# Non-Maximal Decidable Structures 

Alexis Bès, Patrick Cégielski

## To cite this version:

Alexis Bès, Patrick Cégielski. Non-Maximal Decidable Structures. 2007. hal-00155282

HAL Id: hal-00155282
https://hal.science/hal-00155282
Preprint submitted on 17 Jun 2007

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

# Non-Maximal Decidable Structures 

Alexis Bès and Patrick Cégielski<br>LACL, Université Paris 12<br>E-mail:\{bes,cegielski\}@univ-paris12.fr

June 17, 2007


#### Abstract

Given any infinite structure $\mathcal{M}$ with a decidable first-order theory, we give a sufficient condition in terms of the Gaifman graph of $\mathcal{M}$, which ensures that $\mathcal{M}$ can be expanded with some non-definable predicate in such a way that the first-order theory of the expansion is still decidable.


## LACL Technical Report 2007-06

## 1 Introduction

Elgot and Rabin ask in [2] whether there exist maximal decidable structures, i.e. structures $\mathcal{M}$ with a decidable elementary theory and such that the elementary theory of any expansion of $\mathcal{M}$ by a non-definable predicate is undecidable.

Soprunov proved in [8] (using a forcing argument) that every structure in which a regular ordering is interpretable is not maximal. A partial order $(B,<)$ is said to be regular if for every $a \in B$ there exist distinct elements $b_{1}, b_{2} \in B$ such that $b_{1}<a, b_{2}<a$, and no element $c \in B$ satisfies both $c<b_{1}$ and $c<b_{2}$. As a corollary he also proved that there is no maximal decidable structure if we replace "elementary theory" by "weak monadic second-order theory".

In [1] we considered a weakening of the Elgot-Rabin question, namely the question of whether all structures $\mathcal{M}$ whose first-order theory is decidable can be expanded by some constant in such a way that the resulting structure still has a decidable theory. We answered this question negatively by proving that there exists a structure $\mathcal{M}$ whose monadic second-order theory is decidable and such that any expansion of $\mathcal{M}$ by a constant has an undecidable elementary theory.

In this paper we address the initial Elgot-Rabin question, and provide a criterion for non-maximality. More precisely, given any structure $\mathcal{M}$ with a decidable first-order theory, we give in Section 3 a sufficient condition in terms of the Gaifman graph of $\mathcal{M}$, which ensures that $\mathcal{M}$ can be expanded with some non-definable predicate in such a way that the first-order theory of the expansion
is still decidable. The condition is the following: for every natural number $r$ and every finite set $X$ of elements of the base set $|\mathcal{M}|$ of $\mathcal{M}$ there exists an element $x \in|\mathcal{M}|$ such that the Gaifman distance between $x$ and every element of $X$ is greater than $r$. This condition holds e.g. for the structure ( $\mathbb{N}, S$ ), where $S$ denotes the graph of the successor function, and more generally for any labelled infinite graph with finite degree and whose elementary theory is decidable, i.e. any structure $\mathcal{M}=\left(V, E, P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right)$ where $V$ is infinite, $E$ is a binary relation of finite degree, the $P_{i}$ 's are unary relations, and the elementary theory of $\mathcal{M}$ is decidable. Unlike Soprunov's condition, our condition expresses some limitation on the expressive power of the structure $\mathcal{M}$.

In Section 2 we recall some important definitions and results. Section 3 deals with the main theorem. We conclude the paper with related questions.

## 2 Preliminaries

In the sequel we consider first-order logic with equality. We deal only with relational structures. Given a language $\mathcal{L}$ and a $\mathcal{L}$-structure $\mathcal{M}$, we denote by $|\mathcal{M}|$ the base set of $\mathcal{M}$. For every symbol $R$ of $\mathcal{L}$ we denote by $R^{\mathcal{M}}$ the interpretation of $R$ in $\mathcal{M}$. As usual we shall sometimes confuse symbols and their interpretation. We denote by $F O(\mathcal{M})$ the first-order (complete) theory of $\mathcal{M}$, i.e. the set of first-order $\mathcal{L}$-sentences true in $\mathcal{M}$. By "definable in $\mathcal{M}$ " we mean "first-order definable in $\mathcal{M}$ without parameters".

We denote by $\operatorname{qr}(\phi)$ the quantifier rank of the formula $\phi$, defined inductively by $q r(\phi)=0$ if $\phi$ is atomic, $\operatorname{qr}(\neg F)=q r(F), \operatorname{qr}(F \alpha G)=\max (q r(F), q r(G))$ for $\alpha \in\{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$, and $q r(\exists x F)=q r(\forall x F)=q r(F)+1$. We define $F O_{n}(\mathcal{M})$ as the set of $\mathcal{L}$-sentences $F$ such that $q r(F) \leq n$ and $\mathcal{M} \vDash F$.

We say that the elementary diagram of a structure $\mathcal{M}$ is computable if there exists an injective map $f:|\mathcal{M}| \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that the range of $f$, as well as the relations $\left\{\left(f\left(a_{1}\right), \ldots, f\left(a_{n}\right)\right)\left|a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n} \in\right| \mathcal{M} \mid\right.$ and $\left.\mathcal{M} \mid=R\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}\right)\right\}$ for every relation $R$ of $\mathcal{L}$, are recursive (see e.g. [7]).

Let us recall useful definitions and results related to the Gaifman graph of a structure [3] (see also [5]). Let $\mathcal{L}$ be a relational language, and $\mathcal{M}$ be a $\mathcal{L}$-structure. The Gaifman graph of $\mathcal{M}$, which we denote by $G(\mathcal{M})$, is the undirected graph whose set of vertices is $|\mathcal{M}|$, and such that for all $x, y \in|\mathcal{M}|$, there is an edge between $x$ and $y$ if and only if $x=y$ or if there exist some $n$-ary relational symbol $R \in \mathcal{L}$ and some $n$-tuple $\vec{t}$ of elements of $|\mathcal{M}|$ which contains both $x$ and $y$ and satisfies $\vec{t} \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$.

The distance $d(x, y)$ between two elements $x, y \in|\mathcal{M}|$ is defined as the usual distance in the sense of the graph $G(\mathcal{M})$. We denote by $B_{r}(x)$ the $r$-sphere with center $x$, i.e. the set of elements $y$ of $|\mathcal{M}|$ such that $d(x, y) \leq r$. It should be noted that for every fixed $r$ the binary relation " $y \in B_{r}(x)$ " is definable in $\mathcal{M}$. For every $X \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ we define $B_{r}(X)$ as $B_{r}(X)=\bigcup_{x \in X} B_{r}(x)$.

A $r$-local formula $\varphi\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ is a formula whose quantifiers are all relativized to $B_{r}\left(\left\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right\}\right)$. We shall use the notation $\varphi^{(r)}$ to indicate that $\varphi$ is $r$-local.

Let us state Gaifman's theorem about local formulas.

Theorem 1 ([3]) Let $\vec{x}=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ and $\varphi(\vec{x})$ be a $\mathcal{L}$-formula. From $\varphi$ one can compute effectively a formula which is equivalent to $\varphi$ and is a boolean combination of formulas of the form:

- $\psi^{(r)}(\vec{x})$
- $\exists x_{1} \ldots \exists x_{s}\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq s} \alpha^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq s} d\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right)>2 r\right)$
where $s \leq q r(\varphi)+n$ and $r \leq 7^{k}$.
Moreover if $\varphi$ is a sentence then only sentences of the second kind occur in the resulting formula.


## 3 A sufficient condition for non-maximality

The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let $\mathcal{L}$ be a finite relational language, and $\mathcal{M}$ be an infinite countable $\mathcal{L}$-structure which satisfies the following conditions:

1. $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable
2. every element of $|\mathcal{M}|$ is definable in $\mathcal{M}$
3. for every finite set $X \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ and every $r \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a $\in|\mathcal{M}|$ such that $d(a, X)>r$.

Then there exists a unary predicate symbol $R \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $a(\mathcal{L} \cup\{R\})$-expansion $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ of $\mathcal{M}$ such that :

- $F O\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$ is decidable
- the set $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ is not definable in $\mathcal{M}$.
- the elementary diagram of $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ is computable.

Let us consider a few examples.

- The structure $\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N} ; S)$, where $S$ denotes the graph of the function $x \mapsto x+1$, satisfies all conditions of Theorem 2. Indeed Langford [4] proved that $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable. Moreover condition 2 is easy to prove, and condition 3 is a straightforward consequence of the fact that $d(x, y)=$ $|x-y|$ for all natural numbers $x, y$.
- The same holds for any structure of the form $\mathcal{M}=\left(\mathbb{N} ; S, P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right)$ where the $P_{i}$ 's denote unary predicates and $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable. Note that expanding a structure by unary predicates does not change its Gaifman graph.
- More generally Theorem 2 applies to any infinite labelled graph with finite degree, more precisely to any structure of the form $\mathcal{M}=\left(V ; E, P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right)$ where $V$ is infinite, $E$ is a binary relation with finite degree, the $P_{i}$ 's denote unary predicates, $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable, and every element of $V$ is definable in $\mathcal{M}$. In this case the Gaifman graph of $\mathcal{M}$ has finite degree, which implies condition 3. Note that Theorem 2 also applies to some structures for which the degree of the Gaifman graph is infinite - see the last example.
- The structure $\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N} ;<)$ does not satisfy condition 3 of Theorem 2 since $d(x, y) \leq 1$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{N}$. Observe that $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable [4], and moreover $\mathcal{M}$ is not maximal: consider e.g. the structure $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N} ;<,+)$ where + denotes the graph of addition; $F O\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$ is decidable [6], and + is not definable in $\mathcal{M}$ since in $\mathcal{M}$ one can only define finite or co-finite subsets of $\mathbb{N}$.
One can prove actually that for every infinite structure $\mathcal{M}$ in which some linear ordering of elements of $|\mathcal{M}|$, condition 3 does not hold. However the next example shows that Theorem 2 can be applied to some structures in which an infinite linear ordering is interpretable.
- Consider the disjoint union of $\omega$ copies of $(\mathbb{N} ;<)$ equipped with a successor relation between copies, i.e. the structure $\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} ;<, S u c)$ where
$-(x, y)<\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)$ if and only if $\left(x=x^{\prime}\right.$ and $\left.y<y^{\prime}\right)$;
- Suc $\left((x, y),\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)\right)$ if and only if $x^{\prime}=x+1$
then $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2: the first condition comes from the fact that $F O(\mathcal{M})$ reduces to $F O(\mathbb{N} ;<)$ and the two other conditions are easy to check.

Let us explain informally the structure of the proof of Theorem 2. Given $\mathcal{M}$ which satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2, we define $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ by marking gradually elements of $|\mathcal{M}|$, some in $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ and some in its complement. More precisely we define by induction on $n$ the sequence $\left(X_{n}\right)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $X_{n}=\left(R_{n}, S_{n}, T_{n}, F_{n}\right)$ where $R_{n}$ corresponds to a set of elements of $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ (we will say "marked positively"), $S_{n}$ corresponds to a set of elements marked in the complement of $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ (we will say "marked negatively"), $T_{n}$ roughly corresponds to a set of spheres whose elements are marked in the complement of $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$, and $F_{n}$ denotes the set of formulas of quantifier rank $\leq n$ which will be true in $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. At each step $n$, the partial marking $X_{n}$ ensures that any subsequent marking will lead to a set $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ not definable by any formula of quantifier rank $n$. Moreover $X_{n}$ also fixes $F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$. Finally $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ will be defined as the union of the sets $R_{n}$. In the construction we impose some sparsity condition on $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$; this condition ensures that there are few elements of $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ in each $r$-sphere, which allows to express with $\mathcal{L}$-sentences whether a $r$-sphere of $\mathcal{M}$ can be marked conveniently, and then use the condition that $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable in order to extend the marking in an effective way.

## Proof of Theorem 2.

Assume that $\mathcal{M}$ is a $\mathcal{L}$-structure which satisfies the conditions of the theorem. Let $R \notin \mathcal{L}$ be a unary predicate symbol. For every $X \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ we shall denote by $\mathcal{M}(X)$ the $(\mathcal{L} \cup\{R\})$-expansion of $\mathcal{M}$ defined by interpreting $R$ by $X$.

Throughout the proof we shall use the following interesting consequences of conditions 1 and 2:

- the elementary diagram of $\mathcal{M}$ is computable. Indeed since $\mathcal{L}$ is finite we can enumerate all formulas $\varphi(x)$ with one free variable. Let us denote by $\left(\varphi_{i}(x)\right)_{i \geq 0}$ such an enumeration. Then the application $f:|\mathcal{M}| \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ which maps every element $e$ of $|\mathcal{M}|$ to the least integer $i$ such that $\varphi_{i}$ defines $e$ is injective; moreover the range of $f$, and the relations $\left\{\left(f\left(a_{1}\right), \ldots, f\left(a_{n}\right)\right)\right.$ : $\left.\mathcal{M} \models Q\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}\right)\right\}$ for every symbol $Q$ of $\mathcal{L}$, are recursive.
- if $\psi(x)$ is a formula with one free variable and $\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists x \psi(x)$ then one can find in an effective way the first integer $i$ who belongs to the range of $f$ and such that $\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists x\left(\varphi_{i}(x) \wedge \psi(x)\right)$. That is, one can find effectively some element $x \in|\mathcal{M}|$ for which $\psi(x)$ holds in $\mathcal{M}$.
- every finite or co-finite subset $A \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ is definable in $\mathcal{M}$. This will allow to use shortcuts such as " $x \in A$ " when we write formulas in the language $\mathcal{L}$.

We now define by induction on $n$ the sequence $\left(X_{n}\right)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that for every $n, X_{n}=\left(R_{n}, S_{n}, T_{n}, F_{n}\right)$ where

1. $R_{n}, S_{n}, T_{n}$ are finite subsets of $|\mathcal{M}|$;
2. $R_{n} \cap S_{n}=\varnothing$;
3. $F_{n}$ is a set of $(\mathcal{L} \cup\{R\})$-sentences with quantifier rank $\leq n$;
4. $d\left(R_{n}, R_{n+1} \backslash R_{n}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}$;
5. $d(x, y) \geq 7^{n+1}$ for every pair of distinct elements of $R_{n+1} \backslash R_{n}$;
6. for every $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ such that $R_{n} \subseteq R^{\prime}$ and

$$
R^{\prime} \cap\left(\left(S_{n} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq n} B_{7^{i}}\left(T_{i}\right)\right) \backslash R_{n}\right)=\varnothing
$$

$R^{\prime}$ is not definable by any $\mathcal{L}$-formula of quantifier rank $\leq n$;
7. For every $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ such that $R_{n} \subseteq R^{\prime}$,

$$
R^{\prime} \cap\left(\left(S_{n} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq n} B_{7^{i}}\left(T_{i}\right)\right) \backslash R_{n}\right)=\varnothing,
$$

$$
d\left(R^{\prime}, R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}
$$

and $d(x, y) \geq 7^{n+1}$ whenever $x, y$ are distinct elements of $R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n}$, we have

$$
F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right)\right)=F_{n}
$$

Induction hypothesis: assume that $\left(X_{i}\right)_{i<n}$ is defined and satisfies the required conditions.

Let us define $X_{n}$. The definition consists in two main steps: during the first step we extend the marking in order to ensure that $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ will not be definable by any formula with quantifier rank $n$; this is the easiest step, and it uses condition (3) of the theorem. During the second step, we extend again the marking in order to fix $F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$.

We set $r=7^{n}$.

First step: during this step we mark a finite number of elements in order to ensure that $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ will not be definable by any $\mathcal{L}$-formula with quantifier rank $n$.

Since we deal with a finite relational language, there exist up to equivalence finitely many formulas with quantifier rank $n$. From $\mathcal{L}$ one can compute an integer $k_{n}$ and a finite set of $\mathcal{L}$-formulas $\left\{\alpha_{n, i}(x): 1 \leq i \leq k_{n}\right\}$ such that every $\mathcal{L}$-formula with quantifier rank $n$ is equivalent to a disjunction of some of the $\alpha_{n, i}$ 's, and moreover such that the formulas $\alpha_{n, i}$ are incompatible. For $i=1, \ldots, k_{n}$, let us denote by $E_{n, i}$ the subset of $|\mathcal{M}|$ defined by $\alpha_{n, i}(x)$. By construction the sequence $\left(E_{n, 1}, \ldots, E_{n, k_{n}}\right)$ is a partition of $|\mathcal{M}|$, and every subset of $|\mathcal{M}|$ definable by a formula of quantifier rank $n$ is a finite union of some of the subsets $E_{n, i}$.

We shall mark elements in order that for some $i$, the subset $E_{n, i}$ contains at least an element marked positively and another element marked negatively. This will ensure that condition 6 is satisfied. More precisely, for $i=1, \ldots, k_{n}$, we mark positively (respectively negatively) at most one new element of $E_{n, i}$. We define the sets $R_{n, i}^{\prime}$ (resp. $S_{n, i}^{\prime}$ ) such that $R_{n, i}^{\prime}$ contains the set of new elements to mark positively (resp. negatively) in $E_{n, i}$ (each of the sets $R_{n, i}^{\prime}$ and $S_{n, i}^{\prime}$ is either empty or reduced to a singleton). We proceed as follows:

- if there exists some element of $E_{n, i}$ which is not marked yet, and moreover all marked elements of $E_{n, i}$ are marked positively, then we mark negatively the first unmarked element of $E_{n, i}$.
Formally, assume that the sets $R_{n, j}^{\prime}$ and $S_{n, j}^{\prime}$ have been defined for every $j<i$, and let

$$
Z_{n, i}=R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} R_{n, j}^{\prime} \cup S_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} S_{n, j}^{\prime} \cup \bigcup_{i<n} B_{\left(7^{i}\right)}\left(T_{i}\right)
$$

If

$$
\mathcal{M} \models \exists x\left(\alpha_{n, i}(x) \wedge x \notin Z_{n, i}\right)
$$

and moreover

$$
\mathcal{M} \models\left(E_{n, i} \cap Z_{n, i}\right) \subseteq\left(R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} R_{n, j}^{\prime}\right)
$$

(this set-theoretic property is expressible as a $\mathcal{L}$-sentence) then we set $S_{n, i}^{\prime}$ as the singleton set consisting in the first $x$ such that

$$
\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists x\left(\alpha_{n, i}(x) \wedge x \notin Z_{n, i}\right) .
$$

Otherwise we set $S_{n, i}^{\prime}=\varnothing$.

- Then, if all currently marked elements of $E_{n, i}$ are marked negatively, and moreover there exists some unmarked element $x$ of $E_{n, i}$ at distance $\geq 7^{n+1}$ from already marked elements, then we mark positively the first such element $x$.
Formally, let

$$
Z_{n, i}^{\prime}=Z_{n, i} \cup S_{n, i}^{\prime}
$$

If

$$
\mathcal{M} \models\left(E_{n, i} \cap\left(R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} R_{n, j}^{\prime}\right)\right)=\varnothing
$$

and moreover

$$
\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists x\left(\alpha_{n, i}(x) \wedge d\left(x, Z_{n, i}^{\prime}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}\right)
$$

then let $R_{n, i}^{\prime}$ be the singleton set consisting in the first such $x$. Otherwise we set $R_{n, i}^{\prime}=\varnothing$.

Note that the previous procedure is effective (see the remarks at the beginning of the proof).

Second step: during this step we extend the marking in order to fix $F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$.
Up to equivalence, there exist finitely many $(\mathcal{L} \cup\{R\})$-formulas $F$ such that $q r(F)=n$. By Proposition 1 every such formula $F$ is equivalent to a boolean combination of formulas of the form

$$
\exists x_{1} \ldots \exists x_{s}\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq s} \alpha^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq s} d\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right)>2 r\right)
$$

Consider an enumeration $G_{n, 1}, \ldots, G_{n, m_{n}}$ of all formulas of the previous form which arise when we apply Theorem 1 to formulas $F$ such that $\operatorname{qr}(F)=n$.

During this step we shall fix which formulas $G_{n, j}$ will be true in $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$, which will suffice (using again Theorem 1) to fix which formulas $F$ with quantifier rank $n$ will be true in $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$.

The first idea is to check, for every $j$, whether there exists $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ which extends in a convenient way the current marking and such that $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models G_{n, j}$. If the answer is positive, then we shall extend our marking just enough to ensure that every subsequent extension of the marking will satisfy $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \models G_{n, j}$. If the answer is negative, then we do not extend the marking, and then every subsequent extension of the marking will satisfy $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \models \neg G_{n, j}$.

We define by induction on $j \leq m_{n}$ the sets $R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime}$ and $T_{n, j}^{\prime}$, such that $R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime}$ contains new elements to mark positively, and $T_{n, j}^{\prime}$ contains the centers of new $r$-spheres whose elements are marked negatively.

We proceed as follows. Fix $j$, and assume that the sets $R_{n, i}^{\prime \prime}$ and $T_{n, i}^{\prime}$ have been defined for every $i<j$. We have

$$
G_{n, j}: \exists x_{1} \ldots \exists x_{s}\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq s} \alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq s} d\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right)>2 r\right)
$$

for some $r$-local formula $\alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}$ (formally $s$ depend on $n$ and $j$, but we omit the subscripts for the sake of readability).

Let $R_{n, j}^{+}$be the set of elements currently marked positively, i.e.

$$
R_{n, j}^{+}=R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{i<k_{n}} R_{n, i}^{\prime} \cup \bigcup_{i<j} R_{n, i}^{\prime \prime},
$$

and let $R_{n, j}^{-}$be the set of elements currently marked negatively, that is

$$
R_{n, j}^{-}=\left(S_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{i<k_{n}} S_{n, i}^{\prime} \cup \bigcup_{i<n} B_{\left(7^{i}\right)}\left(T_{i}\right) \cup \bigcup_{i<j} B_{\left(7^{n}\right)}\left(T_{n, i}^{\prime}\right)\right) \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}
$$

Let $P_{n, j}=R_{n, j}^{+} \cup R_{n, j}^{-}$.
We want to check whether there exists $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ such that

1. $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models G_{n, j}$;
2. $R_{n, j}^{+} \subseteq R^{\prime}$ and $R_{n, j}^{-} \cap R^{\prime}=0$ (i.e. $R^{\prime}$ extends the current marking);
3. $d\left(R_{n, j}^{+}, R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}$;
4. $d(x, y) \geq 7^{n+1}$ for every pair of distinct elements of $R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}$.

Let us denote by $(*)$ the conjunction of these four conditions. Let us prove that one can express $(*)$ with a $\mathcal{L}$-sentence.

Assume first that there exists $R^{\prime}$ which satisfies $(*)$. Let $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{s} \in|\mathcal{M}|$ be such that

$$
\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq s} \alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq s} d\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right)>2 r\right)
$$

Conditions 3 and 4 of $(*)$ imply that each sphere $B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$ contains at most one element of $R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}$, and moreover that if such an element exists, it is the unique
element of $R^{\prime}$ in $B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$. Thus we can assume without loss of generality that there exist $t \leq s$ and $y_{1}, \ldots, y_{t} \in|\mathcal{M}|$ such that

$$
B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right) \cap\left(R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}\right)=\left\{y_{i}\right\}
$$

for every $i \leq t$, and

$$
B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right) \cap\left(R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}\right)=\varnothing
$$

for every $i>t$. Condition (3) yields $d\left(R_{n, j}^{+}, y_{i}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}$ for every $i$, and condition (4) yields $d\left(y_{i}, y_{j}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}$ for all distinct integers $i, j$.

Let us consider first the $r$-spheres $B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$ for $i \leq t$. By definition of $x_{i}$ we have $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models \alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$. Now $y_{i}$ is the unique element of $R^{\prime} \cap B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$ thus we have $\mathcal{M} \models \alpha_{n, j}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right)$ where $\alpha_{n, j}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right)$ is obtained from $\alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$ by replacing every atomic formula of the form $R(z)$ by $\left(z=y_{i}\right)$.

Now consider the $r$-spheres $B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$ for $i>t$. By definition we have $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models$ $\alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$, and $B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right)$ contains no element of $R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n, j}^{+}$. Thus we have $\mathcal{M} \models$ $\gamma_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$ where $\gamma_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$ is obtained from $\alpha_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)$ by replacing every atomic formula of the form $R(z)$ by $\left(z \in B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right) \cap R_{n, j}^{+}\right)$.

The previous arguments show that $\mathcal{M} \models G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ where $G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ is the $\mathcal{L}$-sentence $G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ defined as follows:

$$
G_{n, j}^{\prime}: \bigvee_{t \leq s} H_{n, j, t}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
H_{n, j, t}: & \exists x_{1} \ldots \exists x_{s} \exists y_{1} \ldots \exists y_{t}\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq s} d\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right)>2 r \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i<j \leq t} d\left(y_{i}, y_{j}\right)>7 r \wedge\right. \\
& \left.\wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq t} d\left(y_{i}, R_{n, j}^{+}\right)>7 r \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq t} \beta_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{t<i \leq s} \gamma_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

with

$$
\beta_{n, j}^{(r)}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right): y_{i} \in B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right) \wedge y_{i} \notin P_{n, j} \wedge B_{r}\left(x_{i}\right) \cap R_{n, j}^{+}=\varnothing \wedge \alpha_{n, j}^{\prime(r)}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right)
$$

Conversely, assume that $\mathcal{M} \models G_{n, j}^{\prime}$. Let $t, x_{1}, \ldots, x_{s}$, and $y_{1}, \ldots, y_{t}$ be such that $H_{n, j, t}$ holds in $\mathcal{M}$. Then if we set $R^{\prime}=R_{n, j}^{+} \cup\left\{y_{1}, \ldots, y_{t}\right\}$, one checks easily that $R^{\prime}$ satisfies (*)

Therefore we have shown that the question whether there exists $R^{\prime}$ which satisfies $(*)$ is equivalent to the question whether $\mathcal{M} \models G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ for some $\mathcal{L}$-formula which can be constructed effectively from $G_{n, j}$.

If $\mathcal{M} \models \neg G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ (which can be checked effectively since by our hypotheses $F O(\mathcal{M})$ is decidable), then we set

$$
R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime}=T_{n, j}^{\prime}=F_{n, j}^{\prime}=\varnothing
$$

Now if $\mathcal{M} \models G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ one can find effectively the least value of $t$ such that $\mathcal{M} \models$ $H_{n, j, t}$, and then $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{s}$ and $y_{1}, \ldots, y_{t}$ for which the formula holds. We set

$$
R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime}=\left\{y_{1}, \ldots, y_{t}\right\}, T_{n, j}^{\prime}=\left\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{s}\right\}, \text { and } F_{n, j}^{\prime}=\left\{G_{n, j}\right\}
$$

This completes the second step of the construction of $X_{n}$.
We can now define $X_{n}$ as follows: we set

$$
\begin{gathered}
R_{n}=R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq k_{n}} R_{n, i}^{\prime} \cup \bigcup_{j \leq m_{n}} R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime} \\
S_{n}=S_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq k_{n}} S_{n, i}^{\prime}
\end{gathered}
$$

and

$$
T_{n}=\bigcup_{j \leq m_{n}} T_{n, j}^{\prime}
$$

In order to define $F_{n}$, consider a formula $F$ with quantifier rank $n$. By Theorem $1, F$ is equivalent to a formula $F^{\prime}$ which is a boolean combination of formulas of the form $G_{n, j}$. Consider the truth value of $F^{\prime}$ determined by setting "true" all formulas $G_{n, j} \in F_{n, j}^{\prime}$, and "false" formulas $G_{n, j} \notin F_{n, j}^{\prime}$. Then we define $F_{n}$ as the union of $F_{n-1}$ and of all formulas $F$ for which $F^{\prime}$ is true.

We have defined $X_{n}$. There remains to show that $X_{n}$ satisfies all conditions required in the definition.

- Conditions (1) to (5) are easy consequences of the construction of $X_{n}$ (and the induction hypotheses).
- Let us consider condition (6). Let $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ be such that $R_{n} \subseteq R^{\prime}$ and

$$
R^{\prime} \cap\left(\left(S_{n} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq n} B_{7^{i}}\left(T_{i}\right)\right)-R_{n}\right)=\varnothing
$$

Let us prove that $R^{\prime}$ is not definable by any $\mathcal{L}$-formula of quantifier rank $\leq n$. Since every subset of $|\mathcal{M}|$ definable by a $\mathcal{L}$-formula with quantifier rank $n$ is the union of some of the sets $E_{n, i}$, it suffices to prove that $R^{\prime}$ and its complement intersect some $E_{n, i}$.
By construction, the set $X=R_{n} \cup S_{n} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq n} T_{i}$ is finite. Now by hypothesis $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies condition 3 of Theorem 2, thus there exists $x \in|\mathcal{M}|$ such that $d(X, x)>7^{n}$. The element $x$ belongs to some set $E_{n, i}$. Let us prove that $R^{\prime}$ and its complement intersect $E_{n, i}$.
Consider the step of the construction of $X_{n}$ during which we marked elements of $E_{n, i}$. Recall that just before this step the set of marked elements was

$$
Z_{n, i}=R_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} R_{n, j}^{\prime} \cup S_{n-1} \cup \bigcup_{j<i} S_{n, j}^{\prime} \cup \bigcup_{i<n} B_{\left(7^{i}\right)}\left(T_{i}\right)
$$

Since $x \in E_{n, i}$ and $d(X, x)>7^{n}$, the set $E_{n, i} \backslash Z_{n, i}$ is non-empty. Thus either $E_{n, i}$ already contained an element marked negatively (and in this case $S_{n, i}^{\prime}=\varnothing$ ), or we marked one (from $E_{n, i} \backslash Z_{n, i}$ ) and put it in $S_{n, i}^{\prime}$. Therefore the complement of $R^{\prime}$ intersects $E_{n, i}$.

Just after this step, then either $E_{n, i}$ already contained some element marked positively, or by definition of $x$ there existed an element $y$ of $E_{n, i}$ at distance $\geq 7^{n}$ from currently marked elements, and thus we could mark positively the first such element $y$. In both cases this ensures that $R^{\prime}$ intersects $E_{n, i}$.

- Let us prove now that $X_{n}$ satisfies condition (7). Let $R^{\prime} \subseteq|\mathcal{M}|$ be such that $R_{n} \subseteq R^{\prime}$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
R^{\prime} \cap\left(\left(S_{n} \cup \bigcup_{i \leq n} B_{7^{i}}\left(T_{i}\right)\right) \backslash R_{n}\right)=\varnothing \\
d\left(R^{\prime}, R \backslash R_{n}\right) \geq 7^{n+1}
\end{gathered}
$$

and $d(x, y) \geq 7^{n+1}$ whenever $x, y$ are distinct elements of $R^{\prime} \backslash R_{n}$. Let us prove that $F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right)\right)=F_{n}$. The case of formulas with quantifier rank $<n$ follows from our induction hypotheses. Consider now formulas with quantifier rank $n$. Their truth values are completely determined by the truth values of formulas $G_{n, j}$. Thus it is sufficient to prove that for every $j$ we have $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models G_{n, j}$ if and only if $F_{n, j}^{\prime}=\left\{G_{n, j}\right\}$. Fix $j$, and consider the step of the construction of $X_{n}$ during which we delt with the formula $G_{n, j}$. If $\mathcal{M} \models G_{n, j}^{\prime}$ then in this case $F_{n, j}^{\prime}=\left\{G_{n, j}\right\}$, and the definition of $R_{n, j}^{\prime \prime}$ and $T_{n, j}^{\prime}$ imply that the formula $G_{n, j}$ holds for every $R^{\prime}$ which extends (in a convenient way) the marking $\left(R_{n}, S_{n}, T_{n}\right)$, thus we have $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \models G_{n, j}$. On the other hand if $\mathcal{M} \not \vDash G_{n, j}^{\prime}$, then the property $(*)$ cannot be satisfied, and we have set $F_{n, j}=\varnothing$. In particular $R^{\prime}$ does not satisfy $(*)$. Now the hypotheses on $R^{\prime}$ yield that $R^{\prime}$ satisfies the three last conditions of $(*)$, thus the first condition is not satisfied, that is $\mathcal{M}\left(R^{\prime}\right) \not \vDash G_{n, j}$.

This concludes the proof that there exists a sequence $\left(X_{n}\right)_{n \geq 0}$ which satisfies all conditions required in the definition.

Now let $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ be the $(\mathcal{L} \cup\{R\})$-expansion of $\mathcal{M}$ defined by

$$
R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}=\bigcup_{n \geq 0} R_{n}
$$

Let us prove that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ satisfies the properties required in Theorem 2.
The definition of $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ implies that for every $n, R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ is not definable by any $\mathcal{L}$-sentence with quantifier rank $n$, and moreover that $F O_{n}\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)=F_{n}$. Therefore $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ is not definable in $\mathcal{M}$, and $F O\left(\mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right)$ is decidable.

Let us prove that the elementary diagram of $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ is computable. Consider the function $f$ used for the elementary diagram of $\mathcal{M}$; it is sufficient to prove that $\left\{f(a)\left|\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \models R(a), a \in\right| \mathcal{M} \mid\right\}$ is recursive. Since every element $e$ of $|\mathcal{M}|$ is definable, there exists $n, i$ such that $E_{n, i}=\{e\}$. During the construction of $X_{n}$, and more precisely just before the marking of $E_{n, i}$, then either $e$ had already been marked, or $e$ is marked during this step. Thus eventually every element of $|\mathcal{M}|$ is marked in $R^{\mathcal{M}^{\prime}}$ or in its complement. This implies that
both $\left\{f(a)\left|\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \models R(a), a \in\right| \mathcal{M} \mid\right\}$ and $\left\{f(a)\left|\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \models R(a), a \in\right| \mathcal{M} \mid\right\}$ are recursively enumerable, from which the result follows.

This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.

## 4 Conclusion

We gave a sufficient condition in terms of the Gaifman graph of the structure $\mathcal{M}$ which ensures that $\mathcal{M}$ is not maximal. A natural problem is to extend Theorem 2 to structures $\mathcal{M}$ which do not satisfy condition (3). We currently investigate the case of labelled linear orderings, i.e. infinite structures $\left(A ;<, P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right)$ where $<$ is a linear ordering over $A$ and the $P_{i}$ 's denote unary predicates; the Gaifman distance is trivial for these structures. Another related general problem is to find a way to refine the notion of Gaifman distance.

Finally, it would also be interesting to study the complexity gap between the decision procedure for the theory of $\mathcal{M}$ and the one for the structure $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.

## References

[1] A. Bès and P. Cégielski. Weakly maximal decidable structures. 2007. submitted.
[2] Calvin C. Elgot and Michael O. Rabin. Decidability and undecidability of extensions of second (first) order theory of (generalized) successor. J. Symb. Log., 31(2):169-181, 1966.
[3] H. Gaifman. On local and non-local properties. In Logic colloquium '81, Proc. Herbrand Symp., Marseille 1981, Stud. Logic Found. Math. 107, pages 105-135, 1982.
[4] C.H. Langford. Theorems on deducibility. (second paper.). Annals of Math., 2:459-471, 1927.
[5] Leonid Libkin. Elements of Finite Model Theory. Springer, 2004.
[6] M. Presburger. Über de vollständigkeit eines gewissen systems der arithmetik ganzer zahlen, in welchen, die addition als einzige operation hervortritt. In Comptes Rendus du Premier Congrès des Mathématicienes des Pays Slaves, pages 92-101, 395, Warsaw, 1927.
[7] Valentina S.Harizanov. Computably-theoretic complexity of countable structures. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 8:457-477, 2002.
[8] S. Soprunov. Decidable expansions of structures. Vopr. Kibern., 134:175179, 1988.

