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A Game-Theoretical Model for Security Risk Management of Interdependent ICT and Electrical Infrastructures

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Ziad Ismail
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 963758
David Bateman
  • Function : Author
Lin Chen
  • Function : Author

Abstract

The communication infrastructure is a key element for management and control of the power system in the smart grid. The communication infrastructure, which can include equipment using off-the-shelf vulnerable operating systems, has the potential to increase the attack surface of the power system. The interdependency between the communication and the power system renders the management of the overall security risk a challenging task. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting a mathematical model for identifying and hardening the most critical communication equipment used in the power system. Using non-cooperative game theory, we model interactions between an attacker and a defender. We derive the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender that minimizes the risk on the power system. Finally, we evaluate the correctness and the efficiency of our model via a case study.
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Dates and versions

hal-01113223 , version 1 (04-02-2015)

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Ziad Ismail, Jean Leneutre, David Bateman, Lin Chen. A Game-Theoretical Model for Security Risk Management of Interdependent ICT and Electrical Infrastructures. IEEE 16th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), Jan 2015, Daytona Beach Shores, FL, United States. ⟨10.1109/HASE.2015.24⟩. ⟨hal-01113223⟩
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