the Gulf region's damaged communications networks.

The DHS National Communications System (NCS) also contributed to communications recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina. NCS linked the telecommunications industry with the relevant government agencies through the National Coordinating Center (NCC). The NCC coordinated with MCI and AT&T, as well as USNORTHCOM to identify and deploy mobile communication assets to the Gulf region both prior to, and following, landfall. Further, due to the destruction of the communications infrastructure, the NCS was required to perform new functions, such as providing interim Land Mobile Radio systems, used to connect two-way radio users to a central dispatcher, to first responders in devastated Louisiana parishes. By [Thursday], September 1, mobile communications systems were beginning to provide much needed telephone and two-way radio communications in Louisiana and Mississippi with additional systems en route to support the entire affected area. [IV, pp. 43-4]

*Destruction du dispositif de pilotage, diffraction des entités : confusion générale*

Le système sombre dans l'impuissance :

- Le Maire est réfugié dans un hôtel, où il sera isolé pendant près de 48 heures.
- Il n'y a pas réellement de centre de crise local, ce qui bloque tout pilotage.



- Le Centre fédéral de coordination avancé (JFO) prévu par le plan national de secours n'est pas établi dès le départ et, lorsqu'il l'est, il ne fonctionne pas comme prévu. Il est établi à Bâton-Rouge, non à la Nouvelle-Orléans.
- En l'absence de centre de coordination, chaque entité opère indépendamment, sur la base de représentations très différentes de la réalité.
- Et chaque agence agit selon son bon vouloir : en cas de difficulté avec les responsables des structures de pilotage mises en place localement, chacun ne manque pas de se rapprocher de son ministère de tutelle propre, déniaient ainsi tout pouvoir de pilotage unifié au centre de crise avancé. Le parfait fonctionnement tuyaux d'orgues si prisé spontanément par les organisations. Exactement ce qui fait le bonheur de la crise, qui met donc d'emblée les amas organisationnels sous son empire.

The New Orleans Mayor's Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina's landfall, unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for nearly forty-eight hours. [IV, p. 37]

Local emergency response officials found it difficult or impossible to establish functioning incident command structures in these conditions. Such structures would have better enabled local response officials to direct operations, manage assets, obtain situational awareness, and generate requests for assistance to State authorities. Without an incident command structure, it was difficult for local leaders to guide the local response efforts, much less command them. Members of the Hammond (Louisiana) Fire Department were receiving "a lot of 'I don't know's' from local government officials"; another Louisiana firefighter stated, "the command structure broke down – we were literally left to our own devices". [IV, p. 37]

On August 30, DHS initiated a virtual National Joint Information Center (JIC) and conducted the first of what would become daily National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) calls with other Federal departments and agencies. [IV, p. 42]

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) was not established at the outset, and did not function as envisioned [by the NRP (i.e. as an overarching coordination center)] when it was established. [In addition], the JFO was established in Baton Rouge, Louisiana: (...) a Federal coordination center was not immediately established in New Orleans. (...) In the absence of a command center near the major incident sites and a fully functioning JFO, agencies independently deployed resources, operated autonomously, and generated disparate reporting streams back to Federal authorities locally and in Washington. This resulted in an often inconsistent and inaccurate operating picture of the disaster area for senior decision makers. [IV, p. 42]

[The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that] Federal law enforcement support to State and local officials [requires] greater coordination [and] unity of command [than was the case during the crisis]. (...) For example, (...) several departments promptly offered their assistance [to the law enforcement effort], but their law enforcement assets were incorporated only after weeks had passed, or not at all. (...) New Orleans was (...) confronted with a rapid influx of law enforcement officers from a multitude of States and jurisdiction – each with their own policies and procedures, uniforms, and rules on the use of force. [V, p. 58]

The Federal response suffered from significant (...) coordination problems. (...) The lack of communications and situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the Federal response. [IV, p. 50]

State and local authorities (...), due to the destruction of infrastructure and response capabilities, lacked the ability to communicate with each other and coordinate a response. Federal officials [had to act] (...) without the benefit of (...) a functioning State/local incident command structure to guide their efforts. [V, p. 52]



The Secretary of Homeland Security is the President's principal Federal official for domestic incident management, but he had difficulty coordinating the disparate activities of Federal departments and agencies. The Secretary lacked real-time, accurate situational awareness of both the facts from the disaster area as well as the on-going response activities of the Federal, State, and local players. [V, p. 52]

[Because of] bureaucratic [delays], (...) many agencies took action under their own independent authorities while also responding to mission assignments from (...) FEMA, creating (...) confusion and potential duplication of efforts. [V, p. 52]

DHS did not established its NRP-specified disaster site multi-agency coordination center – the Joint Field Office (JFO) – until after the height of the crisis. Further, without subordinate JFO structures to coordinate Federal response actions near the major incident sites [in the first days of the crisis], Federal response efforts in New Orleans were not initially well-coordinated. [V, p. 53]

Compounding the coordination problem, the agencies assigned ESF responsibilities did not respect the role of the PFO [(i.e. Michael Brown and later Thad Allen)]. As [Vice Admiral] Thad Allen stated, “the ESF structure currently prevents us from coordinating effectively because if agencies [participating in] (...) ESFs do not like the instructions they are receiving from the PFO at the field level, they go to their headquarters in Washington to get decisions reversed.” [V, p. 53]

[The] lack of understanding of the [NRP by many officials at all levels of governments] (...) not surprisingly resulted in ineffective coordination of the Federal, State, and local response. [V, p. 53]

### ***Search and Rescue : confusion***

Le Department of Interior (DOI) est au nombre des mieux préparés. Mais, n'étant pas formellement considéré comme partie de la structure, ses offres d'intervention se perdent dans les labyrinthes bureaucratiques.

Et les interventions des grands services que sont notamment les Coast Guards, les Armées, interviennent sans coordination, ce qui crée des problèmes tout à la fois de vide et de recouvrement de l'action.

There is no overarching plan that incorporates [all] aspects of search and rescue. The absence of such a plan led to coordination problems. (...) Some teams displayed their own initiative to fill the gap in unified command, determining their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and locations to drop off the people they rescued. [IV, p. 38]

The Department of Interior (DOI) has valuable expertise in (...) conducting civil search and rescue operations. Unfortunately, because DOI is not formally considered a part of [Emergency Support Function-9] (ESF-9 [i.e. search and rescue]), DOI's offers to deploy shallow-water rescue boats during the response apparently never reached the operational level [at FEMA]. Had DOI been considered a supporting agency under ESF-9, its water assets would likely have been effectively integrated into response operations. [IV, p. 38]

Search and rescue teams (...) were conducting boat and helicopter rescue operations with neither a coordinated plan nor a unified command structure. [IV, p. 39]

The overall search and rescue effort demonstrated the need for greater coordination between US&R, the Coast Guard, and military responders (...). Lacking an integrated search and rescue incident command, the various agencies were unable to effectively coordinate their operations. This meant that multiple rescue teams were sent to the same areas, while leaving others uncovered. When successful rescues were made, there was no formal direction on where to take those rescued. [V, p. 57]

### ***Abris, evacuations, relogement : confusion***

Sur ces questions de mise à l'abri, d'évacuation, de relogement, on retrouve le leitmotif : pas d'anticipation, pas de coordination, pas de vision générale de la situation, pas de communication, pas de capacité à utiliser les savoir faire existant pourtant dans d'autres organisations que la FEMA...

Deux lectures doivent être conduites en parallèle :

- d'une part, il aurait fallu tout faire pour introduire à tous les stades, dans toutes les organisations, un peu plus de compétence, de capacité de vue globale, de souci de ne pas s'enfermer dans des visions « tunnel », d'aptitude à la valorisation des capacités autres que les siennes propres, etc. Des organisations sclérosées, non entraînées, bunkérisées, n'ont aucune chance en pareilles circonstances. Et tout se passe finalement comme si le sabotage rapide était choisi pour souffrir moins longtemps ;
- d'autre part, il faut aussi retourner l'approche : certes, les uns et les autres – la FEMA, la ville de la Nouvelle-Orléans, l'État de Louisiane–, n'étaient pas des modèles de compétence, mais il faut aussi et surtout bien prendre en compte le saut qualitatif sans les difficultés à traiter.

Si l'on ne parvient pas à avoir une vue globale, si l'on est débordé sur chaque point, c'est aussi parce que la situation échappe fondamentalement à nos grammaires, nos savoir faire, nos outils. Il ne s'agit pas de traiter l'évacuation d'un quartier, vers une zone globalement non touchée. Il s'agit de traiter un immense territoire, des flux de populations énormes, des dynamiques dans le temps qui ne sont plus celles des hypothèses convenues. Quand on croit pouvoir réfléchir à l'évacuation d'un immense abri, il continue à se remplir sans interruption, des foules arrivent de nulle part, les moyens sont totalement débordés, et les conditions de leur utilisation n'ont plus rien de nominal...

Les crises de l'avenir emprunteront largement, et de plus en plus, au second modèle évoqué. Il ne suffira pas de critiquer les organisations en charge en soulignant qu'elles n'ont pas bien appris les leçons connues. Le problème sera qu'elles ne connaîtront pas les règles à appliquer – puisque ces règles restent à inventer. Le travail efficace en milieu chaotique ne relève pas de l'application consciencieuse des règles d'hier.

Et il est probable que rien, dans leur cursus de formation, n'aura préparé les officiels à affronter un tel univers, qui ne sera plus sous contrôle d'un savoir établi. Le risque, observé régulièrement, est alors c'est celui de décrochage brutal des responsables, soudain placés dans une configuration qu'ils ne peuvent pas porter ni intellectuellement, ni psychologiquement.

Reports on [the] exact [number of people evacuated from the Superdome] vary because (...) additional **evacuees continued to arrive** [there] **while the evacuation** [of those people who had actually ridden out the storm in the stadium] **was under way**. [IV, p. 39]

Federal transportation coordinators had little situational awareness regarding the movement of evacuees due to the complete breakdown of the region's communications infrastructure. (...) [States supposed to take in evacuees were not always given] prior notice of the evacuees' arrival times. [IV, p. 40]

A lack of prior planning combined with poor operational coordination generated a weak Federal performance in supporting [evacuations] (...) following Katrina's landfall. The Federal effort lacked (...) coordination with State, local, and non-governmental officials receiving and sheltering the evacuees. (...) Poor situational awareness and communications [plagued] (...) the evacuation operations. [V, pp. 56-57]

FEMA's efforts to provide trailers to evacuees foundered [in part] due to (...) poor coordination. [IV, p. 50]

The [inadequate Federal response to emergency housing issues] resulted from a lack of interagency coordination to relocate and house people. FEMA's actions often were inconsistent with evacuees' needs and preferences. Despite offers from the Departments of

Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture as well as the private sector to provide thousands of housing units nationwide, FEMA focused its housing efforts on cruise ships and trailers, which were expensive. (...) HUD, with extensive expertise and perspective on large-scale housing challenges and its nation-wide relationship with State public housing authorities, was not substantially engaged by FEMA in the housing process until late in the effort. [V, p. 60]

***Sécurité publique : défaut de coordination, retard d'une semaine***

Le système parvient peu à peu à remettre de l'ordre. Mais le processus est très long. La crise a déjà eu le loisir de placer de solides têtes de pont.

The standard National Guard deployment coordination between State Adjutants General was effective during the initial response but [later proved to be] insufficient for such a large-scale and sustained operation. To address this shortfall, LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, held a conference call on [Wednesday], August 31 with all fifty-four [Adjutants Generals (from States, DC, and the territories of Porto-Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands)] to distribute requests for forces and equipment to all [Adjutants General]. [IV, p. 43]

A **fragmented** deployment and lack of an integrated command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial response. Deployment for (...) National Guard forces were coordinated State-to-State through EMAC agreements and also by the National Guard Bureau. (...) Active duty forces deployment were coordinated through USNORTHCOM [(i.e. QG de l'armée régulière pour les opérations domestiques aux Etats-Unis)]. Once forces arrived in the Joint Operations Area, they fell under **separate command structures**, rather than one single command. The separate commands divided the area of operations geographically and supported response efforts separately, with the exception of the evacuations of the Superdome and the Convention Center in New Orleans. Equipment interoperability problems further hindered an integrated response. Similar issues of **bifurcated operations and interoperability challenges** were also present between the military and civilian leadership. This lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment. [IV, p. 43]

**On September 6**, the two Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials (SFLEOs), (...) representing the [Department of Justice] (DOJ) and DHS, respectively, established a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) in New Orleans to help coordinate law enforcement personnel operating in the city and surrounding parishes. For the first time during the hurricane response, New Orleans now had a unified command for law enforcement. [IV, p. 47]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation recognized that there was a lack of unified law enforcement leadership, and no central coordination for law enforcement in New Orleans, and created a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC). Once the LECC was established, all law enforcement personnel and agencies (including those provided by the National Guard) had a unified command structure. This allowed every law enforcement agency operating in the New Orleans area to coordinate with other agencies. Additionally, senior federal law enforcement officials from the FBI and DHS not only coordinated the response of the Federal law enforcement agencies, they also brought the New Orleans Police Department command element together for the first time since the hurricane struck. Further, they integrated Federal law enforcement assets and personnel into the remaining local police structure. FBI Special Agent in Charge Michael Wolf and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Assistant Director Michael Vanacore were appointed to

serve as the Co-Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials (SFLEO) under the NRP. Within a day of their appointment and for the first time since Katrina made landfall, the SFLEOs brought together all the Federal law enforcement agencies operating in the New Orleans area with the State police to coordinate efforts. The SFLEOs established a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) first in Baton Rouge and subsequently in New Orleans modeled after the FBI's Joint Operations Center. The LECC coordinated all law enforcement activities in the New Orleans area, bringing together Federal, State, and local law enforcement (...) including National Guard and DOD military police to provide assistance and support to the New Orleans Police Department. The rapid establishment of the LECC led to the rapid coordination of law enforcement activities and the restoration of law and order in New Orleans. [Appendix B, p. 132]

### ***Forces Armées : lignes de faille***

Les Armées, elles aussi, sont aux prises avec un univers chaotique. Elles ne peuvent, d'un coup de baguette magique, assurer cohérence et intégration verticale. Elles ont un travail de réflexion et d'adaptation considérable à engager pour assurer des opérations en pareil contexte chaotique. Si d'aventure ces terrains deviennent, comme on peut le penser, des champs d'intervention de plus en plus fréquents pour les Armées, il est d'ores et déjà important d'y réfléchir dans nos Ecoles de Guerre et nos états-majors, ou dans une « National Homeland Security University » si l'on reprend l'idée américaine d'une innovation majeure en termes de préparation des dirigeants – et qu'on la transpose par exemple à l'échelon européen. Car, sur ces terrains civils non plus, les Armées ne doivent pas être en retard d'une guerre. Ce seront probablement là des horizons majeurs dans nos réflexions sur la sécurité nationale au cours des années à venir.

[During the] response to Hurricane Katrina, (...) **active duty military and National Guard operations were not coordinated** and served two different bosses, one the President and the other the [Governors]. (...) Separate command structures for active duty military and the National Guard hindered their unity of effort. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commanded active duty forces, while each State government commanded its National Guard forces. For the first two days of Katrina response operations, USNORTHCOM did not have a situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the ground. Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) [(i.e. USNORTHCOM's Field Office)] simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility (...) over (...) [National Guard] forces in the disaster area. Neither the Louisiana National Guard nor JTF-Katrina had a good sense [of] where each other's forces were located or what they were doing. (...) As a result, some units were not immediately assigned missions matched to on-the-ground requirements. Further, **FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing [that] State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs.** Also, the [active duty] Commanding General of JTF-Katrina and the Adjutant Generals (...) of Louisiana and Mississippi [(commanding State National Guard personnel)] had only a coordinating relationship, with no formal command relationship established. This resulted in confusion over roles and responsibilities between National Guard and Federal forces. [V, pp. 54-55]

### ***Santé publique : des initiatives, un manque de coordination***

Le système tente de faire face. Le rapport souligne des défaillances importantes dans l'action. La première lecture, comme ci-dessus, est de voir qu'effectivement on pourrait gagner beaucoup en rigueur, en cohérence, en efficacité générale grâce à des efforts de coordination, d'intégration.

La seconde lecture consiste à prendre de la distance avec l'obsession d'efficacité totale. Oui, **il y aura des incohérences et des problèmes** ; on les accepte comme possibles, et l'on se prépare à les traiter de la façon la plus pertinentes. Mais l'essentiel est de sauver le patient, et à moindre coût humain et social. Il est possible qu'une stratégie de rigueur absolue conduise à des résultats finalement moins bons qu'une ligne plus ouverte.

Federal department and agencies worked together to attempt to meet [public health] challenges, beginning before Hurricane Katrina's landfall and continuing long after. [Department of Health and Human Service] (HHS) and DOD health officials (...) maintained situational awareness for their respective agencies. (...) Several agencies assigned responsibilities in the NRP under ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services, sent liaisons to the HHS Operations Center in Washington, DC, and the HHS Secretary's Emergency Response Teams (SERTs) in the affected States. [IV, p. 46]

[The local] Information Center (JIC) [which DHS established] (...) in New Orleans [on September 9] improved the flow of accurate information back to the Baton Rouge JIC [that DHS had established three days earlier to improve public communication]. [IV, p. 48]

The coordination of Federal [medical] assets within and across agencies was poor. (...) In some cases, (...) large numbers of Federal assets were deployed, only to be grossly underutilized. (...) Thousands of medical volunteers were sought by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), (...) [but] many volunteers reported that they received no message [from HHS notifying them that they were needed]. (...) These inefficiencies were [in part] the products of a fragmented command structure for medical response (...) and the absence of a uniform electronic health record system. [V, pp. 58-59]

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) quickly identified the need for specific guidance on how to get hospitals in the region affected by the hurricane and flood reopened and running again. The Agency developed easy to read information, and checklists regarding (...) reopening evaluation. (...) AHRQ developed this information and got it into the hands of the State and Local leaders responsible for making hospitals function again. [Appendix B, p. 133]

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) (...) immediately recognized that they were in the best position to match medical experts with health care providers [through their call centers], (...) providing both groups with the information they needed to better manage health care concerns in the midst of the crisis. [Appendix B, p. 134]

### ***FEMA/Autres administrations ; Public/Privé : des failles majeures***

Ineffective communications between FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies prevented available Federal resources from being effectively used for response operations. [IV, p. 45]

[Following landfall], HHS struggled [to fulfill] its (...) role as coordinating agency for ESF-8 (...). FEMA deployed [National Disaster Medical System] (NDSM) teams without HHS's oversight or knowledge. FEMA administrative delays in issuing mission assignments exacerbated the lack of coordination within ESF-8 (...). In order to respond swiftly, HHS felt compelled to take emergency response actions without mission assignments, bypassing FEMA. While this may have pushed additional assets to the region, it also had a deleterious effect on the Federal government's situation awareness of its deployed assets. [IV, p. 47]

The private sector (...) met roadblocks in its efforts to coordinate with the Federal government during the response. For example, the American Bus Association spent an entire day trying to find a point of contact at FEMA to coordinate bus deployment without success. (...) **Throughout the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the Department of**



Commerce worked to close the gap between the private and the public sector. The Department set up an informal website and hotline to provide businesses with a one-stop source of information on contracting opportunities. [IV, p. 45]

As a result of the lengthy restoration time [necessary to bring back power to its pumping stations], Colonial [(i.e. compagnie gérant un pipe-line majeur)] contracted for some generators. [But] these initial contacts were superseded by FEMA for use on lifesaving activities. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Governor of Alabama was made aware of the [fact that lack of fuel hampered the activity] of Cahaba, [an Alabama company] which was producing poles for Entergy and Mississippi Power. ESF-12 at the Mississippi [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC) confirmed with Entergy and Mississippi Power that this pole supply was critical. (...) ESF-12 spoke with all parties (...) involved (Hunt Oil, Stephens Oil Distributor, and Cahaba) and got Hunt Oil to release the needed fuel beginning the following day. [Appendix B, p. 135]

[In its efforts] to protect and restore (...) critical infrastructures, (...) the Federal government did not adequately coordinate its actions with State and local [stakeholders]. (...) In fact, the Federal government created confusion by responding to individualized requests in an inconsistent manner. (...) Federal, State, and local officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without a comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of the critical infrastructure sectors in each geographic area and the potential national impact of their decisions. For example, [when] an energy company arranged to have generators shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the entire mid-Atlantic United States, (...) FEMA regional representatives diverted [them] (...) to hospitals. (...) There was no overall awareness of the competing important needs of the two requests. (...) [In addition], the Federal government lacked the timely, accurate, and relevant ground-truth information necessary to evaluate which critical infrastructures were damaged, inoperative, or both. [V, p. 61]

### *Centre de crise/ONG : des failles majeures*

Première lecture : il est regrettable que les ONG ne soient pas mieux connectées au système de pilotage.

Seconde lecture : il est possible qu'à un certain stade, sur certaines dimensions, le système de pilotage – celui sur lequel sont fixés tous les regards, et notamment nos regards managériaux habituels – ne soit plus le point le plus pertinent. Si les dynamiques qui comptent véritablement viennent « par le bas »<sup>38</sup>, trouvent des chemins « impensables » pour les systèmes décisionnels habituels, alors le fait que les ONG ne soient pas parfaitement intégrés aux architectures traditionnelles devient moins essentiel. Tout se joue ailleurs. C'est le risque majeur pour les grandes organisations. C'est comme si, soudain, s'inscrivaient à leur fronton : « Absent pour cause de crise. Reprise d'activités dès la fin des problèmes ».

Faith-based and non-governmental groups (...) often encountered difficulties coordinating their efforts with Federal, State and local governments. (...) [An official from] the Salvation Army testified to Congress that the Salvation Army “wasn't permitted to have a liaison officer in the State's Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As a result, we had to obtain critical information second-hand (...) if we received the information at all”. (...) [The] President of Catholic Charities USA remarked, “(...) We were not always allowed admittance to FEMA operations and the local EOCs. This significantly impaired a more coordinated response.” These groups succeeded in their missions (...) mostly in spite of, not because of, the government. [IV, p. 49]

<sup>38</sup> Cette notion est au cœur de l'approche de Xavier Guilhaud sur les crises hors-cadres. Entretiens personnels.

Virtually every national, regional and local charitable organization in the U.S., and many from abroad, contributed aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. To assist in the coordination of these offers of assistance, the USA Freedom Corps (...) and the Governor's State Service Commissions rallied non-profit organizations to list volunteer opportunities in the Freedom Corps volunteer search engine. The Freedom Corps also worked with the Corporation for National and Community Service to create a Katrina Resource Center that helped groups of volunteers connect their resources with needs on the ground. The Citizen Corps coordinated volunteer efforts throughout the country. [Appendix B, pp. 125-126]

### *Chaînes logistiques : une guerre de retard, du côté du public*

Notre culture d'urgence classique nous a toujours conduit à considérer que le secteur privé devait, en situation exceptionnelle, se mettre aux ordres, et se couler dans les moules et le savoir-faire du secteur public, en charge des crises. Le rapport souligne qu'en matière de logistique, il y a un fossé impressionnant entre les compétences du privé et du public, en faveur du privé. Dans le secteur public, on est tout juste en mesure d'assurer qu'une commande de matériels a été passée. Quant à savoir où en sont les choses, où est quoi, et quand cela arrivera, c'est le trou noir. Les grandes entreprises de service spécialisées en logistique ont une avance considérable en ce domaine. Quand on est obligé de faire une autre guerre que celle préparée, c'est rapidement la débâcle.

The (...) supply processes of the Federal government (...) failed to leverage (...) 21<sup>st</sup> Century advances in supply chain management. Throughout the response, Federal resource managers had great difficulty determining what resources were needed, what resources were available, and where those resources were at any given point in time. Even when Federal resource managers had a clear understanding of what was needed, they often could not readily determine whether the Federal government had that asset, or what alternative sources might be able to provide it. (...) FEMA [suffered from the] lack of a real-time asset-tracking system. [V, p. 56]

Because of poor situational awareness and communications throughout the evacuation operations, FEMA had difficulty providing buses through ESF-1, Transportation (with the Department of Transportation as the coordinating agency). FEMA also had difficulty delivering food, water, and other critical commodities to people waiting to be evacuated, most significantly at the Superdome. [pp. 56-57]

### *Interventions d'urgence et risques environnementaux pour les sauveteurs*

Le problème fut dramatique à Tchernobyl. Il fut critique pour le World Trade Center<sup>39</sup> et revient aujourd'hui en force dans les débats américains<sup>40</sup>. Cette dimension de la toxicité létale du contexte d'intervention d'urgence est probablement une difficulté à intégrer désormais dans toute grande opération d'urgence.<sup>41</sup> La référence "toutes choses égales par ailleurs" devient totalement hors de propos. Aucun compartiment de l'action ne peut plus être pensé indépendamment du contexte. La crise dans la crise peut être un facteur de blocage, de

<sup>39</sup> Patrice de Beer : "Les retombées toxiques du 11 septembre à New York", *Le Monde*, 11 septembre 2003, Horizons, page 19.

<sup>40</sup> Antony DePalma: "Ground Zero Illnesses Clouding Giuliani's Legacy", *The New York Times*, 14 May 2007.

<sup>41</sup> "Gouvernance et Responsabilité dans des mondes explosés", film vidéo avec Patrick Lagadec, à l'écoute de Christian Frémont, préfet de la zone de défense sud, préfet de la région Provence-Alpes-Côtes-d'Azur, préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône, précédemment directeur de l'administration au ministère de l'intérieur, directeur des stages à l'École nationale d'administration, montage Aurélien Goulet, avril 2004.



lenteur, de controverses considérables.<sup>42</sup> Et la question deviendrait pathétique en cas d'attaque nucléaire.<sup>43</sup>

Federal officials could have improved (...) communication of appropriate [environmental hazard] warnings to emergency responders. (...) Although the process used to identify environmental hazards provides accurate results, these results are not prompt enough to provide meaningful information to responders. [V, p. 62]

### *Une culture du cloisonnement*

Le rapport n'en finit pas de déplorer le cloisonnement des systèmes bureaucratiques. Une première approche est, effectivement, de considérer qu'il faut lutter contre les barrières, omniprésentes, qui ne permettent pas de faire face à ce type de situation.

Une seconde approche consisterait à mettre l'accent beaucoup moins sur les affichages de frontières, les plans de référence, les organigrammes, mais beaucoup plus sur les dynamiques que ces systèmes parcellisés sont capables d'engager, tout en gardant leurs cloisons. Dans cette optique, on travaillerait moins, en préparation, sur les impératifs de mise à la norme générale, sur les mêmes « vocabulaires » et les mêmes modes opératoires à faire adopter, sur les mêmes hiérarchies à respecter, mais sur la capacité à inventer ensemble des actions et des modalités d'intervention ad hoc. Peut-être découvrirait-on bien vite que les guerres de frontières ont pour premier objet, au-delà de la tenue de fortins symboliques, le refus de s'engager sur le vrai sujet : la prise en charge des défis qui se présentent. Le cloisonnement est probablement bien moins une scorie dommageable à effacer grâce au bon vouloir de chacun, qu'une expression de besoin de protection vitale pour les systèmes concernés.<sup>44</sup>

Greater collaboration among Federal, State, and local officials (...) could have improved the effectiveness of [debris removal efforts]. [V, p. 62]

Time and again, government agencies did not effectively coordinate relief operations with NGOs. Often, government agencies failed to match relief needs with NGO and private sector capabilities. [V, p. 64]

[At present], the United States (...) has guidelines and individual plans across multiple agencies and levels of government that do not yet constitute an *integrated* national system that ensures unity of effort. [VI, p. 66]

There are significant institutional (...) challenges for information (...) sharing. (...) These barriers stem from a multitude of factors – different cultures, lack of communication

<sup>42</sup> Et encore, on n'évoque nulle part l'existence (dont il fut question dans des rumeurs) de laboratoires aux activités sensibles, dont l'inondation pouvait/aurait pu conduire à des risques très difficiles à estimer.

<sup>43</sup> "The choices would be determined by the dose of radiation they were willing to absorb. Except in the hot zone around the blast and a few miles downwind, even unsheltered people would not be exposed to enough radiation to make them die or even become sick. It would be enough only to raise their statistical chance of getting cancer later in life from 20 percent (the average chance we all have) to something greater — 21 percent, 22 percent, up to 30 percent at the maximum survivable exposure. Similar choices would face first responders and troops sent to the stricken area: how close to ground zero could they go, and for how long? Few would choose to have their risk of death from cancer go up to 30 percent. But in cases of smaller probabilities — an increase to 20.1 percent, for example — a first responder might be willing to go into the radiation zone, or a resident might want to return to pick up a beloved pet. These questions could be answered only by the individuals themselves, based on information about the explosion". William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter and Michael M. May, "After the Bomb", Op-Ed Contributor, *The New York Times*, June 12, 2007, op. cit.

<sup>44</sup> Sur un autre registre, juste pour illustrer. Lorsque l'on entre dans une salle de congrès pour une conférence, il est un peu tard pour se dire qu'on devrait avoir appris le chinois, l'arabe et le russe. Et, en fin d'intervention, il est peu utile de se livrer à l'incantation habituelle des retours d'expérience sur le thème : « Si on ne parle pas le même langage, on ne peut rien faire »... Il vaut mieux accepter les barrières, et aller passer un peu de temps avec les interprètes, qui sont la clé de l'affaire. Mais, étrangement, ces derniers ne voient guère les intervenants venir à eux, qui sont pourtant le canal critique.

between departments and agencies, and varying procedures and working patterns among departments and agencies. [VI, p. 67]

Medical operations [in crisis situations] are highly dependent on efficient inter-agency coordination. [Appendix A, p. 104]

Although Federal, State, and local agencies had communications plans and assets in place, these plans and assets were neither sufficient nor adequately integrated to respond effectively to the disaster. Many available communications assets were not utilized fully because there was no national, State-wide, or regional communications plan to incorporate them. For example, (...) the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service's radio cache – the largest civilian cache of radios in the United States – had additional radios available that were not utilized. (...) [The] inability to connect multiple communications plans and architectures [across all levels of government] clearly impeded coordination and communication at the Federal, State, and local levels. [V, pp. 55-56]

### *Aide étrangère : des failles majeures*

Un système non préparé aux crises hors-cadres est incapable de tolérer une aide étrangère. Autrement dit : l'incapacité à intégrer l'aide étrangère est le signe clair (surtout si cette aide est de qualité) que le système est non préparé.

Mais, si l'aide ne peut pas passer par les artères officielles, elle passera désormais, dans notre monde globalisé, par des capillaires au ras du sol. Cela peut représenter un potentiel de déstabilisation majeur pour les institutions en place. Plus grave, si d'aventure l'aide est stratégiquement organisée par des entités qui ont des vues allant bien au-delà de l'humanitaire, la crise a toute chance de déboucher sur des transformations dans les équilibres de forces. Les grandes crises civiles peuvent devenir rapidement des questions de sécurité nationale. Et il est clair que ceux qui se seront refusés à approcher ces questions autrement que comme des tactiques d'intervention de secours sont promis à de rudes défaites s'ils doivent se mesurer à des entités qui ont compris, elles, la nature stratégique de ces circonstances à haut potentiel d'opportunités... hors-cadres.

Inadequate planning delayed the overall process of accepting and receiving disaster aid from abroad. (...) A German company offered the use of a \$3 million integrated satellite and cellular telephone system capable of handling 5,000 calls at once, only to wait five days for a written deployment order from USNORTHCOM. [IV, pp. 45-46]

After Switzerland had loaded relief supplies onto an aircraft, FEMA requested that the country send only the portion FEMA required to meet response needs. As the (...) contribution of supplies could not be unloaded (...) and repackaged (...) in a timely manner, the (...) entire flight [was cancelled]. [IV, pp. 45-46]

[In dealing with public health challenges after landfall, the Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) (...) over-relied on departmental routines. [IV, p. 47]

[FEMA had difficulties] finalizing [its verbal] agreement with [the private contractor] Kenyon [International Emergency Services, for the recovery of bodies on the ground]. (...) Frustrated Kenyon executives [eventually] withdrew from their agreement with FEMA. (...) In a September 13 press conference, Governor Blanco (...) blamed FEMA for failing to "break through the bureaucracy" to finalize a [contract] with Kenyon International. [IV, p. 48]

Use of foreign support (...) [was often] tied up by bureaucratic red tape. [V, p. 62]

### *Des entités exemplaires, des avancées remarquables*

Des succès très intéressants sont mentionnés par le rapport. Il resterait à les étudier de façon transverse pour mieux cerner les dimensions « gagnantes » de ces interventions. Retenons pour le moment :

- La perception de besoins d'expertise encore mal repérés – comme en matière de cartographie, qui devient soudain un problème majeur dans les grandes crises (ce fut le cas par exemple en septembre 2001 à New York : 1000 géographes mobilisés).
- La perception de besoins interstitiels – par exemple dans le domaine financier, ou des langues étrangères (le Département d'État mobilisa ainsi des centaines de personnes).
- La capacité à se mobiliser en quelques minutes, et non en quelques semaines, pour apporter ce type d'appui.
- La capacité à organiser sur-le-champ **un cluster d'organisations diverses** (public-privé-ONG, etc.), pour apporter des systèmes opérationnels directement pertinents.

Because [it] had assets in place and focused on the region, [the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] (NGA) **provided the first comprehensive overview** of the damage resulting from the hurricane and flood. NGA merged imagery with other information, creating **hundreds of intelligence products per day** that could be used and applied by response professionals to aid in decision-making. NGA assessments were multi-dimensional, timely, relevant, and continuous. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The Department of Transportation (DOT) (...) coordinated (...) the [airlift for] (...) the emergency evacuation of (...) citizens [stranded in] New Orleans. This large and complex **operation involved three federal Departments and a fleet of private sector and military aircraft.** [Appendix B, p. 136]

Using the recently developed Employee Profile Plus database, managers in the State Department rapidly located current and former employees with **skills in about 300 specific areas.** (...) They quickly found employees with required language, area and disaster relief expertise **in a matter of minutes, rather than days or weeks.** [Appendix B, p. 139]

[A number of] organizations in the Department of the Treasury, such as the Financial Management Service (FMS), (...) issued guidance to financial institutions to help them confirm the identity of people trying to redeem Treasury checks – to help the institutions prevent fraud and help the victims obtain needed funds. [Appendix B, p. 140]

[The Federal Communications Commission] (...) **contacted each segment** of the communications industry to help match their needs with resources (such as (...) emergency generators and fuel) around the nation. [Appendix B, p. 143]

### **1.3. Recommandations : une série d'ajustements**

**Les recommandations sont d'un grand clacissisme** : une meilleure intégration des efforts de préparation ; un plan global pour communiquer l'information aux intervenants de terrain ; une direction spécifique pour la question des infrastructures critiques au sein du dispositif de crise central du DHS ; l'intégration de la dimension « secteur privé » dans le dispositif ; la préparation de l'aide étrangère ; le développement de liens nouveaux avec le secteur associatif, les ONG, les cercles confessionnels ; la préparation de compétences communes pour intervenir à l'échelon local ; le développement de la formation préalable, en insistant sur la participation effective des responsables.

Au-delà, il serait bon, aujourd'hui, de préconiser un travail de chacun et de tous sur les nouveaux horizons qui s'imposent à haute vitesse. Pour inventer de nouvelles intelligences, de nouvelles références, en dépassant la seule mise en lien des bonnes volontés. L'obsession doit être de ne jamais être en retard d'une guerre. Katrina n'est pas qu'un échec tactique, organisationnel, de plans, ou de moyens de liaison. Par exemple, l'une des recommandations du rapport est, comme cela est habituel, que chacun se connaisse déjà à l'échelon local. Certes, c'est là un point à ne pas négliger. **Mais, le véritable enjeu est désormais, pour toute organisation importante, d'être en mesure de s'articuler au plus vite avec des organisations qu'elle ne connaît pas,** pour la prise en charge de problèmes majeurs, et inconnus, en terrain d'une instabilité extrême, traversé par des dynamiques chaotiques.

Les recommandations de bon sens du rapport sont certes indispensables, mais elles sont très insuffisantes.

### *Une meilleure intégration interne des acteurs publics*

The storm demonstrated the need for **greater integration** and synchronization of preparedness efforts. [IV, p. 50]

There must be a **comprehensive plan** to accurately and quickly communicate (...) critical information [on environmental hazards] to the emergency responders. [V, p. 62]

[The Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) should develop [information and registration centers for victims, where its employees could gather] (...) all the necessary data and [enter] it into a database that is shared and transparent among all human service providers at the Federal, State, and local level as required. (...) [This] should avoid duplication of effort (...) and foster the interagency administration of human services in a disaster area. [Appendix A, p. 107]

The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve the Federal government's capability to quickly (...) **provide (...) emergency responders the most accurate information** available, to determine whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment. [Appendix A, p. 112]

### *De meilleurs liens avec les acteurs externes*

To assure the appropriate expertise is brought to bear in all phases of a disaster (preparation, response, recovery and rebuilding) [with respect to mass care and emergency housing, [the Department of Housing and Urban Development] (...) (HUD), DHS and [the American Red Cross] (ARC) must develop a **close working relationship**, not just during crises. [Appendix A, p. 108]

DHS should (...) (a) provide for **a stronger Infrastructure Support Branch in the National Operations Center**. The Infrastructure Support Branch will coordinate among the appropriate ESFs (...). In addition, this branch will coordinate with critical infrastructure sectors, provide senior leaders with a summary of reports and modeling, and develop recommended preemptive and responsive actions. (...) Strengthen the role and responsibility of the Infrastructure Liaison, (...) [i.e.] the principal advisor to the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) Coordination Group regarding all national and regional level critical infrastructure and key resource incident-related issues. [Appendix A, pp. 110-111]

DHS should revise the National Preparedness Goal to require the **collaborative** development of regional disaster plans (...) with the **private sector**. This activity will not only prepare the Federal government to respond, but will set private sector expectations of specific actions the government will take in response to a disaster. (...) There is a lack of a clear and agreed upon prioritized implementation plan to address the coordinated restoration and protection of critical infrastructure during times of limited resources and competing demands. [Appendix A, p. 111]

DHS should **share** the plans and policy for Federal response and delineated roles and responsibilities with the private sector. (...) Businesses have been unable to develop completely effective contingency plans without understanding the actions Federal, State, and local governments will take in response to a disaster. (...) [Therefore], the first step to establishing a collaborative planning and exercise program with the private sector is (...) (with appropriate protections) [to] share relevant sections of the NRP with key private sector partners. [Appendix A, p. 112]

DHS should **revise the NRP to [coordinate] (...) non-governmental assistance**, including faith-based organizations, during emergencies. (...) [It should] improve communication of

requirements from the incident site, (...) [and] ensure there is a mechanism to coordinate spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers. [Appendix A, p. 114]

There is no single office within DHS that is responsible for integrating non-governmental and faith-based assistance into emergency response planning. By establishing such an office, DHS can foster an integrated planning process through which government at all levels can identify and communicate their requirements to NGOs during response and recovery operations. (...) DHS should condition State and local grants (...) on incorporating NGOs and the private sector into their emergency planning, training, exercises, and disaster relief efforts. (...) [During Katrina], an improved plan to (...) connect volunteers and private sector assets with emergency management officials would have enabled the better use of NGO contributions. Some States have improved how NGOs respond to incidents by creating a volunteer and social service infrastructure. In Florida and North Carolina, NGOs and emergency managers have formalized their relationships at the State and local level by including a volunteer coordinator in the State [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC). As a result, their State and local emergency managers better understand what non-governmental assistance is available before, during, and after a disaster. (...) The next version of the [National Preparedness Goal's] Target Capabilities List should (...) [establish the] role [of volunteer organizations] in staffing State emergency operations centers.

DHS should improve (...) awareness of private sector and non-governmental resources available for use during emergency response operations. This process should include the following: (a) **Pre-arranged and contingency contracting**; (b) Provision of requirement estimates to **NGOs and private sector organizations** that are willing to provide resources during catastrophic events; (c) Consistent, accurate, and timely messaging of resource needs to NGOs; (d) Providing NGOs and private sector organizations with information on reimbursement and access to Federal aid. [Appendix A, pp. 115-116]

### *Une meilleure préparation à l'échelon régional*

**Business-government partnerships require a level of trust and agility most easily built at the regional level.** (...) [A] model which had proven successful is the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Business Force project. [These] Business Force partnerships [include] regional, State, and local officials, together with businesses and local NGOs. The BENS model also includes a web-based catalogue of private sector resources. (...) Integrating regional partnerships and resource databases (like the ones created by BENS) with national databases and response capabilities gives incident commanders full visibility of supply and volunteer sources. The capability to draw on these resources should inform and be part of Federal, State, and local logistics systems and response plans. [Appendix A, p. 116]

DHS should encourage NGOs and the private sector to plan their giving streams at the local level in order to provide comprehensive support to affected local areas during an emergency and prevent duplication of relief efforts. By improving the integration of planning among voluntary organizations at the local level, these organizations will be better positioned to serve citizens during an emergency. [Appendix A, p. 117]

### *Une meilleure préparation-formation*

DHS should conduct State and local officials training and exercises. **Key State and local officials should participate in training and exercises.** [Appendix A, p. 118]

DHS should establish a National Exercise and Evaluation Program (NEEP). (...) The NEEP should (...) include domestic and international exercises that enable Federal, State



and local governments to improve interagency coordination across all types of crises. [Appendix A, pp. 118-119]

### *Un travail de fond sur les cultures professionnelles et les carrières*

All departments and agencies assigned specific homeland security roles should establish professional development programs to insure [among others that their] (...) personnel (...) have the requisite (...) understanding of other organizations' (...) emergency responsibilities. Homeland security professional development programs should include *interagency* and *intergovernmental* (i.e., Federal, State, and local governments) perspectives. (...) [In addition], Federal Departments and agencies should implement a career development process that mandates interagency and intergovernmental assignments. (...) These career development processes must require and reward interagency and intergovernmental homeland security assignments. Such assignments will enable homeland security professionals to understand the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of other organizations and disciplines. Interagency and intergovernmental assignments will build **trust and familiarity among homeland security professionals** from differing perspectives. These assignments will also break down barriers between organizations, thus enhancing the exchange of ideas and practices. (...) Interagency and intergovernmental assignments should be designed to build a cadre of homeland security professionals across all levels of government who possess common knowledge of operational roles and responsibilities. (...) Departments and agencies should establish fellowships that allow State and local homeland security professionals to serve in a related Federal department or agency for a limited period of time. This can promote the development of a common planning culture and foster collaboration among federal, State, and local governments. Further, these fellowships can enhance partnerships that result in more effective and efficient emergency responses. [Appendix A, pp. 119-120]

### *Une meilleure préparation sur la question de l'aide étrangère*

[The Department of State] (DOS) and DHS should [develop] (...) a coordination process among Federal agencies and non-governmental partners to solicit, accept, receive, integrate and distribute **foreign assistance**. (...) [New] operating procedure [must ensure] (...) the inclusion of a representative from USAID/OFDA [(Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance)] on the State Department Task Force and a DOS representative on USAID/OFDA's Response Management Team to improve interagency coordination; also the addition of a DHS representative to both task forces to provide more efficient information sharing about assistance needs on the ground. [Appendix A, p. 113]

## **2. Communications entre les intervenants et le grand public**

### **2.1. Avant l'impact : une autre guerre, qui a été perdue**

L'examen est extrêmement rapide. Il aurait fallu s'interroger bien plus avant sur :

- La perception précise des risques dans la zone, à partir des connaissances déjà acquises sur cette question ; et à partir de nouvelles questions, non traitées par la littérature usuelle, du type : « comment faire passer un message très décalé par rapport aux habitudes ? ». En cas de message extrêmement inhabituel, y a-t-il effacement automatique de perception, repli instantané sur l'agenda préexistant ?
- Les actions qu'auraient pu prendre les autorités locales. Et les problèmes sur lesquels on n'a pas encore suffisamment réfléchi, par exemple sur les délais de préavis

d'évacuation, et la contradiction : 48 heures, ce n'est pas assez / plus de 72 heures, est-ce jouable ? Est-il possible d'évacuer Houston plusieurs fois par saison ? Comment intégrer à la notion d'évacuation la possibilité d'un déplacement de très longue durée – ce qui n'est pas du tout dans nos univers intellectuels en matière d'urgence ?

On bute sur un problème de fond. Les opérationnels partent d'abord des plans et cultures en vigueur, fondés sur les risques anciens. Les spécialistes universitaires partent d'abord de leurs modèles, fondés sur des observations datant souvent de plus de vingt ans, et ont les plus grandes difficultés à accepter l'idée de phénomènes en rupture (traités, jusqu'à preuve publiée du contraire, comme des signes de méconnaissance de la littérature de référence).<sup>45</sup> Les crises de nouveaux types ont donc en principe le champ libre.

### *Les alertes météo, le point d'excellence*

On voit ici à l'œuvre l'un des meilleurs services au monde, sur un champ théorique et opérationnel au nombre de mieux connus. Et pourtant, l'excellence scientifique, l'excellence dans la transmission de l'information, dans le pays le plus avancé au monde, ne permet pas encore d'assurer les comportements voulus.

Members of the National Weather Service knew that the time would come to issue warnings, and they developed them ahead of time, evaluating data and basing the warning language on various scenarios, so that when certain criteria were met [by] (...) Hurricane Katrina they did not have to waste time creating statements – they could issue them immediately. [Appendix B, p. 138]

The Federal government's dissemination of essential public information prior to Hurricane Katrina's Gulf landfall is **one of the positive lessons learned** [from the disaster]. (...) The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Hurricane Center worked with diligence and determination in disseminating weather reports and hurricane track predictions. (...) This includes disseminating **warnings and forecasts via NOAA radio and the internet** (...). We can be certain that their efforts saved lives. [V, p. 60]

However, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) disseminated warnings and forecasts via NOAA radio and the internet, operating in conjunction with EAS. Initially, these reports were issued every six hours; however, as the storm neared landfall they were updated with increasing frequency. In accordance with NOAA policy, local weather offices took over responsibility for these broadcasts shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. At this time, Weather Service offices like the one in Slidell, Louisiana, began to transmit real-time hazard information using both NOAA Radio and the EAS. These reports were distributed to all area media outlets as well as local emergency management personnel. When the severity of the storm finally forced the Slidell weather office offline, operations were successfully transferred to weather centers in Mobile and Baton Rouge. [III, p. 28]

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (...) World Wide Navigational Warning Service (...) relayed messages from the National Weather Service to people at sea. [Appendix B, p. 131]

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<sup>45</sup> L'une des solutions est alors que le créateur central de la littérature de référence se mobilise personnellement, en l'occurrence Enrico Quarantelli. E.L. Quarantelli, Patrick Lagadec, Arjen Boin : " A Heuristic Approach to Future Disasters and Crises : New, Old, and In-Between Types", in R. Dynes, H. Quarantelli, H. Rodriguez, *Handbook of Disaster Research*, Springer, September 2006 (p. 16-41).



***Des alertes qui restent impuissantes à entraîner les comportements souhaités***

D'importants travaux d'analyse sont à engager, et en allant au-delà des acquis consignés par la littérature de référence.<sup>46</sup>

Prior to [Katrina], (...) the National Weather Service provided repeated and accurate warnings, but **local populations did not fully evacuate** – greatly magnifying human suffering in the wake of the storm. [Appendix B, p. 125]

Many Gulf Coast residents had become so accustomed to hurricanes and tropical storms that they refused to evacuate despite the warnings. [III, p. 26]

***Les responsables locaux : entre efforts louables, demi-mesures, et impuissance***

Certes, nous avons ici un exemple d'institutions qui sont loin de l'excellence. Mais il ne faudrait pas que l'arbre cache la forêt : les intéressés étaient aussi aux prises avec un problème qui n'est plus celui d'une évacuation nominale en Floride. Comme noté précédemment, des problèmes nouveaux se profilent en termes de déplacement en masse de populations (le vocable « évacuation » est trompeur, ce n'est plus de l'évacuation rapide de précaution), de gestion du temps et de l'incertitude, de coûts démesurés, de montée hyperbolique des problèmes sociétaux, etc. **Bianco et Nagin n'avaient pas seulement à se montrer aussi compétents que leurs homologues de Floride : ils étaient jetés sur un théâtre d'opérations dont personne ne connaît les règles.**

Prior to Hurricane Katrina's landfall, **State and local officials did not use the Emergency Alert System** (EAS) in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama. [III, p. 28]<sup>47</sup>

[On Saturday, August 27], Louisiana State agencies (...) began implementing phase I of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan, which included public communications. [III, p. 25]

Local governments across the Gulf Coast issued evacuation orders throughout Saturday, [August 27]. (...) In New Orleans, Mayor Ray Nagin hosted a press conference [on the **afternoon [of Saturday]**], during which **he recommended evacuation** of Algiers, the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas of the City. Later, at 5:00 CDT, he formally called for voluntary evacuations of the City. He also declared a state of emergency for New Orleans, which advised residents to undertake several precautionary measures such as stocking up on bottled water, batteries, and non-perishable food. In a joint press conference with Governor Blanco, Nagin warned residents, saying "this is not a test. This is the real deal". [III, p. 26]

**Despite hurricane (...) warnings throughout [Saturday, August 27], it appeared many people along the Gulf Coast remained unaware (...) about the storm.** (...) [Many] had not paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans. (...) **Many (...) thought the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle**, as reported by the National Hurricane Center up until late Friday afternoon. [III, p. 25]

In an effort to reach as many citizens as possible, Governor Blanco and her staff contacted clergy throughout (...) [the] night [of Saturday, August 27] and early Sunday morning to ask them to urge their parishioners to evacuate immediately. [III, p. 26]

[On the] **morning [of Sunday, August, 28]**, (...) Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin held a joint press conference during which the Mayor **ordered a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans**. [III, p. 28]

<sup>46</sup> Et l'on pourrait suggérer qu'un étudiant allant investiguer dans la région commence son rapport non pas par le rappel de la littérature consacrée, mais par ses observations sur le terrain.

<sup>47</sup> [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency\\_Alert\\_System](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_Alert_System)]

After the video teleconference [on Sunday, August 28], the President (...) issued a public statement, [urging] (...) citizens [of the Gulf Coast to evacuate, and to] (...) listen carefully to instructions provided by State and local officials. [III, p. 29]

[In the] afternoon [of] August 28, (...) State and local officials in Alabama and Mississippi issued evacuation orders for low-lying areas vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina's storm surge and encouraged people in other areas to evacuate as well. [III, p. 29]

[In] the late afternoon [of Sunday, August 28], (...) Louisiana and Mississippi State officials continued to encourage people to evacuate even after contra-flow operations ceased. [III, p. 29]

[In addition to State and City orders], by August 28, fifteen of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes had issued mandatory, recommended, or precautionary evacuation orders. [III, p. 30]

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior (DOI) focused their efforts on assisting tribes in the Gulf region (...). They maintained communication before hurricane landfall and coordinated directly with Tribal governments. [Appendix B, p. 138]

Inefficiencies [in the medical response to Hurricane Katrina's aftermath] were [in part] the products of (...) insufficient pre-storm risk communication to the public. [V, p. 59]

## 2.2. Après l'impact : la débâcle

Le rapport donne l'essentiel : il a fallu plusieurs semaines pour que les structures de communication vers le public soient véritablement opérationnelles. La communication a été marquée par des messages officiels contradictoires, et largement contredits par les médias.

Mais l'analyse reste bien légère. Il aurait fallu donner une vue précise des actions des uns et des autres, et de leurs actes de communication. Il aurait fallu s'interroger sur les modes de communication possibles en situation de perte de contrôle de grande échelle.

As Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Director Brown provided public assurances that FEMA was prepared to act to meet the logistical challenge. [IV, p. 44]

At Governor Blanco's 3 pm EDT press conference on August 30, FEMA Director Michael Brown stated that no resources in fixing the levees would be spared, and that the USACE was diligently working on a plan. [IV, p. 36]

Broadcast communications were (...) severely affected [by Katrina], as 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of area television stations went off the air. [I, p. 8]

[On Sunday, August 28], The Louisiana State Police reported that one of its 800 MHz communications towers had been rendered inoperable. [III, p. 30]

Most of the radio stations and many television stations in the New Orleans area were knocked off the air. [IV, p. 34]

Without timely, accurate information or the ability to communicate, public affairs officers at all levels could not provide updates to the media and to the public [once the Hurricane made landfall]. It took several weeks before public affairs structures, such as the Joint Information Centers, were adequately resources and operating at full capacity. In the meantime, Federal, State, and local officials gave contradictory messages to the public, creating confusion and feeding the perception that government sources lacked credibility. On September 1, conflicting views of [the situation in] New Orleans emerged with positive statements by some Federal officials that contradicted a more desperate picture painted by reporters in the streets. The media, operating 24/7, gathered and aired uncorroborated information which interfered with [was not corrected in time by public communications officials]. (...) The Federal public communications and public affairs response proved inadequate and ineffective. [V, p. 60]

[After Hurricane Katrina, many] foreign governments sought information regarding the safety of their citizens. (...) [However, the Federal government did not] have the mechanisms in place to provide foreign governments with whatever knowledge we had regarding the status of their nationals. (...) Many foreign governments, as well as the family and friends of foreign nationals, looked to the Department of State for information regarding the safety and location of their citizens after Hurricane Katrina. [But] the absence of a central system to manage and promptly respond to inquiries about affected foreign nationals led to confusion. [V, p. 63]

The National Weather Service (...) correctly realized that the levees were breaching and issued a flash flood warning at 8:14 am Monday, August 29, saying “A levee breach occurred along the industrial canal at Tennessee Street. Three to eight feet of water is expected due to the breach.” (...) [It] correctly characterized the situation, identified the danger, and got the word out clearly and promptly. [Appendix B, p. 138]

### 2.3. Recommandations : des rappels de base

Le rapport avance deux lignes principales de propositions :

- *La ligne classique* : une meilleure communication par le Fédéral, ce qui suppose : un plan intégré de communication ; une fonction de coordination à l'échelon de la Maison-Blanche ; une meilleure activité de communication préventive ; une meilleure capacité d'alerte ; l'intégration de la dimension des étrangers dans la communication.
- *Une ligne plus avancée* : une meilleure éducation aux risques et aux crises du 21<sup>ème</sup> siècle, qui clarifie les limites des capacités de la puissance publique à répondre à toutes les crises, la nécessité pour le citoyen de prendre en charge une partie de sa sécurité.

Sur la communication fédérale, on en reste à des préconisations de type « plan », « coordination » au plus haut niveau. Il aurait été crucial d'ouvrir la question de la préparation effective des dirigeants à ces situations hors-cadres, en ne s'arrêtant pas aux clés habituelles du plan, de l'organigramme, des attributions-papiers. Qui n'est pas préparé à ces univers, qui fait tout pour les nier, et s'en protéger ne pourra jamais communiquer à l'heure H, et ce quels que soient les organigrammes et plans dernier cri sortis des bureaux conseils. Le fait que l'on en reste à ces mécanos de base en dit long sur nos difficultés et nos retards culturels.

Sur l'éducation au risque, on note la prise en considération de ce que l'on sait déjà depuis près de dix ans. Il resterait à préciser les lignes de travail, les pièges à déjouer, les refus à poser, les exigences à mettre en œuvre, les expérimentations à lancer. Bref, ne pas se contenter d'énoncer une autre vision, même si c'est déjà une avancée. L'objectif ne saurait être de se débarrasser, sur le citoyen, de tout ce dont les instances publiques ne veulent pas se charger.

On notera l'inévitable mention du fait que les autorités doivent « rassurer » le public. Si elles ont effectivement la substance voulue pour le faire, c'est une exigence à respecter. Si on ne sait rien, ou que l'on est totalement dépassé, « rassurer » sera illusoire, trompeur, et dangereux – y compris pour l'autorité. Il est dommage que le rapport soit encore inscrit dans cette veine. Mais cela fait partie des défenses les plus profondes, et chacun se sent indigne d'une charge de haut niveau s'il ne met pas en avant cette mention rituelle « rassurer le public ».

#### *Les limites de ce qui a été fait*

[With respect to public communications], more could have been done by officials at all levels of government. For example, the EAS – a mechanism for Federal, State and local officials to communicate disaster information and instructions – was not utilized by State

and local officials in Louisiana, Mississippi or Alabama prior to Katrina's landfall. [V, p. 60]

The Surgeon General should routinely communicate public health, as well as individual and community preparedness guidance to the general population. While there are other prominent and capable Federal health officials, the Surgeon General's stature and credibility should be used to repeatedly and proactively deliver a consistent public health preparedness message to the public. This will not only help to increase personal, community and national disaster preparedness, it will also make the Surgeon General a more effective and credible source of guidance during public health emergencies. [Appendix A, p. 105]

### *Une meilleure planification pour la communication en situation de crise*

The Department of Homeland Security should develop an integrated public communications plan to better inform, guide, and reassure the American public before, during, and after a catastrophe. (...)

[DHS should] develop a Public Communications Coordination capability for crisis communications at the White House. [It should] designate a senior White House Communications official to be responsible for the Homeland Security Council and crisis communications portfolio. In close collaboration with DHS' Office of Public Affairs, this official would be responsible for: (a) Coordination of public communications and public affairs within the homeland [security field] across all relevant Federal departments and agencies; (b) Establishing a permanent strategic communications capability, to facilitate messages to the public, the media, and all departments and agencies; (c) developing a national public communications and public affairs strategic plan; (d) [Developing] "Risk Communications" to communicate pre-incident expectations to private citizens. This may be carried out by identifying credible spokespersons who can frequently update the public on preparedness, current threats and crisis communications.

DHS should establish an integrated public alert and warning system in coordination with all relevant departments and agencies. The system, building on the Emergency Alert System (EAS), must leverage advanced communication technologies and existing Federal, State, and local systems. Federal, State, and local levels of government must have the means to communicate essential and accurate emergency information to the public prior to, during and after a catastrophe. [Appendix A, pp. 109-110]

DHS should establish (...) an interagency process to (...) ensure (...) use of [international donations] (...) in a transparent and accountable manner; (...) and to communicate to donors how their funds were used. [Appendix A, p. 113]

Public and Diplomatic Communications during domestic emergencies should both encourage cash donations (...) and emphasize that donations of equipment or personnel should address disaster needs. (...) In a catastrophe, rapid, proactive communication of requirements reduces the potential for the refusal of assistance. The Department of State should have domestic crisis communications procedures in place before June 1, 2006. [Appendix A, p. 113]

The Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security should (...) jointly develop procedures to ensure that the needs of foreign missions are included in domestic plans for tracking inquiries regarding persons who are unaccounted for in a disaster zone. (...) In improving their strategies for providing faster information (...) to American citizens, Federal, State, and local emergency management officials should include provisions covering the needs of affected foreign nationals. (...) DHS should provide daily disaster response situational updates through the Secretary of State to all Chiefs of Mission

or Chargés d’Affaires. These updates should improve situational awareness and provide information to address host government concerns or questions. [Appendix A, p. 114]

### 3. Communications entre les intervenants et les victimes

#### 3.1. Immédiatement après l’impact

Un seul trait domine : la victime est dans le vide organisationnel et le trop plein de rumeurs terrifiantes. Et quand, par bonheur, on s’occupe d’elle, elle est traitée comme un colis et entreposée où on peut... Les radio-amateurs font ce qu’ils peuvent...

[Following the storm] 911 service (...) [did not function] sufficiently. [IV, p. 37]

[No] strong public messaging [informed the public] (...) that the Convention Center [had not been intended as a shelter]. [IV, p. 39]

Some [people] reported that [during the post-landfall evacuation airlift], they had not been informed of their destinations when they boarded the evacuating flights and had no idea where they were when their flights landed. Speaking about the evacuees, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, [whose State took in many of them] relayed, “They have been treated like boxes, in many cases, warehoused.” [IV, p. 40]

Exaggerated, unconfirmed claims of violent crimes and lawlessness [after landfall] took on a life of their own in the absence of effective public information to counter them. [IV, p. 40]

Too often rescuers had to leave victims at drop-off points and landing zones that had insufficient (...) communications resources, such as atop the I-10 cloverleaf [(échangeur)] near the Superdome. [V, p. 57]

Amateur Radio Operators from both the Amateur Radio Emergency Service and the American Radio Relay League monitored distress calls and rerouted emergency requests for assistance throughout the U.S. until messages were received by emergency response personnel. [Appendix B, p. 127]

#### 3.2. Pendant l’effort de remise en route

Les grandes organisations qui ont la charge de prendre la vague de plein fouet sont laminées par l’analyse. Les autres sont louées pour leur sens de l’intervention fine, adaptée, inventive, humaine.

Cela ne peut manquer d’interroger. Le grand service de sécurité civile est-il promis devenir bouc émissaire ? A-t-il une tâche impossible ? Faudrait-il qu’il s’invente une autre posture, plus modeste, moins traditionnellement hiérarchique-centralisée au sens : « Nous avons des plans, faites-nous confiance, ne paniquez pas » ? Ou bien faut-il que ces services se sachent à l’avance promis à être cloués au pilori, sacrifiés, tandis que leurs collègues, qui ne prennent que certains aspects en charge, seront les « gentils » ? Le tout sous l’ombre des héros, que seront les grands hommes du sauvetage de dernière extrémité ?<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Dans un registre proche, j’écrivais en 1993 : « Visitant la Croix-Rouge américaine, le directeur du Disaster Research Center [E. Quarantelli] se vit ainsi un jour interrogé par ses hôtes, désespérés, sur les raisons des critiques qui leur étaient systématiquement adressées lors des catastrophes sur lesquelles ils intervenaient. Le directeur du Disaster Research Center put les rassurer : les études montraient que les critiques n’avaient pas pour origine ce qu’ils auraient fait ou n’auraient pas fait ; les reproches étaient tout simplement liés au fait que la Croix-Rouge était le dernier acteur bien visible intervenant sur les sites après un désastre. De ce fait, la Croix-Rouge restait le seul interlocuteur à qui pouvaient être adressées toutes les récriminations. Quelques années plus tard, par suite d’une réorganisation de la planification des secours, la FEMA devint la dernière agence présente sur les lieux... et la Croix-Rouge cessa d’être attaquée (la FEMA prenant ce relais peu envié). Patrick Lagadec, *La Gestion des crises – Outils de réflexion à l’usage des décideurs*, McGraw Hill, 1993, p. 280.



### *Des systèmes de prise en charge débordés*

The DHS Public Affairs Office established a Joint Information Center (JIC) in Baton Rouge on Wednesday, **September 6**, to provide accurate and timely information on the Federal response and relief efforts as well as to counter misinformation. (...) A second facility [was set up] in New Orleans three days later. (...) These JICS helped to stem the spread of rumors and unsubstantiated reports that had plagued public information efforts during the first week after landfall. [IV, p. 48]

Staff at the [Disaster Recovery Centers] (DRCs) [set up by FEMA] directed victims to register [their assistance claims] by telephone or via the internet. Since many households in Hurricane Katrina-affected regions were without power or telephone service, such instructions left many without the means to file their registrations. In addition, FEMA had not determined **the capacity of existing Federal agency call centers** and telephone banks to handle increased call volumes. Consequently, victims registering for assistance via telephone repeatedly encountered long delays and **disconnected calls**.

At times, FEMA public statements regarding the provision of assistance were confusing or incomplete. For example, FEMA announced that it was making \$2,000 cash payment to qualified/registered disaster victims and that these funds would be provided through various means, including by debit card. However, it made this announcement before the debit card were widely available and did not provide detailed guidance on distribution procedures. This led to **widespread confusion and frustration**. Security personnel had to lock down the Houston Astrodome during the distribution of debit cards due to unrest among evacuees. [IV, p. 49]

Because the NRP did not mandate a single Federal point of contact for all assistance and required FEMA to merely coordinate assistance delivery (...) **the Federal government's system for distribution of human services was not sufficiently responsive to the circumstances of a large number of victims – many of whom were particularly vulnerable – who were forced to navigate a series of complex processes to obtain critical services in a time of extreme duress**. (...) Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) **did not provide victims single-point access to apply to the wide array of Federal assistance programs**. [V, p. 59]

FEMA focused its housing efforts on cruise ships and trailers, which were expensive and perceived by some to be a means to force evacuees to return to New Orleans. [V, p. 60]

Federal officials could have improved communication of [environmental hazard] warnings to (...) the public. (...) **There [was no] comprehensive plan to accurately and quickly communicate (...) critical information [on environmental hazards] to (...) area residents**. (...) [As a result, the public received] mixed messages from Federal, State, and local officials on the reentry into New Orleans. [V, p. 62]

An enhanced public communication program could have improved the effectiveness of [debris removal efforts]. [V, p. 62]

### *Des systèmes d'appui spécifiques qui déploient des initiatives intéressantes*

On September 13, as Hurricane Rita was headed toward the Gulf Coast, (...) personnel [from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)] went to all of the sick and elderly people known to them in the New Orleans area and attempted to convince them to evacuate. [Appendix B, p. 133]

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed (...) personnel [specialized in] (...) public information and health risk communication. CDC (...) experts (...) determined which diseases would result from the hurricane and flood, and not only



monitored the region for them, they also communicated information on these diseases and others the public might be worried about, helping to allay public fears. They (...) communicated health-related information to the public. [Appendix B, p. 134]

Many victims of the hurricane and flood took charge of their own medical care to the extent that they could. In response to their demands for more information, for two weeks immediately after the hurricane and flood, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) expanded their program for medical consultation (...) specifically [to advise] patients and the worried (...) in the affected region. Working with their partners in academic medical centers and professional medical societies, NIH opened and manned phone lines all day every day to answer questions about a variety of diseases and cases (...). NIH immediately recognized that they were in the best position to match medical experts with health care providers and patients in needs of answers – providing both groups with the information they needed to better manage health care concerns in the midst of the crisis. [Appendix B, p. 134]

Working with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) coordinated the identification of housing opportunities for hurricane victims. As a result, numerous cities, counties, and Indian Tribes offered housing and transportation to displaced persons. (...) HUD (...) worked with FEMA to match displaced individuals with vacant housing. HUD (...) sent personnel to Disaster Recovery Centers (...) to meet with people displaced from their homes, and personally help them find temporary and permanent housing (...). [In so doing] HUD used key interpersonal skills and relationships it had developed over the years. [Appendix B, p. 136]

Clearly understanding the impact of the hurricane and flood on businesses in the region, the Minority [(i.e. minorités ethniques)] Business Development Agency of the Department of Commerce (DOC) sent business development specialists to the region to provide on-the-ground assistance to the owners of (...) minority firms in Louisiana. MBDA established a minority business development center in Houston to assist with loan applications, business plans, insurance claims, reconstruction of business records, and business administration. [Appendix B, p. 138]

Recognizing that getting back to work and starting new jobs would be critical for those affected, (...) the Department of Labor established a “Pathways to Employment” initiative. Using the Department’s network of over 3,500 career centers nationwide, the initiative helps evacuees and survivors find jobs. The Department sent numerous personnel directly to the affected region to provide job counseling to evacuees (...) and help all in need of jobs use the expanded resources provided by this initiative. [Appendix B, p. 139]

The Department of Education established an innovative website to help provide assistance to those schools that had accepted students displaced by Hurricane Katrina and the flood. At this site schools list the needs of these students (e.g. books, clothes, school supplies, computers – even counseling) and donors list what they can provide. Schools and donors have access to one another’s information, and are then encouraged to contact each other directly. [Appendix B, p. 139]

Using the recently developed Employee Profile Plus database, managers in the State Department rapidly located current and former employees (...) with required language (...) expertise. (...) These skilled personnel were critical in communicating information to those that primarily or solely spoke foreign languages. [Appendix B, p. 139]

The Internal Revenue Service (...) took action to advise taxpayers in the affected region of recent changes in tax law that under certain conditions would allow them to withdraw funds early from retirement plans, without the usual penalties. [Appendix B, p. 140]

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), [its] (...) partners in the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and other local officials (...) identified the potential hazards returning victims would face, and distributed information to people in affected areas regarding a range of hazards, from asbestos to septic systems. [Appendix B, p. 142]

### 3.3. Recommendations

La réflexion tourne autour de l'idée qu'il faut au plus vite "rebrancher" les systèmes. Pour cela, un certain nombre d'outils, de principes, peuvent aider. Ainsi faut-il : que l'on dispose de dossiers médicaux électroniques, aisément récupérables ; que les multitudes d'aides puissent être offertes à travers des guichets uniques, servis par des personnes bien identifiées ; que l'on puisse mobiliser des gens en appui ; que l'on soit en mesure d'apporter de l'information sur les risques encourus au retour, etc.

Il resterait à ouvrir une réflexion de fond sur cette approche « biologique » des phases de « réanimation » collective après un drame majeur. En clarifiant tout ce qui, dans nos cultures habituelles de management ou de commandement, peuvent venir contrecarrer ces perspectives.

Il faudrait clarifier aussi les zones délicates : par exemple, la capacité centrale à avoir en fiche tous les citoyens, pour leur apporter de l'aide personnalisée en cas de crise majeure, pourrait conduire à des risques non négligeables en termes de démocratie, de libertés individuelles. Ce sont de vrais sujets, qui appellent de vraies réflexions, de vrais débats<sup>49</sup>. Et de vraies compétences.

Le rapport mentionne aussi le problème de l'information des évacués au moment du retour sur les risques environnementaux rémanents.

[The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should] accelerate [its] initiative to foster widespread use of interoperable electronic health (...) records systems [(EHR)]. (...) The adoption of interoperable EHR systems will support first responders and health providers and dramatically improve the quality and efficacy of care to displaced patients. [Appendix A, p. 106]

The Department of Health and Human Services should coordinate with other departments of the Executive Branch, as well as State governments and non-governmental organizations, to develop a (...) system (...) [that] should be designed to provide victims a consumer oriented, simple, effective, and single encounter from which they can receive assistance. [Appendix A, p. 106]

HHS should develop a simple, comprehensive, and efficient means for disaster victims to enroll for all available human services at a single encounter. Many important human service programs have wide variation in eligibility requirements. HHS' coordination and integration is vital in helping to simplify access to complex and varied human service programs. (...) HHS should (...) develop plans to establish "one-stop" centers where disaster victims would enroll in Federal, State, local, and non-governmental assistance programs. These "one stop" centers should complement the continued and expanded use of simplified telephone and internet-based registration modalities. The goal should be for the victim to go to one physical location, encounter one person who gathers all the necessary data and inputs it into a database (...). This will likely (...) reduce frustration of evacuees and expedite the delivery of services for eligible recipients. (...)

HHS and DHS should jointly work with the private sector to encourage the development of a capacity to voluntarily store and retrieve personal identifying

<sup>49</sup> La question fut notamment examinée dans le cadre des efforts déployés pour repérer les « personnes isolées », lorsque l'on voulut améliorer le dispositif de prévention en matière de canicule.

information. Encourage the private sector development of a capability for individuals to voluntarily submit their personal identifying information for virtual storage that citizens and their families could access during emergencies. (...) Disaster victims could access the virtually stored data to apply for Federal assistance, medical treatment, or insurance benefits. Because of the sensitivity of the personal data stored, strict privacy limitations and protections would be required. (...)

Existing Federal sources of information [on individual citizens] should be identified which might assist Federal authorities upon an emergency or disaster declaration by the President. While numerous current Federal information sources exist (such as those maintained by [the Social Security Administration] (SSA), DHS, [the Department of Veterans Affairs] (VA), Treasury and the Department of Defense), they are not designed to identify or track individuals. [Appendix A, p. 107]

DHS should develop a system to maintain awareness of the movement of shelter and temporary housing residents. Local, State, and Federal officials in charge of sheltering evacuees must know the number and type (e.g. number of disabled, number of minors) of evacuees in addition to their names and personal identifying data as they move between shelters and from shelters to temporary housing. [Appendix A, p. 108]

DHS should revise the NRP to delineate a clear structure for a fully coordinated, integrated, and synchronized public communications strategy, across the Federal government and with State and locals.

DHS should establish rapidly deployable Public Affairs teams, able to operate self-sufficiently, in austere conditions. These deployable Public Affairs teams should be established across all Federal departments and agencies with key Homeland Security responsibilities. These teams should be capable of providing Public Affairs assistance within hours to incident locations. These teams could be used to form the Incident [Joint Information Center] (JIC). All Federal departments and agencies with domestic operational responsibilities should establish programs to use embedded media where appropriate. (...) DHS should (...) strengthen relationship with [military schools] (...) and other academic institutions. These Federal partners can assist in providing training and certification to [Federal], State and local emergency management [personnel]. (...) Such training would help to improve communications efforts. [Appendix A, p. 109]

The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve the Federal government's capability to quickly (...) provide the public (...) the most accurate information available, to determine whether it is safe (...) to return after evacuation [from an environmental standpoint]. (...) Procedures [for debris removal] should include an integrated public communication approach (...), especially as [debris removal] applied to private property. [Appendix A, p. 112]

## RAPPORTS PUBLIC-PRIVÉ

Katrina a bien montré la nécessité de faire appel au privé et à ses moyens. Et l'heure est à la célébration du « partenariat public-privé ». Mais on sent bien, au fil des pages du rapport (exposés des convictions, lignes d'action proposées), que l'on reste inscrit dans une vision régaliennne, assez exclusive, sans doute même défensive, comme assiégée.

Certes, il ne s'agit pas de prôner un retrait du régalienn. Le problème, pour l'État, est de prendre en charge toutes ses responsabilités, et de pouvoir dans le même temps le faire avec tous les acteurs concernés. Le scénario à éviter est celui d'une affirmation grandiloquente des attributions de l'État, laissant place, dans le cœur de l'événement, à un recours en catastrophe au privé... avant de consacrer le principe selon lequel, finalement, c'est au citoyen de savoir se prendre en charge.

### 1. Présupposés culturels : un panorama « régalienn »

#### 1.1. Sur l'essentiel, le secteur privé n'est pas même envisagé

[The] most solemn obligation [of the] President is to protect the American people. And every day and night, millions of men and women throughout the Federal government – both civilian and military – work to achieve that objective. [Cover Letter, p. i]

[The President] ordered a comprehensive review of the *Federal Response* to Hurricane Katrina so that *we as a Nation* could make the necessary changes to be better prepared. [Cover Letter, p. I, et Foreword, p. 1] [Mes italiques. Noter l'équivalence posée entre réponse fédérale et « Nation » tout entière].

The true transformation envisioned in this Report will require a sustained commitment over time by the Federal government as well as by State and local governments. [Cover Letter, p. i]

Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New Orleans exposed significant flaws in Federal, State and local preparedness for catastrophic events and our capacity to respond to them. Emergency plans at all levels of government, (...) were put to the ultimate test, and came up short. [Foreword, p. 1]

On Wednesday, August 24, (...) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activated its Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), consisting of FEMA, [the National Weather Service] (NWS), and State and local officials. The HLT deploys to the National Hurricane Center to assist in the coordination of advisories with Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies, providing forecast updates and technical advice. [III, p. 22]

Recognizing that current Federal, State, and local disaster response capabilities overall needed to be enhanced (...), FEMA [in 2004] provided funding for a "Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project" ["Hurricane Pam"], which brought together responders and decision makers from all levels of government and the American Red Cross. (...) The (...) planning [groups] included (...) Federal, State, and local emergency response officials. [III, pp. 24-25]

FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC, conducted (...) daily video [teleconferences] (...) to exchange information and reconcile activities among the FEMA Regions, the [National Hurricane Center] (NHC), liaisons from various Federal agencies and departments responsible for disaster support, representatives from the States projected to

be affected by the storm, and States monitoring and providing mutual aid to support their neighbors. [III, p. 25]

[On the] evening [of Saturday, August 27, National Hurricane Center] Director Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, Mayor Nagin, and [the] Alabama Emergency Management Agency Chief of Operations (...) about Hurricane Katrina's magnitude and the potential storm impacts. [III, pp. 27-28]

On Sunday, August 28, (...) the President (...) participated in FEMA's daily video teleconference with DHS headquarters, FEMA headquarters, FEMA's regional offices, the National Hurricane Center, and representatives from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. (...) The President " (...) had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local officials (...) prior to landfall". [III, pp. 28-29]

[In the days before landfall], State and local governments, supported by the Federal government and FEMA, (...) carried out unprecedented preparations. [III, p. 31]

[In case of a crisis], FEMA[s] (...) Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments (...) [are meant to] support the operations of Federal, State, and local authorities. [IV, p. 43-44]

After a week of crisis, Federal, State, and local officials began transitioning to a more organized and sustained response. [IV, p. 47]

Hurricane Katrina necessitated a national response that Federal, State, and local officials were unprepared to provide. [IV, p. 50]

Federal, State and local governments have not yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve [communication systems] operability and interoperability to meet the needs of emergency responders. [V, p. 56] [Mes italiques. NB : pas de mention du secteur privé en matière de communications]

The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve the Federal government's capability to quickly gather environmental data [after a disaster]. [V, p. 62] [NB : pas de mention du secteur privé en matière environnementale].

The Department of Homeland Security should review our current laws, policies, plans, and strategies relevant to communications. Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland Security Council, with support from the office of Science and Technology Policy, should develop a National Emergency Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability. [Appendix A, p. 96] [NB : secteur privé exclu de cette « review »]

## 1.2. Secteur privé envisagé, mais réduit à un rôle d'appui à la marge

De chaque ligne écrite concernant le secteur privé se dégage une **dissociation claire et nette** : le secteur privé, c'est un autre monde, qui, par construction, n'est pas **partie prenante** de ces questions de sécurité nationale. Il se dégage aussi, sans doute, **une suffisance étonnante, traduction d'une vive inquiétude, profondément inscrite dans la culture publique.**

Certes, il ne s'agit pas de voir le Régalien échapper à ses responsabilités, s'en remettre au privé ou aux ONG. Mais **il faudrait être capable d'inventer une culture de partenariat véritable**, dans laquelle chacun joue effectivement son rôle.

Pour l'heure, les références restent en vérité les suivantes :

- La « coordination » envisagée avec le secteur privé se limite à l'exploitation plus efficace, par le secteur public, des ressources des entreprises.
- L'effort de réponse de la Nation est conçu comme celui du secteur public, auquel *vient s'ajouter* la contribution du secteur privé.

- Le gouvernement fédéral reste l'instigateur et le « visionnaire » de la démarche, de l'action.
- Le secteur public réfléchit et dirige, le privé aide à l'application. Le schéma, bien qu'intitulé « A Shared Vision of Preparedness », donne le monopole des niveaux « Stratégie », « Doctrine », et « Analyse » au secteur public.
- Le rôle du secteur privé se réduit donc à venir en appui au secteur public, à combler ses lacunes, ou à en prendre la relève pour le soulager.
- En ce qui concerne les infrastructures critiques, l'État se considère toujours comme le principal intervenant, et s'en tient à poser la question « what infrastructure is truly critical » dans le simple contexte d'une ignorance technique des responsables publics (« secteur privé, lequel de vos poteaux nous faut-il réparer en premier ? »). L'État devrait en fait poser le problème des infrastructures critiques dans un contexte *stratégique* et, sur cette base, s'en tenir à donner les grands axes de priorité et de responsabilité (donc être celui qui détermine « what infrastructure is truly critical ») – puis s'effacer pour laisser le secteur privé prendre la tête de l'intervention sur la base de ces grands axes. C'est ce que le secteur privé attend de la part de l'État, et qui n'a pas eu lieu pendant Katrina.
- L'État prône un dialogue avec le secteur privé. Mais s'agit-il vraiment d'un « dialogue », si la conclusion souhaitée est déjà connue : « plus de centralisation du système au niveau fédéral » ?
- De même, on trouve l'idée que, seul, le secteur public peut faire des retours d'expérience.
- Le secteur public ira aussi enseigner au privé l'art et la manière de gérer les crises. Le public est le « professeur naturel » du privé ; le « top-down » régalien reste la référence.

La question de fond est de savoir si le secteur public peut véritablement penser autrement. S'il est paniqué par l'idée qu'il n'aurait plus le monopole de l'affirmation des doctrines, le monopole du pilotage, le monopole de la formation, le monopole du retour d'expérience – tout en ayant à traiter des problèmes qui, il le sait, le dépassent. À tout propos est ainsi soulignée la nécessité absolue d'un appui du privé. Il est aussi souligné qu'on ne saurait tout de même trop en attendre du secteur public quand 85% des réseaux vitaux ( aux Etats-Unis) sont gérés par le privé.

Il est vrai que le secteur public ne cesse de constater à quel point le secteur privé se montre peu intéressé à ces sujets de sécurité nationale. C'est du moins le leitmotiv des interventions sur le sujet. Mais on pourrait se demander si la façon dont est posée la perspective – « vous n'êtes que des moyens, et nous allons vous dire ce que vous devez faire pour que vous rentriez dans nos plans et nos actions » – n'est pas en partie aussi (mais bien sûr, en partie seulement) la cause des difficultés observées.

Mais, abandonner les atours du pilotage exclusif, et la protection qu'offre le monopole de l'analyse, est une mutation bien éprouvante pour le secteur public. Il faudra pourtant être en mesure de la conduire. Et sans abandonner ses responsabilités, sur le mode « Ah bon, si c'est à ce point compliqué, je vous laisse faire, et je me contente de la communication médiatique – sur le mode de l'indignation prenant le citoyen à témoin<sup>50</sup> –, et du retour d'expérience critique sur votre action ».

De façon brutale, pour s'en tenir à Katrina, le secteur public ne peut plus se contenter de convoquer avant, de disparaître pendant, et de disserter après.

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<sup>50</sup> Comme cela m'avait été précisé en haut lieu : « Notre stratégie de communication ici est d'écouter ce que ressent la population. Et nous communiquons en amplifiant son indignation ».



[During a crisis], State and local officials and first responders identify necessary missions and required commodities which FEMA (...) will assign to a Federal department or **secure from the private sector**. [II, p. 17]

The Federal government must develop the capacity to conduct large-scale operations (...) by **leveraging resources** within both the public sector and the private sector. [V, p. 56]

The private sector (...) made substantial contributions [to the response following Hurricane Katrina]. Unfortunately, *the Nation* did not always make effective use of these contributions because *we* had not effectively planned for integrating them in the *overall* response effort. [V, p. 63] [Mes italiques]

The current homeland security environment (...) now demands that the Federal government actively (...) encourage the Nation as a whole to plan, equip, train, and cooperate for all types of future emergencies, including the most catastrophic. (...) The Federal government [has a] central role in **organizing** the national efforts of our homeland security partners. [VI, pp. 66-67]

Building upon the President's *Homeland Security Strategy*, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and the *Interim National Preparedness Goal*, the Federal government must clearly articulate national preparedness goals and objectives; it must create the infrastructure – through the definition of common strategies and interoperable capabilities – for ensuring unity of effort. (...) The Federal government must develop common doctrine and ensure alignment of preparedness plans, budgets, grants, training, exercise, and equipment. (...) **DHS must** (...) identify how State, local, regional, and **private-sector preparedness activities support the national strategy**. [VI, p. 68]

Our planning and operational documents should define the critical roles played by all of our homeland security partners in the Preparedness System. Federal, State, and local governments play *prominent roles* throughout the System, from *strategy development* to assessment and lessons learned. **Additionally, the private sector (...) [plays an] important [role] in operational capabilities** as well as response activities. [VI, p. 77]

To the extent that we can **incorporate [the private sector] into the National effort**, we will be reducing the burden on other response resources so that Federal, State, and local responders can concentrate [their] energies on those with the greatest need. [VI, p. 81]

**Governments cannot plan to adequately respond [to large-scale crises] unless the private sector helps them understand what infrastructure truly is critical.** [VI, p. 81].

The National Preparedness System must (...) recognize the role of the Federal government for **monitoring and guiding** national preparedness efforts. [VI, p. 81]

Both State and local governments must (...) reach out to (...) [the] private sector (...) to promote [its] preparedness efforts. [VI, p. 82]

We must begin a national *dialogue* on (...) preparedness. (...) This dialogue must develop a shared understanding of the **need for active Federal management** of the National Preparedness System. [VI, p. 82] [Mes italiques].

As the Federal government works to implement the (...) recommendations contained in this Report, we encourage State and local governments, all facets of the private sector as well as the media to undertake a review of their own respective roles and responsibilities in both preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. (...) We are confident that the lessons *we* have learned from Hurricane Katrina and **the accompanying recommendations we propose** (...) will help the Nation – all levels of government, the private sector, and communities and individual citizens – achieve a shared commitment to preparedness. [VII, p. 84] [Mes italiques]

Using feedback and lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina response, (...) [an] interagency group led by DHS and overseen by [the Homeland Security Council] (HSC) [should] develop findings and recommendations for changes to the NRP and request

detailed comments and feedback from all agencies. (...) A second, independent group of (...) experts from across the State and local emergency response and homeland security community and **the private sector should then review and validate the group's recommendations.** [Appendix A, p. 88]

DHS should (...) develop and deliver detailed briefings and instructions on the [National Incident Management System] (NIMS) and NRP to all relevant Federal decision-makers. (...) Additionally, DHS should develop and deliver similar briefings and instructions tailored to relevant state and local decision makers, the private sector and Non-Governmental Organizations. [Appendix A, p. 89]

Executive Order 12656 (...) states that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible to “*guide* and assist State and local governments and private sector organizations in achieving preparedness for National security emergencies, including development of plans and procedures.” [Appendix A, p. 92] [Mes italiques]

DHS should (...) set basic criteria for private sector preparedness. (...) Basic levels of private sector preparation *similar to those outlined in the National Preparedness Goal* should be set and used to measure progress in (...) planning. (...) DHS should (...) finalize the Interim [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] (...) to (...) link the prioritization of both protection and restoration. (...) [This] **will motivate private sector participation** in the effort to prioritize critical infrastructure and to develop disaster response plans. [Appendix A, p. 111] [Mes italiques]

The Department of Commerce should lead, in cooperation with the Department of Treasury, Homeland Security, and other sector-specific agencies as appropriate, the development of a proposal (...) for incentives and other mechanisms to **motivate private sector cooperation** and participation in efforts to prioritize infrastructure protection. [Appendix A, p. 112]

**The Federal government cannot comprehensively plan and coordinate how NGOs and private sector entities will respond locally or regionally in a catastrophic disaster.** State and local officials must take the lead in *planning the best use* of non-governmental resources at the local level. [Appendix A, p. 116] [Mes italiques]

[A] model [of public-private partnership] which had proven successful is the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Business Force project. Business Force partnerships of regional, State, and local officials, together with businesses and local NGOs, have been successful in emergency response planning and **using private sector resources and volunteers to fill gaps** in preparedness and response capabilities. [Appendix A, p. 116] [Mes italiques]

**The Department of Homeland Security should develop a comprehensive program for the professional development and education** of the Nation's homeland security personnel (...) as well as emergency management persons **within the private sector.** [Appendix A, p. 119]

DHS must expand its efforts to **promote** awareness and implementation of the [National Incident Management System] (NIMS) and the NRP throughout Federal, State, and local governments, and the private sector. [Appendix A, p. 120]

## 2. Une évolution

### 2.1. Vers un panorama incluant le privé

Une fois les principes de fond rappelés, la réflexion s'ouvre sur mille et une considérations qui font une nouvelle place au secteur privé. Il est même clairement reconnu parfois, comme

par exemple en matière de logistique, que le privé a beaucoup de savoir-faire à enseigner au public.

Deux lignes d'analyses sont sans doute à suivre : d'une part, on peut en rester à l'idée que, s'il n'y a pas de rupture réelle avec le modèle régalien coutumier, ces avancées ne conduiront pas à des sauts décisifs ; d'autre part, on peut soutenir que cette montée « par le bas » d'une nouvelle place prise par le secteur privé sera finalement décisive, et que les références affichées ne sont plus que des reliquats, indispensables au discours souverain, mais bien moins décisifs que cela pourrait paraître.

Assurément, les jeux ne sont pas faits, des contradictions majeures se présenteront en situation de crise grave. Elles feront partie du lent processus d'évolution des institutions. Le point vital est que cette évolution, dans sa lenteur et sa majesté, ne soit pas trop préjudiciable aux Sociétés. Au-delà d'un certain seuil d'ailleurs, la difficile évolution, concédée par l'interne, pourrait laisser place à des déchirements expéditifs, imposés par l'externe, et par le bas.

#### *La Mission, le Rapport, et le secteur privé*

As part of the review, (...) we met with government officials [as well as] **business** and community leaders [in the Gulf Coast]. [Cover Letter, p. i]

The objective of this Report is to (...) lay the groundwork for **transforming** how this Nation – from every level of government to the private sector (...) – pursues a real and lasting vision of preparedness. [Foreword, p. 2]

Policies, authorities, plans, doctrine, operational concepts, and resources at the Federal, State, local, private sector, and community levels must be strengthened and **transformed**. [VI, p. 66]

We must build upon our initial successful efforts to partner with other homeland security stakeholders – namely the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based groups. Each of these groups plays a critical role in preparedness. [VI, p. 81]

#### *Katrina et le secteur privé*

Hurricane Katrina prompted an extraordinary national response that included all levels of government – Federal, State, and local – the private sector, [as well as] faith-based and charitable organizations (...). [Foreword, p. 3]

[After landfall], extraordinary efforts [were undertaken] by Federal departments and agencies in concert with our partners from the State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, **and the private sector**. [IV, p. 33]

The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and local government and the private and non-profit sectors as well. [IV, p. 50]

Over the course of the Hurricane Katrina response, **a significant capability for response resided in organizations outside the government**. Non-governmental and faith-based organizations, as well as the private sector all made substantial contributions. [V, p. 63]

Our response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the imperative to integrate and synchronize our policies, strategies, and plans – among all Federal, State, local, private sector, and community efforts. [VI, p. 65]

#### *L'architecture nationale et le secteur privé*

The (...) National Response Plan [is] the Federal government's plan to coordinate all its departments and agencies and integrate them with State, local, and **private sector partners**. [Foreword, p. 1]

The [National Incident Management System] (NIMS) provides a common, flexible framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic incidents. [II, p. 13]

The NRP should provide for a unified command structure to serve as the local, multi-agency coordination center for the effective and **efficient coordination of Federal, State, local, tribal, non-governmental, and private-sector organizations**. [II, p. 15]

We as a Nation – Federal, State, and local government; the private sector; as well as communities and individual citizens – **have not developed a shared vision** of or commitment to preparedness. [VI, p. 66]

[Our] preparedness system (...) must (...) **incorporate** the private sector. [VI, p. 68]

Federal, State, local, and private sector partners must agree on a system in which the **Federal government** responds more actively and effectively [to catastrophic events]. [VI, p. 81]

We must begin a national dialogue on (...) preparedness. (...) This dialogue must result in a shared understanding of **the roles and responsibilities** (...) of the Federal government, State governments, local governments, the private sector (including non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations); and communities and individual citizens. [VI, p. 82]

### *L'intervention locale et le secteur privé*

[During a large-scale crisis calling for Federal involvement, the Federal Coordinating Officer] (FCO) (...) is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources to affected State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector. [II, p. 15]

Emergency Support [Functions] (...) (ESFs) are organized groups of government and private sector entities that provide support, resources, and services [in case of a disaster]. An ESF is staffed by specialists from multiple Federal departments, agencies, and the private sector. The purpose of the ESFs is to integrate skills and capabilities that reside in disparate organizations. [II, p. 15]

Effective incident management of catastrophic events requires coordination of a wide range of organizations and activities, public and private. [V, p. 52]

[Strengthening] Homeland security regional offices (...) [would] foster State, local, and private sector integration. [VI, p. 70]

The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and community preparedness. [VI, p. 80]

[Together with State and local] governments, the private sector, and communities and individual citizens, (...) we will strengthen our ability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from (...) catastrophic [events]. [VII, p. 84]

DHS should revise the National Preparedness Goal to require the collaborative development of regional disaster plans (...) with the private sector. This activity will not only prepare the Federal government to respond, but will set private sector expectations of specific actions the government will take in response to a disaster. [Appendix A, p. 111]

### *Communications : mise en lien des acteurs, combinaison des moyens*

[In the future], updated communications guidance must (...) emphasize the ability of emergency responders and private security officials to share information and (...) connect with authorities at all levels of government. Planning [in the area of communications] needs to cover not only system connectivity, but also operating practices, [and] business processes (...) to make the system work. (...) The NRP's [Emergency Support Function]

(ESF-2) must direct the integration of all available Federal, State, local, and private communications assets. [Appendix A, p. 97]

To restore [communication] operability and achieve interoperability [after a crisis], there is a strong need for rapidly deployable, (...) *commercial*, off-the-shelf equipment. (...) To keep pace with technology changes [in the field of communications], DHS should consider commercial, off-the-shelf solutions. [Appendix A, pp. 97-98]

### ***Le privé, la logistique et les contrats***

DHS should [promote] much better [logistical] planning efforts between State and Federal emergency management logisticians and operations personnel, [including] (...) more robust private sector partnerships. DHS should mandate the use of pre-competed private sector contracts for capabilities ranging from airlift to advanced communications and life support. (...) Federal funding should be predicated on States entering into their own contractual agreements, pre-crisis, with the private sector for procurement and delivery of commodities. [Appendix A, p. 95]

DHS should partner with State and local governments, other Federal agencies and the private sector to develop and efficient, transparent and flexible logistics system for the procurement and delivery of goods and services during emergencies. (...) DHS should (...) execute direct (...) contingency contracts with [private] sources prior to disasters, and encourage State and local governments to do the same. (...)

DHS should require that local and State governments establish contracts with private sector vendors for disaster relief supplies in advance of an emergency with the assurance of reimbursement should these contracts be activated in post disaster declaration environment. (...)

The new logistics system developed in concert with State and local governments, and the private sector should be transparent to all managers within the system (Federal, State and local governments and the private sector). (...) The system should take into account all the sources of logistical provisions such as mutual aid agreements within States, EMAC agreements between States, contracts between the private sector and Federal and State governments, and agreements between non-governmental, community, faith-based and volunteer organizations and Federal and State governments. (...) [Appendix A, pp. 98-99]

### ***Services à la personne, et le secteur privé***

HHS in coordination with DHS should oversee the development of deployable interagency teams to assess human service needs and deliver assistance. Created before the disaster, these teams (...) should be composed of (...) Federal employees as well as personnel from State and local agencies and the private sector, as appropriate. [Appendix A, p. 107]

HHS and DHS should jointly work with the private sector to encourage the development of a capacity to voluntarily store and retrieve personal identifying information. (...) Individuals [could then] voluntarily submit their personal identifying information for virtual storage (...) [so they could] access [it] during emergencies. [Appendix A, p. 107]

### ***Les efforts de formation-préparation, et le secteur privé***

[Homeland security] education programs (...) for Federal personnel (...) must integrate participants from other homeland security partners – namely, State and local governments as well as the private sector. [VI, p. 73]

Our National Preparedness [System] should systematically investigate and seek out innovative approaches [to preparedness and crisis management] being applied in the various localities, States, departments, agencies, and the private sector. [VI, p. 74]

A new preparedness culture must emphasize that the entire Nation – Federal, State, and local governments, [as well as] the private sector (...) shared common goals and responsibilities for homeland security. [VI, p. 79]

DHS should restructure the TOPOFF Exercise Series. (...) Scenarios for future exercises should include recovery issues that explore the role of the private sector and non-governmental agencies, including faith-based organizations. [Appendix A, p. 118]

DHS should establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU) for senior officials. (...) An NHSU should be established to provide a strategic perspective of homeland security and counterterrorism that transcends organizations, levels of government, response disciplines, and the private sector. This requires that the NHSU faculty and student body include interagency, intergovernmental, and private sector representatives. [Appendix A, p. 120]

### *Initiatives*

DHS should share the plans and policy for Federal response and delineated roles and responsibilities with the private sector. (...) Businesses [do not always understand] the actions Federal, State, and local governments will take in response to a disaster. (...) The first step to establishing a collaborative planning and exercise program with the private sector is (...) (with appropriate protections) [to] share relevant sections of the NRP with key private sector partners. [Appendix A, p. 112]

DHS should [increase] relationship-building to include conducting a national conference for NGOs and the private sector on emergency preparedness and response where they can share best practices. (...) DHS should condition State and local grants (...) on incorporating NGOs and the private sector into their emergency planning, training, exercises, and disaster relief efforts. [Appendix A, p. 115]

DHS should improve access to, and awareness of, private sector and non-governmental resources available for use during emergency response operations. This process should include (...) provision of requirement estimates to NGOs and private sector organizations that are willing to provide resources during catastrophic events; (...) [and] providing NGOs and private sector organizations with information on reimbursement and access to Federal aid. [Appendix A, pp. 115-116]

The Federal government should recognize that the private/non-government sectors often perform certain functions more efficiently and more effectively than government because of their expertise and experience in applying successful business models. These public-private partnerships should be facilitated, recognized, and funded. [Appendix A, p. 116]

DHS should finalize the Target Capabilities List (TCL) (...) with input from Federal, State, local, and professional entities. [Appendix A, p. 117]

### *Le privé dans les efforts de préparation du citoyen*

The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign. [Appendix A, p. 121]

DHS should develop tools for State and local government to use in order to prepare, train, exercise, and engage citizens (...) in all areas of preparedness. (...) These tools [should be developed] (...) in partnership with non-governmental organizations, the private sector, [and] emergency responders. [Appendix A, p. 122]



The government should (...) work closely with the private sector to build “preparedness packs” in various sizes (individual through family size) for sale at low cost. [Appendix A, p. 123]

State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, private companies and even individual citizens (...) [pulled] together to provide (...) assistance for the public services that were overwhelmed or incapacitated. [Appendix B, pp. 128-129]

## 2.2. Mais l’attention est souvent portée d’abord sur le caritatif

Le système s’ouvre sur de nombreuses dimensions : les secours d’urgence, des initiatives novatrices, l’acheminement des denrées et autres supports aux victimes, la planification générale des actions de secours, la formation, l’appui en matière d’électricité, de nourriture, d’eau, etc. Mais, sur chacun des items, l’ouverture est exprimée vers les ONG — le secteur privé n’est pas mentionné.

Dans le passage consacré à ce qui a bien fonctionné, il n’est question que d’ONG, jamais du secteur privé.

Oubli ? Peur de se mesurer à trop puissant, à trop réactif ? Paralyse devant un tel partenaire, qui ne permet pas le paternalisme sympathique comme dans le cas des ONG ?

[Historically], the Federal government (...) quickly recognized the role that private non-profit organizations can play [in disaster relief]. [II, pp. 11-12]

FEMA [in 2004] provided funding for a “Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project”, which brought together responders and decision makers from all levels of government and the American Red Cross. [III, p. 24] [NB : mais pas le secteur privé]

The Department of Health and Human Services should coordinate with other departments of the Executive Branch, as well as State governments and non-governmental organizations, to develop (...) [an] integrated system to deliver human services [(i.e., assistance)] during disasters. [V, p. 59]

Even in the best of circumstances, government alone cannot deliver all disaster relief. Often, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the quickest means of providing local relief. [V, p. 63] [NB : pas de mention du secteur privé pour assister le « disaster relief delivery »]

The Federal response should better integrate the contributions of volunteers and non-governmental organizations into the broader national effort. (...) State and local governments must engage NGOs in the planning process. [V, p. 64] [NB : le secteur privé est « oublié » dans ce passage, qui conclut la section sur l’aide « non gouvernementale ». Le reste de la section mentionne pourtant le secteur privé, mais le « noie » sous ses références aux ONG, cf. pp. 63-64]

[In addition to DHS], nongovernmental organizations can (...) play a key role in [the] area [of public preparedness]. [VI, p. 80] [NB : mais qu’en est-il du secteur privé en matière d’éducation du public ?]

DHS should (...) [incorporate] NGOs and the private sector into (...) emergency planning. (...) [It should identify] what Federal, State, or local support NGOs will need to sustain operations (sanitation, electricity, food, and water). [Appendix A, pp. 115-116] [NB : Secteur privé passé sous silence à cet égard]

[Beyond the failures], there are other, [successful] stories from Katrina. (...) These are the stories of the men and women of our military, our law enforcement and fire departments, our private citizens, non-government organizations and our faith-based groups. [Appendix B, p. 125] [NB : Aucun succès notable du côté du secteur privé ?]

Appendix B – What Went Right: (...) Non-governmental Organizations. [Appendix B, p. 125] [NB : Le premier paragraphe du « What Went Right » est consacré aux ONG]

### 3. Par delà les principes, l'examen de l'épisode Katrina au ras du sol

Loin des grands principes, on observe – sur le terrain – une myriade d'initiatives visant à renouer des liens, faire se rencontrer des priorités, apporter des appuis essentiels, alléger telle contrainte, etc.

Il serait utile de faire une étude systématique de ces actions au ras du sol, et sur les réseaux qui les portent, pour rechercher des possibilités d'améliorations – sans tuer bien sûr les dynamiques émergentes.<sup>51</sup> Ou pour identifier les erreurs majeures à éviter : même avec les meilleures intentions, on peut casser une dynamique naissante. Et il pourrait être intéressant de songer à des « incubateurs d'initiatives » visant à débloquer des situations, susciter des actions communes et transverses, etc. Il faut aussi voir les limites des micro-initiatives, qui peuvent avoir des difficultés à trouver une surface minimale qui puisse entraîner des cercles vertueux suffisamment significatifs.

#### *Des difficultés*

On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting [on the exact situation in New Orleans] was extremely difficult to obtain. (...) As a result, local, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of conflicting reports from a combination of media, government, and private sources. [IV, p. 35]

[FEMA's] contracts with private companies, though sufficient for smaller disasters, were incapable of supplying the enormous quantities of resources needed [following Katrina]. [IV, pp. 44-45]

Private sector companies (...) encountered problems when attempting to donate their goods and services to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina response efforts. [IV, p. 45]

On September 1, FEMA reached a verbal agreement with Kenyon International Emergency Services, a disaster management contractor, to retrieve and transport bodies. However, difficulties finalizing the agreement with Kenyon hindered body recovery efforts on the ground. Frustrated Kenyon executives withdrew from their agreement with FEMA; this led FEMA to request that DOD take over the body recovery effort until another contractor could be found. (...) On September 13, Governor Blanco directed the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to sign its own written contract with Kenyon. [IV, p. 48]

Hurricane Katrina [created] (...) a massive requirement for Federal resources. (...) [But] the (...) supply processes of the Federal government (...) failed to leverage the private sector. (...) Federal resource managers (...) often could not readily determine whether the Federal government had [a particular] asset, or what alternative sources, (...) such as the private sector or a charity, might be better able to fill the need. [V, p. 56]

Following Katrina's landfall, (...) the (...) lawlessness in New Orleans (...) delayed restoration of essential private sector services. [V, p. 57]

Despite offers from the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture as well as the private sector to provide thousands of housing units nationwide, FEMA focused its housing efforts on cruise ships and trailers. [V, p. 60]

[After landfall], an energy company arranged to have generators shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the entire mid-Atlantic United States. However, FEMA regional representatives diverted these generators to hospitals. (...)

<sup>51</sup> Vidéo pédagogique : “Populations en danger de mort – Voies de survie collective”, à l'écoute de l'expérience de Michel Séguier, “Accompagnant d'inédits viables”, entretien avec Patrick Lagadec, Montage Aurélien Goulet, Janvier 2006.

[FEMA had] no overall awareness of the competing important needs of the two requests. [V, p. 61]

Often, government agencies failed to match relief needs with (...) private sector capabilities. [V, p. 64]

The private sector (...) met roadblocks in its efforts to coordinate with the Federal government during the response. For example, the American Bus Association spent an entire day trying to find a point of contact at FEMA to coordinate bus deployment without success. Federal procurement officers also neglected to draw upon retailers' supply lines to get the resources that victims needed. [Thus], despite an acute shortage of blue tarps to cover damaged roofs, Federal officials were slow to draw upon the corporate supply chains that deliver tarps to the stores that sell them. For example, one private sector company had 600,000 tarps available. [Appendix B, p. 128]

### *Des initiatives*

[In the week after landfall], a joint DHS, [Department of Transportation] (DOT), and DOD airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people [from New Orleans]. (...) DOT coordinated with private air carriers (...) to begin the massive airlift. DOT invited the Air Transport Association, the trade organization of principal U.S. airlines, to come to (...) [FEMA's National Response Coordination Center] (NRCC) to help coordinate with air carriers volunteering their services. [IV, p. 40]

[With respect to emergency communications], the DHS National Communications System (NCS) (...) linked the telecommunications industry with the relevant government agencies through the National Coordinating Center (NCC). The NCC coordinated with MCI and AT&T (...) to identify and deploy mobile communication assets to the Gulf region both prior to, and following, landfall. [IV, p. 44]

Throughout the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Commerce worked to close the gap between the private and the public sector. The Department set up an informal website and hotline to provide businesses with a one-stop source of information on contracting opportunities. The Department also granted certain companies prioritized access to the raw materials needed to restore the region's crippled infrastructure, even when the resources had previously been contracted to other parties. [IV, p. 45]

In the weeks after landfall, government, private sector, faith-based, non-profit, and other volunteer personnel collaborated (...) to provide medical, financial, and housing assistance [to victims of Hurricane Katrina]. [IV, p. 48]

In Harris County, Texas, the Citizen Corps Council – a volunteer organization under the auspices of DHS – coordinated private sector contributions. [IV, p. 49]

The number of (...) private sector entities that aided in the Hurricane Katrina relief effort was truly extraordinary. [V, p. 63]

Volunteers allowed for the creation of an actual city (with its own zip code) for nearly 25,000 Louisiana evacuees sheltering in the Houston Reliant Astrodome. They were successful because they had coordinated ahead of time with local businesses. [Appendix B, p. 126]

Private sector organizations provided commodities, services, expert advice, financial donations and volunteer groups to assist in the relief efforts. FedEx facilitated equipment and supply distribution, particularly for the American Red Cross. Dell, Home Depot, IBM, Lenovo, Pfizer, Wal-Mart, and other corporations gave millions of dollars in cash and in-kind donations to support immediate relief and recovery efforts as well as long-term rebuilding.

Vanguard Technologies, Inc., (...) provided communications [to] (...) St. Bernard's Parish [and Plaquemines Parish] officials. (...) Private companies also worked hard to mitigate the economic damage that Hurricane Katrina was sure to bring, (...) [by] pre-positioning [repair equipment and other supplies]. [Appendix B, p. 128]

State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, private companies and even individual citizens (...) [pulled] together to provide services for the victims of the storm and assistance for the public services that were overwhelmed or incapacitated. [Appendix B, pp. 128-129]

U.S. Army soldiers provided a number of services in support of Local, State, Federal, and private-sector activities. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (...) World Wide Navigational Warning Service (...) provided navigation information to the (...) Merchant Marine. [Appendix B, p. 131]

DOE (...) worked with the local utilities to **prioritize their restoration of commercial power** [to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port], (...) and [it] facilitated their communication with the U.S. Coast Guard to get their shipping lanes surveyed. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Department of Transportation (DOT) (...) coordinated (...) the emergency evacuation [by airlift] (...) of (...) citizens [stranded in] New Orleans. This large and complex operation involved three federal Departments and a fleet of private sector and military aircraft. (...) The Air Transport Association (...) coordinated (...) DOD and civilian flights to evacuate a total of 24,000 people. [Appendix B, p. 136]

Clearly understanding the impact of the hurricane and flood on businesses in the region, the Minority Business Development Agency of the Department of Commerce (DOC) sent business development specialists to the region to provide on-the-ground assistance to the owners of the more than 59,000 minority firms in Louisiana. MBDA established a minority business development center in Houston to assist with loan applications, business plans, insurance claims, reconstruction of business records, and business administration. Instead of letting these businesses slide, MBDA helped get owners back on their feet quickly. [Appendix B, p. 138]

### ***Aux prises avec les contradictions***

Colonial and Plantation Pipelines, major suppliers of fuel for the eastern US, were not operating due to the lack of power at their pumping stations in Mississippi and Louisiana due to effects of Hurricane Katrina. The Department of Energy (DOE) persuaded Entergy and Mississippi Power to elevate the electrical restoration of these pumping stations to near the top of the priority list. Mississippi Power elevated restoration of Collins, Mississippi to their number one priority. (...) Entergy raised the pump stations in their priority list and were able to restore power to some of the lesser damaged facilities quickly. As a result of the lengthy restoration time, Colonial contracted for some generators. After these initial contacts were superseded by FEMA for use on lifesaving activities, the Department of Transportation, as the lead for Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF-1) under the NRP, coordinated transport and delivery of large emergency generators to petroleum and natural gas industry sites that lacked power following the hurricanes. (...) Colonial worked with DOE to request that FEMA recognize Colonial Pipeline as critical infrastructure and part of the necessary emergency response, providing critical fuel to the recovery effort. DOE worked with FEMA to get emergency responder identification for Colonial contractors and staff to expedite their travel through the police barricades and into the disaster area. DOE worked with Mississippi Highway Patrol to provide the company the information they needed to get into the disaster areas and checked road availability at the pumping stations.

(...) DOE arranged with the Mississippi Highway Patrol to **provide police protection** to three of the Colonial pumping stations. [Appendix B, p. 135]

[It was urgent to get] electricity back on at the water pumps at Lake Livingston Pumping Station. This pumping station supplies Houston with water. After speaking to all parties, it was determined that four different groups were preparing four different solutions involving portable generation. DOE, as the lead for ESF-12, pulled CenterPoint Energy, Entergy, Army Corps of Engineers, City of Houston, and the Coastal Water Authority (who ran the pumping station) together on a conference call to discuss the situation. (note [that] there was not a lot of communication between Center Point Energy and Entergy up to this point). CenterPoint Energy suggested [a solution] (...) Late night on Sunday September 25, CenterPoint Energy contacted the DOE Emergency Operations Center to ask for permission to [implement it]. (...) ESF-12 at the Austin JFO gave the (...) go-ahead to CenterPoint to proceed with its work on getting the pump station up. The work was completed two days later. [Appendix B, p. 135]

ESF-12 in Alabama was asked to contact an Alabama pole-making company (Cahaba) and attempt to get them fuel so they could continue their pole-making/treating. (...) The Governor of Alabama was made aware of the plight of Cahaba which was producing poles for Entergy and Mississippi Power. (ESF-12 at the Mississippi [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC) confirmed with Entergy and Mississippi Power that this pole supply was critical) and ESF-12 was tasked with getting them fuel. ESF-12 spoke with all parties (...) involved (Hunt Oil, Stephens Oil Distributor, and Cahaba) and got Hunt Oil to release the needed fuel beginning the following day, the day that Cahaba was going to have to shutdown their pole-making due to lack of fuel. (...) Six pole-making companies in [Mississippi] had shut down and the utilities were using the poles as fast as they were produced. (...) Without [Cahaba] poles, restoration would have been severely affected. [Appendix B, p. 135]

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the [Department of Commerce] (DOC) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) (...) coordinated with the Federal Communications Commission to temporarily authorize the use [by Federal agencies] of private sector satellite, ultrawideband, and microwave communication services. [Appendix B, p. 138]

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (...) approved temporary waivers and expanded eligibility standards, [which helped] (...) natural gas companies restore service and deliver additional gas to the market. [Appendix B, p. 142]

[The Federal Communications] (...) operated twenty-four hours a day every day of the week to **assist industry efforts to restore communications**. The Commission streamlined procedures to approve requests for special temporary authority (STA), which would in turn expedite industry recovery efforts. The Commission quickly granted more than ninety STA requests and 100 temporary frequency authorizations that telecommunications companies and broadcasters needed to get service restored. The Commission also contacted each segment of the communications industry to help match their needs with resources (such as (...) emergency generators and fuel) around the nation. (...) Further, the Commission assisted telecommunication carriers by helping their repair crews to secure the transportation and credentials recognized by local authorities to gain access to damaged sites. [Appendix B, p. 143]



## INFRASTRUCTURES CRITIQUES

La dimension « Infrastructures critiques » devient de plus en plus centrale dans les réflexions sur les vulnérabilités des sociétés contemporaines.<sup>52</sup> Il est donc intéressant d'ausculter l'expérience Katrina<sup>53</sup> et le rapport de la Maison Blanche sous cet angle. Le dossier illustre à nouveau l'importance de ces réseaux vitaux. Mais aussi les ruptures à introduire pour le prendre véritablement en compte.

Il conviendrait encore de compléter l'examen : les réseaux vitaux, pour leur part, sont-ils préparés à prendre toute leur part du problème collectif ? Le rapport de la Maison-Blanche n'analyse pas ce point, hors du champ de sa mission.

### 1. Vue globale

Le rapport souligne un certain nombre de points à considérer pour des déastres d'une telle ampleur dans le domaine des infrastructures critiques :

- une perte totale de tous les réseaux ;
- une très grande difficulté de recueil d'information ;
- un manque de coordination, sur chaque maillage ;
- la difficulté à percevoir que des problèmes locaux peuvent avoir des effets dominos pour l'échelon national ;
- l'importance de commencer à recenser avant le désastre (si l'on peut) l'information relative aux infrastructures critiques, et l'ampleur des champs à couvrir quand les infrastructures vitales sont détruites.

#### *La question des infrastructures critiques*

Private sector companies own and operate 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure. (...) Companies are responsible for protecting their systems, which comprise the majority of critical infrastructure. Because of this, private sector preparation and response is vital to mitigating the national impact of disasters. Government actions in response to a disaster can help or hamper private sector efforts. (...) Businesses cannot develop contingency plans without understanding how the governments will respond. To maximize the Nation's preparedness, Federal, State, and local governments must join with the private sector to collaboratively develop plans to respond to major disasters. There are important initiatives in this area already underway by the Business Round Table (BRT) and Business Executives for National Security (BENS) project. We must encourage and build upon these efforts. The private sector must be an explicit partner in and fully integrated across all levels of response – Federal, State, and local. [VI, p. 81]

<sup>52</sup> Patrick Lagadec et Erwann Michel-Kerjan : "Comment protéger nos grands réseaux vitaux ?" Les dossiers de *La Recherche* n° 26, février-avril 2007, pp 38-42. <http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/38-42-lagadec.pdf>  
Philip Auerswald, Lewis M. Brancomb, Todd M. LaPorte and Erwann Michel-Kerjan (eds): *Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability*, Cambridge University Press, September 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec, Erwan Lagadec : "Les Grands Réseaux Vitaux et Katrina, enseignements sur les crises hors-cadre et leur pilotage". Dans le cadre d'une mission Electricité de France, à la demande de Pierre Bérroux, Directeur du Contrôle des Risques.  
[http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF\\_Katrina\\_Rex\\_Faits\\_marquants.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/EDF_Katrina_Rex_Faits_marquants.pdf)



Federal, State, and local officials need an implementation plan for critical infrastructure protection and restoration that can be shared across the Federal government, State and local governments, and with the private sector. (...) The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, should revise the National Response Plan (...) to be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. [V, p. 61]

The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, should (...) be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. [Appendix A, p. 110]

DHS should (...) strengthen the role and responsibility of the Infrastructure Liaison, (...) [i.e.] the principal advisor to the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) Coordination Group regarding all national and regional level critical infrastructure and key resource incident-related issues. (...) The liaison should (...) gather and fuse relevant data about private infrastructure operational status; (...) and (...) strengthen direct communications with private infrastructure owners and operators. This expanded Infrastructure Liaison will incorporate the Private Sector Liaisons to ensure unity of effort. [App. A, pp. 110-111]

### ***Katrina et les infrastructures critiques***

In New Orleans, primary and secondary power sources, sewerage and draining systems and communication and power lines were incapacitated [following Katrina]. [IV, p. 34]

Security problems in the Gulf Coast [after landfall] (...) delayed the restoration of communications infrastructure, and impeded medical support missions. (...) The lawlessness also delayed restoration of [other] essential private sector services such as power [and] water. [IV, p. 40]

[In the week after landfall], military personnel (...) performed such missions as salvage, sewage restoration, (...) air traffic control, and fuel distribution. [IV, p. 43]

Hurricane Katrina had a significant impact on many sectors of the region's "critical infrastructure". [V, p. 61]

The Federal government's ability to protect and restore the operation of priority national critical infrastructure was hindered by four interconnected problems. First, (...) [these efforts suffered from a lack of coordination among] Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). (...) Second, the Federal government did not adequately coordinate its actions with State and local protection and restoration efforts. (...) Third, Federal, State, and local officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without a comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of the critical infrastructure sectors in each geographic area and the potential national impact of their decisions. For example, (...) generators [that had been] shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the entire mid-Atlantic United States [were in fact diverted to hospitals by] FEMA regional representatives. (...) Fourth, the Federal government lacked the timely, accurate, and relevant ground-truth information necessary to evaluate which critical infrastructures were damaged, inoperative, or both. The FEMA teams that were deployed to assess damage in the [affected] regions did not focus on critical infrastructure and did not have the expertise necessary to evaluate protection and restoration needs. [V, p. 61]

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) started collecting key infrastructure-related information (i.e. on airports, hospitals, (...) highways, (...) etc.) well in advance of landfall. (...) [After landfall, NGA] assessments (...) addressed many issues, including but not limited to: (...) transportation infrastructure, critical and catastrophic damage, dike stability and breaches, industry damage, and hazard spills. The NGA World Wide Navigational Warning Service also provided navigation information to the U.S. Navy, Merchant Marine, and Coast Guard. (...) NGA also aided in the location and

recovery of oil platforms. The imagery activities of NGA were essential to the restoration of critical infrastructure. [Appendix B, p. 131]

## 2. Les différents secteurs

Des points communs se dégagent de toutes les descriptions fournies :

- le niveau de destructions, largement hors-cadres ;
- la complexité des mécanos concernés ;
- les effets potentiels sur longue distance, hors de la zone.

Mais il faut noter :

- la rapidité, globalement, des restaurations techniques ;
- l'ingéniosité des intervenants ;
- le fait que, pour nos sociétés techniques avancées, les exploits semblent infiniment plus aisés à assurer dans ces registres technologiques que dans les dimensions sociales.

Cependant, on doit mentionner que les résumés faits par le rapport relèvent de la description rapide. Il aurait été important de solliciter plus avant les opérateurs pour de véritables retours d'expérience. Mais cela aurait exigé davantage de temps. Et surtout : une autre culture, qui fasse naturellement une tout autre place au secteur privé.

Le danger, dans la démarche suivie, est que les opérateurs se sentent vraiment très loin des retours d'expérience. Comme le plus souvent, la question centrale pour les analystes est moins de s'interroger sur le résumé qu'ils pourront fournir que sur la démarche à engager, pour assurer la meilleure dynamique d'apprentissage commune.

### 2.1. Énergie

#### *Electricité*

L'infrastructure électrique de trois États concernés est dévastée, laissant 2,5 millions de consommateurs sans électricité. Une première priorité est de remettre en marche les installations critiques pour les secours d'urgence. Puis, de fixer les priorités devient un problème majeur : dégager les lignes, pour permettre une réalimentation des réseaux ; faire repartir des activités clés, comme la fabrication de poteaux ; sauver l'alimentation en eau de Houston ; assurer des fonctions critiques hors de la zone (livraison de fuel pour l'est des États-Unis), en faisant repartir des installations de la zone. Le tout sans négliger les problèmes de sécurité publique dans la zone où il faut intervenir.

The storm devastated the regional power infrastructure. In Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, approximately 2.5 million power customers reported outages. [I, p. 8]

[Coast Guard] Officer Rodney L. Gordon landed in the first aircraft to return to New Orleans and immediately began a series of complex electrical and mechanical repairs vital to sustaining (...) search and rescue [operations]. (...) He repaired failed and failing emergency generators [and] power lines. (...) He restored power to vital operations. (...) Most critically, the viability of the entire joint service air rescue operation was jeopardized by the electrical failure of the [Naval Air Station's] enormous aviation fuel distribution plant. He took charge and (...) performed a complex rewiring of its emergency generators, enabling hundreds of aircraft to continue life-saving missions. [Appendix B, p. 129]

Colonial and Plantation Pipelines, major suppliers of fuel for the eastern US, were not operating due to the lack of power at their pumping stations in Mississippi and Louisiana due to effects of Hurricane Katrina. The Department of Energy (DOE) persuaded Entergy and Mississippi Power to elevate the electrical restoration of these pumping stations to near the top of the priority list. (...) Unfortunately, the assessments of the electrical grid

revealed damage to multiple transmission lines. (...) As a result of the lengthy restoration time, Colonial contracted for some generators. After these initial contact were superseded by FEMA for use on lifesaving activities, the Department of Transportation, as the lead for Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF-1) under the NRP, coordinated transport and delivery of large emergency generators to petroleum and natural gas industry sites that lacked power following the hurricanes. (...) As Colonial attempted to restore power and deliver generators to [its pumping] sites, their crews reported **criminal activity and gunshots**. [Appendix B, p. 135]

DOE provided (...) recommendations regarding getting electricity back on at the water pumps at Lake Livingston Pumping Station. **This pumping station supplies Houston with water**. [Appendix B, p. 135]

ESF-12 in Alabama [secured fuel to] (...) an Alabama pole-making company (Cahaba) (...) so they could continue their pole-making/treating. (...) Cahaba (...) was producing poles for Entergy and Mississippi Power. ESF-12 at the Mississippi [Emergency Operations Center] (EOC) confirmed with Entergy and Mississippi Power that this pole supply was critical (...). ESF-12 [managed to] (...) release the needed fuel beginning the following day, the day that Cahaba was going to have to shutdown their pole-making due to lack of fuel. (...) **Six pole-making companies in MS had shut down and the utilities were using the poles as fast as they were produced**. (...) Without [Cahaba] poles, restoration would have been severely affected. [Appendix B, p. 135]

DOE (...) worked with the local utilities to prioritize their restoration of commercial power [to the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port]. [Appendix B, p. 135]

Federal land-management agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as well as their state counterparts (...) deployed [employees] to the Mississippi-Louisiana border to clear (...) power lines of damaged and fallen trees (...) so that first responders could (...) restore power. [Appendix B, pp. 138-139]

### *Pétrole et gaz*

Une zone majeure de production, de raffinage, et de réception de navires est sévèrement touchée, et pour une longue période : du 26 août 2005 au 11 janvier 2006. Les effets dominos potentiel sur l'Est américain sont importants, et il faut intégrer cette dimension dans les priorités. Cela suppose de **nombreux ajustements, en environnement très dégradé, sur différents théâtres d'opérations aux exigences contradictoires, et sur longue période**.

In the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina battered the offshore energy infrastructure and forced the evacuation of more than 75 percent of the Gulf's 819 manned oil platforms. Two day before landfall, U.S. energy companies estimated that the approaching storm had already reduced Gulf of Mexico oil production by more than a third. [I, p. 5]

The combined effects of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita (...) were such that, **between August 26, 2005, and January 11, 2006, 114 million barrels of oil production capacity were left unused, equivalent to over one-fifth of yearly output in the Gulf of Mexico**. [I, p. 8]

The Hurricane temporarily caused the shutdown of most crude oil and natural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico as well as much of the refining capacity in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. More than ten percent of the Nation's imported crude oil enters through the Louisiana Offshore **Oil Port**, adding to the impact on the energy sector. (...) **Eleven petroleum refineries, or one-sixth of the Nation's refining capacity, were shut down**. [V, p. 61]

**Colonial and Plantation Pipelines, major suppliers of fuel for the eastern US**, were not operating due to the lack of power at their pumping stations in Mississippi and Louisiana due to effects of Hurricane Katrina. (...) The Department of Transportation, as the lead for

Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF-1) under the NRP, coordinated transport and delivery of large emergency generators to petroleum and natural gas industry sites that lacked power following the hurricanes. (...) Colonial worked with [the Department of Energy] (DOE) to request that FEMA recognize Colonial Pipeline as critical infrastructure and part of the necessary emergency response, providing critical fuel to the recovery effort. [Appendix B, p. 135]

ESF-12 in Alabama was asked to contact an Alabama pole-making company (Cahaba) and attempt to get them fuel so they could continue their pole-making/treating. (...) ESF-12 was tasked with getting them fuel. ESF-12 spoke with all parties (...) involved (Hunt Oil, Stephens Oil Distributor, and Cahaba) and got Hunt Oil to release the needed fuel beginning the following day, the day that Cahaba was going to have to shutdown their pole-making due to lack of fuel. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port was (...) partially damaged and initially shut down by Hurricane Katrina. This facility is the only US facility capable of offloading ultra large tankers and pumps about 1 million barrels of oil a day. DOE (...) worked with the local utilities to prioritize their restoration of commercial power, (...) and facilitated their communication with the U.S. Coast Guard to get their shipping lanes surveyed, which resulted in a U.S. Navy minesweeper being deployed to the area. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took immediate steps to reconstruct the natural gas infrastructure of the region, and reduce the disruption in the natural gas supply. Because the Commission approved temporary waivers and expanded eligibility standards they were able to help natural gas companies restore service and deliver additional gas to the market. [Appendix B, p. 142]

### 2.3. Gestion de l'eau

#### *Levées et inondation*

Traiter l'inondation fut un travail d'Hercule, alors que les 563 km de digues étaient sous pression maximale, avec des brèches et des dépassements ; que les stations de pompes étaient inondées, ou sans énergie. Il s'agissait d'évacuer 850 Mns de m<sup>3</sup> d'eau. Ce fut réalisé en 43 jours, moitié moins que ce qui était estimé au départ, grâce à un engagement exemplaire.

The storm surge, extreme amounts of rain, and high winds stressed the city's complex 350 mile ( 563 km) levee system to its breaking point. Several of the levees and floodwalls were overtopped, and some were breached throughout the day of landfall. (...) In addition (...), many of the pumping stations (...) stopped working due to power outages and flooded pumping equipment. [IV, p. 34]

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers led the removal of 224 billion gallons (850 Mns de m<sup>3</sup>) of water from New Orleans in 43 days, enabling recovery and repair operations. By improving their pumping capacity and efficiency, adding pumps, creating intentional breaches, and developing on-the-spot workarounds, they were able to reduce the estimated time to clear New Orleans of water by approximately 50 percent. [Appendix B, p. 131]

#### *Traitement des eaux*

Là aussi, les destructions sont impressionnantes : 170 installations de traitement de l'eau potable, 47 unités de traitement des eaux usées.

The storm's surge (...) destroyed or compromised at least 170 drinking water facilities and forty-seven wastewater treatment works along the Gulf Coast. [IV, p. 37]

Florida sent a mobile drinking water lab (...) to Mississippi, helping the prevent people from getting sick from contaminated water. [Appendix B, p. 127]

DOE provided (...) recommendations regarding getting electricity back on at the water pumps at Lake Livingston Pumping Station. This pumping station supplies Houston with water. (...) [A solution was suggested by] CenterPoint Energy (...) [and] ESF-12 at the Austin JFO gave the go-ahead to CenterPoint to proceed with its work on getting the pump station up. The work was completed two days later and the pump station came back on line just as the water supply was down to about a one day supply. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (...) arranged for fresh water to be delivered from other States [to Indian Tribes in the affected area]. [Appendix B, p. 138]

Recognizing the need to purify drinking water, the Bureau of Reclamation sent an expeditionary water purification unit to Mississippi, purifying both contaminated and salt water to levels that not only met, but exceeded, [Environmental Protection Agency] (EPA) drinking water standards. The unit produced 100,000 to 200,000 gallons [38 000 m<sup>3</sup> to 76 000 m<sup>3</sup>] of purified water per day. (...) Scientists from the Geological Survey worked with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to monitor water quality in the state following the hurricane and flood. Using a mobile laboratory, they collected and analyzed water samples from 22 sites in and around Lake Pontchartrain (...) for three weeks to determine levels of contamination, and whether this contamination extended into the Mississippi Sound. [Appendix B, p. 139]

## 2.4. Communications

### *Télécommunications*

Les installations sont dévastées. Les réseaux inopérables, entre les milliers d'antennes-relais pour les téléphones portables détruites, les dizaines de milliers de poteaux de téléphone brisés, etc. Entre autres initiatives, on notera la mise à disposition de nouvelles plages de fréquence, par l'autorité des télécommunications, et la mise à disposition rapide de protocoles Internet par une petite société.

[On Sunday, August 28], The Louisiana State Police reported that one of its 800 MHz communications towers had been rendered inoperable. [III, p. 30]

[After landfall], a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report described the communication infrastructure in Biloxi and Gulfport as "non-existent". [IV, p. 33]

Hurricane Katrina devastated communications infrastructures across the Gulf Coast, incapacitating telephone service. (...) Almost three million customer phone lines were knocked out, telephone switching centers were seriously damaged, and 1,477 cell towers were incapacitated. [IV, p. 34]

Flooding blocked access to the police and fire dispatch centers in New Orleans; neither 911 service nor public safety radio communications functioned sufficiently. In addition, the State of Louisiana's 800 MHz radio system (...) ceased functioning. [IV, p. 37]

[National] Guardsmen from Texas and Pennsylvania supplied satellite phone communications to the response. [IV, p. 43]

More than 50,000 utility poles were toppled in Mississippi alone, meaning that even if telephone call centers and electricity generation capabilities were functioning, the connections to the customers were broken. [V, p. 55]

In Louisiana, (...) Livingston Parish (...) provided means of communication to the [New Orleans 2<sup>nd</sup> District Police Department] (NO 2<sup>nd</sup> PD) via the Parishes radios and satellite phones as the NO 2<sup>nd</sup> PD has no communications devices that worked. [Appendix B, p. 128]

Vanguard Technologies, a small Louisiana business, provided Saint Bernard and Plaquemines parishes with innovative internet protocol (IP) network solutions and utilized a Point of Presence (POP) internet connectivity, that remained fully operational during



Katrina, when no other company, big or small, was able to restore crucial communications in this devastated area. Vanguard also deployed a fully operational, redundant, broadband, wireless IP network, covering more than 100 square miles, within five days of Katrina's Gulf Coast landfall. The networks supported: Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony; (...) high speed World Wide Web internet access; email communications via simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP); and web mail services. Vanguard, to date, continues servicing the parishes with critical communications access linking key government services and facilities. [Appendix B, p. 128]

[Coast Guard] Officer Rodney L. Gordon (...) restored power to vital (...) communications facilities, including the Naval Air Station control tower, enabling the successful control and dispatch of thousands of military and Coast Guard aircraft sorties on rescue and evacuation missions. [Appendix B, p. 129]

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the [Department of Commerce] (DOC) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) correctly and immediately identified the need for additional communications bandwidth, and allocated more than 1,100 frequencies to nine Federal agencies which allowed them to operate their land mobile, aeronautical, maritime, and satellite communications. NTIA also coordinated with the Federal Communications Commission to temporarily authorize the use of private sector satellite, ultrawideband, and microwave communication services. In addition to these response efforts, NTIA also provided financial support to reestablish the communications infrastructure in Louisiana. [Appendix B, p. 138]

The [Federal Communications] Commission acted quickly to facilitate the resumption of communications services in the affected areas. [Appendix B, p. 142]

### *Radio-télévision*

Contrairement à ce qui est prévu dans les plans de crise, le premier problème n'est pas de savoir ce qu'on dira aux médias : il n'y a plus de médias locaux, dans une large mesure.

Broadcast communications were (...) severely affected, as 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of area television stations went off the air. [I, p. 8]

[Following landfall], most of the radio stations and many television stations in the New Orleans area were knocked off the air. [IV, p. 34]

[The Federal Communications Commission] quickly granted more than (...) 100 temporary frequency authorizations that (...) broadcasters needed to get service restored. (...) Additionally, the Commission used its High Frequency Direction Finding Capability Center to remotely assess the damage done to radio stations in the areas struck by Hurricane Katrina and to monitor the progress of restoration activity. [Appendix B, p. 143]

## **2.5. Transports**

Deux grandes dimensions sont à traiter : la perte des réseaux de transports de la zone, ce qui est gravissime pour la zone, la mise à l'abri des populations, la reprise économique ; les répercussions possibles de la perte des réseaux et hubs situés dans la zone, et qui peuvent bloquer bien d'autres activités supra-régionales. L'exemple emblématique est le risque de perte du Mississippi, et du port de la Nouvelle-Orléans, un temps envisagé.

### *Transports terrestres*

[In the days before landfall], numerous private sector entities took action (...). Norfolk Southern Railroad, for example, recognized the potential impact of the loss of certain key bridges and pre-staged repair barges in order to be able to move in quickly to make repairs after the hurricane made landfall. [III, p. 23]



[Following landfall], major east-west highways in southern Mississippi became impassable due to storm debris. [IV, p. 34]

The Mississippi National Guard, supported with Guard members from many other States, performed superbly throughout the response, carrying out a number of duties, including clearing key roads. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior (DOI) (...) cleared debris from roadways [in Tribal areas]. (...) Federal land-management agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as well as their state counterparts deployed [employees] to the Mississippi-Louisiana border to clear roadways (...) of damaged and fallen trees that had cut off those in the coastal communities. [Appendix B, p. 138]

### *Transports aériens*

By the late afternoon [on Sunday, August 28], (...) increasing winds around New Orleans' Louis Armstrong International Airport caused air carriers to begin reevaluating their plans and canceling flights. The last passenger flight departed at 4:30 pm CDT and the airport was officially closed at 6:43 pm CDT. [III, p. 29]

[In the week after landfall], a joint DHS, DOT, and DOD **airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people** [from New Orleans]. (...) The Federal Aviation Administration restored traffic control and runway operations at New Orleans's Louis Armstrong International Airport. (...) In addition to (...) civilian flights, the Department of Defense simultaneously conducted **a major medical airlift from the airport**. The DHS Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided screeners and Federal Air Marshals to maintain security. Search and rescue helicopters brought people directly to the airport, while Federal Protective Service personnel escorted busloads of evacuees from the Superdome [to the airport]. [IV, p. 40]

Air Force personnel supported recovery and relief operations, including (...) air traffic control, (...) aerial lift, [and] refueling. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The DOT Federal Aviation Administration quickly restored air traffic control and runway operations at the Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans. (...) The Air Transport Association (...) coordinated (...) DOD and civilian flights to evacuate a total of 24,000 people. [Appendix B, p. 136]

Members of the Forest Service (...) provided aviation assistance. (...) They bolstered the destroyed aircraft infrastructure in the region with their own fixed wing planes and helicopters. [Appendix B, p. 137]

### *Transports maritimes*

[In] Alabama, (...) large amounts of debris necessitated the closure of Mobile's port. [IV, p. 34]

By pre-positioning freighters offshore and swiftly returning their grain transport to operational status, the Cargill Corporation started shipping grain internationally almost immediately after landfall. **With over half of all U.S. grain exports flowing through ports affected by Hurricane Katrina from 17 different states** this single action had a significant positive national economic impact. [Appendix B, p. 128]

Coast Guard personnel (...) worked tirelessly in multi-agency teams to reconstitute waterways and conduct environmental assessments. **They restored hundreds of buoys** and channel markers that were missing or destroyed in the hurricane. Their efforts to restore these and other navigational aids and waterways allowed maritime industry in the area to return to normal faster. [Appendix B, p. 129]

The U.S. Navy mobilized (...) salvage units. [Appendix B, p. 131]

## 2.6. Santé publique

La dimension Santé est au nombre des plus complexes. Soudain, un système déjà très en limite (les états du sud sont parmi les moins bien classés du pays), est privé de son architecture : hôpitaux, centres secondaires, dossiers, transport, etc.). Chaque élément est exposé à des risques tous azimuts : patients dans des conditions inimaginables ; pas d'accès au soin ; dossiers inaccessibles ; risques sécuritaires graves, ou pensés comme tels, avec cette image des transports aériens sous le feu des snipers ; risques de maladies contagieuses, notamment dans centres d'hébergement surpeuplés et insalubres ; craintes de maladies, accroissant encore l'inquiétude générale ; etc. Et les grands nombres exacerbent la lourdeur de la tâche : 100 000 patients à traiter, 200 000 patients sortis de la région, 200 patients et personnels réfugiés sur le toit d'un hôpital et à hélitreuiller ; etc.

Il s'agit, là aussi, et plus encore qu'ailleurs, de sauver tout ce qui peut l'être en urgence absolue (hélitreuillages de dernière extrémité), de bloquer le tourbillon mortel (sécurisation de fortune), et de réussir une réanimation générale, dans des conditions instables, illisibles, hors-cadres. En comptant tout à la fois sur une tenue du terrain par les personnels, des consolidations fédérales – notamment par le CDC, qui envoie 200 experts et personnels –, des actions individuelles, de l'entre-aide entre hôpitaux, et une action forte de communication à travers des centres d'appel pour répondre à d'innombrables demandes (passées car ceux qui, par bonheur, ont des moyens d'appel). Car **tout est bouleversé** : par exemple, sans connaissance des dossiers médicaux, les soins peuvent représenter des risques pour les patients ; les patients ne savent plus quoi faire s'ils n'ont pas accès aux pharmacies, etc.

Ce type de défi appelle sans doute deux types de préparation : d'une part, l'excellence de chaque entité en matière de situation de crise ; mais aussi, d'autre part, un travail de préparation qui anticipe pareil contexte. Si les systèmes ne savent opérer que dans le cadre des « plans rouges », « plans blancs », « régulations », tels que définis pour les événements bien circonscrits, ils risquent fort le *burn-out* rapide si d'aventure la crise se fait barbare, ne respectant plus les hypothèses de nos planifications d'urgence – la première de ces hypothèses étant que le « chantier » est clairement délimité, limité, connu. Il faudrait avoir le courage – intellectuel, managérial, et psychologique plus encore – d'ouvrir des réflexions et des apprentissages sur ce type de situation.<sup>54</sup>

Ici encore le rapport est tout au plus **une compilation de données**. Il faut aller beaucoup plus loin.

### *Avant l'impact : une mobilisation*

[On Saturday, August 27], FEMA began activating the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) [and the] Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) (...). The DMATs are mobile self-contained medical teams with equipment and medical professionals trained and certified to provide emergency medical care to disaster victims. These teams are comprised of professionals from around the country organized and deployed by FEMA to support disaster response activities. [III, p. 27]

[On Sunday, August 28], Medical personnel arrived at the Superdome from the Louisiana National Guard contingent. (...) In all, "the total medical complement at the Superdome totaled 71 medical personnel." [III, p. 30]

[Prior to landfall, FEMA pre-deployed] in the region (...) thirty-three National Disaster Medical System teams, including Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, medical Strike

<sup>54</sup> Témoignage vidéo sur un autre front, encore plus déstabilisant : "Un management de l'extrême – Hôpital de Mitrovica, 1999", à l'écoute de Murielle Arondeau, Directrice d'Hôpital, Directrice de l'hôpital de Mitrovica – conflit du Kosovo, 1999, montage Aurélien Goulet, 15 juin 2005.

Teams, a National Medical Response Team, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams, and Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams. [III, p. 31]

*Après l'impact : la saturation, sur tous les fronts*

Most of the evacuees did not have access to their medical records, which increased the risk of complications when receiving medical treatment. [I, p. 9]

The Gulf Coast region's health care infrastructure sustained extraordinary damage. Such damage was particularly evident in New Orleans, where Katrina destroyed several large hospitals, rendered many others inoperable, and forced the closure of nearly all other health care facilities. The region's most vulnerable residents and those individuals with special needs suffered terribly from Hurricane Katrina's impact. (...) The storm stranded hundreds of hospital patients inside dark and flooded facilities that lacked basic supplies. Some patients succumbed to the horrible conditions before they could be evacuated. At St. Rita's Nursing Home in St. Bernard's Parish, Louisiana, thirty-four nursing home residents drowned in the floods resulting from Hurricane Katrina. [IV, p. 34]

As the [post-landfall] evacuation progressed, the situation at the Convention Center and the Superdome stabilized, with (...) medical supplies available at both locations. [IV, p. 39]

[In the week after landfall], the Department of Defense (...) conducted a major medical airlift from the [New Orleans] airport. [IV, p. 40]

[In] the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, (...) hospitals (...) required diesel fuel to run their back-up generators. Many evacuees lacked access to medical providers and supplies. [IV, p. 44]

The public health and medical situation throughout the Gulf Coast required substantial Federal resources to prevent even further loss of life. On [Wednesday], August 31, [Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) Secretary Leavitt declared a Federal Public Health Emergency for the Gulf Coast region. This emergency declaration (...) allowed HHS to make grants and enter into contracts more expeditiously. Immediate public health and medical support challenges included the identification, triage, and treatment of acutely sick and injured patients; the management of chronic medical conditions in large numbers of evacuees with special health care needs; the assessment, communication, and mitigation of public health risks; mortuary support; and the provision of assistance to State and local health officials to quickly reestablish health care delivery systems and public health infrastructure.

Federal department and agencies worked together to attempt to meet these challenges, beginning before Hurricane Katrina's landfall and continuing long after. HHS and DOD health officials (...) hastened the direction of medical and public health assets. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams also formed an integral component of the medical response to Hurricane Katrina, collectively treating over 100,000 patients. (...) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) used its extensive resources to deliver care to evacuees and veterans from the affected region.

HHS deployed medical supplies and personnel to bolster State and local public health capacity in the region. It provided pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) beginning with pre-landfall deliveries to the Superdome. By September 3, HHS had delivered 100 tons of medical supplies from the SNS to Louisiana. HHS also deployed twenty-four public health teams that included epidemiology, food safety, sanitation, and toxicology experts. [IV, p. 46]

Louisiana State University worked with the State Office of Emergency Preparedness, Federal personnel, and responders from outside the region to turn its Pete Maravich

Assembly Center into an acute care medical facility. Within a week, the facility processed approximately 6,000 patients and more than a thousand prescriptions. [IV, p. 47]

[In the weeks after landfall], Federal responders overcame many of the initial public health challenges as increasing numbers of medical personnel and supplies flowed into the region. The continuing efforts of medical personnel to vaccinate Hurricane Katrina evacuees prevented most communicable diseases from spreading in the densely populated shelters. [IV, p. 48]

Hurricane Katrina created enormous public health and medical challenges, especially in Louisiana and Mississippi – States with public health infrastructures that ranked 49<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> in the Nation, respectively. But it was the subsequent flooding of New Orleans that imposed catastrophic public health conditions on the people of southern Louisiana and forced an unprecedented mobilization of Federal health and medical assets. Tens of thousands of people required medical care. Over 200,000 people with chronic medical conditions, displaced by the storm and isolated by the flooding, found themselves without access to their usual medications and sources of medical care. Several large hospitals were totally destroyed and many others were rendered inoperable. Nearly all smaller health care facilities were shut down. Although public health and medical support efforts restored the capabilities of many of these facilities, the region's health care infrastructure sustained extraordinary damage. Most local and State public health and medical assets were overwhelmed by these conditions, placing even greater responsibility on federally deployed personnel. [V, p. 58]

Inefficiencies [in the medical response to Hurricane Katrina's aftermath] were the products [in part] of (...) weak State and local public health infrastructures. [V, p. 59]

[A doctor] from Texas, operating independently, arrived (...) to Baton Rouge shortly after the storm hit (...) [with] RVs [(i.e. caravanes) and trailers] (...) full of medical supplies. (...) The RVs were used to set up a mobile hospital unit and decontamination clinic at the Children's Hospital in the City of New Orleans 2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct to take care of injured soldiers, police, and other responders who could not otherwise get medical care. [Appendix B, p. 126]

Multiple State Public Health Laboratories volunteered to assist the devastated Louisiana and Mississippi State Public Health Laboratories. [Appendix B, p. 127]

The Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) (...) sent over [to New Orleans] 660 fire department staff, including (...) emergency medical technicians, paramedics, counselors, [and] physicians. [Appendix B, p. 127]

In Louisiana, (...) Livingston Parish (...) provided a critically important security function, escorting medical assets to and from hospitals. [Appendix B, p. 128]

FEMA (...) mobilized elements of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), such as Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), deploying them to the Gulf States to assist with emergency health care delivery. (...) Also part of the National Disaster Medical System, the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) created a large, temporary morgue in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, to support the entire state, and supplemented and otherwise provided mortuary service in Louisiana and Mississippi. [Appendix B, p. 130]

Identifying the dead (...) [was] made even more challenging by the destruction of medical, dental and other records. [Appendix B, p. 130]

U.S. Army soldiers provided a number of services in support of Local, State, Federal, and private-sector activities, including medical treatment (e.g. thousands of immunizations). [Appendix B, p. 131]

Air Force personnel supported recovery and relief operations, including (...) medical evacuation. [Appendix B, p. 131]

On September 3, ATF [(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives)] New Orleans Field Division agents provided security at a Mandeville, Louisiana hospital to which a large number of evacuees were airlifted. Due to aircraft coming under fire, the hospital requested that ATF provide armed support for a rescue mission into the city to evacuate patients and personnel from Tulane University Hospital. (...) Agents also provided an armed escort for a transport shipment of emergency medical supplies from the New Orleans Airport to the Mandeville hospital. (...) ATF (...) personnel also established a medical facility to provide medicine and prescription drugs (e.g. insulin) to individuals in needs and living in the area of the [ATF] base at the Algiers post office. ATF (...) personnel went to residences and nursing homes to provide (...) much-needed medical attention to people who could not or would not leave their homes. (...) Throughout the response to Hurricane Katrina, ATF continued to reach out to the sick and elderly citizens in the New Orleans area. [Appendix B, p. 133]

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) quickly identified the need for specific guidance on how to get hospitals in the region affected by the hurricane and flood reopened and running again. The Agency developed easy to read information, and checklists regarding supplies, medications, staffing, patient transport, reopening evaluation, and management. AHRQ developed this information and got it into the hands of the State and Local leaders responsible for making hospitals function again.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed approximately 200 personnel to the affected region, including the following specialties: public health nursing, occupational, laboratory, medical, epidemiology, sanitation, environmental health, disease surveillance, public information and health risk communication. CDC led and/or assisted with a variety of emergency public health programs. CDC immunization experts helped to provide vaccines and vaccinate children displaced by Hurricane Katrina, especially those staying in evacuation centers. Most importantly, they determined which diseases would result from the hurricane and flood, and not only monitored the region for them, they also communicated information on these diseases and others the public might be worried about, helping to allay public fears. They helped to fill gaps in the public health infrastructure, prevented disease from gaining a foothold in the already devastated region, and communicated health-related information to the public.

Many victims of the hurricane and flood took charge of their own medical care to the extent that they could. In response to their demands for more information, for two weeks immediately after the hurricane and flood, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) expanded their program for medical consultation to not only help health care providers throughout the Nation, but also specifically [advise] patients and the worried (...) in the affected region. Working with their partners in academic medical centers and professional medical societies, NIH opened and manned phone lines all day every day to answer questions about a variety of diseases and cases involving complicated medical treatment. NIH immediately recognized that they were in the best position to match medical experts with health care providers and patients in needs of answers – providing both groups with the information they needed to better manage health care concerns in the midst of the crisis. [Appendix B, p. 134]

Over 200 patients and staff, many of whom were non-ambulatory, [were evacuated by helicopter] from the rooftop of the flooded Louisiana State University Hospital in downtown New Orleans. [Appendix B, p. 136]

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) (...) sent hundreds of employees to help [(among other things)] restore public health (...) in the devastated region. [Appendix B, p. 138]



The Department of Veterans Affairs (...) provided medical services, hospital beds, and medications in accordance with its standing emergency health care mission. (...) By Friday, Sept. 2, all patients, employees and family members had been safely evacuated from the VA [hospital] in New Orleans. (...) After evacuating the VA Medical Center, employees donated all of their food [and] (...) water, all their medical supplies, and needed medication to Charity Hospital, a neighboring hospital that was still operating and had yet to completely evacuate. [Appendix B, p. 141]

### 3. Recommandations : plus de collaboration, pour un meilleur dispositif national

Les recommandations du rapport sont marquées au coin du « bon sens ». En substance : « Si on veut plus d'efficacité dans la conduite des opérations post-crise, il faut que les autorités aient des plans adéquats, notamment en ce qui concerne les grandes infrastructures critiques. Il faut avoir toutes les données nécessaires pour être en mesure d'établir des priorités, connaître notamment les effets domino possibles à l'échelon régional et aussi national, s'il y a perte de telle ou telle installation. Pour cela, il faut que le secteur privé veuille bien collaborer afin de donner aux agences publiques en charge de la préparation et de l'intervention tous les moyens de conduire l'action, de fixer les priorités, de distribuer les tâches. C'est bien au secteur privé qu'il revient de dire, pour utilisation par le secteur public, ce qui est vraiment critique. Comme tout cela est un peu compliqué, il faut donner un nouvel élan aux groupes de liaisons, aux bureaux qui s'occupent de recueillir et de traiter toutes les informations, etc. Il faut que toutes les administrations concernées s'impliquent, et ainsi on pourra aboutir à un modèle pertinent, qui clarifie tous les enjeux, tous les rôles, toutes les frontières d'attributions. »

Et l'on poursuit dans le registre qui semble ressortir de l'évidence : « Si on veut être efficace, il faut un leadership clair et unique – le secteur public. Il faut disposer de toutes les données, de façon exhaustive. Il faut tout prioriser. Le public est la clé de voûte, le privé doit collaborer. Et ainsi, dans les grandes crises, la rationalité efficace pourra s'imposer pièce par pièce, et sur l'ensemble du système ».

Aussi longtemps que cette approche formelle fonctionne, il est légitime de la retenir. Mais il faudrait oser une question redoutable : et si le niveau de complexité atteint désormais ne permettait plus ce mécano – en quelque sorte d'ancien régime ? Et s'il nous fallait inventer autre chose ? Et si les réticences du Privé n'étaient pas seulement motivées par une solide culture de l'intérêt particulier, mais aussi par le sentiment – clair ou obscur – que le Public n'est plus en phase avec les défis de notre temps ?

On pourrait même se demander si l'attente de clarification, d'ordonnement, de coordination, ne devient pas purement compulsive, obsessionnelle... traduisant surtout un profond désarroi du secteur public. On se bunkérise sur des modèles qui ne tiennent plus, mais qui, même suicidaires, continueront à faire consensus de convenance, donc à protéger les formes.

Mais les tenants du « pilotage as usual » disposent d'un formidable argument : « Et vous proposez quoi à la place ? ».

C'est là que l'on attend la recherche et les groupes de réflexion à monter. L'urgence n'est pas, comme on le voit ici, de collectionner les cas, les amoncellements de données, mais bien de lancer de nouvelles pistes d'intelligence, et de modes opératoires.

La première exigence à poser serait au moins celle-ci : ne plus, notamment, inviter le secteur privé à venir « apporter ses données », mais l'inviter à venir réfléchir, pour inventer. Sinon, l'incompréhension et le conflit risquent fort d'être au rendez-vous. C'est très exactement ce qu'il m'a été donné d'entendre en quelque sorte lors d'une réunion Public-



Privé à Washington. Le Public demandait au Privé plus de données pour pouvoir rédiger ses plans et les envoyer au Privé. Le Privé répondit en substance : « Vous n'aurez plus aucune donnée. Vous avez été trop incapables lors de Katrina. Vous avez été incapables d'intervenir. De nous apporter le minimum de sécurité qui nous était indispensable. Et, en plus, vous avez fait main basse sur nos moyens, pour pallier votre impuissance. Vous n'aurez plus de données ».

Le temps n'est plus à la confection de beaux plans dans des bureaux administratifs. Il est à la réinvention des concepts, des modes de raisonnement, des modes de coopération entre tous les acteurs, à commencer par les plus essentiels – au nombre desquels les entreprises, les ONG. Certes, cela va être rude et va appeler des deuils douloureux – intellectuels, organisationnels, et plus encore en termes de puissance, d'orgueil, de leadership et de responsabilité. Si ces passages ne sont pas faits, de façon créatrice et non pas défensive, les prochaines crises seront de terribles épreuves.

Et il faudra aussi, point que l'on oublie souvent au moment où l'on brandit la « coopération public-privé » comme dernier remède miracle, que le secteur privé n'est pas forcément préparé à agir sur de tels théâtres d'opérations, ni désireux de l'être.

**Governments cannot plan** to adequately respond [to large-scale crises] unless the private sector helps them understand what infrastructure truly is critical. [VI, p. 81]

States should utilize their licensing authorities to require providers of essential services and commodities, such as gas stations, pharmacies, and cell tower operators to equip their facilities with generators to enable them to operate in an emergency where central power is lost. [Appendix A, p. 93]

[The Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) working with DHS and the Department of Labor should inventory existing Federal infrastructure and resources which could be utilized for provisions of consolidated services to affected areas. Contingency plans should be developed for the utilization of Federal facilities, equipments such as phones, computers, and personnel on short-notice to provide consolidated services in response to a crisis. [Appendix A, p. 107]

[With respect to critical infrastructures], having restoration priorities will allow the Federal government to make crisis decisions informed by clearly established restoration priorities. [Appendix A, p. 111]

The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, should revise the National Response Plan and finalize the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. We must use this knowledge to inform Federal response and prioritization decisions and to support infrastructure restoration in order to save lives and mitigate the impact of the disaster on the Nation. (...)

DHS should revise the National Response Plan to: (a) **Provide for a stronger Infrastructure Support Branch in the National Operations Center**. The Infrastructure Support Branch will coordinate among the appropriate ESFs to ensure that the guidance developed by the Critical Infrastructure Policy Coordinating Committee is followed for infrastructure protection and restoration after an event. In addition, this branch will coordinate with critical infrastructure sectors, provide senior leaders with a summary of reports and modeling, and develop recommended preemptive and responsive actions to remediate or mitigate the impact of the loss of critical infrastructure. (...) (b) Strengthen the role and responsibility of the **Infrastructure Liaison**. Currently, the Infrastructure Liaison is designated (...) to serve as the principal advisor to the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) Coordination Group regarding all national and regional level critical infrastructure and key resource incident-related issues. This role should be more clearly defined, and have greater responsibility. (...) The liaison should: (1) Gather and fuse relevant data about private

infrastructure operational status; (2) Coordinate overall Federal response efforts for infrastructure restoration and recovery; and (3) Strengthen direct communications with private infrastructure owners and operators. This expanded Infrastructure Liaison will incorporate the Private Sector Liaisons to ensure unity of effort. (...)

DHS should revise the National Preparedness Goal to require the collaborative development of regional disaster plans (...) with the private sector. This activity will not only prepare the Federal government to respond, but will set private sector expectations of specific actions the government will take in response to a disaster. (...) There is a lack of a clear and agreed upon prioritized implementation plan to address the coordinated restoration and protection of critical infrastructure during times of limited resources and competing demands. (...)

DHS should (...) finalize the Interim [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] to: (...) (a) link the prioritization of both protection and restoration. (...) (b) Require the use of a systems and resiliency approach to determine the global consequence of the loss of each asset. Using a systems approach will clearly identify the assets in each region whose loss has the greatest potential to cause a national impact. (c) Address cross sector dependencies in the systems approach. (...) (d) Describe how those policy considerations that are learned in the prioritization for protection will be used to develop restoration priorities. The Federal government can develop priorities for restoring critical infrastructure using much of the same information used to prioritize protecting it. Having restoration priorities will allow the Federal government to make crisis decisions informed by clearly established restoration priorities. (...)

DHS should expand the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center's (NISAC) Modeling and Analysis capability to allow more robust and accurate systems modeling. (...) The National Economic Council should form an Impact Assessment Working Group to provide an overall economic assessment of major disasters, including the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, Energy (...) and Labor as well as the President's Council of Economic Advisers. Since Hurricane Katrina, NISAC has significantly improved their capability to provide reports detailing the cascading impact of major disasters on the Nation's infrastructure but it does not include a robust assessment of the economic impacts. The various economic modeling expertise of the members of the Impact Assessment Working Group should be incorporated into the NISAC models.

The Department of Commerce should lead, in cooperation with the Department of Treasury, Homeland Security, and other sector-specific agencies as appropriate, the development of a proposal (...) for incentives and other mechanisms to motivate private sector cooperation and participation in efforts to prioritize infrastructure protection. (...)

DHS should share the plans and policy for Federal response and delineated roles and responsibilities with the private sector. The National Response plan urges businesses to develop disaster contingency plans. [However], businesses have been unable to develop completely effective contingency plans without understanding the actions Federal, State, and local governments will take in response to a disaster. Furthermore, the Federal government has been unable to develop agreed upon response plans for prioritized restoration. [Therefore], the first step to establishing a collaborative planning and exercise program with the private sector is (...) (with appropriate protections) [to] share relevant sections of the NRP with key private sector partners. [Appendix A, pp. 110- 112]

## PLACE DES ARMÉES

Le réflexe usuel, à l'occasion de toute crise, est d'en appeler aux militaires. L'appel risque même de devenir de plus en plus fort avec les crises à venir et leur potentiel de destruction et de déstabilisation. Dans le même temps, les Armées ne sont plus ces grands corps de batailles napoléoniens, prêts à venir sur chaque site de catastrophe rejouer Iéna ou Austerlitz. Des réflexions sont en cours sur ces questions, notamment dans le registre de la coopération civilo-militaire. L'intérêt du cas Katrina est qu'il offre des éléments d'expérience permettant d'enrichir l'examen.

### 1. Présupposés constitutionnels et légaux

Section 331 of the Insurrection Act requires the State legislature or, in its absence, the State governor, to make a formal request of the Federal government before the President may send in Federal troops to assist State efforts to restore order. [II, p. 11]

[Trough] the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) (...), States make available to each other in time of crisis (...) National Guard troops. [II, p. 17]

### 2. L'expérience Katrina

#### 2.1. Avant l'impact : une forte mobilisation

Le monde de la Défense en général, dans ses multiples composantes, s'est bien mobilisé. On a bien envoyé des personnels en charge de la sécurité au Superdôme, par exemple.

Cela ne fait que consolider le questionnement de fond : si ces préparations furent effectives, et si les résultats ont été ce qu'ils furent, c'est bien qu'il y a une faille majeure de raisonnement et de modèle de référence. Et c'est là-dessus qu'il faut s'interroger, plus que sur « un peu plus de moyens ou de coordination à la marge ».

Well before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the Department of Defense (DOD) prepared for the 2005 hurricane season. Based on prior assistance for hurricane recovery operations, on August 19<sup>th</sup> the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order to prepare and organize for severe weather disaster operations. This order expedited the pre-positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense Coordinating Officers, to act as liaisons with other governmental organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. The order also authorized the use of DOD installations as logistical areas for FEMA. U.S. Northern Command directed a number of emergency deployment readiness exercises prior to FEMA requests, spending training funds to pre-position response capability. Once officially activated and deployed, DOD provided logistics support to FEMA, helping the Agency track items in motion. [Appendix B, p. 130]

[Just like] the Federal government, (...) the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the military command charged with defending the U.S. homeland and providing military support to civil authorities, (...) began monitoring the Tropical Depression [that would become Katrina] at its Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on [Tuesday], August 23. (...) On Wednesday, August 24, USNORTHCOM (...) issued a Warning Order for supporting commands to prepare for request for Department of Defense (DOD) assets should the need arise. [III, p. 22]

On Friday, August 26, (...) State agencies began putting their response plans into action. (...) [Meanwhile], the Louisiana National Guard began mobilizing 2,000 personnel while the Joint Forces headquarters-Louisiana National Guard activated its Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans to coordinate their emergency response operations. [Mississippi] Governor Barbour issued an Executive Order that directed Major General Harold Cross, Adjutant General of the Mississippi National Guard, to prepare to use the Mississippi National Guard for disaster relief operations. The Mississippi National Guard alerted military police and engineers, activated 750 personnel, and activated its [Emergency Operations Center] in Jackson. [III, p. 24]

In the final two days before Hurricane Katrina's second landfall, (...) Mississippi's State Emergency Response Team (ERT) deployed to Camp Shelby while National Guard emergency rescue assets were deployed to three coastal counties [in the State]. The Louisiana National Guard deployed liaison officers to the thirteen southernmost parishes projected to suffer the greatest impact from the storm. (...) Alabama National Guard troops were positioned in Mobile and Baldwin Counties in preparation for landfall. [III, p. 26]

At 1:15pm EDT, FEMA [on Saturday, August 27] issued its first Mission Assignment to USNORTHCOM "to provide NAS Meridian (Mississippi) as a FEMA operational Staging Base for pre-staging of FEMA supplies prior to landfall". USNORTHCOM granted this request later that afternoon, releasing an Execute [sic] Order making Naval Air Station Meridian available to FEMA. [III, p. 27]

By early morning on Sunday, (...) the U.S. Coast Guard, in preparation for anticipated operations, placed Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) on standby for deployment to Southeast Louisiana and evacuated its District 8 New Orleans Command Center. [III, p. 28]

[During the teleconference held on Sunday, August 28], Secretary Chertoff inquired into DOD's level of engagement with FEMA, to ensure coordination of DOD support should it become necessary, and was assured by Director Brown that DOD was fully engaged. [III, p. 29]

The Louisiana National Guard (...) pre-positioned some supplies at the Superdome. (...) In addition to stocking the superdome with food [{"meals ready to eat", MREs}] and water, the Louisiana National Guard sent additional personnel to the Superdome throughout the day on Sunday, August 28. The National Guard's Special Reaction Team, a unit "highly trained in Law Enforcement missions," arrived [at the Superdome on Sunday morning] (...) with forty-six members. The team "began conducting Law and Order / Area Security missions." More National Guard forces got to the Dome in the early afternoon. By 3:00 pm CDT, the 527<sup>th</sup> Ready Reaction Force had arrived in the Superdome with 220 personnel, and had as their principal mission crowd control. The 225<sup>th</sup> Engineer Group joined that evening with 220 soldiers "to assist with security operations." Another 100 personnel from the 159<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing came to help out with security. Medical personnel arrived at the Superdome from the Louisiana National Guard contingent as well. [III, p. 30]

The amount of space required to house the large volumes of [pre-positioned] commodities and people required large industrial and military staging areas (...) accessible to heavy equipment and aircraft. (...) On Sunday, [August 28], FEMA opened a Federal logistics mobilization center at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. [III, p. 31]

## 2.2. Après l'impact

Les descriptions fournies donnent la mesure du caractère pharaonique de la réponse. Il manque cependant, ici encore, un effort d'analyse qui aille au-delà de la simple compilation. Par exemple, si les Coast Guards ont pu opérer comme ils l'ont fait, c'est non seulement en

raison de leur excellence technique et tactique, mais tout autant sinon davantage du fait de leur culture, de leur intégration très fine et multiforme dans les multiples tissus locaux.<sup>55</sup> Il aurait fallu aller beaucoup plus loin dans l'examen.

### *Opérations impliquant divers Corps militaires*

Federal search and rescue assets from the Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Federal agencies worked in concert with State and local responders to rescue tens of thousands of people [trapped by the flood, especially in New Orleans]. [IV, p. 38]

Since neither the Louisiana nor the New Orleans evacuation plans addressed evacuation protocols for post-landfall, State and local officials worked with FEMA, DOD, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct the post-landfall evacuation. [IV, p. 38]

[In the week after landfall], a joint DHS, DOT, and DOD airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people [from New Orleans]. (...) DOT coordinated with private air carriers and the Department of Defense's Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to begin the massive airlift. (...) In addition to (...) civilian flights, the Department of Defense simultaneously conducted a major medical airlift from the airport. [IV, p. 40]

Active duty military and National Guard personnel provided critical emergency response and security support to the Gulf Coast during the height of the crisis. (...) National Guard forces that deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi operated under the command of their respective Governors. (...) Active duty forces, on the other hand, fell under the command of the President and had more limited civil response authority. [IV, p. 42]

Issues of [separated command structures] (...) and interoperability challenges were (...) present [between the National Guard and active duty forces, but also] between the military and civilian leadership. This lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that [civilian] emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment. [IV, p. 43]

[After a private contractor] withdrew from [its] agreement with FEMA [with respect to the recovery of bodies on the ground], (...) FEMA (...) [requested] that DOD take over the body recovery effort. [IV, p. 48]

[Because of the] separate command structures for active duty military and the National Guard (...) FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing [that] State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs. [V, p. 55]

The overall search and rescue effort demonstrated the need for greater coordination between US&R, the Coast Guard, and military responders who, because of their very different missions, train and operate in very different ways. (...) Lacking an integrated search and rescue incident command, the various agencies were unable to effectively coordinate their operations. [V, p. 57]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (...) created a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC). Once the LECC was established, all law enforcement personnel and agencies (including those provided by the National Guard) had a unified command structure. (...) The LECC coordinated all law enforcement activities in the New Orleans area, bringing together Federal, State, and local law enforcement (...) including National Guard and DOD military police to provide assistance and support to the New Orleans Police Department. [Appendix B, p. 132]

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<sup>55</sup> Entretiens dans le cadre de la mission EDF sur place.



[The Department of Energy facilitated the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port's] communication with the U.S. Coast Guard to get their shipping lanes surveyed, which resulted in a U.S. Navy minesweeper being deployed to the area. [Appendix B, p. 135]

The Air Transport Association (...) coordinated (...) DOD and civilian flights [during the airlift]. [Appendix B, p. 136]

### *Armée régulière*

On August 30, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England authorized U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all appropriate measures to plan and conduct disaster relief operations in support of FEMA. USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) at Camp Shelby to coordinate the growing military response to the disaster.

By [Thursday], September 1, JTF-Katrina, commanded by LTG Honoré, included approximately 3,000 active duty personnel in the disaster area; within four days, that number climbed to 14,232 active duty personnel. LTG Honoré's leadership, combined with the Department of Defense's resources, manpower, and advanced planning, contributed to the military's success in the Federal response, especially in areas such as search and rescue, security, and logistical support. Two C-130 firefighting aircraft and seven helicopters supported firefighting operations in New Orleans. By September 5, military helicopters had performed 963 search and rescue, evacuation, and supply delivery missions. Military personnel also assisted Federal, State and local agencies with other needs as well. For example, DOD aircraft flew mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions over 2 million acres to prevent the spread of mosquito- and water-borne diseases. Military personnel also performed such missions as salvage, sewage restoration, relief worker billeting, air traffic control, and fuel distribution. [IV, pp. 42-43]

DHS[s] (...) National Coordinating Center (NCC) (...) coordinated with MCI and AT&T, as well as USNORTHCOM to identify and deploy mobile communication assets to the Gulf region both prior to, and following, landfall. [IV, p. 44]

FEMA turned to DOD for major support in [the] area [of logistics]. On September 3, Secretary Rumsfeld directed USNORTHCOM to execute greater logistical support operations in both Louisiana and Mississippi. [IV, p. 45]

Inadequate planning delayed the overall process of accepting and receiving disaster aid from abroad. (...) A German company offered the use of a \$3 million integrated satellite and cellular telephone system capable of handling 5,000 calls at once, only to wait five days for a written deployment order from USNORTHCOM. [IV, pp. 45-46]

U.S. Army soldiers provided a number of services in support of Local, State, Federal, and private-sector activities, including medical treatment (e.g. thousands of immunizations), debris clearing, evacuation, planning, and performance of search and rescue missions. (...) The U.S. Navy mobilized more than 10,000 naval personnel to the affected Gulf Coast region, as well as 8 aircraft, and 16 ships, including amphibious construction equipment and mobile diving salvage units, particularly useful in flood conditions. (...) The 53<sup>rd</sup> Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (also known as the Hurricane Hunters), of the 403<sup>rd</sup> Wing, is composed of U.S. Air Force Reservists. Flying out of Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi, it is the only military unit flying into hurricanes and tropical storms. The unit followed Hurricane Katrina from inception to landfall, and provided critical reconnaissance information to the National Hurricane Center throughout the event. They maintained daily hurricane vigilance. Other Air Force personnel supported recovery and relief operations, including transportation of more than 13,000 people, air traffic control, and aerial lift, refueling, photography, search and rescue, and medical evacuation. [Appendix B, p. 131]



### *National Guard*

Governors Barbour and Blanco requested additional National Guard assets from other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to assist State and local emergency responders. National Guard forces continued to deploy to the region as States responded in the days following landfall. [IV, p. 37]

Within four hours of landfall, Army National Guard helicopters were airborne and actively performing rescue missions, with other National Guard personnel joining the effort on the ground. [IV, p. 38]

[The] Superdome (...) had lost power during the storm, leaving only dim lighting from emergency generators. Louisiana National Guard personnel worked to protect the stadium's emergency generators from rising floodwaters. [IV, p. 39]

Guardsmen performed a range of missions, including search and rescue, including search and rescue, security, evacuations, and distribution of food and water. In Mississippi, National Guard forces prepared Camp Shelby as a staging point for incoming forces and also engaged in law enforcement support, debris removal, shelter support and other vital operations. Guardsmen from Texas and Pennsylvania supplied satellite phone communications to the response. (...) By August 29, sixty-five National Guard helicopters were positioned throughout the Gulf Coast. By [Friday], September 2, nearly 22,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen had deployed to the region – including 6,500 in New Orleans alone). (...) Eventually, over 50,000 National Guard members from fifty-four States, Territories, and the District of Columbia deployed to the Gulf Coast, providing critical response assistance during this week of crisis. The robust active duty and National Guard response played a crucial role in the effort to bring stability to the areas ravaged by Hurricane Katrina. [IV, p. 43]

On August 31, National Guard Bureau Chief LTG Blum reported that DOD was “pushing every communication asset that we have” [to the affected areas]. [IV, p. 44]

Law enforcement personnel operating in [New Orleans in the weeks following landfall included] (...) the New Orleans Police Department, the Louisiana State Police, the National Guard, and (...) Federal law enforcement personnel. (...) On September 12, the DOD stated (...) that the “military presence deters criminals” [in New Orleans]. (...) By September 13, the City of New Orleans reported law enforcement and military personnel had successfully reestablished security in the City. [IV, p. 47]

In Louisiana, the Livingston Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness conducted search and rescue missions in the City of New Orleans for 16 days after the storm with the Arizona National Guard 855<sup>th</sup> Military Police. [Appendix B, p. 128]

The Mississippi National Guard, supported with Guard members from many other States, performed superbly throughout the response, carrying out a number of duties, including clearing key roads, search and rescue, and getting supplies in the hands of victims as quickly as possible. [Appendix B, p. 131]

Many organizations and agencies that responded to Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing flood arrived in the region without much experience with or knowledge of the affected States and their geography. [But] a National Guard member (...) – also of the USDA [(Department of Agriculture)] National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) utilized the organization's digital [topographic] data (ordinarily used to produce conservation plans) (...) to create (...) much needed maps of the affected regions. (...) In addition to hand-delivering these maps to National Guard units, [he and his] team also delivered maps to local police, law enforcement officers arriving from other States, and FEMA. [Appendix B, p. 137]

### *Army Corps of Engineers*

Mid-afternoon on [Monday], August 29, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) notified DHS of (...) reported levee [breaches]. (...) Throughout the morning and early afternoon on [Tuesday], August 30, the USACE continued to determine the extent of the damage, and assess whether the levees could be repaired. At Governor Blanco's (...) press conference on August 30, FEMA Director Michael Brown stated that (...) the USACE was diligently working on a repair plan [for the levees]. The USACE worked throughout the remainder of Tuesday but despite best efforts, by Wednesday morning, it was becoming clear that the repairs could take weeks or months. [IV, p. 36]

State and local government are normally responsible for debris removal. However, in the event of a disaster in which State and local government are overwhelmed and request assistance, the Federal government can provide (...) assistance, [for instance through] debris removal by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). [V, p. 62]

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers led the removal of 224 billion gallons [853 Mns de m<sup>3</sup> of water from New Orleans in 43 days, enabling recovery and repair operations. [Appendix B, p. 131]

[It was urgent to get] electricity back on at the water pumps at Lake Livingston Pumping Station. This pumping station supplies Houston with water. (...) DOE, as the lead for ESF-12, pulled CenterPoint Energy, Entergy, Army Corps of Engineers, City of Houston, and the Coastal Water Authority (who ran the pumping station) together on a conference call to discuss the situation. [Appendix B, p. 135]

Coordinating with FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and their sister organizations within the [Department of Interior] (DOI), the Bureau of Reclamation mobilized equipment and staff in response to the hurricane and flood. [Appendix B, p. 139]

Nancy Jones [had prepared] (...) a Hurricane Debris Management Plan (...) for the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) while participating in the "Hurricane Pam" planning workshops. Because of this experience, the USACE specifically requested that Ms. Jones be deployed to assist USACE in handling the debris collection and segregation of the hazardous materials resulting from Hurricane Katrina. She was instrumental in setting up the collection and debris management plan in many of the eastern Parishes including the City of New Orleans. Her coordination with the USACE made the response to the hurricane more efficient and effective. [Appendix B, p. 142]

### *Coast Guard*

At 6pm EDT [on Monday, August 29<sup>th</sup>], aboard a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA (...) official, [confirmed reports of levee breaches]. [IV, p. 36]

Immediately following Katrina's (...) landfall, Coast Guard assets began conducting rescue operations throughout the Gulf Region. [IV, p. 38]

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard jointly led an interagency environmental assessment and recovery effort, cleaning up the seven million gallons of oil [that had spilled in the Gulf Coast waterways] and resolving **over 2,300 reported cases of pollution.** [V, p. 61]

**Almost 6,000 U.S. Coast Guard personnel** (active duty, Reserve, Auxiliary, and civilian members) from throughout the country conducted one of the largest search and rescue missions in [the] history [of the Coast Guard] as part of an even larger multi-agency, multi-level search and rescue effort. **They retrieved more than 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast, including more than 12,000 by air, and 11,000 by surface, plus 9,403 evacuated from hospitals. Almost one-third of the Coast Guard's entire fleet was dedicated to rescue efforts.** Coast Guard personnel also worked tirelessly in multi-agency teams to reconstitute

waterways and conduct environmental assessments. They restored hundreds of buoys and channel markers that were missing or destroyed in the hurricane. Their efforts to restore these and other navigational aids and waterways allowed maritime industry in the area to return to normal faster. [Appendix B, p. 129]

#### *Department of Veterans Affairs*

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) used its extensive resources to deliver care to evacuees and veterans from the affected region. [IV, p. 46]

Despite offers [among others] from the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) (...) to provide thousands of housing units nationwide, FEMA focused its housing efforts on cruise ships and trailers. [V, p. 60]

The Department of Veterans Affairs (...) provided medical services, hospital beds, and medications in accordance with its standing emergency health care mission. (...) By Friday, Sept. 2, all [VA] patients, employees, and family members had been safely evacuated from the VA [hospital] in New Orleans, using boats, military trucks, and military transport planes. [Appendix B, p. 141]

#### *Autres*

To augment FEMA's effort [with respect to emergency communication], DOD deployed available communications assets to the affected areas, such as its Deployable Joint Command and Control System. [IV, p. 44]

Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) and DOD health officials collaborated with State and local health officials [to address public health issues]. [IV, p. 46]

[During] the response to Hurricane Katrina, (...) the NSA was instrumental in matching up missing family members, and the NGA provided valuable overhead imagery of the disaster site. [Appendix A, p. 94]

The U.S. Marine Corps helped local government reinvigorate their infrastructures and augmented search and rescue operations. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (...) World Wide Navigational Warning Service (...) provided navigation information to the U.S. Navy, Merchant Marine, and Coast Guard. [Appendix B, p. 131]

The Department of Education (...) worked [among others] with the Defense Logistics Agency (...) to (...) quickly provide thousands of pieces of furniture, computers and other equipment from (...) [their] surplus to schools in need. [Appendix B, p. 139]

### **3. Leçons et recommandations : développer les coordinations**

Le rapport souligne que la Défense a énormément à apporter dans les situations de catastrophe majeure. Ce fut la composante fédérale la plus performante durant Katrina, soulignent les auteurs. Dans cette ligne, tout doit être fait pour développer les meilleures coordinations avec le DHS, la FEMA, et bien d'autres grandes organisations, notamment au plus près du terrain, en assurant un fonctionnement de la cellule de crise avancée qui, à l'avenir, prévoit une place essentielle à la Défense.

#### *Des coordinations internes à parfaire*

As demonstrated during the Hurricane Katrina response, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a significant joint force provider for homeland security missions. (...) However, NGB's role in homeland security is not yet clearly defined. (...)

[...] the Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on **increased integration** with active duty forces for homeland security plans and activities. [V, p. 55]

In addition to the National Guards, the other Reserve Components of the military services should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions. Reserve components historically have focused on military and war fighting missions, which will continue; however, we should recognize that the Reserve components are too valuable a skilled and available resource at home not to be ready to incorporate them in any Federal response planning and effort. (...) **Efforts should be made to leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts.**

DOD should (...) enhance National Guard capabilities by resourcing and fully implementing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) State, (...) [which] is key to rapid deployment of National Guard forces in response to a catastrophe.<sup>56</sup>

The transformation of JFHQ-State and other National Guard capabilities for homeland security missions will ensure response forces are available in each DHS region. These capabilities should support NRP requirements including: security, maintenance, aviation, engineer, medical, communications, transportation, and logistics. The National Guard should develop **rapid reaction forces** capable of responding to an incident within 24 hours. This is vital to future rapid deployment of National Guard forces in response to a catastrophe. (...)

JFHQ-State will provide the **command structure** in which to lead and direct arriving Federal response capabilities, forming the backbone of State Incident Command System (ICS) and, as a result, the Federal Joint Field Office (JFO). It will facilitate unity of effort and provide the situational awareness needed for an effective response. To that end, the Command, Control, Communications, and Information (...) structure must be interoperable and satisfy a common set of mission essential tasks.

[DOD should] develop the capability to rapidly activate a JTF-State for contingencies.<sup>57</sup>

JTF-State is a forward deployed command group that can stage assets (by conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration); provide situational awareness and initial command and control for both State governors (for National Guard troops) and USNORTHCOM (for Federal active duty troops); and provide State level components to a Federal active duty JTF, should one be required. JTF-State coordinates with USNORTHCOM and State authorities to ensure the application of the full capability of the Joint Force for domestic response missions. A key component of the JTF-State should be the State's WMD [Civil Support Teams] (CSTs). The option [of] expanding the role of the CSTs to an all-hazards response team should be explored. This (...) would improve situational awareness and command and control capabilities at the State level.<sup>58</sup>

A JTF-State model streamlines the command structure exercising command and control over all assigned forces supporting civil authorities. The JTF command and control architecture should provide a wide network to build a single common operating picture that increases situational awareness and redundancy. The JTF should assume command and control of Federal active duty forces and National Guard forces from other States. (...) If and when necessary, this JTF model enables a National Guard Commander familiar with

<sup>56</sup> Cf. sur JFHQ-State : <http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/hld/jfhq/factsheet.asp>

<sup>57</sup> Cf. sur JTF-State : <http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/hld/jtf/factsheet.asp>

<sup>58</sup> Cf. sur WMD CSTs : <http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/hld/cst/factsheet.asp>

State and local area of operations to serve both in a Federal and State status providing both unity of effort and unity of command for Federal and State forces.

DOD should consider assigning additional personnel (to include General officers) from the National Guard and the reserves of the military services to USNORTHCOM to achieve enhanced integration of Active and reserve component forces for homeland security missions. [Appendix A, pp. 94-96]

### ***DOD/DHS***

DOD should support DHS development of an analysis and operational planning capability to enable DHS to predict detailed requirements and plan for specific actions needed to respond to future disasters. This DOD:DHS element should assess past catastrophic disasters and the successes and failures of the overall responses to those events. This information should inform detailed planning for future disaster response. [Appendix A, pp. 94-96]

Federal, State, and local logistical planners should use the best practices (...) from DOD as the standard to develop improved operational capabilities and coordination procedures in the [public sector's] logistics system. (...) DOD should detail logistics planners to DHS to assist in develop [a new Federal] logistics system. DOD and DHS should review and consider supply chain management best practices in developing the DHS logistics system. DOD should assist DHS in developing its logistics system; train DHS personnel in logistics managements; exercise the DHS logistics system; and assist operating DHS' logistics management system until a fully mature capability exists. [Appendix A, p. 99]

As outlined by the NRP, law enforcement personnel should be drawn from the following sources, *in this order*: 1) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from affected State[s] 2) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from other States; and 3) Civilian law enforcement from Federal agencies. [Appendix A, p. 103]

DHS should jointly lead DOD/US [Army Corps of Engineers] (USACE), [the Department of the Interior] (DOI), [the Department of Agriculture] (USDA), and [the Environmental Protection Agency] (EPA) to address and coordinate debris removal issues as part of ESF operational procedures. [Appendix A, p. 112]

[With respect to] foreign assistance, (...) [the Department of State] (DOS) should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying responsibilities of DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and other supporting agencies in response to domestic incidents. [Appendix A, p. 113]

DHS and DOS should revise the NRP to include DOD (...) as [a] cooperating [agency] to the International Coordination Support Annex. Including DOD more directly in foreign assistance management would leverage existing relationships with partner military establishments and help to ensure that staging areas for the acceptance of foreign aid are preplanned and quickly available. [Appendix A, p. 114]

### ***Des coordinations connexes***

DOD and DHS should plan and prepare for a significant DOD supporting role during a catastrophic event. DOD's joint operational response doctrine is an integral part of the national effort and must be fully integrated into the national response at all levels of government. DOD should have a contingency role and a requirement to assist DHS with expertise in logistics, planning, and total asset visibility. DOD should coordinate with DHS and [the Department of Transportation] (DOT) to identify DOD's contingency role in airport operations and evacuations, and the planning and use of Ready Reserve Fleet vessels for housing, evacuation, communications, command, control, and logistics. The

NRP and Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) should specify the specific requirements for DOD resources based on the magnitude and type of a catastrophic event.

DOD should provide support from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) as part of overall DOD support to DHS under the NRP to provide technical skills, situational awareness, imagery support, analysis and assessment for responding to catastrophic events. (...) NGA and NSA have significant technical capabilities that should be integrated into the Nation's preparation and response efforts. NGA and NSA have the capability to rapidly provide situational awareness and analysis. The response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted that NGA and NSA possess unique capabilities that can be utilized in homeland missions, to include severe weather events. (...) These agencies have established relationships with governmental and private/commercial entities, which can be integrated as part of a larger national response effort. NGA and NSA roles and support to the homeland security mission should be added into the agencies' core mission statements. NGA and NSA support should be coordinated with civil agencies providing geospatial support and analysis, including the U.S. Geological Survey. (...) In order to meet these new mission requirements these agencies need to expand from a legacy focus of being a producer [of information] to a broader role as a service provider. (...)

DHS should [promote] much better [logistical] planning efforts between State and Federal emergency management logisticians and operations personnel, [with] the assistance and advice of DOD strategic logistics planners, and more robust private sector partnerships. (...) [Appendix A, pp. 94-96]

[The Department of Transportation] (DOT) should, in coordination with [the Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS), DOD, [the Department of Veterans Affairs] (VA), DHS, and the American Red Cross (ARC) plan, train, and conduct exercises for the timely evacuation of patients and transportation of medical supplies and personnel. (...) DOT should coordinate directly with HHS, DOD, VA, [the Department of Agriculture] (USDA), DHS and ARC, as well as State and local agencies, to plan, train and exercise for mass evacuations. [Appendix A, pp. 99-100]

[The Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) should organize, train, equip, and roster medical and public health professionals in pre-configured and deployable teams. These personnel should be comprised of officers of the Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), the [National Disaster Medical System] (NDMS), health care providers within DOD and the [Department for Veterans Affairs] (VA), and volunteer health professionals from the private sector. [Appendix A, p. 105]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 transformed the Department of Defense (DOD) into a truly integrated department by requiring an assignment in another branch of the Armed Forces as a prerequisite for promotion. (...) Similar legislation should be considered for the Federal government to achieve the same sort of integration across Executive Branch departments and agencies. [Appendix A, p. 120]

DOD should work with DHS and State officials to improve integration of military response capabilities. [Appendix A, pp. 94-96]

[Federal] departments and agencies (...) should develop a national system of information management to provide a common operating picture which allows for the processing and timely provisioning of interagency information sources (e.g. DOD National Military Command System, National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Strategic Information Operations Center). [Appendix A, p. 92]



### ***Le Department of Defense dans le centre de crise avancé (en local)***

[In the future], in order to enhance coordination of military resources supporting the response, [we should] co-locate a single Department of Defense point of contact at the [Joint Field Office] (JFO) and (...) FEMA regional offices. [VII, p. 83]

It is critical that each [Homeland Security] Region have the resources, equipment, and personnel to establish a [Joint Field Office] (JFO) after a major disaster. This JFO should be built using available State, local, and/or National Guard infrastructure. [Appendix A, p. 90]

### ***Formation et perfectionnement***

DHS should (...) strengthen relationships with the Defense Information School, Navy Post Graduate School, National Defense University, and other academic institutions. These Federal partners can assist in providing training and certification to [Federal], State and local emergency management (...) personnel. [Appendix A, p. 109]

All agencies with operational components should establish and fund Remedial Action Management Programs (RAMPs) (...) to identify and incorporate lessons learned. (...) To assist in this effort, DOD should work closely with DHS to establish the overall program, using the current DOD model as a basis. [Appendix A, p. 118]

To assist Federal, State and local collaboration [in training and exercises], DHS should develop and fund a National Exercise Simulation Center (SIMCEN), similar to the Department of Defense's Joint Warfighting Center. [Appendix A, p. 119]

### ***Une National Homeland Security University (NHSU)***

DHS should establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU) (...). [In doing so], DHS should consider leveraging the infrastructure and expertise at the National Defense University by partnering with DOD to have the NHSU be a joint DHS/DOD initiative that focuses on both Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. [Appendix A, pp. 120-121]

The Naval Postgraduate School [and] the National Defense University, [among others], (...) are critical national resources for developing skilled and knowledgeable homeland security professionals. Departments and agencies should ensure that these and other similar homeland security educational programs have the greatest impact. This should include requiring State and local participation in such programs through Federal fellowships. (...) DHS should pursue opportunities to replicate innovative educational programs, such as the joint New York City Fire Department-U.S. Military Academy's Counterterrorism Leadership Program. (...) The White House, (...) [through the establishment of] a Presidential Board, (...) should (...) should provide a roadmap for uniting the efforts of DHS, DOD, and other departments and agencies in educating, training and preparing our leaders for their crucial roles in safeguarding the Nation. [Appendix A, p. 121]

## **4. La question des crises cataclysmiques et de la place des Armées**

On sent bien, au travers du rapport, la prégnance des préoccupations essentielles de l'Exécutif américain. Le problème, ce n'est pas tellement la catastrophe naturelle, mais l'acte terroriste majeur, l'attaque nucléaire multiple. Et le raisonnement bascule. On évoque alors le tableau d'une région entière anéantie, dans toutes ses capacités de leadership ; une société pulvérisée et basculant dans le néant. Alors, la Défense doit prendre le leadership, alors il faut que l'Armée puisse intervenir d'elle-même, dans une logique de push-system pleine et entière. Certes, le rapport reste discret, mais cela semble bien l'essentiel de la préoccupation.

Ces questions sont majeures. Il faut y réfléchir avec tout le sérieux nécessaire. D'une part, il faut effectivement prendre en considération l'hypothèse d'une région incapable de se piloter encore, dans la ligne de ce qui s'est produit à la Nouvelle-Orléans – et même à des niveaux encore bien plus extrêmes<sup>59</sup>. À l'inverse, il est certainement bien dangereux de faire l'hypothèse d'une société "totalement anéantie" où les dynamiques de vie ne pourraient venir que d'un corps militaire extérieur, seule organisation à surnager encore. Quoi qu'il en soit, ces situations extrêmes devraient faire l'objet de recherches et de réflexions, à la hauteur des enjeux.

With the exception of the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard – two organizations with considerable operational capabilities – the Federal government was at times slow and ineffective in responding to the massive operational demands of the catastrophe. [VI, pp. 68-69]

The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to play a critical role in the Nation's response to catastrophic events. During the Katrina response, DOD – both National Guard and active duty forces – demonstrated that along with the Coast Guard it was one of the only Federal departments that possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground. In addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers that have been trained and equipped for their missions, DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities. Since DOD, first and foremost, has its critical [mission] overseas, (...) the solution to improving the Federal response to future catastrophes cannot simply be "let the Department of Defense do it." Yet DOD capabilities must be better identified and integrated into the Nation's response plans.

The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted various challenges in the use of military capabilities during domestic incidents. For instance, limitations under Federal law and DOD policy caused the active duty military to be dependent on requests for assistance. These limitations resulted in a slowed application of DOD resources during the initial response. (...)

[This process is not satisfactory, especially since] one could imagine a situation in which a catastrophic event is of such a magnitude that it would require an even greater role for the Department of Defense. (...) We should [now] (...) define the circumstances under which [DOD] will push resources to State and local governments [even in the absence of] a request. [V, p. 54]

The Department of Homeland Security and Defense should jointly plan for the Department of Defense's support of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the Federal response. [V, p. 55]

DOD and DHS should develop recommendations for revision of the NRP to delineate the circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when DOD might temporarily assume the lead for the Federal response to a catastrophic incident. (...) DOD should develop plans to lead the Federal response for events of extraordinary scope and nature (e.g., nuclear incident or multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks causing a breakdown in civil society).

DOD should revise its Immediate Response Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even without a request from local authorities. [Appendix A, pp. 94-96]

<sup>59</sup> Une référence extrême étant celle d'Hiroshima : « Un peuple psychiquement anéanti fuyait une cité physiquement détruite » (p. 65-66), Michihiko Hachiya, *Journal d'Hiroshima – 6 août-30 septembre 1945*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1957.

DOD should develop plans to lead the Federal response for events of extraordinary scope and nature (e.g., nuclear incident or multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks causing a breakdown in civil society). [Appendix A, p. 94]

Reserve components [of the military] historically have focused on military and war fighting missions, which will continue; however, we should recognize that the Reserve components are too valuable a skilled and available resource at home not to be ready to incorporate them in any Federal response planning and effort. [Appendix A, p. 95]

Kathleen J. Tierney<sup>60</sup> pointe le risque d'une militarisation du domaine des crises :

*“The position taken by the Bush administration – that the United States is now at war with terrorism and will be for the foreseeable future– has the potential for drastically expanding military participation within the nation’s borders in a variety of activities that formerly were considered the domain of civil authorities, including emergency management. This shift raises questions regarding the extent to which military culture, doctrine, and modes of operation are consistent with the crisis-related needs and requirements of a diverse civil society. War and domestic emergencies are not analogous, and new domestic military missions that conflate disaster response with battlefield operations could ultimately be detrimental to both.”* (p. 410-411)

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<sup>60</sup> Kathleen J. Tierney, idem.

## LE CITOYEN

Le rapport souligne l'importance de l'implication individuelle dans les préparations, la réaction, l'éducation. Et notamment le fait de disposer de trois jours d'autonomie de subsistance pour les familles, ce qui permettrait une meilleure allocation des ressources publiques dans le traitement des priorités.

Il est bon que le dossier soit ouvert. Il conviendrait maintenant d'aller plus loin.

- Veiller à ne pas tomber dans le piège d'une mobilisation individuelle qui aurait comme véritable objectif de pallier les carences des responsables.
  - Veiller à ne pas en rester à l'idée bateau qu'il convient seulement de « former les enfants en maternelle ».
  - Tenter d'éclairer ce qui est à demander au citoyen, et ce qu'il ne faut pas lui demander. Tenter notamment de clarifier les domaines dans lesquels il peut être inefficace, voire dangereux<sup>61</sup>, d'impliquer le citoyen.
  - On peut aussi recommander que le citoyen sache s'intégrer dans des associations, pour dépasser le simple statut de badaud atomisé de bonne volonté (mais n'oubliant pas non plus le risque d'enrôlement, pour des causes étrangères au seul impératif de sauvetage humanitaire).
  - Veiller aussi à ne pas tomber dans des raisonnements oublieux de toute science sociale : on ne peut approcher l'individu sans le prendre dans ses relations sociales, point capital dans les crises.<sup>62</sup>
  - Prendre garde à ne pas adopter rapidement le point de vue des seules institutions, qui peuvent avoir vite fait de verser dans un Command and Control expéditif.<sup>63</sup>
- Bref, des questions difficiles se posent qui exigent un véritable travail, des débats rigoureux.

### 1. Des individus exemplaires

“There are lessons learned that we don't need to change: the lesson of courage... the determination of our citizens... the compassion of our fellow citizens... the decency of men and women.” – President George W. Bush. [Appendix B, p. 125]

[Beyond the failures], there are other, [successful] stories from Katrina. (...) These are the stories of the men and women of our military, our law enforcement and fire

<sup>61</sup> Par exemple, le cas de bénévoles qui viennent s'exposer à des produits dangereux, comme lors des marées noires ; ce qui peut d'ailleurs, par la suite, se traduire par des actions en justice pour exposition dangereuse. (Entretiens avec le Préfet Christian Frémont).

<sup>62</sup> Voir par exemple : Jeanne S. Hurlbert, John Beggs, and Valerie A. Haines : “Bridges Over Troubled Waters: What are the Optimal Networks for Katrina's Victims?”, Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, [http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Hurlbert\\_Beggs\\_Haines/](http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Hurlbert_Beggs_Haines/) : “Our research also showed that the structure of individuals' social networks prior to the storm affected the degree to which the activated ties for help in the preparation and recovery phases”.

<sup>63</sup> “When the National Guard did arrive, it was quickly apparent that they were working under orders to control the city militarily and protect property rather than bring aid to the desperate. Angry citizens, who waded through the fetid city looking for promised buses that never came, were prevented at gunpoint, from getting out. “We are not turning the West Bank [ a New Orleans suburb] into another Supedome”, argued one suburban sheriff. Groups of refugees who tried to organize water, food, and shelter collectively were also broken up at gunpoint by the national guard.” Neil Smith: “There's No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster”, Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith>

departments, our private citizens, non-government organizations and our faith-based groups. **These are the stories of the human side of Katrina.** [Appendix B, p. 125]

[In addition to NGOs and faith-based groups], private citizens also provided assistance and resources in the aftermath of the storm. [Appendix B, p. 126]

[Coast Guard] Officer Rodney L. Gordon (...) took charge and single-handedly performed [vital repairs to Naval Air Station assets] (...) enabling hundreds of aircraft to continue life-saving missions. [Appendix B, p. 129]

**Many victims of the hurricane and flood took charge of their own medical care** to the extent that they could. In response to their demands for more information, for two weeks immediately after the hurricane and flood, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) expanded their program for medical consultation (...) specifically [to advise] patients and the worried (...) in the affected region. [Appendix B, p. 134]

A member of the [Department of Transportation] Region Ten Emergency ESF-1 response cadre, John Calvin (...) played a crucial role in post-landfall evacuation operations. (...) He personally coordinated and led the evacuation [by helicopter] of over 200 patients and staff (...) from (...) Louisiana State University hospital in downtown New Orleans. (...) His personal efforts were instrumental in moving 210,000 people from New Orleans to shelters. [Appendix B, p. 136]

[The] chief engineer at the New Orleans VA Medical Center single-handedly kept the hospital supplied with necessary power and utilities to ensure adequate care for patients, employees and their families. [Appendix B, p. 141]

## 2. Des citoyens informés, notamment de ce qu'ils peuvent attendre des autorités

Our citizens need to **know what to expect from their government**, in order to make sure they do everything possible at their level to protect themselves and their loved ones. [VI, p. 82]

We must begin a national dialogue on (...) preparedness. (...) This dialogue must result in a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities (...) of [all stakeholders, from] the Federal government (...) [to] individual citizens. [VI, p. 82]

## 3. Des citoyens actifs, préparés, organisés et financés

Millions of Americans were reminded [by Katrina's consequences] of **the need to protect themselves and their families.** [Foreword, p. 1]

On May 16, 2005, (...) the National Hurricane Center (NHC) [reminded the public that] (...) “[during] last year’s hurricane season, (...) residents in hurricane vulnerable areas who had a plan, and took *individual responsibility* for acting on those plans, fared far better than those who did not.” [III, p. 21] [Mes italiques]

During a press conference [on Sunday, August 28], (...) Mayor [Nagin] (...) advised that anyone seeking shelter [at the Superdome] should “come with enough food, non perishable items to last for three to five days. Come with blankets, with pillows.” [III, p. 30]

Our planning and operational documents should [recognize that] (...) individuals play important roles in operational capabilities as well as response activities. [VI, p. 77]

Complacency of our citizens presents a great challenge [to our preparedness]. [VI, p. 79]

Our preparedness culture must (...) emphasize the importance of citizen and community preparedness. Citizen and community preparedness are among the most effective means of preventing terrorist attacks as well as protecting against, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all hazards. (...) Citizens and communities can help themselves by becoming more prepared. **If every family maintained the resources to live in their homes without electricity and running water for three days, we could allocate more Federal, State, and local response resources to saving lives.** Similarly, if every family developed their own emergency preparedness plan, they almost certainly would reduce the demand for outside emergency resources. As the 9/11 Commission Report states, “One clear lesson of September 11 is that individual civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability that they will survive, should disaster strike”. (...) Public officials at the Federal, State, and local levels (...) should begin a public dialogue that emphasizes (...) the importance of citizen preparedness. DHS should continue to build upon those programs and institutions that already work, such as Department of Education (...) school [information] programs. (...) The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and community preparedness. This campaign should (...) [focus] on the importance of individual and community responsibility for all-hazard disaster preparedness, [and provide] (...) education, training and exercise opportunities [for] (...) the American population. (...) As with so many (...) successful campaigns [for public awareness], **the Nation’s children** can help lead the way. [VI, p. 80]

DHS should create a national search and rescue volunteer certification program. (...) A national certification program would speed the incorporation of these individuals into the unified search and rescue command structure and greatly increase the effectiveness of the response. [Appendix A, p. 102]

The Federal response should better integrate the contributions of volunteers (...) into the broader national effort. (...) DHS should (...) develop a statewide support function for volunteers (both pre-trained and spontaneous) in each state to assist local emergency managers. (...) [It should] ensure there is a mechanism to coordinate spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers. [Appendix A, p. 114]

**DHS should make citizen (...) preparedness a National priority.** To facilitate this initiative, Cabinet Secretaries and other prominent National public figures (e.g. the Surgeon General) should serve as spokespersons to promote citizen (...) preparedness. The Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Education, United States Surgeon general, and other National public figures, should publicize the importance of the (...) individual preparedness. The goal of this effort should be **to have citizens better understand the role and limitations of government and to encourage individual preparedness.** [Appendix A, p. 121]

**The Citizen Corps** (...) should be integrated with the DHS’s United States Fire Administration so that preparedness efforts of local fire departments can be expanded to include citizens (...) preparedness. Additionally, DHS should leverage the success of the USAonwatch program to form a National Network of Community Watches comprised of citizen volunteers. (...) The newly created Office of Public and Community Preparedness should continue to assist with implementing National strategies for citizen preparedness. [Appendix A, p. 122]

DHS should consider increasing grant funding for citizen (...) preparedness programs, (...) [and] allowing greater use of Federal funds for Citizen Corps Council staff positions at the State and local level. (...) The availability of full-time positions at the State and local



levels for the Citizen Corps to coordinate the government and community planning is critical. [Appendix A, p. 122]

DHS should develop tools for State and local government to use in order to prepare, train, exercise, and engage citizens (...) in all areas of preparedness. (...) Providing tools [to individual citizens], such as instructor guides and participant handbooks for classroom based instruction, (...) will elevate National preparedness without depleting scarce resources at the local level. [Appendix A, p. 122]

Elementary and secondary [school] (...) students should be required to take courses in first aid, disaster preparedness or other related topics as part of their curriculum. [Appendix A, pp. 122-123]

The government should (...) build “preparedness packs” in various sizes (individual through family size) for sale at low cost. [Appendix A, p. 123]

## *Postface*

***Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21<sup>st</sup> Century catastrophic threats.*** [V, p. 52]

Ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'il y avait trop de faiblesse sur trop de points que l'on a connu le fiasco lors du passage de Katrina en août 2005. Si les systèmes ont été désarticulés, c'est aussi parce que l'on avait quitté le monde connu de l'urgence et de la catastrophe conventionnelle.<sup>64</sup> Les crises hors-cadres sont des armes de déstructuration massive qui génèrent rapidement des environnements de type chaotique.

L'intervention en pareil contexte aurait appelé d'autres concepts, d'autres logiques d'action, d'autres préparations – à ce jour quasi-méconnus, et même le plus souvent violemment rejetés – au nom de la tradition, des codes sacrés en matière d'urgence, de la routine opérationnelle, de la paresse intellectuelle, et plus encore des angoisses que provoque toute idée de discontinuité, de perte des repères, et de transplantation brutale en limite ou au cœur du chaotique.<sup>65</sup>

Katrina a d'abord montré que nous étions globalement en retard d'une guerre en matière de traitement des crises. Au-delà des problèmes liés à la FEMA, au DHS, aux cadres constitutionnels américains, aux spécificités de la zone touchée, il ne faut pas manquer l'essentiel : le cas ne fait que révéler crûment les nouvelles dimensions des problèmes stratégiques de sécurité nationale et de développement durable à l'heure des grandes crises hors-cadres – qui deviennent la norme au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Dans un article publié en mars 2006, Joanne Nigg, John Barnshaw et Manuel Torres apportent des indications intéressantes sur le caractère hors-cadres du problème de l'hébergement de secours (un des problèmes hors-cadres parmi bien d'autres) : Masse et vitesse des flux d'évacuation, surface de projection de ces flux, durée de l'hébergement à prévoir. On imagine une projection sur l'Europe : des centaines de milliers de personnes se répandant en deux jours jusqu'à 400 km des lieux touchés, des dizaines de milliers transplantées à plus de 1500km. Un séisme-tsunami sur Nice pourrait ainsi projeter des populations dans toute la France, et probablement l'Europe, sur longue période.

“Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest relocation of citizens within the United States since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. However, the Dust Bowl migration from the southern plains states to California took place over several years, in comparison to an estimated 1.2 million people who left their homes and communities **within hours or days** before Hurricane Katrina's landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005 [...]. Due to the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, the 100,000 to 120,000 residents who remained in the city were rapidly transformed into a second wave of evacuees, greatly intensifying the need for shelter and housing. (p. 113) [...]

Two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, twenty-five States were involved in the provision of sheltering for evacuees and, by September 30, evacuees were registered in every state and almost half of the ZIP codes in the United States. Three-quarters of the evacuees were staying within 250 miles of their pre-impact homes ; but **tens of thousands were more than one thousand miles away from New Orleans**” (p. 117)

Also **unique to Katrina was the extended duration of evacuation**. In many previous disasters, the upward limit of evacuees' stay in temporary shelters may be days or a couple of weeks at most ; but Katrina-induced flooding caused thousands of evacuees to remain in shelters for **weeks or months**.” (p. 121)

Joanne Nigg, John Barnshaw et Manuel Torres, Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 604, March 2006, pp. 113-128.

<sup>65</sup> Michel Nesterenko and Patrick Lagadec "Complexity and chaos", *Crisis Response*, vol. 3, issue 1, 2006, pp. 62-64. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis\\_nester.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis_nester.pdf)

<sup>66</sup> Patrick Lagadec : “Crisis Management in the Twenty-First Century – “Unthinkable” Events in “Unthinkable” Contexts”, in Havidan Rodriguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli, and Russel R. Dynes: *Handbook of Disaster Research*, Springer, September 2006. (Chapter 30, pp. 489-507).

## 1. Des enjeux de sécurité nationale

Les crises désormais à l'ordre du jour ne sont plus des problèmes "à la marge", pouvant être traités par les urgentistes et quelques plans spécialisés, et "réglés" dans les tuyaux des procédures d'indemnisation et d'assurance (certes de plus en plus sophistiquées<sup>67</sup>). Elles posent d'emblée des problèmes qui débordent nos cartographies de sécurité, elles portent atteinte à des équilibres fondamentaux de nos Sociétés.

Le rapport final la Commission Marsh, mise sur pied par le Président Clinton au milieu des années 1990 – *Critical Foundations : Protecting America's Infrastructures* – avait clarifié, en 1998, les nouveaux enjeux à prendre en considération dans le domaine des infrastructures critiques.

« La prolifération et l'intégration rapides des systèmes de télécommunication et des systèmes informatiques ont lié les infrastructures les unes aux autres pour parvenir à un réseau complexe d'interdépendances. Ces liens ont créé de nouvelles dimensions de vulnérabilités qui, quand elles sont combinées avec une constellation inédite de menaces, induisent des risques sans précédents pour la sécurité nationale. [...]. Nous devons apprendre à négocier une nouvelle géographie, dans laquelle les frontières ne sont plus pertinentes, les distances n'ont plus de signification, dans laquelle un ennemi peut porter atteinte à des systèmes vitaux sans s'attaquer à notre système de défense militaire. La défense nationale n'est plus du ressort exclusif de l'exécutif, et la sécurité économique échappe à la seule sphère des affaires ». <sup>68</sup>

Désormais, en raison de la globalisation et de l'interconnexion des activités, de la transformation accélérée de nos socles de vie (climat, populations, économie, violence, etc.), ce type de réflexion est à systématiser dans toutes les sphères du jeu. Les événements déclencheurs extrêmes se font plus nombreux ; les seuils de déclenchement d'effets dominos généralisés s'abaissent. Le monde de la crise n'est décidément plus celui de la probabilité faible et des conséquences de gativité "raisonnable" ; il n'est plus celui de l'urgence, de ses scripts et de ses solutions réflexes.

Si nous étions encore réticents, au vu des statistiques à disposition, n'oublions pas que les plus grands effondrements ne relèvent pas d'une loi gaussienne. Il faut être prêt à se poser des questions au-delà des exemples du passé, au-delà des problématiques habituelles. Le basculement mental est certes difficile à opérer. Nous sommes immergés dans une vision du monde tout entière marquée par l'idée de stabilité et d'équilibre, seulement sujet à quelques soubresauts rares et marginaux dans leurs impacts. Nous avons spontanément à l'esprit une immense zone de stabilité, troublée seulement par quelques foyers de crise aux marches de l'empire du « normal ». Nous avons admis, voici une petite décennie, l'existence de « zones grises », échappant aux logiques habituelles de contrôle. Il nous faut probablement aujourd'hui penser le monde et ses risques comme une immense zone grise, avec sans doute quelques zones vertes résiduelles –elles aussi bientôt soumises à la possibilité de la surprise, de la turbulence hors-cadres. Le principe de stabilité comme état nominal du monde est bien sûr confortable, mais il tend à devenir une exception plutôt que la règle. Les principes de crises et de ruptures, de dynamiques chaotiques, tendent à s'imposer, sur tous les fronts, et au cœur même de nos

<sup>67</sup> Olivier Godard, Claude Henry, Patrick Lagadec, Erwann Michel-Kerjan : *Traité des nouveaux risques – Précaution, Crise, Assurance*, Editions Gallimard - Folio, novembre 2002.

<sup>68</sup> President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, *Critical Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures*, Washington D.C., 1998, p. ix.

systèmes. Les conséquences d'un tel basculement sont incalculables, et c'est bien là désormais notre défi essentiel en termes de sécurité nationale.

Il nous revient de prendre la question à bras le corps. N'oublions pas que certains, forts de leurs solides cultures asymétriques, sont prêts à exploiter toute turbulence majeure au mieux de leurs intérêts : les situations de grandes crises sont les meilleures fenêtres d'opportunité pour les groupes les moins attachés à la démocratie.

## 2. De nouveaux paradigmes : discontinuité, événements extrêmes

Même pour le domaine des crises –et cela est tout à fait extraordinaire–, nous restons fondamentalement attachés à des cultures de « moyennes », dans lesquelles l'événement aberrant ne peut être que rarissime, ne saurait avoir d'impact décisif sur l'ensemble. Les notions de discontinuité, de basculement, de montée aux extrêmes, d'inconcevable, nous sont étrangères. Dorénavant au contraire, elles doivent être résolument mises au centre des réflexions stratégiques, car les plus grands dangers viennent précisément de l'irruption soudaine de chocs « impensables », multiformes et difformes, que nous avons largement mis hors de nos périmètres mentaux. Comme l'a souligné le Secrétaire à la Santé (Dpt of Health and Human Service) Leavitt dans le cas de Katrina (on notera toutefois la grande « prudence » de la remarque, avec l'utilisation du « sometimes ») :

“What we all learned from Hurricane Katrina is sometimes we have to think clearly about the unthinkable” [...] (p. 254)<sup>69</sup>

Cela va nous demander un violent renversement de perspective intellectuelle, comme le souligne par exemple Nicholas Taleb :

“Our world is dominated by the extreme, the unknown, and the very improbable (improbable according to our current knowledge)– and all the while we spend our time engaged in small talk, focusing on the known, and the repeated. This implies the need to use the extreme as a starting point and not treat it as an exception to be pushed under the rug. I also make the bolder (and more annoying) claim that in spite of our progress and the growth in knowledge, or perhaps, *because of such progress and growth, the future will be increasingly less predictable*, while both human nature and social “science” seem to conspire to hide the idea from us”.<sup>70</sup>

Mais il n'y a rien d'impossible à faire le pas. Il a déjà été fait dans d'autres champs que celui des catastrophes et crises civiles, et notamment en finance comme le soulignent Jacques Lévy Véhel et Christian Walter :

“Si la non-normalité est aujourd'hui considérée comme un « fait » de base des marchés, il est intéressant de noter qu'il aura fallu près d'un demi-siècle pour que ce « fait » observable devienne un « fait » observé, la non normalité entrant dans le champ de la recherche en finance. Certains travaux, comme [ceux de] Granger et Orr [1972], suggéraient d'ailleurs de tronquer les queues de distribution pour en retirer les grandes valeurs, assimilées à des « points aberrants » non significatifs pour la bonne modélisation des variations des marchés : le « fait » disparaissait purement et

<sup>69</sup> Vicki Bier, “Hurricane Katrina as a Bureaucratic Nightmare”, in Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F Kettl and Howard Kunreuther (Eds.), *On Risk and Disaster – Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, pp. 243-254.

<sup>70</sup> Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2007, p. xvii-xviii.

simplement du phénomène observé, disparition qui semble valider de manière emblématique la conception de Kuhn [1983] sur la nature subjective des « faits » d'expérience dans les paradigmes. Malgré les anomalies recensées, les grandes variations boursières n'avaient pas d'existence intellectuelle dans la finance théorique. On pouvait encore écrire en 1993 que « étudier les mouvements extrêmes est une approche originale en finance » (Longin [1993], p. 25). Ce n'est plus le cas aujourd'hui, où la nécessité de prendre en considération une structure différente du risque, donc d'aléa, dans les distributions réelles, est à l'origine d'un bouleversement dans les manières de considérer les marchés. [...] Parallèlement à ce changement de vision dans la communauté scientifique, est apparue dans la communauté des professionnels **une prise de conscience grandissante de la non normalité et de ses conséquences.**<sup>71</sup>

### 3. Des cultures régaliennes à réinventer

Le secteur public, le plus directement concerné par les crises, va être confronté à de sérieux défis. Étant donné la difficulté des questions à traiter, il va devoir se mobiliser, inventer, lancer des initiatives. À la base, il va d'abord lui falloir accepter la **modestie**. Il ne peut plus prétendre qu'il est au-dessus de la mêlée, qu'il a réponse à tout, en matière d'urgence et de crise – même si pareille posture permet de « rassurer » à bon compte (le temps d'un communiqué), de ne jamais avoir à accepter d'audit un peu rigoureux, ni de retour d'expérience un peu exigeant.

Cela est difficile. Le « tout est sous contrôle » a longtemps permis de donner aux collectivités un sentiment illusoire – certes recherché quand on se prend à douter, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui – d'une maîtrise totale sur nos environnements. Mais, quand les fiascos répétés viennent démontrer que l'on n'est sans doute plus à la hauteur de cette prétention, la désillusion se paye très cher en termes de crédibilité, voire de légitimité. Les ressorts nécessaires à un nouveau départ risquent même d'être sérieusement atteints.

La FEMA n'a semble-t-il pas échappé à la règle lors de la simulation Pam en 2004.

“A former employee of Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. (which helped create the simulation exercise for Hurricane Pam) [...] confirmed that during the exercise, FEMA “**promised the moon and the stars**. They promised to have 1,000,000 bottles of water per day coming into affected areas within 48 hours. They promised massive prestaging with water, ice, medical supplies and generators. Anything that was needed, they would have either in place as storm hit or ready to move in immediately after. All it would take is a phone call from local officials to the state, who would then call FEMA, and it would be done.” This suggest that FEMA may have been more concerned by using Hurricane Pam for public relations (as an opportunity to make the agency “look good”) than with identifying actual weaknesses in agency planning and capabilities, so that they could be remedied.”<sup>72</sup>

Le secteur public va devoir accepter **l'ouverture aux autres acteurs**. Non pas en élargissant les

<sup>71</sup> Jacques Lévy Véhel et Christian Walter : *Les marchés fractals*, Préface par Benoît Mandelbrot, Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, p. 29.

<sup>72</sup> Vicki Bier, Vicki Bier, “Hurricane Katrina as a Bureaucratic Nighmare”, in Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F Kettl and Howard Kunreuther (Eds.), *On Risk and Disaster – Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p. 247.

« convocations », mais en apprenant de nouvelles formes de travail en commun. Il s'agit d'impliquer tous les acteurs, en oubliant l'idée de monopole de l'intelligence et du leadership, comme apanage naturel de la puissance publique. Il convient de réunir tous les acteurs concernés : secteur public, **secteur privé**,<sup>73</sup> **ONG**, au premier chef. Pour inventer de nouvelles postures pour chacun, de nouvelles coopérations transverses.<sup>74</sup>

Certes, il faut rester réaliste, et ne pas succomber à l'illusion que finit par inspirer la référence constante au « partenariat public-privé ». Encore faut-il que les autres parties aient la volonté d'aller au partenariat. Et ce qui a été dit sur l'impréparation fréquente de nos secteurs publics – dans tous les pays du monde – doit être largement repris pour ce qui concerne le secteur privé. Rarissimes sont les Comités Exécutifs spontanément prêts à s'engager dans des préparations à des crises non conventionnelles (le cas de la pandémie grippale représentant sans doute un premier véritable début sur ce terrain).

Il y a donc obligation de progresser puissamment et rapidement sur ces enjeux. Pour avancer véritablement –bien au-delà des conférences traditionnelles–, la meilleure initiative à considérer est le lancement de plateformes d'échanges et de réflexions stratégiques, à vocation opérationnelle, et cela à l'échelle internationale. Le principe est de réunir les acteurs majeurs –secteur public, secteur privé, ONG, etc.– à un niveau exécutif. Il ne s'agit pas d'organiser des colloques alternant présentations « théoriques », et présentations « concrètes » de plans et dispositifs existants. Au-delà même du partage des « best practices », il s'agit de lieux où peuvent se penser et s'échanger des visions, des approches, des modes d'action, sur les territoires non balisés des crises en émergence.

La première plateforme du genre a été lancée en mars 2007 à Washington, et à l'échelle internationale (USA, France, Canada, Grande-Bretagne, pour le moment), avec l'appui essentiel d'EDF (Direction du Contrôle des Risques – Pierre Bérour) et de Verizon. Elle s'est constituée sur le thème général : « *Unconventional Crises and Inter-Sector Leadership: A Transatlantic Platform for Cross-Boundary Dialogue and Initiative* ». <sup>75</sup>

Le cadre du « think-tank » à l'américaine est probablement le meilleur : il offre un lieu « neutre » où les uns et les autres peuvent avancer dans un climat de recherche-action, sur un terrain difficile et sensible.

Le secteur public a le plus grand intérêt à s'investir dans des projets innovants, s'il veut notamment se mettre en logique d'apprentissage dynamique, et **se garder du danger de l'évitement-décompensation**, risque non négligeable lorsque l'on découvre soudain qu'un

<sup>73</sup> Philip Auerswald, Lewis M. Brancomb, Todd M. LaPorte and Erwann Michel-Kerjan (eds): *Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability*, Cambridge University Press, september 2006.

<sup>74</sup> Voir l'expérience de Xavier Guilhou : Développer des compétences de sortie de crise : l'expérience des affaires civilo-militaires (ACM – 19945-2001), in Xavier Guilhou et Patrick Lagadec : *La Fin du risque zéro*, Eyrolles société-Les Echos, 2002, pages 114-119). Et : Jean-Marie Aoust, Gilbert Canaméras, Xavier Guilhou, Claude Revel, avec Elisabeth Auvillain : *Quand ONG et PDG osent*, Eyrolles, 2004.

<sup>75</sup> Le projet a été monté et piloté par Erwan Lagadec, Visiting Fellow au Center for Transatlantic Relations (SAIS – School of Advanced International Studies, au sein de Johns Hopkins University). Elle réunit notamment : de grands réseaux vitaux (EDF, Verizon, Accor-USA, Microsoft, Société Générale, etc.), des acteurs des secteurs publics (USA, Canada, UK, France, Nations Unies), des ONG, de la Croix-Rouge (USA), des Universités (Kennedy School, Harvard ; Johns Hopkins ; Ecole Polytechnique ), des spécialistes des think-tanks travaillant sur les grands enjeux internationaux (Woodrow Wilson Center, Center for Strategic and International Studies–CSIS, National Defense University).



terrain de prérogatives jusqu'alors indiscuté et non discutable s'est transformé en terrain de responsabilités colossales – et sans mode d'emploi. Après des décennies d'assurances réflexes, voire de suffisance, le secteur public peut être tenté de se déclarer finalement incompetent, et de « laisser les clés » aux grands réseaux techniques, aux ONG, à la Croix-Rouge<sup>76</sup>, bientôt à chaque administré.

Insistons. On peut craindre effectivement cette décompensation brutale lorsque l'on observe les dynamiques rituelles qui se mettent en place à chaque manifestation, colloque ou conférence mettant en scène des acteurs publics essentiels sur le thème des catastrophes et des crises majeures. Quels que soient les scénarios donnés pour base de référence, la réponse semble être figée sur le même moule : « Laissez-moi vous dire que nous avons des textes, une doctrine, une organisation du commandement et des moyens ». « Laissez-moi vous exposer ce que nous ferions normalement s'il n'y avait pas de problème ». Et chacun à tour de rôle part dans un laborieux exposé fait d'organigrammes et de listes de moyens, tout entier fondé sur le principe que, même en cas de séisme majeur, par exemple, le COD du Préfet serait gréé en temps réel, que les communications fonctionneraient comme à la parade, que tous les centres d'intervention seraient à pied d'œuvre, que tous les renforts zonaux et nationaux seraient acheminés comme prévu sur le papier, même s'il n'y a plus ni autoroute, ni aéroport, ni chemin de fer. Chacun est dans son tuyau d'orgue, supposant que chaque tuyau d'orgue à côté fonctionne comme prévu, sur le papier. Le tableau proposé ne fait aucune place, sauf peut-être en toute fin de conclusion, à l'idée qu'il existerait un secteur privé. Et l'hypothèse que « la population panique » est posée d'entrée, comme pour mettre le régalien en alpha et oméga de toute chose. Un tableau qui ne tient qu'à une condition : que jamais la réalité ne vienne troubler un si beau rêve. Il est urgent de sortir de ces ballets trop bien réglés pour éviter que ce soit le cauchemar qui s'impose. Ce fut le cauchemar de Katrina.

Certes, il faut bien mesurer le déchirement terrible pour beaucoup de devoir passer d'une culture de fière réassurance, fondée sur les plans, écartant toute hypothèse hors-cadres, à des démarches faisant une place au non conventionnel, et à des acteurs inhabituels. Certes, il faut savoir que cela prendra du temps. Mais il faut rappeler à chacun que les crises en émergence ne nous laisseront plus beaucoup de temps, et qu'il faut tout mettre en œuvre désormais pour nous transformer. Il faut entrer dans la démarche avec détermination, confiance et fierté. Non en dénonçant quelque « pessimisme », ou atteinte aux valeurs régaliennes. Un régalien qui n'est plus en phase avec les défis de l'heure est un danger pour tous.

Pour se mettre en logique positive, il va falloir marier tout à la fois une solide préparation sur le fond, se traduisant notamment par les meilleurs plans possibles, et une forte aptitude à l'improvisation, à la valorisation des acteurs et formes organisationnelles émergentes, à l'initiative hors-cadres. Tricia Wachtendorf et James Kendra du Disaster Research Center le rappellent fort justement avec à l'appui les exemples de mobilisations et de sauvetages « par la mer », dans les cas de Katrina et du 11 Septembre<sup>77</sup> sur Manhattan.

The Coast Guard did not act alone in its sizeable rescue effort. An emergent and ephemeral flotilla of civilian boat operators also converged on the heavily damaged areas, both on their own initiative and in response to a call for assistance by political leaders. The

<sup>76</sup> On notera ici l'engagement très rapide de la Croix-Rouge américaine à appuyer la mise en place de cette plateforme sur ces sujets stratégiques à Washington (note précédente).

<sup>77</sup> James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf: "The Waterborne Evacuation of Lower Manhattan on September 11: A Case of Distributed Sensemaking", Preliminary Paper 355, Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2006.

ability of Coast Guard operational commanders to act relatively autonomously in the field, a strong-hold of experienced personnel, versatile training, an organizational environment that combines uniformed and civilian operations, and the development of a shared vision of what was necessary by both Coast Guard and civilian boat operators facilitated the ability to improvise at a multi-organizational level.

Interestingly, one of New York City's most dramatic (albeit rarely mentioned) improvised response activities on September 11th, 2001 was the waterborne evacuation of Lower Manhattan. With many transportation routes cut-off as a result of the attacks, commuters and residents had relatively few options for fleeing the area. While many walked north or over bridges, others found themselves along the southern shore of the island. The harbor community did not have plans to execute a mass evacuation of the City, but vessels converged—again, some on their own initiative and others in response to the Coast Guard's call for all available boats—to improvise a successful evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people. In fact, ferries, tugs, dinner cruise boats, and other private vessels played an even more significant role in the operation than actual Coast Guard vessels. This same operation quickly became involved in transporting critical equipment, supplies, and personnel to Manhattan on return trips to collect more evacuees. Like the operation in New Orleans, vessel operators in New York harbor were able to effectively make sense of their social and physical environment while simultaneously acting within that environment.

It is easy to see the development of comprehensive plans and the need to improvise as opposites. We should not be too quick, however, to view improvisation solely as evidence of failures on the part of organizations and governments. Improvisation has an important role in disaster management. At the same time, to discount the importance of pre-disaster planning is not only short-sighted but ignores the important role planning plays in enabling improvisation. Despite his sarcasm, *New York Times* columnist David Brooks makes very astute points regarding the hubris in over-reliance on plans, yet his conclusion that what transpired in New Orleans demonstrates a need for reduced government involvement in disasters is misplaced.<sup>78</sup>

Le scénario à éviter absolument serait qu'aucun des partenaires ne veuille finalement s'intéresser au dossier, avec pour argument (s'il fallait vraiment se défendre d'une telle fuite) que les institutions, par essence, ne sont pas faites pour traiter des événements vraiment exceptionnels. Avec, pour tout ce qui pose tout de même problème, le principe d'un recours à l'Armée...

L'Armée comme *Joker*, pour prendre les responsabilités à la place des autres acteurs, partis aux abonnés absents. Le dossier appelle des réflexions exigeantes.

- À ceux qui l'ont souvent oublié, au lendemain d'une catastrophe touchant leurs administrés, il faut rappeler que les Armées ne sont plus les grandes masses d'hommes de l'armée napoléonienne ; la "conscription de 3 ans", c'est déjà un peu loin. « L'Armée », ce n'est pas la solution à tout.
- Dans cette ligne, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les Armées sont déjà engagées, le plus souvent, sur de nombreux théâtres d'opérations, et sur leurs missions "cœur de métier". La question fut sensible dans le cas de Katrina, et n'est pas abordée dans le rapport de la Maison-Blanche. D'autres l'ont évoqué :

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<sup>78</sup> Tricia Wachtendorf and James Kendra: "Improvising Disaster in the City of Jazz: Organizational Response to Hurricane Katrina, Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006 [http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Wachtendorf\\_Kendra/](http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Wachtendorf_Kendra/)

“At the time Katrina made landfall, Louisiana had about 3,700 National Guard soldiers in Iraq; Alabama had about 2,100. The Mississippi National Guard had a brigade of more than 4,000 **soldiers in Iraq**, about 40 percent of its soldiers were deployed or scheduled to be deployed in Iraq. “Missing the personnel is the big thing in this particular event. We need our people”, Lt. Andy Thaggard, a spokesman for the Mississippi National Guard, told the Washington Post. There are “too many Guard in Iraq,” said Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), who later emphasized that was what lost by the Guard’s heavy commitment to Iraq “was a lot of local knowledge” that would have been critical in rescue and recovery operations in Louisiana and Mississippi. [...] Ten days after Katrina made landfall, the National Guard finally acknowledged the war in Iraq was draining the ability of the nation to deal with domestic terrorism and natural disasters. [...] **More than two-thirds of the Guard’s helicopters**, trucks, and communications equipment that would be necessary for homeland security were in Iraq Lt. Gene Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau told the Defense Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Sept. 28. More important than the amount of equipment in Iraq was that it was **the Guard’s best equipment.**”<sup>79</sup>

- Il faut bien comprendre qu’à l’ère des grands systèmes, les Armées peuvent aider, mais à la condition d’un travail très sérieux sur les missions et d’un effort méticuleux de branchement « biologique » sur la texture des terrains concernés. Ce fut la clé de la réussite des Coast Guard sur Katrina. La perspective n’est donc pas de dire que « si les civils échouent, alors les militaires prennent le relais, et ils sauront faire en vertu de leur hiérarchie stricte et claire, et de leur habitude des crises ». Il faut réfléchir aux apports spécifiques et complémentaires des uns et des autres, dans des environnements complexes et enchevêtrés, dépendants de technologies qui supposent horizontalité et connectivité, à haute vitesse.
- Enfin, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que, même si les Armées ont l’habitude des interventions humanitaires sur théâtres d’opérations extérieures, telle l’opération post-Tsunami fin 2004, l’intervention massive et de longue durée *sur le territoire national* est d’une tout autre nature. Par exemple, sur le cas de Katrina, des réflexions comme les suivantes ne sont pas anodines sur les missions que doit accepter ou non l’Armée :  
Some officials spoke of an insurgency in the city. In the *Army Times*, Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, commander of the Louisiana National Guard’s Joint Task Force was quoted as saying “We’re going to go out and take this city back. This will be a combat operation to get this city under control”.<sup>80</sup>

#### 4. Des cultures managériales à transformer

Dans le domaine des risques et des crises, même si nous prôtons des approches globales (“all hazards”), nous restons fondamentalement attachés à des images d’événements mono-types, bien circonscrits, et placés en univers stable (« toutes choses égales par ailleurs »). Nous sommes aujourd’hui aux prises avec des registres de complexité, de vitesse, de connectivité, d’inconnu, radicalement différents.

D’emblée, ces épisodes posent des questions de pilotage stratégique d’importance vitale,

<sup>79</sup> Walter Brasch, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, BookSurge, Charleston, 2005-2006, (p. 23-25).

<sup>80</sup> Joseph R. Chenelly, “Troops begin combat operations in New Orleans,” *Army Times*, 9/2/2005, cité par Monika Krause, “New Orleans: The Public Sphere of the Disaster”, *Understanding Katrina*, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Krause>

exigeant des reconfigurations instantanées des champs de responsabilité, des modalités de l'action. Dans le cas de la Nouvelle-Orléans, précisément :

- Le directeur de l'aéroport se retrouve rapidement en conduite de systèmes très dégradés, de perte de toutes les ressources habituelles en termes d'assistance, et plus encore de mutation totale de son champ d'action. Il était directeur d'un aéroport, le voici en charge de l'ultime plateforme de vie de toute une ville et de sa région. À devoir opérer dans le vide le plus total durant trois ou quatre jours, puis avec la présence de 5 000 hommes de la 82<sup>e</sup> division aéroportée... Comme dans le sauvetage d'Apollo 13, où le module lunaire permit la survie de l'équipage, l'aéroport va jouer ce rôle de module annexe permettant de sauver la situation, ou tout au moins de constituer un point d'appui essentiel pour la Nouvelle-Orléans.<sup>81</sup>
- De même, les hôpitaux se muent rapidement en zone d'hébergement d'urgence à la dérive (aucune des hypothèses consacrées ne s'appliquant plus : perte de tous les moyens vitaux, évacuation impossible) : **"We weren't really functioning as a hospital but as a shelter..."**. Enfin, un centre d'hébergement qui empruntait surtout au radeau de la Méduse : **"we had no electricity."**<sup>82</sup> **"Stop the Lying and get us the hell out of here."**<sup>83</sup>

Pour faire face, il faut assurément avoir mis sur pied des dispositifs de gestion de crise intégrant les leçons des travaux des années 1980-90, notamment en termes de salle de crise, de plans de crise, de communication de crise, d'exercices de crise, etc. Mais il faut bien davantage : la réponse appelle de nouvelles visions<sup>84</sup>, et de nouvelles prises en charge. Le premier pas est d'avoir placé ces enjeux au niveau des Comités Exécutifs. Il faut introduire aussi de nouveaux outils opérationnels – notamment les *Forces de Réflexion Rapide*<sup>85</sup> –, afin de donner aux dirigeants des lectures, des ouvertures, des options qui les sortent de la simple application de solutions clés en main (qui ne fonctionnent plus), et de communications plus marquées par les leçons des années 1980 qu'adaptées aux enjeux en émergence.

Pourtant, sauf exception, les tentatives déployées pour passer des acquis des années 80 à de nouvelles modalités, se heurtent à de fortes résistances. Le résultat est aisé à prévoir : refus d'anticipation et de préparation avant l'événement ; paralysie, pendant ; refus de retour d'expérience un peu exigeant, après. Frilosité à l'égard de toute initiative hors-cadres, alors

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<sup>81</sup> "Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport and Katrina: Working out of the book", entretien avec Roy A. Williams, Director of Aviation. Témoignage recueilli par Patrick Lagadec dans le cadre de la mission de retour d'expérience engagée par EDF, Pierre Bérout, Directeur du contrôle des risques sur Les grands réseaux vitaux et Katrina, 19-26 février 2006. La mission était composée de : Xavier Guilhou (XAG Conseil), Patrick Lagadec (Ecole Polytechnique), Erwan Lagadec (Harvard University), Daniel Madet (EDF), Jean-Pierre Roche (ADP).

<sup>82</sup> Havidan Rodriguez and Benigno E. Aguirre, "Hurricane Katrina and The Healthcare Infrastructure : A Focus on Disaster Preparedness, Response and Resiliency, in *Frontiers of Health Services Management, Volume 23, Number 1, Fall 2006*, pp. 13-24. (Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2006).

<sup>83</sup> *A Failure of Initiative*, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, US House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, 15 February 2006, p. 384.

<sup>84</sup> Patrick Lagadec : "Nouvelles menaces et gouvernance", *Gérer et Comprendre, Annales des Mines*, Juin 2005, n° 80, p. 8-22. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/008-022\\_Lagadec.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/008-022_Lagadec.pdf)

Michel Nesterenko and Patrick Lagadec "Complexity and chaos", *Crisis Response*, vol. 3, issue 1, 2006, pp. 62-64. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis\\_nester.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Crisis_nester.pdf)

Patrick Lagadec et Erwann Michel-Kerjan : "Comment protéger nos grands réseaux vitaux ?" Les dossiers de *La Recherche* n° 26, février-avril 2007, pp. 38-42 ; <http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/38-42-lagadec.pdf>

<sup>85</sup> Pierre Beroux, Xavier Guilhou, Patrick Lagadec: "Implementing Rapid Reflection Forces", *Crisis Response*, vol. 3, issue 2, pp. 36-37. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Implementing\\_Rapid\\_Reflection\\_Forces.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/Implementing_Rapid_Reflection_Forces.pdf) ;

que c'est là une exigence cruciale pour une sortie par le haut.<sup>86</sup>

Le danger est de fuir dans le développement d'une bureaucratie délirante.<sup>87</sup> Une grande part des difficultés, lors de Katrina, semble avoir été provoquée par cette bunkérisation défensive, de plus en plus pathétique, qui engloutit toutes les initiatives.

"After the breach of the levees, FEMA was initially still in normal operating mode, waiting for **itemized requests** of needed supplies and support. [...] In fact, it appears that such itemized requests were actually made. For example, Maestri [Emergency Manager] of Jefferson Parish stated, "We were flabbergasted by some statement made by high FEMA officials... that FEMA didn't come because the locals didn't ask... The locals did ask". Governor Blanco and other state and local officials were clearly exasperated with even the request for an itemized list of needs, since Louisiana's emergency responders were overwhelmed and lacked adequate communication systems. [...] Members of Blanco's staff summarized the frustration similarly: "**It was like walking into an emergency room bleeding profusely and being expected to instruct the doctors how to treat you**" [...] **We wanted soldiers, helicopters, food and water... They wanted to negotiate an organizational chart**" (Shane, 2005). [...]

While FEMA eventually break the mold in initiating emergency efforts, the government was frequently unable to waive requirements that did not appear to make sense in a catastrophic situation. The most famous (or infamous) example was requiring routine training on issues like sexual harassment before sending first responders out into the field (Rosetta, 2005). However, similar "red tape" also resulted in international food aid going unused, physician being unable to practice medicine [...], bus drivers being allowed to drive for only their 12-hour customary shift, bus being turned away for lack of air conditioning and toilet facilities. [...] Perhaps most disturbingly, FEMA was apparently unable to waive its requirement for **signed original** request for assistance, even in the face of an overwhelming emergency that severely disrupted normal mail service, Federal Express and so forth.

[...] Three days after the storm, Blanco... had already requested 40,000 more troops; ice, water and food; buses, base camps, [...]. The administration responded that it had not received formal application: "**We found it on the governor's Web site, but we need 'an original' for our staff secretary to formally process the requests**".

Further [difficulty] was exhibited by the problems of truck-loads of ice and other supplies circling the country for days [...] Some of the ice eventually ended up in Tucson, Arizona, where it provided treat for some polar bear in the local zoo (Kelly, 2005).<sup>88</sup>

À l'inverse, dans la dynamique top-down, on ne s'embarasse pas de trop de vérifications fines :

<sup>86</sup> Ainsi le retour d'expérience, à l'échelle internationale, comme cela fut engagé et réalisé par *La Poste*, à la suite de l'épisode de l'anthrax : Patrick Lagadec, Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, and Ryan N. Ellis: "Disaster via Airmail - The Launching of a Global Reaction Capacity After the 2001 Anthrax Attacks", *Innovations*, The MIT Press, Technology/Governance/ Globalization, Philip E. Auerswald and Iqbal Z. Qadir, Editors, Summer 2006, p. 99-117. [http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/INNOV0103\\_p99-117\\_lagadec.pdf](http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/INNOV0103_p99-117_lagadec.pdf)

<sup>87</sup> J'ai pu personnellement goûter aux délices de ce type de délire lorsque, pour intervenir lors d'une conférence à Genève, il me fut précisé que je devais impérativement renseigner les 600 questions qui m'étaient envoyées sur CD Rom, et qui me demandaient, notamment, de certifier que j'avais bien pris toutes dispositions pour un tel déplacement, assimilé à une mission de longue durée en zone de guerre urbaine type Bagdad.

<sup>88</sup> Vicki Bier, "Hurricane Katrina as a Bureaucratic Nightmare", in Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F Kettl and Howard Kunreuther (Eds.), *On Risk and Disaster – Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, pp. 248-250.



“When the first federal aid did come, stunned recipients opening boxes asked why they were being sent anthrax vaccine. “These are the boxes Homeland Security told us to send”, came the reply.<sup>89</sup>

La réponse ne peut pas être d’ordre « technique » ou « administrative » — sous forme de matériels, de textes juridiques, ou de simple mécano organisationnel. C’est le message d’un officier des Coast Guard en charge des opérations de sauvetage lors de Katrina<sup>90</sup> :

### *Katrina’s Neglected Lessons*

« Much post-Katrina attention has focused on what are essentially technical questions: Who's in charge; where do the pieces fit together; how are resources and services acquired and accountability maintained; what should the National Response Plan say; how do we make our telecommunications systems more resilient. Getting these structural issues right is absolutely necessary. But addressing them alone is not enough.

Katrina's neglected lesson is that to prepare for the next catastrophe, we must direct equal attention to leadership and the human element, which often have more influence on organizational outcomes. Some public and private organizations, though virtually cut off from contact with their chains of command and support and unable to conduct business using customary or even safe procedures, were nonetheless able to recognize what needed doing, and then adapt, innovate and perform at a high level. How? These organizations had set the conditions that enable leaders to emerge spontaneously from the workforce wherever they are needed as crises unfold.

In the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe, it's not organizational charts but organizational culture that distinguishes those who get to work from those who stand reeling from the blow. Tens of thousands of Katrina survivors were rescued because legions of Coast Guard, National Guard, local and other first responders found themselves with more responsibility and less oversight than they had ever had before, and rose to the occasion.

Building and sustaining a winning organizational culture is not glamorous, and neither easy nor easily measured. But a leader has no more important responsibility. How will your organization perform if it finds itself at the center of a catastrophe?”

Sauf réaffirmation, par les Comités Exécutifs, d’une responsabilité sur ces champs, et prises d’initiatives fortes, le risque est que tous les acteurs en arrivent finalement à la conviction que nos organisations ne sont plus faites pour traiter les risques de notre temps.<sup>91</sup>

## 5. Des formations à reconfigurer

<sup>89</sup> Neil Smith: “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster”, Understanding Katrina, Perspectives from the Social Sciences, 01/02/2006, <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith>

<sup>90</sup> Bruce C. Jones : “Katrina's Neglected Lesson”, Government Executive.com, May 21, 2007. National Journal Group. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0507/052107ol.htm>

<sup>91</sup> Même si certains continuent à tenir le discours rituel sur le thème : “Moi, je suis optimiste, nous avons des plans”, qui permettent de masquer les refus de lucidité et de prise de responsabilité. Très récemment et fort heureusement, dans une réunion de haut niveau où un responsable crut pouvoir, comme à l’accoutumée, tenir ce type de discours, un Préfet prit la parole pour marquer, avec courtoisie mais netteté, qu’il était urgent de montrer désormais un peu plus de sérieux.



Si l'on veut que les dirigeants et leurs collaborateurs soient préparés aux univers chaotiques<sup>92</sup> – et risquent moins d'être tétanisés sur-le-champ par les événements hors-cadres – deux conditions sont à satisfaire : un entraînement professionnel au pilotage de ces situations ; une formation initiale qui leur donne un certain nombre de cartes de référence et la possibilité de reconnaître ensuite l'importance de ces champs difficiles.

Rien ne sert de polir de grandioses architectures organisationnelles, des dispositifs et outils techniques « dernier cri », si les responsables sont happés par un besoin de fuite irrésistible au moindre signal de phénomène non conventionnel ; ou de simple proposition de simulation hors-cadres. Cela suppose beaucoup plus de détermination, de hardiesse et de rigueur, notamment en matière d'exercice, de débriefings, de mise en œuvre des leçons acquises. Aussi longtemps que le renversement des perspectives stratégique et intellectuelle souligné aux points précédents n'a pas été effectué, les activités dans ces secteurs continueront à être prises comme d'aimables pertes de temps, n'intéressant pas le cœur des affaires, ni la sécurité du pays, encore moins du continent. Le cas de la Nouvelle-Orléans et de son exercice Pam est exemplaire à cet égard. Une belle avancée, qui se perdit rapidement dans les sables...

**“To be determined at a later date”**

“The success of the rescue efforts conducted by Wildlife and Fisheries, the Coast Guard, and the other first responders reflected the benefits of the Hurricane Pam Exercise. I think it convinced *almost* everyone involved of the enormity of the challenge posed by a flooded New Orleans. However, in many other emergency response aspects, the exercise fell short. We know this for the simple reason that we know what happened –and didn't happen–during Katrina. During the Pam exercise there was discussion of the problem of evacuating 127,000 people in New Orleans without access to vehicles. “To be determined at a later date”, was the solution reached during the exercise, and I can only conclude that the same solution pertained to numerous other issues, because they never got determined at a later date. [...] FEMA representatives had talked about a second Pam exercise to focus on the low-mobility groups. It didn't happen”. (p. 146)<sup>93</sup>

Comme le prônent les auteurs du rapport Maison-Blanche, il faudrait réfléchir à une **“École de Homeland Security”**, probablement en ce qui nous concerne de ce côté-ci de l'Atlantique à l'échelon européen. Pareil outil permettrait de conduire des formations dépassant le seul registre tactique (déjà couvert par ailleurs), ouvertes à tous les grands secteurs – publics, privés, ONG, médias–, et très directement ciblés sur les dirigeants et jeunes dirigeants, venant se préparer ensemble aux grandes questions et réponses possibles relativement aux risques et aux crises d'aujourd'hui. Mais ce pourrait être, car on peut sortir des schémas habituels, un **réseau de pôles d'enseignement** reliés par la même ambition de préparer les dirigeants à la vie en haute mer, aux “Quarantièmes rugissants”.<sup>94</sup> Bien entendu, une pareille ambition ne pourrait se développer sans une activité résolue en matière de recherche, pensée elle aussi comme une démarche conduite par des équipes riches d'une grande diversité d'acteurs.

<sup>92</sup> Patrick Lagadec : “Enseigner la question des crises : Enjeux, Obstacles, Initiatives”, *Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie*, janvier 2007, Ecole Polytechnique. <http://www.patricklagadec.net/fr/pdf/2007-01.pdf>

<sup>93</sup> Ivor Van Heerden and Mike Bryan, *The Storm – What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina – The Inside Story from one Louisiana Scientist*, Viking, Penguin Group, New York, 2006.

<sup>94</sup> Xavier Guilhou et Patrick Lagadec : « A l'écoute du terrain, les “quarantièmes rugissants” », seconde partie, in *La Fin du risque zéro*, Eyrolles société-Les Echos, 2002.

Il serait éminemment souhaitable, en outre, de songer à une première rencontre, au temps de la formation initiale, avec ces sujets « barbares ». <sup>95</sup> C'est probablement une condition sine qua non pour que les propositions de perfectionnement avancées ensuite n'apparaissent pas comme des options peu légitimes, pouvant toujours être remises sine die, et réduites au minimum.

## 6. Les crises majeures, dimension de la problématique du “Développement durable”

Le dossier des crises civiles majeures doit désormais se penser aussi dans le cadre du « développement durable », et de la résilience<sup>96</sup>, puisque nos choix de développement, nos « fabriques sociales » induisent ou aggravent directement ces phénomènes de crise de plus en plus hors-cadres.

Charles Perrow l'illustre sur le cas de la Nouvelle-Orléans, et montre bien qu'il ne suffit pas, dans ce cas, d'exiger des digues plus hautes, ou des dispositifs de pompage d'urgence plus puissants :

“The Louisiana delta is the city's protection, and it is disappearing, no longer fed by the farmland of nine states. The dams and levees concentrate the force of the river's flow, a form of economic concentration we ordinarily do not consider. Channels below New Orleans carry the silt far out into the Gulf of Mexico in a concentrated stream. The rest of the delta, starved for replacement soil, subside. Since the 1930s, an area the size of Rhode Island has sunk beneath the waters of the Gulf of Mexico” (Scully, 2002). Every hour a parcel of wetlands the size of two football fields converts to open water, with incursions from the Gulf. Every 2.7 miles of marshland that a hurricane has to travel over reduces the surge tide by a foot, dispersing the storm's power. Simply put, had Katrina struck in 1945 instead of 2005, the surge that reached New Orleans would have been as much as five to ten feet shallower than it was (Tidwell, 2005).”<sup>97</sup>

Et Charles Perrow précise qu'à l'exposition au risque de plus en plus forte s'ajoute un potentiel de destruction de plus en plus critique :

“Southern Louisiana produces one-quarter to one-third of the country's seafood, one-fifth of its oil, and one-quarter of its natural gas, so the potential economic loss from a more serious blow will be enormous.”<sup>98</sup>

Inversement, dans la mesure où les efforts en matière de développement durable ne produiront pas instantanément des effets réducteurs significatifs sur nos potentiels de crise, il serait judicieux que le domaine du développement durable ne reste pas découplé de la problématique des crises hors-cadres. Car il serait bon **que nos sociétés soient capables de ne**

<sup>95</sup> Comme cela se fait, notamment, depuis plus de quinze ans, à l'École des Mines de Paris.

<sup>96</sup> “Theories abound about what produces resilience, but three fundamental characteristics seem to set resilient people and companies apart from others. [...] The first characteristic is the capacity to accept and face down reality. [...] Second, resilient people and organizations possess an ability to find meaning in some aspects of life. And values are just as important as meaning [...]. The third building block of resilience is the ability to improvise. [...] (p. 79-80).

Diane Coutu: “How Resilience Works”, *Harvard Business Review on How Leading in Turbulent Times*, Harvard Business School Press, 2003, pp. 79-96.

<sup>97</sup> Charles Perrow: *The Next Catastrophe, Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters*, Princeton, 2007, (p. 22-23).

<sup>98</sup> Charles Perrow, *Idem*, p. 24.

pas implorer sous des chocs multiples avant que les inflexions en matière de développement durable aient donné leur effet. Ce n'est pas parce que l'on s'intéresse à la prévention routière que l'on doit supprimer les SAMU.

## 7. Initiatives

Ce monde de la discontinuité et du chaotique exige d'autres théories du risque, de la perception des risques, de la communication sur les risques, du pilotage et de la gouvernance. Si on ne fait pas cette mutation intellectuelle et stratégique, les fiascos s'ajouteront les uns aux autres. Et la simple critique de quelque bouc émissaire ne pourra pas suffire à circonscrire les gravissimes effets du découplage croissant entre citoyens et dirigeants ; ne pourra suffire à contrer les effondrements de confiance, et les dynamiques morbides qui envahiront le champ sociétal si, décidément, nous nous révélons incapables de nous hisser à la hauteur des défis de notre temps.

Ceux qui ont pris soin de réfléchir aux grandes défaites, aux grandes percées, sont toujours parvenus à ce constat : l'essentiel tient à l'adéquation entre le modèle de pensée et d'action et les défis à traiter. Sun Tsu l'a bien souligné : qui ne connaît pas ses risques, qui ne se connaît pas lui-même sera défait à chaque bataille. Henry Kissinger en fait un thème récurrent dans ses écrits et ses mémoires : la faille intellectuelle conduit au désastre stratégique.

Nous sommes à la croisée des chemins : ou bien ce constat d'une mutation de nos risques et de nos environnements est reconnu, et nous nous donnons les moyens d'y travailler – alors nous nous mettons en posture de traverser les univers chaotiques qui sont désormais les nôtres. Ou bien nous continuons à exclure viscéralement ces enjeux de nos enceintes tant académiques que décisionnelles, et nous pouvons nous employer à bien ancrer nos tampons réservés aux « étranges défaites », aux capitulations les plus noires.

À l'heure, notamment, du bouleversement climatique, gros de chocs majeurs à *court terme*, il est urgent de nous mettre en marche. Déjà, fort heureusement, certaines initiatives sont prises, et c'est d'ailleurs précisément dans ce cadre qu'ont été engagés ces travaux sur Katrina — rendus possibles par la conjonction des volontés d'Electricité de France – Pierre Bérroux, du Chef d'Etat Major de la Marine – l'Amiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, et du Préfet de la Zone de Défense Sud – le Préfet Christian Frémont. Et par les appuis décisifs de M. Jean-David Levitte, Ambassadeur de France aux Etats-Unis et Pierre Lebovics, Consul Général de France à La Nouvelle-Orléans.

Il ne reste plus qu'à mobiliser plus avant les volontés, à renforcer les initiatives audacieuses. Et toujours davantage à l'échelle internationale.