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On the Equilibria of Resource-Sharing Games

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Abstract

We investigate the strategic interaction between a fixed number of users sharing the capacity of a processor operating with relative priorities. Each user chooses a payment, which corresponds to his priority level, and submits jobs of variable sizes according to a stochastic process. These jobs have to be completed before some user-specific deadline. They are executed on the processor and receive a share of the capacity that is proportional to the priority level. The users' goal is to choose priority levels so as to minimize their own payment, while guaranteeing that their jobs meet their deadlines. Given the complexity of the underlying queueing model, we develop an approximation based on heavy-traffic. We characterize the solution of the game under the heavy-traffic assumption and we numerically investigate the accuracy of the approximation. Our results show that the approximate solution captures accurately the structure of the equilibrium in the original game.
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Dates and versions

hal-00910195 , version 1 (29-11-2013)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00910195 , version 1

Cite

Josu Doncel, Urtzi Ayesta, Olivier Brun, Balakrishna Prabhu. On the Equilibria of Resource-Sharing Games. 2013. ⟨hal-00910195⟩
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