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Article Dans Une Revue ACM Transactions on Computational Logic Année : 2020

Typing messages for free in security protocols

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Résumé

Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalence properties. Secrecy and authentication are examples of reachability properties while privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are generally expressed as behavioral equivalence in a process algebra that models security protocols. Our main contribution is to reduce the search space for attacks for reachability as well as equivalence properties. Specifically, we show that if there is an attack then there is one that is well-typed. Our result holds for a large class of typing systems, a family of equational theories that encompasses all standard primitives, and protocols without else branches. For many standard protocols, we deduce that it is sufficient to look for attacks that follow the format of the messages expected in an honest execution, therefore considerably reducing the search space. CCS classification: Security and privacy/Formal methods and theory of security/Logic and verification
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Dates et versions

hal-02268400 , version 1 (20-08-2019)

Identifiants

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Rémy Chrétien, Véronique Cortier, Antoine Dallon, Stéphanie Delaune. Typing messages for free in security protocols. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2020, 21 (1), ⟨10.1145/3343507⟩. ⟨hal-02268400⟩
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