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## To cite this version:

José Figueira, Salvatore Greco, Bernard Roy. ELECTRE Methods with interaction between crireria: an extension of the concordance index. 2007. hal-00133644v1

HAL Id: hal-00133644
https://hal.science/hal-00133644v1
Preprint submitted on 27 Feb 2007 (v1), last revised 20 Dec 2007 (v2)

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# ELECTRE Methods with Interaction between Criteria: An Extension of the Concordance Index 

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November 25, 2006

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# Méthodes ELECTRE avec Interaction entre Critères: Une Généralisation de L'Indice de Concordance 


#### Abstract

RÉSumé

Cet article est consacré à une généralisation de l'indice de concordance global pour les méthodes ELECTRE. Une telle généralisation a été conçue pour prendre en compte l'interaction entre critères. Trois types d'interaction ont été considérés : auto-renforcement, auto-affaiblissement et antagonisme. Dans des situations de décision réelles, il est raisonnable de considérer l'interaction entre un petit nombre de paires de critères. Afin que le nouvel indice de concordance prenne correctement en compte ces types d'interactions, diverses conditions, aux limites, de monotonicité et de continuité ont été imposées. On démontre que l'indice généralisée pend en compte de façon satisfaisante les trois types d'interaction (ou dépendance entre critères), tout d'abord en présence de quasi-critères puis en présence de pseudo-critères.

Mots-clés : Aide Multicritère à la Décision, Méthodes de Surclassement, Interaction entre Critères.


# ELECTRE Methods with Interaction <br> between Criteria: An Extension of the Concordance Index 


#### Abstract

This paper is devoted to an extension of the comprehensive concordance index of ELECTRE methods. Such an extension has been considered to take into account the interaction between criteria. Three types of interaction have been considered, self-strengthening, self-weakening, and antagonism. In real-world decision-making situations it is reasonable to consider the interaction between a small number of couples of criteria. The new concordance index takes correctly into account these types of interactions, various conditions as, boundary, monotonicity, and continuity have been imposed. We demonstrate that the generalized index takes into account in a satisfactory way the three types of interaction (or dependencies between criteria), first of all in presence of quasi criteria then in presence of pseudo criteria.


Key-words: Multiple Criteria Analysis, Outranking Methods, Interaction between Criteria.

## 1 Introduction

In this paper it is assumed that a coherent set or family $F$ of $n$ criteria has been built to support a comprehensive preference model for comparing the actions of a set $A$ in a decision aiding perspective. Almost all the current well-known outranking multiple criteria methods (see Part III in Figueira et al., 2005) assume that $F$ is composed of independent criteria.

It is important to point out that the interest of using outranking methods is to take into account purely ordinal scales (Martel and Roy, 2006) keeping thus their concrete verbal meaning, without any kind of conversion of the original scales into abstract ones with an arbitrary imposed range. Such type of conversion is used in many multiple criteria methods, for example, AHP (Saaty, 2005), MACBETH (Bana e Costa and Vansnick, 1994 and Bana e Costa et al., 2005) MAUT (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), SMART (Edwards, 1977 and Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986), TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981), and the fuzzy integrals based methods (Grabisch, 1996 and Grabisch and Labreuche, 2005).

The concept of independence is rather a complex notion (see Roy, 2006 and Chap. 2 in Roy and Bouyssou, 1993). This paper only deals with the extension of the concordance notion, as it has been designed for ELECTRE methods (see Figueira et al, 2005), to three particular types of interaction designated in this paper by self-strengthening, self-weakening, and antagonism.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides two illustrative examples for a better understanding of the three types of interactions that may occur in real-world decision-making situations. Section 3 is devoted to the elementary concepts, definitions, and notation; the comprehensive concordance index is defined as well as the fundamental properties of this index. Section 4 is consecrated to the definition of the three types of interaction considered. Section 5 presents the extension of the concordance index, starting from the simplest case, when only quasi criteria are considered and then the extension for the pseudo criteria model. Finally, a section is devoted to outline the main conclusions of the paper.

## 2 Illustrative Examples

This section presents two illustrative examples that shed some light on the concrete meaning of the three types of interaction this paper deals with. When describing the criteria we will assign $[\mathrm{min}]$ to the criteria to be minimized and $[\max ]$ to the criteria to be maximized.

### 2.1 Choosing the site for constructing a new hotel

This example is related to the selection of a site for building a new hotel in a given city where a company is not present yet. For aiding to make the "best" decision, a family of four criteria has been built,

$$
g_{1}: \text { land purchasing and construction costs (investment costs) [min]; }
$$

$g_{2}$ : operating rates (variable costs) [min];
$g_{3}$ : the image of the ward of the town for clients (image) [max];
$g_{4}$ : easiness in recruiting personnel (recruitment) [max].
The first two criteria are of financial nature while the remaining are qualitative (purely ordinal). As for the criteria of financial nature they can be quantitative, but very often the value attached to each site is not precisely known. The scales are not purely ordinal, but if we want to use indifference and preference thresholds for modelling the imprecision, then these scales cannot be considered as interval scales (Martel and Roy, 2006).

Suppose that a relative weight characterizing adequately, from the decision-maker point of view, the individual role that each one of the four criteria should play, could have been defined when making the abstraction of the possible interactions that can exist with one of the three remaining criteria (as it can be shown later on, the SRF procedure by Figueira and Roy (2002) can, for example, be used with such an objective). Consider now two sites $a$ and $b$ and take into account the individual weights when there is only one criterion in favor of $a$ over $b$. In other words, when doing the abstraction of all interactions between criteria, only the considered criterion is in favor of $a$ over $b$. But, as soon as the two criteria form a coalition where both are in favor of $a$ over $b$, the relative weight of this coalition become stronger than the summation of the individual weights the investment and the variable costs. Consequently, an interaction weight or coefficient should be introduced to express this reinforcement. Therefore, when comparing sites $a$ and $b$ a reinforcement (called also strengthening) effect occurs. On the contrary, the criteria image and recruitment lead to the reverse effect. If these two criteria are both in favor of $a$ over $b$, then there is a weakening effect of the summation of the two individual weights. The conjoint weights are too strong and it is necessary to weaken their summation.

### 2.2 Choosing a new digital camera model

A manufacturer wants to introduce a new digital camera model in the market. To support his/her decision the following criteria have been considered,

```
g}\mp@subsup{g}{1}{}\mathrm{ : purchasing costs (cost) [min];
g}\mp@subsup{g}{2}{}\mathrm{ : weakness (fragility) [min];
g}\mp@subsup{g}{3}{}\mathrm{ : buttons user friendliness (workability) [max];
g4: quality of the image (image) [max];
g5: aesthetics [max];
g6: volume [min];
g7: weight [min].
```

The problem consists of choosing the "best" digital camera among the available models. It is supposed that the individual weights are defined as in the previous example.

Consider two digital camera models, $a$ and $b$; assume that $a$ is better than $b$ on fragility but not on cost; model $a$ is less fragile, but more expensive no matter on what happens with the remaining criteria. The weights of fragility and cost are important either if they are or not in favor of $a$ over $b$. Therefore, these weights play well their role vis-a-vis the remaining criteria weights. In other words, as soon as $a$ is better than $b$ on fragility, one admits that the weights are adequate. In this case, one of the criteria is not in favor of $a$ over $b$ while the other is. But if both were in favor of $a$ over $b$, the individual weights were good too. When $a$ is less fragile than $b$, one supposes that the individual weights of cost and fragility play well the role we want, when both are in favor of $a$ over $b$.

Now, what happens if we consider model $c$ that is less expensive than model $d$, but more fragile? This loss of fragility makes the weight of cost too strong. In this situation fragility degrades the weight of cost where there is no fragility. The presence of a bad performance in fragility should decrease the weight that one granted to cost when considering a model that is not fragile. In other words, an interaction coefficient strictly greater than zero has to be considered. There is a deterioration of the weight of cost due to the fact of a surplus in fragility. The previous hypothesis is not true in the reverse sense. A surplus of cost does not necessarily make the weight of fragility too strong. In this case, there is an antagonism in a sense, but not in the two senses simultaneously.

How can this case be taken into account? This is a new situation of interaction that we shall examine in Section 4.1.

## 3 Concepts: Definitions and notation

This section is only devoted to to some elementary concepts, definition, and the notation used in the rest of this paper. As for the key concepts and the main features concerning ELECTRE methods (the context in which they are relevant, modelling with an outranking relation, their structure, the role of criteria, and how to account for imperfect knowledge) see Figueira et al. (2005). A comprehensive treatment of ELECTRE methods may be found in Roy and Bouyssou (1993) and Vincke (1992). Much of the theory developed on this field is presented in these books.

### 3.1 Basic data

The basic data of a multiple criteria problem is composed of a set or family of coherent criteria, a set of actions, and an evaluation matrix. Let,

- $F=\left\{g_{1}, \ldots, g_{i}, \ldots, g_{n}\right\}$ denote a family or set of criteria; for the sake of simplicity we shall use also $F$ as the set of criteria indices (the same will apply later on for subsets of $F$ );
- $A=\{a, b, c, \ldots\}$ denote a finite set of actions with cardinality $m$;
- $g_{i}(a) \in E_{i}$ denote the evaluation of action $a$ on criterion $g_{i}$, for all $a \in A$ and $i \in F$, where $E_{i}$ is the scale associated to criterion $g_{i}$ (no restriction is imposed to the scale type).

In what follows it is assumed that all the criteria are to be maximized, which is not a restrictive assumption.

### 3.2 Binary relations

When comparing two actions $a$ and $b$, the following comprehensive binary relations can be defined on the set $A$. For a pair $(a, b) \in A \times A$ let,

- P denote the strict preference relation; $a P b$ means that " $a$ is strictly preferred to $b$ ";
- I denote the indifference relation; aIb means that " $a$ is indifferent to $b$ ";
- $Q$ denote the weak preference relation; $a Q b$ means that " $a$ is weakly preferred to $b$, which expresses hesitation between indifference $(I)$ and preference $(P)$;
- $S$ denote the outranking relation; $a S b$ means that " $a$ outranks $b$ " or more precisely that " $a$ is at least as good as $b$ ". Note that, $S=I \cup Q \cup P$.

For a given criterion $g_{i}$, the same interpretation of the above binary relations is valid, but now these relations are called partial binary relations, $P_{i}, I_{i}, Q_{i}$, and $S_{i}$, respectively.

### 3.3 The notion of pseudo criterion

The concept of pseudo criterion is based on the definition of two preference parameters, called thresholds. Let

- $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ denotes the indifference threshold for criterion $g_{i}$, for all $a \in A$ and $i \in F$;
- $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ denotes the preference threshold for criterion $g_{i}$, for all $a \in A$ and $i \in F$.
such that $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right) \geq q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $g_{i}(a) \in E_{i}$ and $a \in A$.

Definition 1 (pseudo criterion). A pseudo criterion is a function $g_{i}$ associated with the two threshold functions $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ and $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ satisfying the following condition, for all $a \in A$ (Roy, 1991, 1996): $g_{i}(a)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ and $g_{i}(a)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ are non-decreasing monotone function of $g_{i}(a)$.

By definition, for all pairs $(a, b) \in A$ with $g_{i}(a) \geq g_{i}(b)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
a I_{i} b & \Leftrightarrow g_{i}(a) \leq g_{i}(b)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(b)\right) ; \\
a Q_{i} b & \Leftrightarrow g_{i}(b)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(b)\right)<g_{i}(a) \leq g_{i}(b)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(b)\right) ; \\
a P_{i} b & \Leftrightarrow g_{i}(b)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(b)\right)<g_{i}(a) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Definition 2 (quasi criterion). If, $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)=p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $a \in A$, then $g_{i}$ is called a quasi criterion. It is a particular case of a pseudo criterion which is also considered in the rest of the paper. For a quasi criterion there is no ambiguity zone, that is, weak preference $Q_{i}$.

In what follows $C(a T b)$ represents the coalition of criteria in favor of the assertion " $a T b$ ", where $T \in\{P, Q, S\}$

### 3.4 The criteria weights and the concordance index

In ELECTRE methods, the relative importance coefficients attached to the criteria refer to intrinsic weights. For a given criterion $g_{i}$, the weight $k_{i}$ can be interpreted as its voting power when it contributes to the majority which is in favor of an outranking; it is not a substitution weight. For more details about the question on how to attribute numerical values to the parameters which must reflect the relative importance of criteria, see Figueira and Roy (2002), Mousseau (1993, 1995) and Roy and Mousseau (1996).

ELECTRE Multiple Criteria Aggregation Procedures (MCAPs) are based on a concordance index $c(a, b)$ which is used both to validate the assertion " $a$ outranks $b$ " and/or to give a measure of the credibility of such an assertion. The concordance index can be defined as follows,

$$
\begin{equation*}
c(a, b)=\sum_{i \in C(a S b)} \frac{k_{i}}{K}, \quad \text { where } K=\sum_{i \in F} k_{i} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where, $C(a S b)$ represents the coalition of criteria in favor of the assertion " $a$ outranks $b$ ", when $F$ if composed of quasi criteria.

When $F$ contains at least a pseudo criterion, this index should be rewritten in the following way,

$$
\begin{equation*}
c(a, b)=\sum_{i \in F} \frac{k_{i}}{K} c_{i}(a, b) \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where,
$c_{i}(a, b)=\left\{\begin{array}{cll}1, & \text { if } \quad g_{i}(a)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right) \geq g_{i}(b),\left(a S_{i} b\right), \\ \frac{g_{i}(a)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)-g_{i}(b)}{p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)-q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)}, & \text { if } \quad g_{i}(a)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)<g_{i}(b) \leq g_{i}(a)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right), \quad\left(b Q_{i} a\right), \\ 0, & \text { if } \quad g_{i}(a)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)<g_{i}(b), \quad\left(b P_{i} a\right) .\end{array}\right.$

It is easy to see that when $F$ is composed of quasi criteria, index (2) becomes (1).
Let $\bar{C}(b P a)$ denote the complement of $C(b P a)$. It should be remarked that when $F$ comprises only quasi criteria $\bar{C}(b P a)=C(a S b)$; if $F$ is composed of at least one pseudo criterion $\bar{C}(b P a)=$
$C(a S b) \cup C(b Q a)$. In both cases this set represents the coalition of all the criteria which are not strongly opposed to the assertion $a S b$ (let us recall that $b Q a$ is not a strong opposition).

### 3.5 Properties of $c(a, b)$

The following properties of $c(a, b)$ hold for all pairs $(a, b) \in A \times A$,
Boundary conditions: $0 \leq c(a, b) \leq 1$.

Monotonicity: $c(a, b)$ is a monotonous non-decreasing function of $\Delta_{i}=g_{i}(a)-g_{i}(b)$, for all $i \in F$.

Continuity: if $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)>q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $i \in F$ and $a \in A$, then $c(a, b)$ is a continuous function of both $g_{i}(a)$ and $g_{i}(b)$.

The proof of the boundary conditions is obvious. The proof of monotonicity is based on the fact that, for each $i, c_{i}(a, b)$ has the same property. Continuity is not valid for quasi criteria. The proof for the case of pseudo criteria is also based on the fact that, for each $i, c_{i}(a, b)$ has the same property.

## 4 Types of interactions considered

The above formulae (1) and (2) do not take into account any type of dependence which may exists between the considered criteria. Very often this is justified because we deal with a structural dependence related to some different points concerning distinct stakeholders (Roy and Bouyssou, 1993). Moreover, for the sake of the clarity, the coherent family of criteria must be defined in such a way that other types of dependence should be reduced as much as possible (see, for example Bisdorff, 2001). It is also necessary to completely remove dependencies derived from dispersion or in the sense of the utility classical approach (Roy and Bouyssou, 1993). Consequently, from a practical point of view, the dependencies that need to be really taken into account are not numerous and in general they concern only couples of criteria. As for triple of criteria, quadruple of criteria and so on, it would complicate too much their effective consideration within a process of decision aiding because their formulation should deal with so many difficulties of interpretation and comprehension that would vanish their expected added value (see Roy, 2006).

Therefore, we consider the cases where the only dependencies between criteria which deserve to be taken into account in MCAPs are related to interactions between couples of criteria. In this paper we are interested in the situations in which the interactions can be modelled by one of the three types that we shall present hereafter. It consists of proper modifications of formulae (1) and (2). The conditions in which these modifications take place are related to the type of the considered interaction. This work has been inspired in the work by Greco and Figueira (2003), where similar types of interactions can be found. Roy (2006) provides a more general formulation of the three
types of interaction proposed in this paper. The general formulation is independent of the ways of taking account the interactions in the concordance index.

### 4.1 Definitions

This sections is devoted to the definition of the three types of interaction.

## a) Self-strengthening effect

If criteria $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$ are both strongly, or even weakly, in favor of the assertion $a S b$ (more precisely, $g_{i}, g_{j} \in \bar{C}(b P a)$ ), we consider that their contribution to the concordance index must be larger than the summation $k_{i}+k_{j}$, because the two weights $k_{i}$ and $k_{j}$ are those that represent the contribution of each one of the two criteria to the concordance index when the other criterion is not in favor of $a S b$. We suppose that the effect of the conjoint presence of $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$ among the criteria in favor of the assertion $a S b$, can be modelled by a self-strengthen coefficient $k_{i j}>0$ that must intervene algebraically in $c(a, b)$. See the interaction between $g_{1}$ and $g_{2}$ in Section 2.1. Note that $k_{i j}=k_{j i}$.

## b) Self-weakening effect

If criteria $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$ are both strongly, or even weakly, in favor of the assertion $a S b$ (more precisely, $g_{i}, g_{j} \in \bar{C}(b P a)$, we consider that their contribution to the concordance index must be smaller than the summation of the weights $k_{i}+k_{j}$, because the two weights $k_{i}$ and $k_{j}$ are those that represent the contribution of each one of the two criteria to the concordance index when the other criterion is not in favor of $a S b$. We suppose that this effect can be modelled by means of one self-weakening coefficient $k_{i j}<0$ that must intervene algebraically in $c(a, b)$. See the interaction between $g_{3}$ and $g_{4}$ in Section 2.1. Note that $k_{i j}=k_{j i}$.

## c) Antagonism effect

If criterion $g_{i}$ is strongly or weakly in favor of the assertion $a S b$ and criterion $g_{h}$ is strongly opposed to this assertion, we consider that the contribution of criterion $g_{i}$ to the concordance index must be smaller than the weight $k_{i}$ that was not considered in case where $g_{h}$ does not belong to $C(b P a)$. We suppose that this effect can be modelled with the introduction of an antagonism coefficient $k_{i h}^{\prime}>0$, that must intervene negatively in $c(a, b)$. See criteria "cost" and "fragility" in Section 2.2., where "cost" play the role of $g_{i}$ and "fragility" the role of $g_{h}$. Let us remark that the presence of an antagonism coefficient $k_{i h}^{\prime}>0$ is compatible with both, the absence of antagonism in the reverse direction $\left(k_{h i}^{\prime}=0\right)$ and the presence of a reverse antagonism ( $k_{h i}^{\prime}>0$ ).

### 4.2 Practical aspects

In this section we examine the question of how to assign values to the weights of criteria and to the interaction coefficients.

1. In a first step, it is important to start by assigning values to the individual weights, $k_{i}$ for all $i \in F$. As indicated in the first above example (see Section 2.1), these weights are those that characterize the relative importance of criterion $g_{i}$, when it belongs to $\bar{C}(b P a)$ in absence of any other criteria susceptible to interact with $g_{i}$. SRF software (Figueira and Roy, 2002) can again be used to elicit those weights under the condition of focusing the attention on the previous stipulated requirement.
2. Then, in a second step, it is necessary to identify,

- the couples $\{i, j\}$ for which it seems necessary to take into account a self-strengthening or self-weakening interaction effect;
- the pairs $(i, h)$ for which it seems necessary to take into account an antagonism interaction effect.
(Note that the couples $\{i, j\}=\{j, i\}$, while the pairs $(i, h) \neq(h, i)$ )
Antagonism is based on a contraposition of one criterion $g_{i}$ towards another criterion $g_{h}$. In this context the direction is important and therefore the contraposition of $g_{h}$ towards $g_{i}$ does not imply a possible contraposition of $g_{i}$ towards $g_{h}$. Anyway, we suppose that if there are both self-strengthening and self-weakening effects with respect to the couple $\left\{g_{i}, g_{h}\right\}$, then there is no antagonism neither of $g_{h}$ against $g_{i}$ nor of $g_{i}$ against $g_{h}$. In practice the number of interaction couples or pairs of criteria is rather very small.

3. A third step comes and it concerns the assignment of a value for each interaction coefficient $k_{i j}$ and $k_{i h}^{\prime}$ for, respectively, the couples $\{i, j\}$ and the pairs $(i, h)$ identified in Step 2. How these coefficients intervene in $c(a, b)$ ? When dealing with a family of quasi-criteria, the interaction coefficients are algorithmically added to $k_{i}+k_{j}$ or $k_{i}+k_{h}$. Thus,

- the greater the absolute value of the coefficients the stronger the impact of the interaction;
- to assign a value of the interaction coefficients, it is necessary to examine along with the decision-maker the variation that should be assigned to the weight of the coalition formed by the two criteria when the following occurs:
- the passage from $k_{i}+k_{j}$ to $k_{i}+k_{j}+k_{i j}$
- the passage from $k_{i}$ to $k_{i}-k_{i h}^{\prime}$

Let us start by the interaction of Types 1 and 2, we should reflect and inquire ourselves about the importance we should assign to the self-strengthening or to the self-weakening effect taken into account by $k_{i j}$ when both criteria $g_{i}$ and $g_{j}$ contribute to validate the assertion $a S b$. This should allow to attribute a value,

$$
k_{i}+k_{j}+k_{i j}
$$

that we think it is adequate for modelling interactions of the above mentioned types. The interaction weights $k_{i j}$ are immediately deduced. When proceeding the same way as in the previous step we should be able to assign a value to the antagonism coefficients, $k_{i h}^{\prime}$.
As an illustrative example assume that for the case in Section 2.1 we obtained with SRF, $k_{1}=5$ and $k_{2}=4$. We can think that it would be adequate to get $k_{1}+k_{2}+k_{12}=12$; thus $k_{12}=3$. Let us now take the criteria $g_{3}$ and $g_{4}$ and assume that $k_{3}=3$ and $k_{4}=2$; if we think that it would be adequate to have $k_{3}+k_{4}+k_{34}=4$, then $k_{34}=-1$. As for the antagonism interaction coefficients it is easy do derive an illustrative example from Section 2.2.

Remark 1. From the definitions of self-strengthening (see 4.1.a)) and self-weakening (see 4.1.b)), for a given couple $\{i, j\}$, it is not possible to have simultaneously both types of interaction; consequently there is only a value for $k_{i j}=k_{j i}$. The two effects are mutually exclusive.

Remark 2. We also assume that for a couple $\{i, h\}$ it is possible to have simultaneously $k_{i h}^{\prime} \neq 0$ and $k_{h i}^{\prime} \neq 0$.

Remark 3. The antagonism effect does not make a double counting with the veto effect; they are different effects indeed. If criterion $g_{h}$ has a veto power, it will always be considered wether $g_{i}$ belongs or not to the concordant coalition. The same is not true for the antagonism effect. It will occur only when the criterion $g_{i}$ belongs to the concordant coalition.
4. Finally, a fourth step is devoted to check a necessary condition. It expresses the following requirement: As soon as criterion $g_{i}$ becomes a member of $\bar{C}(b P a)$, the conjunction of all the interactions susceptible to reduce the contribution of this criterion to value of $\bar{C}(b P a)$ cannot, in the worst case (only if the whole set of couples such that $k_{i j}<0$ and $k_{i h}^{\prime} \neq 0$ intervene in the concordance coalition), lead to a negative contribution of $g_{i}$. This condition is called the non-negative net balance condition of the interactions.

Condition (non-negative net balance). For all $i \in F$,

$$
\left(k_{i}\right)-\left(\sum_{\{i, j\}: k_{i j}<0}\left|k_{i j}\right|+\sum_{h} k_{i h}^{\prime}\right) \geq 0
$$

If, after checking this condition, the same is not fulfilled, we should go back to the previous step a redefine the values of some $k_{i j}<0$ or $\backslash$ and $k_{i h}^{\prime}$.

## 5 Extensions of the concordance index

This section is devoted to the definition of the concordance index, first when $F$ is composed of quasi criteria, and then when at least one criterion is a pseudo criterion.

Before presenting the formulae it is useful to introduce the following additional notation. Let,

- $L(a, b)$ denote the set of all couples $\{i, j\}$ such that $i, j \in \bar{C}(b P a)$;
- $O(a, b)$ denote the set of all pairs $(i, h)$ such that $i \in \bar{C}(b P a)$ and $h \in C(b P a)$.


### 5.1 The quasi criterion model

Let us recall that a quasi criterion is a pseudo criterion such that $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)=p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $a \in A$.

### 5.1.1 Definition of $c(a, b)$

The comprehensive concordance index, when $F$ is composed of quasi criteria, is defined as follows,

$$
\begin{equation*}
c(a, b)=\frac{1}{K}\left(\sum_{i \in \bar{C}(b P a)} k_{i}+\sum_{\{i, j\} \in L(a, b)} k_{i j}-\sum_{(i, h) \in O(a, b)} k_{i h}^{\prime}\right) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The coefficient $K$ should be defined to ensure the validity of the boundary conditions,

$$
0 \leq c(a, b) \leq 1
$$

Let us consider separately the two inequalities,

1. $c(a, b) \geq 0$

This inequality derives from the definition of $c(a, b)$ and the non-negative net balance condition; it is fulfilled for every $K$. The proof is provided in Theorem 1.
2. $c(a, b) \leq 1$

Two cases have to be considered,
(a) $\bar{C}(b P a)=F$ (all the criteria belong to the concordant coalition)

It represents unanimity and the index must be equal to one,

$$
c(a, b)=1
$$

Since unanimity leads to the absence of antagonism interactions $c(a, b)$ can be rewritten as follows,

$$
\begin{equation*}
c(a, b)=\frac{1}{K}\left(\sum_{i \in F} k_{i}+\sum_{\{i, j\}} k_{i j}\right)=1 \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

This result implies that,

$$
K=\sum_{i \in F} k_{i}+\sum_{\{i, j\}} k_{i j}
$$

(b) $\bar{C}(b P a) \neq F$ (at least one criterion belongs to $C(b P a)$ )

In the previous case, the antagonism coefficients were not present. As soon as these coefficients appear in $c(a, b)$ it leads to $c(a, b)<1$.

Remark 4. If $F$ is composed of quasi criteria, the function $c(a, b)$ presents a discontinuity when $g_{i}(a)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$ becomes strictly lower than $g_{i}(b)$. In the case of pseudo criteria, $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)>$ $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $i \in F$ and $a \in A$, this discontinuity will not occur.

### 5.1.2 Main theorem

Before introducing the main result it is important to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all $(a, b) \in A \times A$ and for all $f \in F, c(a, b)$ defined as in (4) is a non-decreasing function of $\Delta_{f}$.

Proof.
The proof of this lemma is based on the fact that, if the difference $\Delta_{f}$ decreases, either $c(a, b)$ remains constant or it decreases. Two cases should be considered.

1. Criterion $f$ belongs to $C(b P a)$.

If $f$ belongs to $C(b P a)$ it cannot belong to $\bar{C}(b P a)$. Consequently, the couple $\{i, f\}$ will not pertain to $L(a, b)$. The decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ does not affect neither the first nor the second summations in (4). Whatever, it will occurs with the existence or not of pairs $(i, f) \in O(a, b)$, the decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ has no influence on the third summation. Consequently, $c(a, b)$ remains constant.
2. Criterion $f$ belongs to $\bar{C}(b P a)$.

Two subcases have to be considered,
(a) Criterion $f$ stills remain in $\bar{C}(b P a)$.

The decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ will not move $f$ from $\bar{C}(b P a)$. Hence, the three summations will not be affected. Then, $c(a, b)$ remains constant too.
(b) Criterion $f$ moves to $C(b P a)$.

The decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ moves $f$ from $\bar{C}(b P a)$ to $C(b P a)$. This moving has some implications on the result. The new value of $c(a, b)$ will become,

$$
c(a, b)^{\text {New }}=c(a, b)^{\text {Old }}-\frac{1}{K}\left(k_{f}+\sum_{\{f, j\} \in L(a, b)} k_{f j}-\sum_{(f, h) \in O(a, b)} k_{f h}^{\prime}\right)
$$

The quantity in between big parenthesis is necessarily non-negative according to the non-negative net balance condition. Consequently, $c(a, b)$ cannot increase.

The proof is complete.

The main result is established in the following theorem.

Theorem 1. Monotonicity and boundary conditions hold for $c(a, b)$ defined as in formula (4).

## Proof.

Lemma 1 proves monotonicity. Let us now prove the boundary conditions,

1. $c(a, b) \geq 0$

If $\bar{C}(b P a)=\varnothing$, then $c(a, b)=0$. Suppose that we could have $c(a, b)<0$. This implies that at least one criterion $f$ does not belong to $\bar{C}(b P a) \neq \varnothing$. Consider that exist at least one criterion in $\bar{C}(b P a)$. If for all $f$ in $\bar{C}(b P a), \Delta_{f}$ is forced to decrease till $\bar{C}(b P a)=\varnothing$, then $c(a, b)$ cannot increase. Contradiction!
2. $c(a, b) \leq 1$

From condition (5), $c(a, b)=1$, when $\bar{C}(b P a)=F$. Suppose that we could have $c(a, b)>1$. This implies that at least one criterion $f$ does not belong to $\bar{C}(b P a)$. Consider that there exist at least one criterion that does not belong to $\bar{C}(b P a)$. If for all $f, \Delta_{f}$ is forced to increase till $f$ becomes an element of $\bar{C}(b P a)$, then $c(a, b)$ cannot decrease. Contradiction!

The proof is now complete.

### 5.2 The pseudo criterion model

When dealing with a pseudo criterion, $g_{i}$, an ambiguity zone should be taken into account, for all $(a, b) \in A \times A$,

$$
g_{i}(a)+q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)<g_{i}(b) \leq g_{i}(a)+p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)
$$

### 5.2.1 Definition of $c(a, b)$

The definition of $c(a, b)$ can be stated in the following manner,

$$
\begin{equation*}
c(a, b)=\frac{1}{K}\left(\sum_{i \in \bar{C}(b P a)} c_{i}(a, b) k_{i}+\sum_{\{i, j\} \in L(a, b)} Z\left(c_{i}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right) k_{i j}-\sum_{(i, h) \in O(a, b)} Z\left(c_{i}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right) k_{i h}^{\prime}\right) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Function $Z(\cdot, \cdot)$ in formula (6) is used to capture the interaction effects in the ambiguity zone. It should be remarked that in the third summation $c_{h}(b, a)$ is always equal to 1 .

Remark 5. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the same function $Z(\cdot, \cdot)$ is used in both, the second and the third summations. It would, however, be possible to use different functions.

Let $x=c_{i}(a, b)$ and $y=c_{j}(a, b)$ or $y=c_{h}(b, a)$. Consequently, $x, y \in[0,1]$. Function $Z(x, y)$ is used to get the reduction coefficients for $k_{i j} / K$ and $k_{i h}^{\prime} / K$ when, at least one of the arguments of $Z(x, y)$ is within the range $] 0,1[$.

What are the properties of $Z(x, y)$ to guarantee the coherence of formula (6)?

Extreme value conditions: When leaving the ambiguity zones $c(a, b)$ should regain the form presented in formula (4). Thus, $Z(1,1)=1$ and $Z(x, 0)=Z(0, y)=0$.

Symmetry: From the fact that $k_{i j}=k_{j i}$ then $Z(x, y)=Z(y, x)$.
Monotonicity: When the ambiguity diminishes the effect due to the interaction cannot increase. Then $Z(x, y)$ is a non-decreasing monotone function of both arguments $x$ and $y$.

Marginal impact condition: When the ambiguity diminishes we pass from $x+w$ to $x$, the relative marginal impact of the interactions is bounded from above,

$$
\frac{1}{w}(Z(x+w, y)-Z(x, y)) \leq 1 \quad x, y, w, x+w \in[0,1]
$$

We will see the interest of this condition in the proof of Lemma 2.
Continuity: Formula (2) is a continuous function of $g_{i}(a)$ and $g_{i}(b)$ when $p_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)>$ $q_{i}\left(g_{i}(a)\right)$, for all $a \in A$. If we want to preserve continuity then it is necessary that $Z(x, y)$ is a continuous function of each argument.

Boundary condition: For preserving the non-negative net balance condition, it is sufficient that $Z(x, y) \leq \min \{x, y\}$.

The boundary condition is a particular case of the marginal impact condition. The proof is as follows.

$$
\frac{1}{w}(Z(x+w, y)-Z(x, y)) \leq 1 \Leftrightarrow Z(x+w, y)-Z(x, y) \leq w
$$

Consider now, $x=0$

$$
Z(0+w, y)-Z(0, y) \leq w
$$

And, according to extreme value conditions. The proof is as follows.

$$
Z(w, y)-0 \leq w \Leftrightarrow Z(w, y) \leq w
$$

Now, for symmetry,

$$
Z(w, y) \leq \min \{w, y\}
$$

It is only sufficient to consider the marginal impact condition. However, for the sake of a better comprehension we keep both conditions; it sounds more intuitive.

Among the multiple forms that can be chosen for $Z(x, y)$, we only present two of them which have an intuitive and meaningful interpretation.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Z(x, y)=\min \{x, y\} \\
& Z(x, y)=x y
\end{aligned}
$$

If $x$ and/or $y$ are equal to 1 , both formulae are equivalent. But, when $x$ and $y$ are both different from 1 , that is, when the two interacting criteria belong to the ambiguity zone, then the impact of the interaction is weaker with $x y$ than with $\min \{x, y\}$. Choosing the $\min \{x, y\}$ formula means that the reduction coefficient is not influenced by what happens in the other ambiguity zone. For these reasons the formula $x y$ seems preferable to $\min \{x, y\}$.

### 5.2.2 Extension of the main theorem

This section presents an extension of the previous results when $F$ is composed of at least a pseudo criteria. The proofs are similar to the ones provided for Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.

Lemma 2. For all $(a, b) \in A \times A$ and for all $f \in F, c(a, b)$ defined as in (6) is a non-decreasing function of $\Delta_{f}$.

## Proof.

The proof of this lemma is also based on the fact that if the difference $\Delta_{f}$ decreases, either $c(a, b)$ remains constant or it decreases. Two cases have to be considered.

1. Criterion $f$ belongs to $C(b P a)$.

For the same reasons as in the absence of pseudo criteria, diminishing $\Delta_{f}$ does not affect neither the first nor the second of the three summations in (6). The same hold for the third summation when there is no pair $(i, f) \in O(a, b)$. If there exist pairs $(i, f) \in O(a, b)$, then decreasing $\Delta_{f}$ leads to $c_{f}(b, a)=1$; the third summation will not change. Consequently, $c(a, b)$ remains constant.
2. Criterion $f$ belongs to $\bar{C}(b P a)$.

Now, three subcases have to be considered.
(a) Criterion $f$ belongs to $C(a S b)$.

The decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ does not moves $f$; it remains thus in $C(a S b)$. More precisely, the decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ will not make any change in the three components of $c(a, b)$. This index remains constant.
(b) Criterion $f$ belongs to $C(b Q a)$.

After decreasing $\Delta_{f}$, criterion $f$ stills remain in $C(b Q a)$, either because it belonged to this coalition before or because it moved to $C(b Q a)$ due to the decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$. All the summations in (6) are affected. Let us suppose that $c_{f}(a, b)$ changes its new value and becomes $c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta$, with $\Delta>0$. We have the following inequality $((i))$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
c(a, b)^{N e w}-c(a, b)^{\text {Old }}= \\
-\frac{1}{K}\left(\Delta k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b)}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{j}(a, b)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right)\right) k_{f j}+\right. \\
\left.-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)\right) k_{f h}^{\prime}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\leq \\
-\frac{1}{K}\left(\Delta k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{j}(a, b)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right)\right)\left|k_{f j}\right|+\right. \\
\left.-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)\right) k_{f h}^{\prime}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

Let us remark that for all $h \in C(b P a)$,

$$
Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)=-\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)\right)
$$

From the marginal impact condition and putting $c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta=x, c_{h}(b, a)=y$, and $\Delta=w$ in the previous condition we obtain,

$$
\frac{1}{\Delta}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)\right) \leq 1
$$

and therefore,

$$
Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right) \leq \Delta
$$

or, in an equivalent way (ii),

$$
Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right) \geq-\Delta
$$

And, now from this expression we obtain,

$$
\begin{gathered}
-\frac{1}{K}\left(\Delta k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{j}(a, b)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right)\right)\left|k_{f j}\right|+\right. \\
\left.-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)}\left(Z\left(c_{f}(a, b)-\Delta, c_{h}(b, a)\right)-Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{h}(b, a)\right)\right) k_{f h}^{\prime}\right) \\
\leq \\
-\frac{1}{K}\left(\Delta k_{f}+\Delta \sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left|k_{f j}\right|-\Delta \sum_{h \in C(b P a)} k_{f h}^{\prime}\right)=-\Delta\left(k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left|k_{f j}\right|-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)} k_{f h}^{\prime}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

From the non-negative net balance condition we have,

$$
k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left|k_{f j}\right|-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)} k_{f h}^{\prime} \geq 0
$$

and, therefore, since $\Delta>0$, we have (iii)

$$
-\Delta\left(k_{f}+\sum_{j \in \bar{C}(a, b): k_{f j}<0}\left|k_{f j}\right|-\sum_{h \in C(b P a)} k_{f h}^{\prime}\right) \leq 0
$$

Considering together $(i),(i i)$, and (iii), we get,

$$
c(a, b)^{\text {New }}-c(a, b)^{\text {Old }} \leq 0
$$

and, we can conclude that after decreasing $\Delta_{f}, c(a, b)$ cannot increase.
(c) Criterion $f$ moves to $C(b P a)$.

The decreasing of $\Delta_{f}$ will move $f$ to $C(b P a)$. In such a case, $c_{f}(a, b) k_{f}$ can no more be found in the expression of $c(a, b)^{N e w}$. If there are $j$ such that $\{f, j\} \in L(a, b)$, then the terms $Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right) k_{f j}$ will be removed from the second summation. If there are $i$ such that $(i, f) \in O(a, b)$, then $Z\left(c_{i}(a, b), c_{f}(b, a)\right) k_{i f}^{\prime}$ will be introduced in the third summation. The new value of $c(a, b), c(a, b)^{N e w}$ is equal to $c(a, b)^{\text {Old mi- }}$ nus a certain quantity; it is calculated as follows,

$$
\begin{array}{r}
c(a, b)^{N e w}=c(a, b)^{\text {Old }}- \\
-\frac{1}{K}\left(c_{f}(a, b) k_{f}+\sum_{\{f, j\} \in L(a, b)} Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right) k_{f j}-\sum_{(i, f) \in O(a, b)} Z\left(c_{i}(a, b), c_{f}(b, a)\right) k_{i f}^{\prime}\right)
\end{array}
$$

Now, it remains to prove that the quantity between big parenthesis, denoted $\Delta c(a, b)$, is non-negative.

$$
\Delta c(a, b) \geq \frac{1}{K}\left(c_{f}(a, b) k_{f}+\sum_{\{f, j\} \in L(a, b): k_{f j}<0} Z\left(c_{f}(a, b), c_{j}(a, b)\right)\left|k_{f j}\right|-\sum_{(i, f) \in O(a, b)} Z\left(c_{i}(a, b), c_{f}(b, a)\right) k_{i f}^{\prime}\right)
$$

which is guarantee by the fact that $Z(x, y) \leq \min \{x, y\}$. Consequently, $c(a, b)$ cannot increase.
The proof is thus complete.

Now the main result can be established.
Theorem 2. Boundary conditions, monotonicity, and continuity hold for $c(a, b)$ defined as in formula (6).

Proof.
Lemma 2 establishes monotonicity. Boundary conditions hold when considering pseudo criteria. And continuity derives from the fact that,

1. the functions $c_{f}(a, b), Z(x, y)$ are continuous, and
2. the conditions $c_{f}(a, b)=0$ if $g_{f}(a)+q_{f}\left(g_{f}(a)\right)-g_{f}\left(g_{f}(b)\right)=0$ and $Z(0, y)=Z(x, 0)=0$ guarantees continuity when a criterion becomes member or is removed from one of the following sets, $\bar{C}(a, b), L(a, b)$, or $O(a, b)$.

The proof is thus complete for the general case.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper we introduced three types of interaction that allow modelling a large number of dependence situations in real-world decision-making problems. We showed how to take into account these types of interaction in the concordance index used within the ELECTRE methods framework. Formula (2) can be simply replaced by (6) in all of ELECTRE methods.

Acknowledgements The first author was supported by RAMS grant from CEG-IST (Center for Management Studies of the Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon). The research of the second author has been supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Scientific Research (MIUR). The first and the third authors acknowledge the support from Luso-French PESSOA bilateral cooperation. The authors also acknowledges Benedetto Matarazzo and an anonymous referee for the valuable comments, remarks, and suggestions they made on a draft version of this paper.

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